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This thesis comparatively examines two prominent contemporary regional agrarian 
organisations, the Confederation of Family Producers of MERCOSUR (COPROFAM) in South 
America, and the Network of Peasants and Agricultural Producer Organisations of West Africa 
(ROPPA). It interrogates their capacity to influence land, labour, and trade policies through their 
leaders' participation in multiscalar policy dialogues across each region with government officials, 
academic researchers, and international organisation staff. I identify and analyse their policy 
claims and negotiated outcomes in policy processes spanning the last three decades. Using a 
threefold analytical framework (subjective representation, intersubjective negotiation, objective 
reality) of policy spaces, I examine claims based on their capacity to aggregate diverse rural 
labouring classes' interests, across three territorial scales (regional, national, local). Agrarian 
organisations' policy discursive frames are traced throughout their representation and 
negotiation processes. I argue that regional policy processes on land, labour, and trade show 
contrasting capacities of agrarian organisations in their efforts to unite different class fractions 
and territorial constituencies around key discursive frames. Relative gains in each area reveal 
how regional policy influence is enabled by planks combining interests of diverse rural labouring 
class fractions (e.g. small-scale peasants, middle farmers, traditional communities) across various 
types of agrarian territories (e.g. dryland, tropical, temperate). Whether enshrined in regional 
norms (labour in South America, trade in West Africa) or only national laws (land in both regions), 
policy processes negotiated in tandem at three contiguous scales have allowed for the 
emergence of alternatives to global dominant policy discourse. The thesis concludes that 
COPROFAM and ROPPA's relative influence on land, labour, and trade policies points towards 
possible paths to expand gains for peasant family farmers and reclaim regional integration for 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 Regional Agrarian Organisations 
 
 Peasants, agricultural workers, indigenous peoples, middle farmers, and other people 
living in rural areas make up about 40% of the world's population (Lowder et al., 2014). Women 
and men of all ages involved in small-scale agriculture, pastoralism, fishery, or forestry activities, 
predominantly living in the Global South, still represent the planet's largest labouring 
constituency. They are also the most vigorously organised, with the decline of industrial labour 
unions since the 1980s, and the rise of agrarian organisations from local to global levels since the 
1990s (Borras et al., 2008).  
 Yet, recent decades have seen an increasing concentration of production, processing, and 
distribution processes in the hands of a reduced number of agri-food giants across global 
commodity chains. Agrarian organisations have mobilised to influence non-binding international 
treaties (e.g. VGGT1), campaigns (e.g. IYFF2), and goals (e.g. SDGs3), drawn attention to their 
causes, and generated policy momentum at global negotiating venues. Nevertheless, most 
national government budgets and strategies – let alone international trade and financial flows – 
remain oblivious to people living in rural areas, whom they by and large perceive as reserve 
armies of cheap labour. Though increasing portions of urban populations in countries of the 
Global North and South begin to recognise peasant family farmers4 (PFF) as part of the solution 
to global food and environmental crises, we are still far from a paradigm shift.  
 This research sets out to discover how agrarian organisation participation in policy 
dialogue and negotiation can bring about significant policy change. To do so, it focuses on two 
 
1 Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of the Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and Forests, adopted by the 
Committee on World Food Security (CFS) in 2012.  
2 United Nations International Year of Family Farming (2014), approved by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 2011. 
3 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals adopted by UNGA in 2015.   
4 The term (peasant) family farming(er) is used throughout this thesis to designate a wide-ranging and diverse rural 
labouring sector, whose production is usually at least partly self-managed. It is differentiated from more capitalized 
agricultural sectors by its 'predominant[…] relian[ce] on family labour' (FAO, 2013:2). One of the reasons for adding 
'peasant' (and often also 'indigenous') before 'family farming(er)' is to underscore this difference, and avoid 
confusion with other uses of the term that designate farming(er) in which family labour is not predominant (see 






regional agrarian organisations (RAOs) representing peasant family farmers, the Confederation 
of Organisations of Family Producers of MERCOSUR5 (COPROFAM) in South America, and the 
Network of Peasant and Agricultural Producer Organisations of West Africa (ROPPA). Both RAOs 
have made some inroads into policy formulation, albeit in different areas in each case, with 
contrasting results.  Through a comparative study of their participation in official dialogue spaces, 
this research aims to unpack how interactions between their representatives, national/regional 
civil servants, academic researchers, and international organisation staff have enabled the 
creation of policies in support of peasant family farmers in several countries of MERCOSUR and 
ECOWAS6. It follows three policy processes – land, labour, and trade – that were found to be 
among both COPROFAM and ROPPA’s central claims.  
 
1.2 Relevance of Research  
 
 Throughout the last two decades, countries of both South America and West Africa have 
witnessed agrarian policy innovations, a significant part of which find their roots in participatory 
regional spaces where RAOs have aimed to formulate and disseminate policies that strengthen 
peasant family farming. Although regional dialogues on rural development can be observed in 
other parts of the world, the experiences of COPROFAM in MERCOSUR and ROPPA in ECOWAS 
are considered by participants and external observers alike to be particularly relevant, though 
they have only received scant attention from academic research.  
 The relevance of comparing these two cases is augmented by the fact that both regional 
dialogue processes have resulted in concrete policy gains in two very different settings - and 
despite fierce resistance from powerful economic sectors and political representatives in both 
cases - making findings potentially relevant for various regions of the world facing similar 
challenges. On the other hand, collective policy formulation through participatory deliberation 
and negotiation has yielded a diversity of paths in each of the two regions, rowing against one-
size-fits-all global policy currents.  
 
5 Common Market of the South. 





 The extent to which agrarian organisations can shape policy-making beyond the local level 
has been increasingly addressed in studies on global multilateral forums such as the post-2009 
reform of the UN Committee on World Food Security (Duncan, Barling, 2012; McKeon, 2015; 
Brem-Wilson, 2015; Gaarde, 2017). Notwithstanding the national policy norm-shaping potential 
of international 'soft law' instruments, increasingly centralized global food chains in the hands of 
a decreasing number of agri-food conglomerates has largely enabled these to set the 'hard' legal 
norms that shape food and agricultural policy on the ground in recent decades – from World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) to regional trade rules, and from national legislation to local politics, 
administrative norms, and practices (McKeon, 2015; Cedro, 2011).  
 While the global periphery’s continental-sized nation-states can potentially wield 
significant policy-making autonomy thanks to economies of scale and sizeable internal consumer 
markets, the same cannot be said of the much more numerous smaller and/or lower income 
nations across the developing world, whose fates tend to be particularly vulnerable to the 
volatility of international commodity prices. Even Brazil's continental scale and immense wealth 
of natural resources has not impeded it from recently succumbing into its worst political-
economic crisis in decades, in no small part as a result of internal vulnerabilities to the global 
downfall in commodity prices that followed the 2008 financial crash.  
 Regional integration projects can potentially enable countries of the Global South to join 
forces and achieve scale at both production and consumption levels, thus reducing dependency 
from the oscillations of volatile and unregulated global agricultural and food markets. Regional 
integration can also enable local economies to become re-embedded into the common social, 
environmental, and cultural fabric of geographically contiguous territories, whose shared 
agrarian and political histories largely pre-date their separation into distinct nation-states. Yet 
these potentials of regional integration as a force for development in the Global South are all but 
ignored by the globally dominant policy agenda (Mkandawire, 2011).   
  
1.3 Research Question 
 
 How, then, have regional agrarian organisations managed to influence policies in their 





strategies outside state and regional institutions have worked in parallel with their active 
participation inside regional dialogue forums that enabled policy milestones to be achieved. But 
the mere existence of participatory spaces where civil society organisations are 'invited' 
(Gaventa, 2006) by government authorities to deliberate on agrarian issues can by no means be 
considered in and of itself a guarantee for meaningful policy change. This leads us to interrogate 
under which conditions can regional dialogue spaces catalyse agrarian organisations’ agency to 














In order to clarify how I analyse the two cases in the following chapters, I first unpack the 
previously posed research question by distinguishing its four main conceptual components, 
visually emphasized (and enumerated by letters in order of appearance) below:  
 
Under which conditions can a) regional b) dialogue spaces catalyse c) agrarian organisations’ 
agency to influence d) policies that strengthen peasant family farmers?  
 
If broken down in the above form, the research question reveals four potential 'pistons' 
generating the 'engine' of RAO political agency: i) regional integration (a); ii) class relations (c), 
iii) public policies (d), and iv) dialogue spaces (b)7. By defining and conceptualising each of these 
in a first theory section of this chapter, I aim to show how I will conduct my analysis of the two 
empirical cases throughout this thesis. Following a global historical materialist approach, the 
relative social force of agrarian organisations in influencing policy is premised upon their capacity 
to join together and consolidate alliances amongst peasant family farmers: i) from a region's 
different agrarian territories and countries; ii) representing diverse rural labouring class fractions; 
iii) unified by economic policy discursive frames voiced inside iv) government-mediated political 
dialogue and negotiation spaces. 
 In the subsequent methodological section, I first explain the rationale for comparing the 
two regions within multiple time- and spatial scales. Time-scales of different lengths range from 
a few years when narrating specific policy processes (particularly in chapters 5, 6, 7), to half-
century long political-economic cycles when putting these into historical context (in chapters 3 
and 4). An understanding of each region through a threefold lens (transborder agrarian 
territories, neighbouring nations, and regional blocs) is complemented by a wider global frame 
which sets a common background for the comparison. 
 





I then explain how I collected the data used in this thesis. This includes practical 
considerations to overcome the challenges of collecting primary data in several countries across 
two regions and additional global venues within specific time constraints. The chapter concludes 
with a reflection on my involvement in this research endeavour, in which I wore two 
complementary hats: one as a researcher seeking to understand RAOs’ strengths and weaknesses 
by using the analytical tools provided by critical agrarian studies and international political 
economy; another as a 'scholar-activist' (Borras, 2016) aiming to somehow contribute to RAOs' 
strategies for policy influence, including by sharing preliminary findings from this research with 
them.  
 
2.1 Regional Class Policy Spaces: an analytical framework 
 
2.1.1 Regional Integration in the Global South 
 
This first sub-section explains the understanding of regional integration used to analyse 
COPROFAM and ROPPA's formation in chapters 3 and 4, and the comparative study of their 
participation in regional policy processes in chapters 5, 6, and 7. After briefly arguing why 
mainstream regional integration theories are inadequate to study RAOs due to their bypassing of 
labouring class majorities (of which rural peasantries form a crucial part in the Global South), I 
draw from critical geographer Milton Santos' (2005) dichotomy between the territory and the 
network to elaborate a framework of the region that enables a spatial understanding of agrarian 
class relations. 
Part of the reason for the relative absence of contemporary studies on regional 
integration in the global periphery is due to the fact that international development institutions, 
such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have historically been 
against autonomous regional integration efforts. This is related to the fact that regional 
integration  
has led to the collective adoption of import-substitution industrialisation [and that Bretton Woods] 
institutions believe that the economies should be 'open' to the entire world – buying from the cheapest 





seeks to integrate. This undermines preferential treatment of member states over non-members, which is 
an inherent part of regional cooperation (Mkandawire, 2011:49).  
 
The promotion of 'open regionalism' was the last visible discourse aiming to theorize 
regional integration that received serious political attention. Indeed, under 1990s neoliberal 
globalisation, "[regional] integration became essentially a component of [market] liberalisation 
and deregulation" (Briceño, 2018:73). Yet regional integration has been understood in past 
epochs or outside the mainstream as a form of regulating international trade by fomenting a 
large single market across national boundaries, and shielded from outside interference. Hence, 
19th century German political economist Friedrich List 
argue[d] that free trade is beneficial among countries at similar levels of industrial development […] but not 
between those at different levels of development. […] To be sure, […] free trade benefits agricultural 
exporters in these economies, but this is to the detriment of their national manufacturers and thus of their 
national economic prosperity in the long run (Chang, 2003:4).    
 
MERCOSUR and ECOWAS are regional entities whose original missions were partly 
influenced by earlier waves of regional integration, with the UN regional economic commissions 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) and for Africa  (UNECA), and some of their influential 
directors (Raúl Prebisch 1950-1963; Adebayo Adedeji 1975-1991) acting as carriers of "important 
policy debates on unequal terms of trade between the industrialized North and the global South; 
as well as national and regional self-sufficiency and people-led development" (Adebajo, 2014:4). 
Yet, whether defending the "free trading liberal" model that became prevalent in the 1990s, or 
a previously dominant "interventionist" (Briceño, 2001:1) model as proposed by List, Prebisch, or 
Adedeji, mainstream regional integration paradigms all but ignored the role of peasantries.  
Whether the region is understood as circumscribed locality (in geography and urbanism 
studies) or as supranational political entity (in international relations), both share the attribute 
of territorial contiguity. In the 1990s, just as the idea of 'globalisation' was at its prime worldwide, 
Brazilian geographer Milton Santos noted that at the other end of the geographical spectrum, 
the 'territory' was making a comeback. According to Santos (as formulated in "The return of the 
territory", 2005), the horizontal contiguity of everyday face-to-face relations in rural villages or 
urban peripheries of the Global South – where most of humanity lives – was challenging the 
hegemonic, globally networked superstructures (made up of nation-states, international 





in this long journey the nation-state was a milestone, a turning point, enthroning a legal-political notion of 
territory […]. However, just as before not everything was, shall we say, 'statized' territory, today not 
everything is strictly 'transnationalized'. Even in places where the vectors of globalisation are more coherent 
and effective, the inhabited territory creates new synergies and ends up challenging the world to a rematch 
(Santos, 2005:255, original emphasis).     
 
According to David Harvey (2006:102-103), if the physical region (i.e. territory) is 
understood as a "defined space of collective consumption and production as well as political 
action" and its inhabitants from different classes share "regional consciousness and identities" 
(i.e. articulated network), the combination of both can lead to a "regional class alliance". Harvey's 
notion of 'region' refers primarily to the local scale, as is usually the case in geography and urban 
studies. But its relevance goes beyond it, given that its defining traits (collective consumption 
and production, political action, and regional consciousness and identities) can equally apply to 
local territories, neighbouring nations, or regional blocs. Most importantly, it serves to 
demonstrate that class alliances are not only based on commonly shared socio-economic status 
across different territories (e.g. internationalist labouring class alliances) but are also often based 
on shared territorial subjective references and objective day-to-day social relations. Hence "a 
regional class alliance [prioritizes] the economic health and well-being of the region rather than 
that of class" (Ibid:103). 
In his analysis of state formation in the Plata River Basin over the last five centuries, 
Brazilian historian Moniz Bandeira (2006) weaves together the territorial interplay between class 
alliances at different scales of that region: hence representatives of overseas export interests 
predominating in the Southern Cone's coastal capitals (e.g. Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, Buenos 
Aires) more often than not united against those of their respective interior provinces and their 
own transborder domestic markets. This dualism between alliances of the 'port' and of the 
'interior' within and across national boundaries, as described by Argentine historian Abelardo 
Ramos (1968), or between the "sector of external market" versus the "sector of subsistence" as 
distinguished by Brazilian economist Paul Singer (1973), forms the basis for the identification of 
different regional agrarian territories in the two cases examined in this thesis. 
The above territorial dichotomies are akin to Amin’s (2011) distinction between 'inward-
looking' and 'outward-looking' class alliances in countries of the Global South, based on each type 





externally (i.e. Global North)-led political-economic agendas. Alain de Janvry's (1981) distinction 
between 'articulated' and 'disarticulated' patterns of accumulation in Latin America, while similar 
to the above, offers a terminology that best incorporates both 'vertical' extroverted-introverted 
types of class alliances, and 'horizontal' class relations within a given territory. Hence, according 
to de Janvry (1981:41-43, emphases added): 
Two types of class alliances tend to exist. One will dominate over the other and thus gain control 
of the state and redirect the process of accumulation towards the structure that it favours - 
articulated or disarticulated. Dominance of the alliance among international capital (metropolitan 
bourgeoisie), dependent bourgeoisie, and landed elites (fundamentally involved in the production 
of exportables, inputs for industry, and luxury foods) implies that the logic of disarticulated 
accumulation - and hence of cheap labour and cheap food [for urban and Northern consumers] - 
prevails. […] Dominance of the alliance among national bourgeoisie, agrarian bourgeoisie (those 
fundamentally involved in the production of wage foods), peasantry, and proletariat creates the 
logic for a socially articulated pattern of accumulation […]. [S]trong conflicts […] remain regarding 
dominance of one alliance over the other, even if the disarticulated alliance has historically 
obtained the upper hand […].  
 
 This section has laid out the first regional pillar of my analytical framework. Borrowing 
from Milton Santos' distinction between the local territories where labouring majorities live and 
work, and ruling elites' hegemonic networks whose members are often alienated from local 
realities yet exert disproportionate political-economic power over them, I have merged this with 
class-relational perspectives that incorporate territorial interactions in their analyses. 
Understanding a regional agrarian territory as a set of contiguous lands sharing physical (e.g. 
climate and soil) and human (e.g. agrarian social formation) geographic features, I have referred 
to Harvey's notion of regional class alliance as a lens to identify such territories. Latin American 
historians and other dependency scholars’ conceptualisations of socially articulated versus 
disarticulated class alliances, in turn provide a framework of how regional class alliances 
dialectically interact. These interactions occur not only through historical struggles based on 
predominant links to internal versus external interests in past time periods, but also – as shall be 










2.1.2 Agrarian Class Relations  
 
According to Edelman and Borras (2016:6, emphases added), "it is impossible to 
understand the politics of rural movements without examining their bases or constituencies in 
particular social classes – large commercial farmers, rich peasants, small peasants or landless 
labourers – as well as the class alliances that may exist within agrarian organisations". As argued 
by Campling et al. (2016:1748, emphases added), class agency is produced by "relations within 
and between multifaceted classes […] which are located at different historical and spatial scales 
and mediated in a variety of ways".  Thus, the "infinite iteration of dialectical relations between 
human actions and material conditions is the process through which class formation and relations 
are to be understood" (Ibid.). Even in cases where the margin for manoeuvre of labouring classes 
is severely constrained by the balance of class forces, “labour possesses agency, albeit often 
latent and hidden from view" (Ibid.).  
Contrary to several strands of Marxist thought, Antonio Gramsci did not perceive the 
(political-ideological) superstructure as subordinate to (economic material) base, but rather 
understood the two as equally interdependent (Portelli, 1971:10):   
The study of the relationship between structure and superstructure is the essential aspect of the notion of 
historical bloc. But Gramsci never conceived of this study in the form of the primacy of one or the other 
element of this bloc, as some of his commentators often do. Ultimately, the concept of a historical bloc 
would then have no other object than the definition of Marxist orthodoxy, by accusing of economism or 
idealism anyone who dwells too much on one or the other moment of the historical bloc. 
 
Gramsci's conceptualisation of the historical bloc represents a more dynamic 
understanding of material class relations and competing discursive strategies than the above-
referred 'economistic' or 'idealistic' strands of Marxism. Most importantly, it gives practical 
guidance on how to potentiate subordinate class agency (Portelli, 1971; Forgacs, 2000), by 
uncovering the pivotal role of organic intellectuals operating at the superstructural level. As laid 
out in Gramsci’s seminal text "Analysis of Situations, Relations of Force", organic intellectuals' 
political-ideological discourse is crucial in ensuring both wide reach and internal coherence of 
class alliances at the structural level (Gramsci, 1932-34:C13 §17, emphases added): 
A third moment is that in which one becomes aware that one's own corporate interests, in their present 
and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must 





the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures; it is the phase in 
which previously germinated ideologies become "party", come into confrontation and conflict, until only 
one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate 
itself throughout society — bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also 
intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate 
but on a "universal" plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of 
subordinate groups. 
 
Eric Wolf's (1999 [1969]) comparative study of successful peasant uprisings in six 
countries of the global periphery during the 20th century identifies two specific class fractions of 
the countryside which had a pivotal role in overcoming oppressive regimes (and, in some cases, 
achieving national independence): 'middle peasants' and 'poor but free peasants'. Middle 
peasants generally share common ground with both the rural poor (who either remain in the 
countryside or sever their ties with it when they move to the city) and the urban proletariat 
(particularly through ties built by their children who study in cities while their parents stay on the 
land). "Poor but 'free' peasants" are often situated at the territorial fringes of countries and 
therefore are "not [as significantly] constrained by any power domain", whether that of local 
semi-feudal landlords or capitalist multinationals (Wolf, 1999:292). These two categories have 
been found to "constitute the pivotal groupings for peasant uprisings" (Ibid.).  
The historically indeterminate behaviour of these class fractions – on some occasions 
allied with broader labouring classes, on others turning up against them – is what makes them 
'pivotal'. Hence "middle peasants […] may embrace both rich- and poor-peasant policies at 
different times, partly depending on whether they have secure access to and/or ownership of 
the land they work and whether their situation is gravitating towards the well-to-do stratum or 
the poor farmer category" (Edelman and Borras, 2016:44). The variable conditions that convince 
members of those pivotal class fractions to either join or oppose contemporary struggles of 
peripheral peasantries and wider labouring classes are particularly relevant to this thesis, as the 
observation of discursive battles waged outside and inside regional policy dialogues in the 
following chapters will show. 
Wolf's (1969) theory is complemented by Moyo and Yeros (2005), who underline the 
pivotal role of an agrarian class fraction (partly overlapping with Wolf's 'poor but free peasant') 
in the building and consolidation of articulated class alliances: the semi-proletarianised 





encompasses labourers who derive their incomes from multiple activities – such as subsistence 
farming and wage labour – and periodically migrate between rural areas and city slums, where 
they may or may not find work, often under precarious/informal labouring conditions. Given that 
semi-proletarianised peasants constitute the "core social base of [contemporary] rural 
movements" (Moyo and Yeros 2005:5), and that the latter are "the nucleus of anti-imperialist 
politics today – and hence of genuine labour internationalism" (Ibid:9), the role of agrarian 
organisations in reflecting the interests of their semi-proletarianised social base in their policy 
claims has decisive implications for articulated development strategies in the global periphery.  
Particular class fractions of the wider peasantries have been identified as pivotal for 
revolutionary struggles in the global periphery to be successful, as Wolf’s (1969) case studies 
indicate. Often more overlooked are the roles played by peasantries in social-democratic 
endeavours of both core and periphery (with the important exceptions of Luebbert, 1991, 
Berman, 2006, and Sandbrook et al., 2006). These are particularly relevant for this thesis, given 
that it looks at agrarian organisations seeking to influence policies through participatory 
deliberation within contemporary peripheral democratic regimes.  
Hence, the "foundation of social democratic hegemony [in Scandinavian countries] was 
provided by the political alliances that were formed in the 1930s between urban workers and 
family peasants" (Luebbert, 1991:267), particularly in landmark agreements between industrial 
workers and the peasantry (sealed in Denmark (1933), Norway (1935), and Sweden (1938)). 
These 'red-green alliances' were enabled not only by "the political hegemony of working class 
parties or the extending of "semi-sovereign status [to trade unions] in making social policies" 
(Ibid.:270) but also by the existence of so-called Agrarian political parties.  
Representing the small and medium peasantry, and usually situated at the centre of the 
political spectrum, Northern European Agrarian parties negotiated common policy platforms 
with the industrial working classes' Social Democratic parties. These were to benefit both their 
constituencies through policy mechanisms negotiated with state authorities under newly formed 
coalition governments. This forced employer organisations to adapt to those demands, instead 
of having the latter pit the former two against each other (an opposing class dynamic that 





e.g. Germany). Indeed, "as long as peasants remained satisfied with their alliance, there was no 
plausible strategy for [employers to revise] the political situation" (ibid.:271). Thus, alliances of 
"workers and middle peasants [provided] Social Democrats with a secure social base" (ibid.). 
While the basis for European fascism was laid by a "coalition between the urban middle 
classes and the family peasantry", a "social democratic order required a coalition of the urban 
working classes and the family peasantry" (Luebbert, 1991:278, emphasis added), compelling the 
middle classes to accept and adapt to the new realities. Thus, family peasantries represented by 
agrarian organisations and political parties were a pivotal force in the two main political-
economic coalitions that marked 1930s Europe: with virtuous consequences in the social-
democratic Nordic paths, and tragic ones in the fascist central and Southern European paths 
(Berman, 2006; Luebbert, 1991).  
One of the most significant lessons from the above cases is the fact that pivoting of the 
peasantry with or against the working classes was considerably influenced by political appeals to 
values deeply entrenched in those countries' societies, in discourses that either bridged or 
accentuated divides along class (e.g. wage workers versus 'petty bourgeoisies') and territorial 
(e.g. urban versus rural) lines. Two 'collective action frames' (Benford and Snow, 2000) in 
particular were mobilized with great efficacy during the turbulent 1930s by very different political 
forces (social-democrats and fascists), in favour of opposing political projects: 'the people', and 
'the nation' (Berman, 2006).  
Fascist communitarian or identitarian appeals to their countries' constituencies as 
representing a people and nation in opposition to an extraneous 'other' upon whom all 
frustrations were to be directed through racism, xenofobia, and imperial war-waging are well-
known. What is much less well-documented, but aptly so by Berman (2006), are the political 
discursive framings and consequent cross-class alliance building processes through which Nordic 
social-democrats – most emblematically in Sweden – enlarged their political base to an otherwise 
conservative middle farmer and peasant public. "Embracing concepts such as 'people' and 
'nation' that the radical right was exploiting successfully elsewhere, the SAP [Swedish Social 
Democratic Party] was able to claim the mantle of national unity and social solidarity during the 





"emphasized the party's desire to help not merely workers, but the 'weak', the 'oppressed', and 
'people' more generally – [thus successfully neutralizing] the fears of some farmers and 
peasants." (Ibid:167). 
Sandbrook et al. (2006) have identified comparable (though less consolidated) social-
democratic trajectories and patterns in the global periphery, in which peasantries have 
successfully struck alliances with urban workers and middle classes, thereby compelling elected 
governments to make important policy concessions to the wider labouring classes. Yet the cases 
analysed in their book are an isolated set of small countries with very open economies (e.g. Costa 
Rica, Mauritius), and a correspondingly limited capacity to pursue autonomous industrialisation 
at scale. Moreover, notwithstanding their historical relevance in both core and peripheral social-
democratic endeavours, collective action frames such as ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’ are very 
broad and do not adequately capture the intricacies of agrarian policy processes and shifting 
regional class alliances. This justifies the need to examine policy discursive frames that weave 
political alliances around specific economic goals.  
 
2.1.3 Reclaiming Economic Policy Discourse 
 
Policy discourse is defined here as representing concrete interests of a specific class or 
wider class alliance, and negotiated in policy spaces with representatives of other classes, with 
the mediation of state civil servants. I explain below how policy discourse is analysed throughout 
this thesis as efforts by class representatives – particularly organic "peasant intellectuals" (Moyo 
and Yeros, 2005:45) from agrarian organisations – to cognitively reconverge the severed 
economic (territorially-grounded base) and political (networked superstructural) spheres.  
Following Gramsci's theorisation of organic intellectuals as establishing links between 
economic base and political superstructure (see previous section 2.1.2), policy dialogue spaces 
are understood in this thesis as potential enablers of reconnections between economic and 
political discourse. Indeed, while the two were hitherto epistemologically indissociable in 18th-
19th century classical political economy, they became increasingly separate fields of knowledge 





science), a division that has been reified into institutions and law by contemporary capitalist 
democracies since the late 19th century (Hudson, 2012; Unger, 2015). 
Indeed, a key characteristic of capitalist democracies is that despite the legal recognition 
of civil and political rights (e.g. universal suffrage, freedom of speech and assembly) these tend 
to be permitted under a tacit agreement that most citizens be kept from decision-making on hard 
economic policy. Under 'market democracies', decisions that affect economic material realities 
are generally restricted to a limited group of technical experts, scientists, and civil servants whose 
work (knowingly or not) disproportionately serves the interests of the ruling classes (Sweezy, 
1980). The most significant exceptions to this rule are found in labour-capital collective 
bargaining spaces, which provided significant advances for labouring classes in the 1930s-1970s 
– at least to the extent that the latter were represented by sufficiently robust and diverse 
organisations. Therefore, the opening and influencing of those exceptional spaces that do affect 
economic policy to non-ruling classes in contemporary democratic regimes is not surprisingly 
perceived as crucial by social movements, unions, and other organisations representing the wider 
labouring classes. 
Polanyi (1944:77) characterised what he termed 'market society'8 as resulting from a 
separation between the economic and political spheres:  
A self-regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional separation of society into an economic 
and political sphere. […] Neither under tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile conditions was there, as we have 
shown, a separate economic system in society. Nineteenth century society, in which economic activity was 
isolated and imputed to a distinctive economic motive, was, indeed, a singular departure.  
 
 This systemic rift brought about by market society was illustrated by what Polanyi 
described as the disembedding of land, labour, and money, and their transformation into 
'fictitious commodities'. In other words, instead of being understood for what they objectively 
are – nature (land), humans (labour), and exchange tokens (money) - under capitalism those 
three elements become tradeable like any other commodity, with deleterious societal and 
environmental consequences. This closely relates to agrarian organisations' central emphasis on 
 
8 Following Fraser (2017), for our purposes, we consider 'market society' to be interchangeable with 'capitalism', 





political regulation of land, labour, and trade9 through specific public policies, as we shall see in 
chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
Similar to Polanyi's point on institutional separation between economic and political 
spheres, the rise of what we know today as representative democracy came into being from a 
historic compromise in industrialising Europe and North America around the 1870s: in exchange 
for gradually extending the voting franchise to the whole national population, legally recognising 
labour unions, and making some concessions to these by increasing real wages and building a 
Welfare State through progressive taxation (Chang, 2003; Losurdo, 2014), ruling classes made 
sure that most other key economic policy choices were left outside the deliberative political 
sphere of liberal democratic regimes (Sweezy, 1980). This was cognitively ensured in society at 
large by a scientific rift between politics and economics (Hudson, 2012).  
It is worth recalling the often obscured fact that prior to the late 19th century, economics 
was not an abstract discipline based on pseudo-universal 'assumptions' about the functioning of 
societies and their allegedly politically neutral 'rational economic men' (Raworth, 2017). Rather 
it was part and parcel of political economy, understood as the economic management of the well-
being of a nation as a whole, whether theorized by liberals (e.g. Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John 
Stuart Mill) or critiqued and expanded upon by Karl Marx (Hudson, 2012).  
For all their differences regarding relations between capital and labour, all of the above 
authors shared a concern with isolating economic rent. Sources of the latter were seen as 
remnants of feudalism during the rise of capitalism, leading to a waste of resources which could 
be otherwise used for productive investment, consumption, or redistributive policies. Economic 
rent, which can be defined as the unproductive 'unearned income' transferred from societies' 
majorities to a minority of 'idle rich', was identified by classical political economists as particularly 
 
9 Though the object of trade policy are traded goods, international trade policy instruments deal with the regulation 
of prices (e.g. through trade tariffs), directly affecting the monetary value of agricultural goods (e.g. making imported 
goods more expensive than national ones). Moreover, countries' balance of payments (of which trade in goods is a 
key component) in theory are one of the determinants of the value of national currencies. Yet exposure of 
deregulated economies to financial speculation under the post-1971 international floating exchange rate monetary 
regime means that currency values can considerably vary based on factors dissociated from trade in goods. Hence, 
insofar as agrarian organisations’ focus on trade policy is fundamentally linked to preventing or curbing unequal 
exchange (accentuated by financialisation, i.e. commodification of money), we consider this policy process to be 





pervasive in three key areas: ownership of land (e.g. left idle for speculation), usurious interest 
charged on loans (i.e. financial rent), and income earned from unilaterally concentrated market 
dominance (i.e. monopoly rent) (Hudson, 2012). The channelling and compounding of different 
forms of rent to capitalists as profit through the exploitation of labour is an additional (and, under 
capitalism, all-pervasive) form of rent, identified by Marx as surplus value (Baran and Foster, 
2017).  
Yet a further type of rent became increasingly dominant after the 1870s, when capitalist 
accumulation became systematized on a global scale. Indeed, the rapid territorial expansion of 
capitalism from Europe to the rest of the world, politically mediated by colonialist discourse and 
institutions, enabled unprecedented levels of rent extraction and transfer from the rest of the 
world back to Europe. This included not only the above-mentioned forms of rent (land, finance, 
monopoly rents - compounded by wage labour exploitation), but an additional form of 'imperial 
rent' resulting from the fact that labour exploitation and resource extraction in the world's 
peripheries is many times more intense than in its centres. Disguised through such mechanisms 
as pricing and exchange rates, imperial rent is defined by Samir Amin as the difference between 
real wages paid to workers in the world's peripheries and centres, which is larger than the 
difference between their actual productivities (Amin, 2020, 1993; Foster, 2011). In other words, 
Amin's law of worldwide value is characterised by the fact that  
the price of the labour force is distributed in a much more unequal way than are the productivities of social 
labour. There are differences in the productivity of labour, of course, but the differences in productivity are 
smaller than the differences in the price of labour. For example, while the difference in productivity 
between the US and Congo is 1:5, the difference in the price of the labour force may be 1:20 (Kvangraven, 
2017:12-13).  
 
Indeed, the exponential rise in surplus value extraction from peripheries to centres 
through systematic transfer of imperial rent from the 1870s onwards was a key factor creating 
space for capital to cede ground to labour on wage rises and Welfare state creation in the world's 
centres. This process, by which labour in the centres obtains relative gains at the expense of 
labour in the peripheries has been coined by Marini (1973) as super-exploitation of labour in the 
peripheries. In political terms, the growing rift between wages and social conditions in centres 
and peripheries made it increasingly difficult for the labouring classes of the Global North and 





Whilst competitive capitalism was mainly prevalent in northwestern Europe and North 
America until the early to mid-19th century, the second industrial revolution's railroads, telegraph 
lines, and steamboats greatly accelerated the worldwide territorial expansion of corporations' 
control over markets across production and distribution chains, marking a transition from mostly 
local-national to fully global monopoly capitalism by the 1870s-1880s (Amin, 1993; Sweezy, 
1994). Monopoly capital was perhaps most famously theorized by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy in 
their seminal (1966) book, in which they further refined Baran's (1957) concept of the economic 
surplus, briefly defined in the book’s introduction as "the difference between what a society 
produces and the costs of producing it" (Baran and Sweezy, 1966:9). Under global monopoly 
capitalism, the size of the economic surplus increased exponentially, in both absolute terms as 
well as relative to Marx's first two departments (i.e. production and consumption), a result not 
just of productivity gains but crucially of the combined sources of economic rent mentioned 
above. Yet, despite its exponential rise, an increasing portion of the surplus became diverted into 
wasteful activities (e.g. sales and marketing, inadequate civilian government expenditure, 
militarism and imperialism), although it could in theory be reinvested into more productive, 
socially distributed, and environmentally sustainable activities, if only the political system would 
allow it. Indeed, under monopoly capitalist societies, the "modes of utilization of the surplus 
constitute the indispensable mechanism linking the economic foundation of society with […] its 
political, cultural, and ideological superstructure" (Baran and Sweezy, 1966:8, emphasis added).  
Amin's (1993:209) definition of the nation as the "centralisation of the surplus" enables 
to pose the national question in the Global South in terms of the capacity for societies to create 
articulated class alliances across their national territories to prevent their generated surplus to 
be siphoned off by dependent bourgeoisies and central nations’ ruling elites. Consequently, 
agrarian organisations' struggles for land, labour, and trade regulation via public policies are 
analysed in this thesis as efforts to distribute and reinvest their generated agrarian surplus into 
national and regional public goods, versus transferring it to rentier elites in both peripheries and 
centres.  
Since the 1970s, a third era has been set off by a further acceleration of globalisation 





financial deregulation and the end of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate international 
monetary system. Accurately dubbed "global monopoly-finance capital[ism]" (Foster, 2014:vii), 
the deployment of the current phase of the capitalist mode of production on a world scale has 
run parallel with the diffusion of neoliberal ideology to justify it, and hide its most perverse 
concentrating effects.  
Given all of the above, it is not surprising that agrarian organisations have primarily 
sprung in the world's peripheries, as peasants suffer from the triple exploitation of (a) global 
North, (b) national South, and (c) local South 'centres' relative to their respective (a’) global 
South, (b’) national labouring, and (c’) local rural 'peripheries'. This is made clear by Amin's six-
fold class distinction, whereby global centre bourgeoisies, national peripheries' dependent 
bourgeoisies, and local rural semi-feudal landlords all extract surplus from the world’s labouring 
classes, particularly their largest and most exploited contingent - the peasantries of the Global 
South. In parallel, labouring classes of the Global North, and of the urban centres and/or 
formalized economic enclaves of the Global South - though also exploited - obtain small benefits 
relative to the more harshly exploited peasantries and informal urban semi-proletariat of the 
Global South, thus posing challenges for unity amongst the wider labouring classes (Foster, 2011).  
Distinguishing centres and peripheries through surplus extraction and transfer 
mechanisms operating at least at those three scales justifies a multiscalar approach to 
understanding regional policy processes (see methodology section 2.2 below). Moreover, given 
that different types of rent are extracted and transferred to ruling elites at local, national, and 
global levels makes it all the more important to interrogate what happens at the overlooked 
regional level, which under regional integration endeavours in the Global South are generally 
underfunded, but serve as potential venues for a greater centralisation - and, if agrarian 
organisations can wield their influence there, redistribution - of neighbouring nations' combined 
economic surplus.  
This section has laid out the international political-economic theoretical bases for the 
comparative analysis of policy processes on land, labour, and trade in South America and West 
Africa undertaken in this thesis. As explained above, the discourse of peasant intellectuals 





of the organic intellectual, who performs a crucial societal role in (re-)establishing severed 
cognitive links between economic base and political superstructure, by elaborating political 
discourses centred on economic policy claims. Hence, the following chapters will interrogate 
whether these discourses are elaborated internally by agrarian organisations with the aim to 
genuinely represent the grievances and demands of their social bases in local rural villages, but 
also to what extent they are formulated to demonstrate the social force of wider territorially-
rooted regional class alliances, so as to compel their respective states and regions in the Global 
South to negotiate a fairer distribution of the economic surplus generated by their societies and 
mostly siphoned off to rentier elites in both South and North. The comparative examination of 
COPROFAM and ROPPA peasant intellectuals' discourse (and that of their organic intellectual 
allies in civil service, academia, and international organisations) on land, labour, and trade policy 
issues will thus be analysed as part of societal efforts to regulate capitalism and ‘re-embed’ 
Polanyi’s three 'fictitious commodities' into their local social fabric, through wide rural labouring 
class alliances and territorial articulation in two regions of the global periphery.  
 
2.1.4 Intersubjective Political Dialogue Spaces 
 
 One of the key lines of argumentation of the deleterious effects of capitalism in its 
monopoly phase argued by Baran and Sweezy (1966) was the exposure of its profoundly 
irrational nature, as the title of their book's last chapter10 indicates. Yet the fact that the system 
appears rational to most, thus forming the moral basis for capitalist democracies' political 
legitimacy, shows us that the concept of reason and its different uses deserve close examination, 
if rationally argued policy discourse is to form the basis for dialogue between agrarian 
organisations and governments. Habermas' (1987) distinction between subjective instrumental 
rationality and intersubjective communicative rationality is particularly useful in this respect.  
 Habermas critiqued Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment (1972 [1947]) 
for mistaking reason with one of its particular manifestations – utilitarian, reductionist, 
instrumental rationality. Narrow instrumental rationality is explicit, for instance, in the "non-
 





universal, particularistic, self-seeking, rational economic man" underpinning 'pure' neoliberal 
economics (Raworth, 2017: 96). According to Habermas, subjective instrumental rationality must 
be counterbalanced by intersubjective communicative rationality, if the public sphere, 
understood as a realm enabling "free uncoerced debate among equals" (Gunaratne, 2006:96) is 
to live up to its ideal.  
Gaventa (2006:26) defines spaces "as opportunities, moments and channels where 
citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships that affect 
their lives and interests". This definition of spaces is therefore not restricted to the physical 
rooms located within government office buildings (i.e. 'invited spaces'), where policy 
deliberations that are more or less open to participation by outsiders occur. In this sense, it has 
commonalities with Habermas' conception of the public sphere. Indeed, the latter not only refers 
to the coffeehouses, salons, masonic lodges, and other objective physical spaces where the 
ascending bourgeoisie met and discussed matters of public interest in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries. It also refers to the subjective networks of people, such as "religious academies, 
political forums, and literary organisations" (Habermas, 1989:164), the ideas intersubjectively 
developed by them inside and outside those physical spaces, and the counter-hegemonic 
diffusion of these ideas compounded by "the power of the printed word" (Ibid: 163) during the 
first industrial revolution (1770s-1830s).  
Though originally formulated in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989 
[1962]) (STPS), Habermas' conceptualisation thereof was subsequently integrated into his Theory 
of Communicative Action (1987 [1981]) in which he further problematized "cognitive 
instrumental rationality [imposing] purposive rational action" (Gunaratne, 2006:96) upon 
societies, a certainly necessary though not sufficient (and if left unchecked, perverse) type of 
rationality in the management of societies’ common affairs. Communicative rationality, on the 
other hand, could enable "participants [to] reach agreement through argumentation based on 
the validity claims of truth, moral rightness, and sincerity" (Ibid.). According to Habermas 
(1987:121-122, emphases added), in the second volume of his Theory of Communicative Action  
This continual process of definition and redefinition involves correlating contents to worlds—according to 
what counts in a given instance as a consensually interpreted element of the objective world, as an 
intersubjectively recognized normative component of the social world, or as a private element of a 






Habermas' distinction between (subjective) instrumental rationality and (intersubjective) 
communicative rationality has significantly influenced debates on democratic deliberation and 
policy influence. The demise of the once vibrant bourgeois public sphere of late 18th-early 19th 
century Europe described by Habermas in STPS has led to a colonisation of the 'lifeworld' by the 
'system’ - or, said otherwise, of communicative rationality by instrumental rationality (Smith et 
al., 2015). Instrumental rationality, which can be understood as a kind of solely utilitarian 
"means-end rationality" has increasingly spread throughout modern capitalist societies, leading 
to the "bureaucratisation and concentration of power in the hands of technically skilled elites 
who treat politics as the preserve of experts, not citizens" (Held, 2006:236).   
Hence, technical expertise becomes reified and ends up serving a reductionist 
understanding of reason "as logic coupled with scientifically constructed empirical knowledge", 
rather than as "intersubjective mutual understanding arrived at by particular people in particular 
times and places; that is [as] historically situated" (Healey, cited by Keeley and Scoones, 2000:31). 
Against "positivist assumptions of conventional linear policy analysis and the instrumentally 
rationalist nature of contemporary planning and administrative systems", scholars influenced by 
Habermas have aimed to integrate intersubjective discursive conceptions into theories of 
democracy and participatory policy formulation, such as Dryzek's 'discursive democracy' or 
Healey's 'collaborative planning' (Ibid.).  
Emphasizing communicative rationality therefore does not imply shunning science, but 
rather, as Keeley and Scoones (2000:32, emphasis added) put it, the creation of "communicative 
institutions allow[ing] multiple perspectives to come into debate, and, through processes of 
argumentation, the negotiation of goals and values and appropriate courses of action". For this 
to occur, "deliberation […] needs to be extended to the relationship between scientific experts 
and citizens in ways that do not mean negating the institutions of science, but transforming them 
so that, where decision stakes and uncertainty are high, the deliberations of scientists are subject 
to 'extended peer review'" (Ibid.), i.e. to public debate by society at large, not just by enclosed 
groups of technocrats.  
In this respect, de Sousa Santos (2012:43) defines intercultural translation as "a procedure 





it one of the pillars to build an epistemology of the South that challenges reductionist 
interpretations of such concepts as the ‘public sphere’ or ‘democracy’, which he dismisses as 
plagued by Eurocentrism. De Sousa Santos considers intercultural translation particularly crucial 
"for an alternative to neoliberal globalisation on the basis of transnational networks of local 
movements" (Ibid:61) to emerge. Hence agrarian organisations' legitimacy in engaging into 
rational intersubjective policy dialogue at national or regional institutional levels depends on 
their leaders' capacity to interculturally translate the popular and local languages of their peasant 
bases.  
One of the attributes through which Paulo Freire (1985:48) distinguishes "popular syntax" 
from the formal grammar of ruling classes, is the former's direct relationship to the concrete, 
versus the latter's greater focus on the conceptual. Freire (1985:49) argues that grammatically 
incorrect popular syntax should be accepted to be "just as beautiful" as the grammatically correct 
discourse validated by ruling elites. In other words, peasants' discourse emanating from their 
daily lived realities should be considered just as valid as that of civil servants speaking in technical 
policy jargon. Nevertheless, Freire (1985:49-50) also advocates that the popular classes must 
learn the rules of official discourse in order to be able to "put up a better fight with the dominant 
class". This relates to Frantz Fanon's (1986:18) reflections on the fact that he or she who "has a 
language possesses the world expressed and implied by that language" whose mastery “affords 
remarkable power".  
Indeed, Fanon's (1986:18 [1952]) remark that the peoples living under the French colonial 
Empire, "will come closer to being [considered as] real human being[s] in direct ratio to [their] 
mastery of the French language" still rings true even generations after most African countries' 
political independence. When the language of the ruling classes and/or colonial powers' is 
mastered, however, it is often at the expense of one's own cultural identity. This is accentuated 
by how colonial (or neocolonial) domination, including through language, breeds an inferiority 
complex in colonized peoples through the "burial of [their] local cultural originality" (Ibid.).  
This connects to Fanon's (2002, [1961]:145) argument about the lack of national 
consciousness of bourgeoisies in the global periphery, given that their social reproduction is so 





administrative structures. National consciousness is understood by Fanon as the "coordinated 
crystallisation of the innermost aspirations of the whole people, […] the immediate and visible 
result of popular mobilisation". Global South bourgeoisies’ lack of national consciousness is thus 
linked to their "historic incapacity […] to rationalise popular praxis, that is to extract the 
underlying reason from it" (Ibid.). Therefore, following Freire and Fanon’s insights, what is at 
stake in development processes is the capacity of pivotal actors to interculturally translate 
between different types of knowledge and language, across class and within entire 
nations/regions, in order to politically negotiate policies that benefit their wider constituencies. 
We now summarize the first theoretical section of this chapter by joining together the 
four pillars of RAO political agency presented above (regional integration, class relations, policy 
discourse, dialogue spaces) as displayed in table 1 below. Each of the four pillars’ key concepts is 
displayed in its respective column, while each of the three bottom lines of the table establish 
transversal correspondences between these. 
 
Regional Integration Class Relations Policy Discourse Dialogue Spaces 
Territory Base Reality  Objective 
Competing Networks Counter-Hegemonic Superstructures Representation Subjective 
Mediated Networks Hegemonic Superstructure Negotiation Intersubjective 
 
Table 1: Summarized regional class policy spaces analytical framework. 
 
Hence, in the first of these three lines, Milton Santos’ (2005) conception of the territory 
is understood as the geographic equivalent of the historical materialist concept of economic 
base, i.e. objective material reality, the prime object of policy discourse dealt with in physical 





are implemented (e.g. peasant family farms) . The following line illustrates the subjective efforts 
of RAOs and others at making sense of their constituencies’ lived realities on the ground by 
collectively representing their different interests and policy visions, and deploying the resulting 
counter-hegemonic political discourses through their alternative regional networks11. The last 
line illustrates the actual spaces12 of regional participatory policy deliberation, in which different 
subjective points of view on objective material issues are intersubjectively debated. Hence 
political dialogue on economic policy is epitomized by inter-class negotiation, whereby 
competing regional networks are mediated by government authorities, within the constraints – 
but also potentially through the cracks - of the ruling class hegemonic superstructural apparatus 
of those regions’ actually existing states.  
The following methodology section (2.2) explains how these inter-related concepts are 
operationalized to guide the comparative study between COPROFAM and ROPPA in the following 
chapters (2.2.1), provides an account of the strategies I adopted to collect empirical data during 




2.2 Research Methodology 
 
2.2.1 Comparing two regions across multiple scales  
 
2.2.1.1 Case study selection 
This study's object of inquiry can be situated within a wider field investigating the policy 
influence of social movements and labour unions. Though regional agrarian organisations 
increasingly figure as single case studies, no studies comparing different regional agrarian 
organisations were identified at the time of writing. This served as an incentive to go ahead with 
 
11 These alternative networks compete for policy space with the hegemonic ‘network’ referred in Milton Santos’ 
(2005) territory-network dichotomy. 
12 Following the wider understanding of Gaventa’s (2006) (invited) spaces and of Habermas’ (1989) public sphere 





a comparative study, despite the significant challenges of analysing two large and complex 
ensembles with sufficient depth to make the comparison relevant.  
Indeed, during my previous work with regional agrarian organisation members in global, 
regional, and national level policy spaces, I had observed parallels between COPROFAM and 
ROPPA members, including their capacity to discursively integrate local, national, regional, and 
global issues (often giving concrete examples from each scale in speeches that lasted only a few 
minutes), demonstrating that it was possible to synthesize multiscalar policy issues in an 
integrated form. Whilst working in South America with MERCOSUR’s Specialised Meeting on 
Family Farming (REAF), however, it became clear that mutual comprehension between agrarian 
issues in different parts of the world remained overshadowed by significant knowledge gaps on 
processes ocurring outside one’s own region. Thus, the need to contribute in raising mutual 
knowledge between agrarian organisations from different regions, as well as to fill a gap in 
international political economy and critical agrarian studies warranted the cross-regional 
comparative endeavour undertaken in this thesis.  
COPROFAM and ROPPA are arguably today's strongest regional agrarian organisations 
(see maps in Figures 1 and 2 below) in terms of size13, coherence, and policy influence. Other 
regional peasant family farmer-based organisations have been active in recent decades, but they 
are less relevant for this study because: i) they are not as strategically engaged in political 
dialogue with a regional integration organisation (e.g. LVC-affiliated CLOC14 in Latin America); ii) 
they represent narrower rural constituencies (e.g. West African pastoralist networks APESS and 
RBM15); iii) their composition is wider and includes large-scale agribusiness organisations (e.g. 
Southern Africa's SACAU16); iv) their membership includes both developing and developed 
member countries (e.g. AFA17 in East, Southeast, and South Asia); v) they are not as coherently 
 
13 COPROFAM is composed of 9 national platforms (in 7 countries) joining together 115 affiliated second degree 
organisations (confederations and federations), representing an estimated 22 million peasant family farmers. ROPPA 
is composed of 13 national platforms joining together 147 second degree organisations (federations and unions), 
representing approximately 20 million peasant family farmers. Interviews AO-SA5 and AO-WA12.   
14 Latin American Coordination of Rural Organisations. 
15 Respectively, Association for the Promotion of Pastoralism in the Savanah and the Sahel, and Billital Maroobé 
Network. 
16 Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions.  





structured or politically influential in their respective regions (such as PROPAC in Central Africa, 
EAFF in Eastern Africa, or PIFON in the Pacific Islands18). 
 
 




18 Respectively Central African Regional Platform of Peasant Organisations, Eastern African Farmers Federation, and 
Pacific Islands Farmers Organisation Network.  





Given the above, COPROFAM and ROPPA's regional significance is comparable to that of 
La Vía Campesina (LVC) at the global level, even if strategies, membership composition, and 




20 Neither COPROFAM nor ROPPA are members of LVC, but have worked closely with the global peasant network 
over the decades. This has occurred at global (as co-members of the International Planning Committee on Food 
Sovereignty (IPC)) and continental levels (through both COPROFAM and CLOC national members' participation in the 
Latin American Alliance for Peoples' Food Sovereignty). Six of ROPPA's thirteen national platforms are currently 
member organisations of LVC, as are some of COPROFAM's former national member organisations. Both COPROFAM 
and ROPPA previously had some national-level members affiliated to the agribusiness-led IFAP before its collapse in 
2010, but these did not join its successor organisation, World Farmers' Organisation (WFO). In Latin American 
countries, competition between LVC and COPROFAM members has sometimes been divisive, while this is generally 
less so between LVC and non-LVC ROPPA members in Africa. Despite its national-level members’ affiliations, ROPPA 
has since its creation had an explicit stance on the preservation of its autonomy as a West African regional network, 
by not affiliating to any global articulation such as LVC or IFAP/WFO. Furthermore, COPROFAM is a member of the 
World Rural Forum (WRF), as are all ROPPA national-level members, although WRF's global network is different in 
nature to a global coordination of affiliated organisations such as LVC or WFO. Indeed, WRF is a Spanish NGO which 
has exercised a coordinating role in partnership with agrarian organisations of multiple affiliations on specific global 






Figure 2: ROPPA and West African Regional Integration.21 
 
COPROFAM and ROPPA are under-researched, and limited existing research does not compare 
them with each other, or with regional organisations outside their continents. Moreover, these 
few works are mostly in Spanish/Portuguese or French, restricting readership to their respective 
linguistic communities. Indeed, because these are predominantly non-anglophone zones, there 
are very few studies in English of these two regions in such understudied fields as agrarian 
organisations, let alone comparisons between them. But even in French, Spanish, and 
Portuguese, there is almost no comparative work between these two regions in any area of study, 
reflecting a generalized and persistent lack of mutual knowledge between both sides of the South 
Atlantic. This work aims to contribute in filling these gaps. 
 
2.2.1.2 Applying comparative methods to regional policy processes 
Comparative research in the social sciences tends to be most heuristic when focused on 
cases that are similar enough to be comparable, but different at least in the variables that one 
endeavours to investigate, since that allows for "the establishment of relationships among a few 
variables while many other variables are controlled" (Lijphart, 1971:687). COPROFAM and ROPPA 
have thus been selected because, in spite of their differences, they are sufficiently similar to be 
comparable, particularly in relation to the object of study: that is, their shared capacity to 
influence policy within their respective regions, through their participation in regional dialogue 
spaces, in the same fields of agricultural and rural development policy. It is because of these 
similarities (constants) that one can look at what is variable between the two cases: for the 
purpose of this study, their contrasting track records in influencing each of the three 
comparatively examined policies. 
One of the limitations of selecting a 'region' or 'country' as macrosocial unit of comparison 
or 'comparator' (Ragin, 1987) is that it risks effacing internal variations within regions or 
countries, resulting in what Lijphart (1971) calls 'whole-nation bias' (which we can also apply to 
the regional scale). Indeed, a territory within one country may bear more (geographic, social, 
 





cultural, economic) similarities with that of a neighbouring country, than to another territory 
within its own national jurisdiction. Without negating the importance of regional blocs or nations 
as significant political-economic entities in and of themselves, I seek to overcome the perils of 
'whole-region bias' by integrating not only national but subnational dimensions of the studied 
regions into this comparative study, particularly through the identification of regional agrarian 
territories within each region (see maps in chapters 3 and 4).22  
Thus, regional integration can be understood firstly through local perceptions and 
affinities stretching across agrarian territories upon which national borders have been drawn as 
a result of historical contingencies. It can secondly be understood as intergovernmental 
opportunities for collaboration between neighbouring nations. And it can thirdly be observed as 
a conjunction of federalist efforts to generate supranational norms and policies, including 
systemic approaches that both supersede and encompass the previous two. Given that the 
peasant family farming policy agenda advocated by COPROFAM and ROPPA in regional invited 
spaces is to be implemented at all scales of governance (regional, national, local), these three 
understandings of the regional – transborder territories, neighbouring nations, and regional blocs 
– underpin my comparison. However, different combinations between these three 
understandings are shaped by the policy processes themselves. Hence, I propose to define the 
two regional comparators through their 'variable-geometries'. 
 
Trade-offs between depth and breadth: regional comparators of variable geometry  
Originally drawn from the field of design engineering to refer to machines whose parts 
can alter their shape to optimize efficiency depending on changing conditions, the expression 
'variable-geometry' has also been used as a metaphor in the context of European regional 
 
22 This is especially true regarding the transborder nature of such key elements of agrarian change as climate and 
soil, demographic density, or patterns of accumulation. For instance, middle family farmers of the Argentine 
temperate humid Pampa have more in common with many of their Uruguayan neighbours than with northern 
Argentine smaller-scale peasants of subtropical and dryland provinces. These in turn are more similar to Paraguayan 
and Bolivian peasants across the border than to their Pampa middle farmer compatriots. Similarly, coffee and cocoa 
producers of Côte d'Ivoire have more in common with their Ghanaian coastal counterparts, than with cotton 
producers at the Soudano-Sahelian northern drylands of those two countries. The latter, for their part, share more 
characteristics with southern Malian and Burkinabe cotton producers across those borders than with the former 






integration. There, it denotes a flexible strategy to resolving differences between member 
countries that aim to regionally integrate at different degrees depending on the policy issue at 
stake (e.g. Schengen Area, Eurozone). I use the expression here as a methodological approach to 
comparing two regional blocs, to signify that the selections of countries (or combinations of sub-
national examples) and degrees of depth with which I analyse them within each region vary 
according to the relevance of different national/subnational experiences for each policy process. 
I consider this variable-geometry approach to regional comparisons to be the most adapted to 
reconciling trade-offs between depth and breadth in a study where the regional, national, and 
local dimensions are so intricately connected.  Indeed, "scanning all variables is not the same as 
including all variables " - the latter of which can result in "unrealistic and eventually self-defeating 
perfectionism" (Lijphart, 1971:690, original emphases). 
Thus, I prioritize the most significant national and subnational member organisations 
within each regional platform, without losing sight of the regional organisation as a whole and its 
other members, weighing these according to their relative importance to tell each regional story. 
However, for these variable geometries of regional policy processes to be comparable, they must 
be of similar 'size', even if their shape may differ. For that reason, I have aimed to maintain similar 
numbers of country and subnational cases within each region for each policy process, to keep 
elements as constant as possible, and observe similarities and differences within the studied 
variables.   
The 'fourth scale' of this study is the global level: the comparison is set against a common 
world-historical backdrop, whereby the two cases are "understood as relational parts of a 
singular (historically forming) phenomenon" (McMichael, 2000: 672). This underpins the time-
scales applied to both cases. Hence, the historical chapters (3 and 4)  follow the formation of the 
studied RAOs throughout the globally polarized deployment of monopoly (1870s-1970s) and 
monopoly-finance (1970s-present) capital (see section 2.1.3). More specifically, they look at 
political-economic cycles from the perspective of rural labouring classes and their peripheral 
states over the course of three consecutive international food regimes (Friedmann and 
McMichael, 1989; McMichael, 2009) spanning the i) 1870s-1930s, ii) 1930s-1970s and iii) 1970s-





the last three decades (1990s-2010s) in chapters dedicated to land (5), labour (6), and trade (7) 
policy, each of which examines one policy process across two different regions, and in their 
dialectical relationship with the dominant global policy agenda.  
 
2.2.2 Field sites and data collection 
 
2.2.2.1 Defining the field 
Although this research is on agrarian organisations and policies that affect family farmers' 
livelihoods at the local level, the main focus is on spaces where those policies are negotiated – 
something that occurs at regional and national institutional venues, often hundreds or thousands 
of miles away from farmers' villages. This justified focusing the data collection process in the key 
cities where agrarian organisations are headquartered and where they meet with government 
officials. Moreover, adopting a 'multi-sited' fieldwork approach (Marcus, 1995) entailed 
prioritizing certain locations instead of others according to a variety of criteria, a key one of which 
was my asymmetrical knowledge of the two cases.  
 
2.2.2.2 Asymmetrical knowledge of two cases and fieldwork 
My prior knowledge of both cases was based on work I undertook during two years at the 
Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development's (MDA) International Office. It stemmed from my 
participation as government representative in REAF/MERCOSUR meetings and continuous 
engagement with involved actors for the first (South American) case. Additionally, it resulted 
from drafting a report and other complementary readings on West Africa's agricultural 
development strategy (ECOWAP/CAADP) for the second case. Given the six-month time 
constraint of my fieldwork (a requirement of my Brazilian scholarship), and unbalanced 
knowledge of the two cases, the best form of obtaining comparable data for both entailed 
prioritising the West African case. This methodological compromise was part of broader efforts 
to offset 'insider bias' (Hantrais, 2014:141) for the South American case, and compensate my 






2.2.2.3 Rationale for specific sites within two cases: countries where data was collected 
and centrality of Brazil and Senegal 
Two one-month field visits in South America were conducted at the end of 2016 and 2017 
respectively, bookending a six-month field visit to West Africa conducted during March-
September 2017. Fieldwork consisted more specifically in visits to Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, and Chile for case 1, and Senegal, the Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau for case 2. The 
pioneering and ultimately determinant weight of the Senegalese National Rurals' Council of 
Concertation and Cooperation (CNCR) in the building of ROPPA led me to prioritize data collection 
for the West African case in that country. Likewise, the central role of Brazil's MDA and 
COPROFAM's Brazilian member CONTAG (National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture) in 
the construction of the MERCOSUR regional agrarian policy dialogue meant a larger proportion 
of Brazilian actors were heard for the South American case.23  
Travel restrictions linked to instability in Mali and Burkina Faso at the time of fieldwork 
prevented field visits there, despite the crucial relevance of their national platforms for ROPPA. 
A field visit by road to the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau was facilitated by geographical proximity 
(see Figure 3) and constituted an opportunity to interview smaller non-francophone ROPPA  
 
Figure 3: West Africa Road Travel: Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau.  
 







national-level organisations in the two neighbouring countries. Road travel also enabled to 
observe climatic transitions between Sahel, savannah, and humid tropical geographic zones 
across three contiguous countries, providing a significant observation site of agrarian transborder 
territories (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: West Africa Road Travel: Sahel, savannah, and tropical landscapes24. 
Photo credits: Fernando Ribeiro and author’s own. 
 
Reconstructing the various stages of the regional policy dialogue processes entailed 
combining the three qualitative research methods most frequently used in social movement 
 
24 Photos (enumerated from left to right, line by line) 1 and 2:  Senegalese Sahel; 3: river Gambia crossing; 4 and 5: 






studies (Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002), namely interviews, participant observation, and 




The adaptation time needed to immerse oneself into a completely new country – Senegal 
– meant the six-month period spent there initially seemed too short for the regional ambition of 
the comparative study. It was fortunately long enough to enable a comparable data collection 
process across the two regions in terms of: i) numbers of interviews (close to 40 per regional 
case, i.e. 83 in total); ii) a snowball sample of the two main categories of actors that this research 
focuses on, namely: a) regional agrarian organisation representatives, and b) civil servants from 
governments of the organisations' respective countries (plus one from each regional institution). 
Significant inputs and insights also resulted from a smaller sample in each region of: c) 
researchers and technical experts and d) staff from international organisations – chiefly among 
which UN agencies and INGOs – involved in agrarian regional policy processes.  
Respondents' work usually spanned two scales of policy formulation: national and 
regional. Many were also active in global policy processes. Most interviewees were agrarian 
organisation leaders and civil servants who have taken part in the three studied policy processes 
in South America and West Africa during the past two decades. Actors were categorised across 
both organisational category and region (see table 2 below). 
 







SOUTH AMERICA 10 26 2 3 41 
WEST AFRICA 21 9 4 4 38 
TOTAL 31 35 6 7 79 
 
Table 2: Numbers of interviewees according to organisational category and region. 
 
The 83 semi-directed interviews (four of the 79 respondents accepted to be interviewed 





organisations’ formation, and their participation in South American and West African agrarian 
policy, often weaved through interviewees' own life histories; ii) discussions on agrarian 
organisation inroads and challenges in influencing contemporary policies, usually through the 
examination of specific cases within the wider issues concerning peasant family farmers' 
negotiation of land, labour, and trade policies. In both cases, respondents' accounts of 
COPROFAM or ROPPA's policy influence made frequent reference to their specific national 
member organisations, of which interviewees were either leaders, technical advisors, or partners 
with whom they had worked closely as government officials, researchers, international 
development agency or INGO staff.  
 
2.2.2.5 Participant observation 
This research is focused on spaces of democratic deliberation that are usually restricted 
to government and agrarian organisation representatives. Yet these often also allow in some of 
their partners in international organisations and academia. Taking part in those discussions as a 
legitimate actor falling into the latter category was a precondition for gaining access to the 
diverse meetings in which deliberations took place, in order to engage in participant observation. 
Indeed, some degree of participation in the activities of respondents is an intrinsic part of 
fieldwork, if only to enable researchers to observe and collect data in environments of more or 
less restricted access (Holy, 1984).  
Additional encounters at the sidelines of official events can be at least as important as the 
events themselves, whether these are civil society ('claimed/created'), government delegation 
only ('closed') meetings (Gaventa, 2006), or more informal small group and one-on-one 
conversations. In this sense, criteria for participating in events were not just based on themes 
discussed, but also on the people attending these. This led me to global venues such as the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), and WTO headquarters, where I was able to meet several key informants - including 
former and current COPROFAM and ROPPA leaders - and interview them on the sidelines of the 
official proceedings. 
Regional policy dialogues I participated in included a ROPPA workshop on Rural Youth in 





Meeting on Family Farming in Florianopolis, Brazil (XXVII REAF, December 2017). I also took part 
in a meeting of Uruguay's REAF National Section bringing together agrarian organisations and 
government representatives discussing local, national, and regional policies in Montevideo 
(November 2016). At the global level, I attended the CFS 43rd and 44th sessions (October 2016 
and 2017) at the FAO headquarters in Rome, Italy. I also attended the WTO Public Forum 
(September 2017) in Geneva, Switzerland, where ROPPA President of Honour Mamadou 
Cissokho co-organised and spoke at one of the panels.  
The immersion process in the West African field site crucially involved working as research 
associate at the Agricultural and Rural Prospective Initiative25 (IPAR), a Senegalese think tank 
focused on West African agrarian issues, which has ROPPA representatives in its governing board. 
Participating as a researcher in IPAR enabled me to have a first-hand experience with West 
African researchers, and through them, to meet members of agrarian organisations and 
government from the region. The work experience at IPAR greatly facilitated access to key ROPPA 
leaders and other interviewees in environments of mutual trust, just as it created spontaneous 
occasions for enlightening informal conversations with West African researchers in the workplace 
itself.  
Observation became more 'participant' on the occasions in which I was asked to 
contribute with simultaneous translation, such as with a Bissau-Guinean ROPPA representative 
who requested to speak in Portuguese at the previously mentioned ROPPA workshop in Dakar 
(which only had French-English official interpretation). More generally, I acted as informal 
interpreter between COPROFAM and ROPPA delegates, as part of my facilitation of bilateral 
meetings between them on the sidelines of global events, which gradually enabled a bilateral 
partnership to take shape between the two organisations.  
A mid- to long-term cooperation project between ROPPA and COPROFAM emerged from 
my work at IPAR. Given my previous work experience in South America and contacts with FAO 
and IFAD colleagues who had long been interested in facilitating exchanges between regional 
agrarian organisations, I suggested to IPAR's executive director, Dr. Cheikh Oumar Ba, that we 
 





bridge each others' networks to foster cooperation between ROPPA and COPROFAM, which he 
enthusiastically supported from the outset.  
I organised an initial meeting between the two organisations, IPAR, and FAO, at the 
latter's Rome headquarters in October 2017, but attempts to secure FAO funding subsequently 
faltered. A second attempt was made in May 2019, at a meeting on the sidelines of FAO and 
IFAD’s launch of UNDFF (2019-2028), where funding was obtained to enable participation of 
COPROFAM and ROPPA representatives at a joint workshop organised at CONTAG headquarters 
in Brasilia, in November 2019. The resulting COPROFAM and ROPPA International Meeting: 
Building Common Actions for Peasant and Family Farming became an opportunity to present 
preliminary findings from this research, identifying potential areas of common interest for mutual 
collaboration. The event yielded a protocol between the two organisations, as well as a draft 
project document to secure funding for future joint exchanges (see Figure 5 below). 
 
Figure 5: Photo of COPROFAM-ROPPA meeting, Brasilia, November 2019. 
Source: COPROFAM website26. 
 
 






2.2.2.6 Secondary sources 
Official documents from MERCOSUR and ECOWAS (e.g. regional policy norms and 
regulations) as well as from national governments (e.g. agricultural policy documents) and 
agrarian organisations (e.g. final declarations of meetings, official position statements, open 
letters) were consulted. This included secondary sources produced by COPROFAM and ROPPA, 
as well as by their national-level affiliated organisations. Their own websites and social network 
pages, which include online newsletters, interview transcripts, position papers, meeting 
declarations and minutes constituted an important source of documentation. Online videos with 
interviews, speeches, and presentations by key COPROFAM and ROPPA leaders and their 
interlocutors in government, academia, and international organisations were also consulted.  
 
 2.2.2.7 From data collection do data analysis  
Whether collected as i) recorded verbal accounts in semi-structured interviews and life 
stories; ii) notes of speeches, statements, and informal reflections voiced by key actors observed 
during my participation in policy dialogue meetings; or iii) contextual and analytical secondary 
sources, the data brought back from fieldwork provided me with a rich pool of contrasting and 
coinciding information, opinions, and analyses. Over the course of fieldwork, but also during the 
subsequent interview transcription process, a constant verification in secondary sources (local 
press, research publications) of facts mentioned by respondents revealed complementary 
information. Indeed, interviewees are usually speaking from memory, and can give replies that 
are at times approximate (especially when referring to remote past events). Yet these were most 
often sufficient for me to reconstitute essential pieces of policy processes with additional 
secondary sources, on which I most likely would not have stumbled upon had the interviews not 
taken place.   
Moreover, just as civil servants will often recite official government narratives, members 
of agrarian organisations frequently give favourable accounts that defend their organisations' 
legacies, and may sometimes even paint a rosy picture that effaces internal contradictions. These 
discursive practices can hardly come as a surprise as they emanate from actors representing 





narratives is part and parcel of their work. Their assertiveness, particularly as expressed through 
vigorous interventions in plenary meetings, was usually revelatory of issues in which peasant 
knowledge and prior internal deliberations among organisations are often particularly relevant 
in finding robust policy solutions to lingering problems, yet are all too often ignored by 
intergovernmental actors. I was equally attentive to conspicuous omissions, or manifestations of 
unease by some respondents faced by certain questions. Indeed, what is and what is not said, 
and the varied degrees of emphasis given to different subjects, may reflect not just contrasting 
perceptions and blind spots of each respondent, but also potentially divisive or polemical issues 
that respondents prefer to avoid. These led me to further triangulate and combine sources in 
ways that sometimes revealed the reasons for unease or diversion in some interviewees’ 
responses, as part of my search for patterns of discourse that reinforce or weaken broader 
territorial class alliances. 
Though interviews broadly followed pre-determined series of questions, the above types 
of situations often led me to further interrogate interview respondents and policy dialogue 
participants on some of the issues that had come up in preceding interviews, and later search for 
complementary data in secondary sources, thus triangulating both within a single method 
(amongst different interviewees) as well as between methods (participant observation, 
secondary sources) (Hantrais, 2014). Complementing claims (or indeed avoidances) that 
surprised me enabled me to further substantiate counter-intuitive findings when their accuracy 
and relevance was confirmed through triangulation.  
 The data collection process was enriched not only by obtaining 'popular language' and 
'technical jargon' versions from respondents of different backgrounds, but also by the contrasting 
nature of viewpoints of actors from different countries of a same region. It was often this 
purposive search for contrasting perceptions and narratives of a given phenomenon by a 
multitude of actors  –  what Olivier de Sardan (2008) calls 'complex triangulation'27 – that led me 
to uncover some of the most revealing tensions and paradoxes of the studied policy processes.  
 
 
27 As opposed to 'simple triangulation' consisting in merely verifying the veracity of information by combining 





2.2.3 Positionality and reflexivity 
 Situating my research within an 'agrarian scholar-activist' perspective, in that it aims to 
produce rigorous academic work that can contribute to meaningful social change (Borras, 2016), 
particularly regarding agrarian organisations’ policy agency, entails not shying away from 
critically engaging with the actors that one endeavours to support. In other words, constructive 
criticism of organisations' limitations can be just as crucial for their growth and survival as is a 
faithful recognition of their efforts. That said, efforts to faithfully reflect fault lines and 
contradictions have been set against equal efforts to evaluate their potential sensitivity for 
involved actors and their organisations.  
 On the rare occasions when interviewees have asked to speak off the record in parts of 
interviews, or whenever the nature of what is being discussed is delicate, references to 
respondents have been anonymized. In most cases, particularly that of prominent agrarian 
organisation and government representatives whose public discourse is in tune with the cited 
allocutions, I have cited them with their real names, as a way of giving voice to actors whose 
discourse is most often rendered invisible by powerful competing forces. In most other cases, as 
with technical assistants of agrarian organisations, or mid-level civil servants, I refer to 
interviewees solely by their professional occupation and country of origin.  
Conducting qualitative social science fieldwork in the Global South served to demonstrate 
on more than one occasion the potentially counter-productive nature of instruments such as 
consent forms which in their original contexts (such as natural science research in the Global 
North) might be well-suited to safeguard the rights of respondents during fieldwork, but taken 
outside of them may backfire and risk breaking fragile informal trust building processes between 
researchers and respondents. In South American field sites, where interviewees either knew me 
previously or had been referred to me through close colleagues, signing consent forms became 
a mere formality.  
In the West African case, however, where I was essentially an outsider, initially without 
the backing of a host institution, the awkward bureaucratic handing of consent forms for 
signature prior to interviews (regardless of the fact that the forms' content essentially protected 





reinforced the fundamental importance of working with a locally-embedded host institution. 
IPAR’s researchers, who have been working closely with ROPPA for more than a decade, 
generously helped me to reach out, build trust, and engage in rich discussions with key ROPPA 
actors and their allies in government, academia, and international organisations.  
As mentioned above, a prominent feature of interviews conducted in both South America 
and West Africa, (particularly with older, more experienced interviewees), was the frequent 
reference to past historical periods that were crucial for the formation of present-day RAOs and 
their policy claims. The significance of these recorded verbal accounts (and secondary source 
investigations that accompanied them) only reinforced my conviction of the importance of 
understanding COPROFAM and ROPPA through its formative roots. Indeed, following Braudel’s 
(1958) conceptualisation of the longue durée, the insertion of contemporary social phenomena 
into their long-term historical contexts allows social scientists to gain an otherwise inaccessible 
perspective and depth for their present-day inquiries. The following two chapters aim to do this 
by looking at the origins of COPROFAM (chapter 3) and ROPPA (chapter 4) over the course of the 













This chapter examines the origins of COPROFAM, by looking at key formative moments of 
its national-level agrarian organisations throughout the 20th century, as well as their coalescing 
into a regional network in the 1990s-2000s. Drawing primarily on evidence from leaders, 
members and close collaborators of five of these – the Argentine Agrarian Federation (FAA), 
Uruguay's, National Commission for Rural Promotion (CNFR), Brazil's CONTAG, Paraguay's 
National Peasant Organisation (ONAC), and the United Chilean Peasants and Indigenous Peoples' 
Movement (MUCECH)28 – as well as secondary sources, it traces policy claims and dialogues by 
looking at how these have enabled to unite various rural class fractions spread across different 
agrarian territories of the South American Southern Cone. 
The regional agrarian organisation's wider origins have been thus described by former 
Uruguayan agriculture (1990-1993) and foreign (1995-1998) minister, later head of IFAD's 
Regional Coordination Unit for the MERCOSUR region and key COPROFAM supporter, Álvaro 
Ramos:   
Andean countries, countries of northern South America, Central America and the Caribbean, [had] very 
strong peasant movements […] a social force with much more influence on national policies than in [the 
Southern Cone]. Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil's three southern states which comprise a 
relatively homogenous region had what was called 'small and medium agricultural production'. [These] 
were like a relapse of producers who did not manage to access market conditions […]. They never had 
specific policies, as peasant movements of other Latin American regions sometimes did, given their social 
mobilisation, numerous contingents, and impacts on rural realities of those countries. [The latter] had much 
more strength than in this [Southern Cone] region. […] Brazil always has two or three [agrarian] faces, at 
least. The most well-known one [in Uruguay] is the southern one, which is part of this platense [i.e. Plata 
River basin] zone, of the humid Pampa […]. Then there is the Northeast face, as well as the Amazon one. 
[All three] are quite distinct.29 
 
I distinguish three broad types of rural class fractions, from within and across the subregion's five 
countries (see map in Figure 6 below): i) relatively more capitalised small and medium producers 
 
28 The choice of focusing on these rather than other member organisations reflects a concern for examining those 
that were most influential in COPROFAM's foundation, and that have the biggest weight in both their national 
contexts and within the regional platform. A comprehensive, regionalised account of all of COPROFAM's national 
member organisations has yet to be written, but falls outside the scope of this thesis.   





located in or near temperate zones (e.g. wider Pampa region formed by eastern Argentina, 
Uruguay, and southern Brazil); ii) small-scale peasants and agricultural wage labourers mostly 
living on drylands, savannahs, and subtropical humid zones (e.g. Brazil's Northeast, eastern 
Paraguay and northern Argentina's Humid Chaco); iii) indigenous and traditional peoples and 
communities in their various territories (e.g. Brazilian Amazon, Chilean Araucanía). 
 
Figure 6: South American Regional Agrarian Territories30.  
 
 





This categorisation stems from the three main constituencies represented in 
COPROFAM's self-identification of its membership base as peasant and indigenous family 
farmers. Following a chronological succession of South American political-economic cycles in 
interaction with three successive Global North-centred global food regimes (McMichael, 2009), 
the chapter focuses chiefly on the small and medium producer organisational formation under 
the first period (1870s-1930s), the peasant base under the second (1930s-1970s), and the 
merging of all three constituencies as COPROFAM under the third food regime (1970s-2010s).  
 
3.1. Formation of national agrarian organisations in South America's Southern Cone 
 
3.1.1 Small and medium family farmers in the Humid Pampa: FAA and CNFR 
 
 3.1.1.1 Migrant agrarian colonies in temperate zones under modernist governments 
 
The Southern Cone's specificity within the diverse agrarian landscape of Latin America 
and the Caribbean is often represented by its temperate small and medium producer zone, 
predominantly settled by Europeans through state-sponsored agrarian colonies in the late 19th-
early 20th centuries. FAA, COPROFAM's most ancient member organisation, stemmed from Italian 
and Spanish migrant tenant farmers' struggles for better working and land tenancy conditions in 
the Argentine Pampa. The movement was led by chacareros31 from Santa Fé province, with the 
help of priests, lawyers, and local tradesmen. Pests inflicted great losses in 1911, so that when 
the following plentiful harvest did not translate into equivalent gains in working and tenancy 
conditions, chacareros mobilized in protest, declaring a general strike on 25 June 1912 in the 
southern Santa Fé town of Alcorta. Subsequently celebrated as the organisation's founding act, 
the Grito de Alcorta32 was a tenant farmers' assembly that approved a list of demands, including 
indexing rental prices as a capped percentage of harvest gains, and making tenancy contracts last 
for a minimum of three years. Over 100.000 farmers from the provinces of Santa Fé, Córdoba, 
Entre Ríos, Buenos Aires, and La Pampa joined the strike, disrupting the country's agricultural 
 
31 As small and medium scale tenant farmers are referred to in Argentina. In 1911, tenant farmers represented 68% 
of total farmers in the province of Buenos Aires, 62% in Santa Fe and Entre Ríos, and 72% in Córdoba, and worked 
on plots of around 150 to 200 ha (Solberg, 1971).  





activities for three months. Despite police repression and imprisonment, local chacareros 
assemblies spread across the region, constituting the backbone for what officially became FAA 
on 1 August 1912 (Solberg, 1971).  
Uruguay's CNFR was created in 1915, with a similar southern European migrant family 
farmer base. The country's economy was dominated by extensive cattle-ranching and exports of 
meat, leather, and wool, with approximately 90% of rural land dedicated to these activities, and 
10% to grow crops in smaller plots on the country's southern and western edges (the bulk of 
Uruguay's arable lands and cradle of CNFR). As its former President Fernando López recalled33:  
The origins were in the first sociedades de fomento,34 which started in 1911, 1912. Several of these, […] 
mainly made up of migrants [sprung up near] train stations, built by the English […]. These were important 
points of concentration: where the train stopped […], the villages were [located], and some roads [had been 
built], as there were no other existing paths. The first sociedades de fomento, around [the Departments of] 
Colonia, some in Canelones, eight or nine of them, in Minas, Lavalleja, held an assembly and created CNFR 
in 1915. This organisation, in a way, was the first that attempted to confront the traditional model of rural 
organisations linked to large landowners: the Asociación Rural de Uruguay (ARU) – which is over 120 years 
old […] and still exists – and Federación Rural, created more or less at the same time as us. But basically 
CNFR was the organisation that represented the 'other' agriculture, not that of large landowners.  
 
Brazil's southern region had developed close economic, social and cultural links with 
neighbouring Uruguay and Argentina's eastern provinces over the previous centuries. This 
greater Pampa region was contested between Spanish and Portuguese colonial Empires and 
subsequent independent nation-states, given its strategic access to the Plata River mouth (Moniz 
Bandeira, 2006). By the early 20th century, agrarian class alliances were closely interwoven with 
common political-ideological influences:  
The doctrine of the Partido Republicano Rio-Grandense [PRR, which ruled Rio Grande do Sul – RS 
state during the 1893-1929 period] was composed of ideas directly inspired from the political 
credo of Auguste Comte. […] The same ideas encompassed the statist projects of the Uruguayan 
Colorados, whose leader, President Jorge Batlle, learned about Pierre Laffitte's Comtism in the 
same meetings at Rue Monsieur-le-Prince that [Brazilian positivist] Miguel Lemos had attended in 
the early 1880s. Similar values were present in the Radical [political party] program of Hipólito 
Yrigoyen, president of Argentina in 1916. […] Rio Grande do Sul, Uruguay, and Argentina, 
notwithstanding differences of scale, were similar socio-economic formations. In all three, the 
livestock export economy, firmly implanted throughout the 19th century, had to confront […] the 
smaller but dynamic alternative of polyculture oriented towards the internal market and new 
urban activities in industry and services. Hardworking farmers devoid of official credit, small and 
medium industrialists established in the larger cities, and a growing class of wage earners arriving 
 
33 Interview AO-SA1. 





from European migration waves constituted poles of necessity that were not unfrequently 
opposed to those of the old livestock ranchers (Bosi, 1993:280).  
  
Slavery (until abolition in 1888) and large-scale latifundia were more pervasive in the 
southern half of Rio Grande do Sul state,35 while its north-eastern quarter (e.g. Serra Gaúcha 
mountain range, Alto Uruguai river valley) became increasingly associated with small and 
medium farming colonies mostly formed by Italian and German migrants (Herédia, 2001). Land 
colonisation schemes gave these small plots to farm, later enabling them to sell surpluses to 
expanding middle class markets in cities of Brazil's South during the early 20th century.  
While in Argentina's Pampa region, the genocide and marginalisation of indigenous 
peoples during the westward Campaña del Desierto in the 1880s made way for the acquisition of 
very large land estates, particularly by Irish and Basque settlers, Italian migrants settled mostly 
in urban areas (especially Buenos Aires). However, some Italian colonies of small-scale farms 
were formed in the eastern and central provinces of Santa Fé and Córdoba, as well as western 
Mendoza (Saéz, 2001). Migrant colonies created strong and durable links with Argentine internal 
markets. Hence, while the country still imported wheat to feed its population in 1874, self-
sufficiency for this grain had been achieved by 1880, as a result of rising production in Santa Fé 
and Entre Ríos (Petrocelli, 2009). Agrarian colonies of Brazil and Argentina's temperate zones 
thus became emblematic of the small and medium producer base that was to found COPROFAM 
almost a century later.  
While the disproportionate economic and political might of South American rural 
oligarchies ruled out meaningful redistributive land reform, other land policy instruments were 
devised by the new generation of positivist statesmen from Rio Grande do Sul, Uruguay and 
Argentina mentioned in Bosi’s (1993) quote above. Taxation was a key policy device used by both 
the PRR administrations in RS and the Colorado party in Uruguay. A progressive territorial land 
tax, from which small plots were exempted, instituted by RS state governor Borges de Medeiros 
(1898-1908, 1913-1928) in 1902 was the first of its kind in Brazil (Buccelli, 2016). In parallel, the 
price of unproductive lands for acquisition by new landholders was considerably reduced through 
 
35 Interview with former MDA minister (2003-2006, 2014) and Rio Grande do Sul Vice-Governor (1998-2002) Miguel 





a decrease in taxation of land sales: hence, "the unproductive [landholder] paid a lot of tax, and 
transmitted it below its [actual] value. This [unified] the Castilhismo36 culture of the republicans, 
with this family farming base".37 Former public lands which had been illegally grabbed by 
extensive cattle-ranchers were also coercively taken back by Brazilian southern state authorities 
during the same period (Bosi, 1993).   
South of the Chuí river, the governing coalition of Uruguay's reformist President José 
Batlle y Ordoñez (1903-1907, 1911-1915) attempted to use similar land policy instruments to 
shift state support towards more intensive small-scale agricultural and livestock production, 
against predominance of the extensive latifundio. The more radical wing of Batllismo tried to 
pass bills in parliament to confiscate public lands from the hands of the rural oligarchy back to 
the state (as in neighbouring RS), or directly expropriate large unproductive landholdings for 
redistribution and conversion to intensive farming. Despite resistance from the cattle-ranching 
latifundista lobby to these bills, the second Batlle administration managed to implement a 
progressive land tax (Maubrigades, 2009) paralleling the RS experience (Bosi, 1993). President 
Batlle said in a public speech in 1903: 
Property, in reality, should not belong to anyone, or, better said, it should belong to all […]. The 
owners of our lands are a limited number of people and our peasants have to work for them for 
an infinitely low monthly wage, while these [lands] make great fortunes […]. Progressive land tax, 
that is, a tax that becomes higher as the value of land increases, makes the interest in owning 
large properties decrease if they do not employ them in a way that produces extraordinary 
utilities (Batlle, 1969, cited by Maubrigades, 2009:12). 
  
Paraguay was unable to implement such reformist agrarian policy due to severe 
destruction and loss of 80% of its male population in the Triple Alliance War (1864-1870), and to 
its landlocked position. The Paraguayan government managed to float bonds on the London stock 
market in the 1870s to stimulate European migrant agricultural colonisation schemes. However, 
"the incapacity to honour payments for the London bonds and the spectacular failure of the first 
migrant settlements would shatter any hopes of imitating, even in part, the model of the 
 
36 The term Castilhismo is in reference to Júlio de Castilhos: first governor of Rio Grande do Sul state after the 
Proclamation of the Republic (1889), he was the main positivist gaúcho leader who almost single-handedly drafted 
the modernizing RS state Constitution of 1891, and paved the way for subsequent governors Borges de Medeiros 
and Getúlio Vargas. Vargas would later become Brazil's longest serving Head of State in the 20th century (1930-1945, 
1950-1954), and its most influential political figure during its developmentalist heyday of 1930-1964. 





Southern neighbours" (Herken, 2011:24-25). By the early 1880s, a large-scale sale of public lands 
had enlarged the latifundio land structure in a similar way as the Westward expansion of the 
Argentine agricultural frontier (Ibid).  
 
3.1.1.2 State-promoted wide rural labouring class alliance in Perón's Argentina 
 
The relationship of FAA's members to Argentine agricultural workers in its formative years 
illustrates the difficulties and pitfalls of worker-peasant-middle class alliances, which tend to be 
tested in times of economic strife. The tenant farmers of the humid Pampa region, who usually 
relied on their own labour force, also hired seasonal migrant agricultural workers during yearly 
harvests. Influenced by anarcho-syndicalist ideals brought by Italian and Spanish migrants, the 
first Argentine agricultural labour unions sprang simultaneously to FAA, and voiced demands for 
twelve-hour shifts (as opposed to the excruciating sixteen daily work hours), and better wages in 
the face of their sharp decline after World War I (WWI). Following rejection, rural workers went 
on strike in December 1919 (Solberg, 1971). However, rather than closing ranks with labourers 
suffering similar repression that they had endured when pressing for better tenancy conditions, 
FAA's newspaper La Tierra defended the government's repressive measures and joined landed 
elites' and mainstream press attempts to delegitimize the agricultural workers' movement by 
blaming the unrest on outside agitators, thereby reproducing a type of accusation that had often 
been directed by the same dominant sectors to FAA in their own strikes (Ibid)38.  
Conversely, FAA's collaborative relationship with president Juan Domingo Perón's 
developmentalist project in the 1940s and 1950s shows how broad alliances are not just the 
result of narrowly perceived class interests depending on each conjuncture, but can also be built 
through government-mediated participatory deliberation and negotiation. Perón's 
administrations (1946-1955), which had as their essential support base the national industrial 
sector and urban working class, also sought to promote the interests of both rural workers and 
 
38 That is not to say that FAA's membership was unanimous in this approach, as illustrated by some of the 
organisation's links to the small but actively militant Socialist Party, as well as the existence of a more radical wing 
within its ranks, which represented a challenge to the organisation's leadership up until the 1930s (Solberg, 1971). 





small and medium farmers. Hence, Perón approved the Rural Worker's Statute39 (1944) when he 
was still Secretary of Labour, providing agricultural workers with an unprecedented recognition 
of economic and social rights.  
Established by decree in 1944 and ratified by Congress during Perón's first presidential 
mandate in 1947, the Rural Worker's Statute was a milestone in Argentina's labour legislation, 
comparable to Brazil's 1963 equivalent law (see section 3.1.2). Indeed, legally enshrining modern 
labouring rights (e.g. minimum wage, shelter, Sunday rest, paid leave) for the urban working class 
was one thing. Extending these to the country's entire rural territory, which latifundio oligarchies 
considered to be de facto under their own jurisdiction (typically under paternalistic semi-feudal 
labour relations), rather than by a nationally enforced labour code, was an entirely different 
matter. This was to generate fierce resistance by landed elites against Perón (Rouquié, 1982). Yet 
the rural labour law was also initially opposed by FAA.40  
In a speech to FAA in 1947, Perón explained the rationale for creating the Argentine 
Institute of Promotion and Exchange (IAPI), which would provide the necessary fiscal space for 
the Justicialista governments' wider rural labouring class unity strategy: 
There is an economic cycle that the country must respect, which is production, industrialisation, 
commercialisation, and consumption. The state must, therefore, link together these four operations. This 
chain-linking implies giving a national solution to the agrarian problem (El Ciudadano y la Región, 2015: 1). 
 
By 'nationalising' agricultural trade, Perón meant regulating agricultural exports by 
ensuring agricultural producer prices were set by the state as unique purchaser of all 
commodities before they were processed and/or exported. This enabled to guarantee revenues 
for small and medium producers, whose vulnerability to international price volatility was much 
higher than that of larger-scale exporters. The resulting national price regulating and processing 
system could capture "differential agrarian rent", understood "not as the product of an individual 
or social group's 'effort', but […] as the exceptional climate and soil conditions of [Argentina's] 
Pampa zone and high international food prices" (El Ciudadano y la Región, 2015: 1). Indeed, 
despite Argentina's tremendous agricultural export growth during WWII, fiscal resources were 
constrained, given concentrated appropriation of agrarian rent through private control of storage 
 
39 Estatuto del Peón Rural. 





and transport infrastructure networks (ports, silos, railroads) and financing mechanisms by 
Argentina's rural oligarchies and foreign capital. Reclaiming public regulation of production, 
transport, and distribution through IAPI's chain-link coordination allowed for the economic 
surplus related to favourable agricultural conditions and concentrated land ownership of the 
Pampa region to be reinvested to a much wider pool of beneficiaries on a national scale.41  
The policy implications of managing IAPI's captured agrarian rent against competing rural 
interests were negotiated through participatory policy mechanisms created during Perón's 
tenure. FAA obtained that IAPI would compensate chacareros if prices fell below previously 
negotiated amounts. IAPI's subsidized compensations enabled family farmers to both maintain 
social reproduction conditions and pay for agricultural workers' wage increases despite declines 
in producer prices. Producer price setting involved intense participation and negotiation between 
FAA delegates and public authorities in local assemblies. This measure was fundamental to 
reduce tensions between small and medium agricultural producers and wage labourers. 
Moreover, whereas the state had made the hiring of temporary agricultural labourers for 
harvesting work compulsory, this changed under FAA pressure, after a 1949 norm allowed 
producers' to alternately use their own family labour in order to minimize production costs 
(Olivera, 2002).  
Different policy spaces in which FAA participated under Perón's governments included 
the state agricultural research institution,42 employer-worker collective negotiation 
commissions,43 and local councils to facilitate access to credit for cooperatives.44 The latter were 
usually located at the local offices of Argentina's main public bank (Banco Nación), and composed 
by members of cooperatives, FAA, and civil servants from the ministry of Agriculture and Banco 
Nación. Differently from the urban and rural labour movements that gave full political support to 
the Peronista administrations of 1946-1955, FAA made a point of maintaining its political 
autonomy. Yet it grew significantly in capillarity, partly as a result of its cooperatives' system 
 
41 IAPI's fortunes were to be short-lived, however. The state agency was gradually deprived of its policy-making 
capacities from the mid-1950s following Perón's overthrow, and eventually extinguished in 1991 (El Ciudadano y la 
Región, 2015). 
42 Consejo de Investigaciones Agrícolas. 
43 Comisiones Paritarias de Trabajo Asalariado. 





strengthening, through participation in local policy negotiation assemblies and councils 
promoted under Perón's governments (Olivera, 2002). Thus "the quantity of local sections, 
individual members, affiliated cooperatives, volumes of production that [FAA member] 
organisations managed was vertiginously multiplied" (Ibid:135).  
Perón's administration also made efforts to bolster the pre-existing National Agrarian 
Council,45 which was tasked with planning and undertaking an agrarian reform (an FAA demand). 
The social function of land property (SFLP) was a prominent concept in Latin American legal 
debates from at least the early 1930s, as exemplified by its inclusion in a draft version of Brazil's 
1934 Constitution promoted by president Getúlio Vargas (Guimarães, Medeiros, 1997) and its 
endorsement in Argentina's short-lived 1949-1955 Constitution46. Indeed, "most Latin American 
Constitutions had incorporated the social function of property" by the mid-20th century 
(Etchichury, 2019:1023). The concept struck a moderate reformist balance between legally 
upholding private property while curbing its excesses to benefit the common good through state 
regulation.  
It was particularly promoted by the Catholic Church's social doctrine in defence of 
redistributive agrarian reform (Prunotto, 1984), but as a softer, more 'acceptable' alternative to 
the abolition of private property advocated by Communist parties and their rural wings. Given 
that much of South America's rural movements have roots across both progressive Catholic and 
Communist or Socialist parties' tendencies, SFLP emerged in public debates on land policy as a 
key discursive frame. In a document summarizing FAA's position on land policy issues, its author 
explicitly refers to the Catholic Church's social doctrine to substantiate his defence of 'integral 
agrarian reform'. This includes a citation of Pope John XXIII's Mater et Magistra (1961)47 stating 
that "private property naturally has an intrinsic social function", and that anyone that benefits 
from it "must necessarily execute it to their own benefit and to that of others" (Prunotto, 1984:3). 
Calling for "preventing parasitic speculation on the soil" and the "necessity for a more just 
 
45 Consejo Agrario Nacional.  
46 Interview CS-SA27. 






distribution of land property", FAA reaffirmed that "land property has an individual function and 
a social function" (Ibid:14).  
Uruguay's CNFR also prioritised SFLP from at least the 1940s, when it pushed for state-
sponsored land colonisation in favour of its small and medium producer base. CNFR members 
often state this as a landmark in the organisation's history when speaking of contemporary 
struggles for equitable land distribution. As stated by CNFR and COPROFAM former president 
Fernando López (2008:2) "In Uruguay, the [land] Colonisation law was brought about by our 
organisation after [it organized] a congress on the social function of land in 1945" leading to the 
creation of the National Colonisation Institute (INC) in 1948. Despite many attempts to extinguish 
the institute since then, "CNFR has always remained very alert on this theme and held intense 
negotiations and mobilisations that prevented its extinction" (Ibid). However modest they may 
have been, concrete gains made in terms of access to land for family farmers in latifundia-
dominated Argentina and Uruguay have usually resulted from actions discursively justified by 
SFLP principles. 
Despite the lack of significant expropriation for land redistribution, frustrating initial 
expectations of Argentina's National Agrarian Council and FAA pressures for agrarian reform, 
Perón did introduce a land price freeze to generate what he dubbed a "tranquil [agrarian] reform" 
(Tifni, 2018:15). This contributed to eventually consolidate most of FAA's tenant farmers into 
propertied small and medium producers. In the words of a former ministry of Agriculture civil 
servant:  
Federación Agraria is over 100 years old and its origins are precisely in the struggle for land, for tenancy 
[conditions]. The people […] who are today in Federación Agraria in many cases became large[r-scale 
farmers]. Because in Argentina, although there was no agrarian reform, there was a long period of land 
tenancy price freeze [from the 1940s to 1960s]. This meant that […] the [land rental] business became 
uninteresting for landowners and enabled tenants to purchase. It enabled a large number of producers to 
gain access to land. Not in the central nucleus of the Pampa Húmeda, but in other places, for instance 
western Buenos Aires province, many places like that […]. A large number of tenants became landowners. 
These are basically Federación Agraria members. Besides others who are [still] tenants [as they were] in 
the early 20th century, when the struggle for land began.48  
 





Yet Perón's land price freeze begun in 1948 (Tifni, 2018) signalled a tactical retreat, as it 
replaced a previously more radical stance on agrarian reform. The interruption of land 
colonisations and latifundio expropriations that year (Balsa, 2012) coincided with rising inflation 
and signs of Argentina's increasing dependency on the US49, whilst Europe under Marshall Plan 
conditions considerably reduced its Argentine food imports (Moniz Bandeira, 1995). Even at its 
height, industrial policy in Argentina stopped short of generating a heavy industrial goods 
production capacity. This was partly achieved in Brazil, but neither country managed to produce 
capital goods at sufficient scale. Correspondingly, Argentina's internal market (emerging middle 
classes and industrial workforce) barely constituted a sufficiently wide domestic demand pool for 
industrialisation (de Janvry, 1981). Moreover, the US did not depend on meat and wheat imports 
like the UK, and thus could impose its conditions on Argentina more forcefully than Britain under 
the previous (first) food regime (Moniz Bandeira, 1995; Frank, 1970; Balsa, 2012).  
Resumption of economic growth in Europe with Marshall Plan funds and increased 
production of grains by the US since the 1930s engendered full deployment of the second food 
regime by the late 1940s and early 1950s, characterized by overproduction in the centre and 
dumping of surpluses (often in the form of 'food aid') in peripheral countries (Friedmann and 
McMichael, 1989; Moyo and Yeros, 2005). Under the 1954 Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act, US surpluses of wheat, corn, rice, cotton, tobacco were sold below market prices 
across the periphery, particularly in Latin American countries (which, excluding Argentina and 
Uruguay, are net wheat importers) (de Janvry, 1981). Thus, the interim conservative Brazilian 
government of João Café Filho that followed Getúlio Vargas' suicide (1954) negotiated the Wheat 
Agreement with the US, which greatly "augmented their participation in the proportion of 
[Brazilian] imports from 9% in 1955 to 38% in 1956 while Argentina's fell from 91% to 62%" 
(Moniz Bandeira, 1995:95). This attended both US interests and those of the Argentine 
opposition to Perón who, notwithstanding partial loss of the Brazilian export market, aimed to 
 
49 Argentina's share of the global grain export market also declined sharply after WWII, partly as a result of US and 
European recovery under the second food regime: whereas before the war, the South American country exported 
"6.5 million tonnes of maize (64% of world demand), by 1950-1954 it did not sell more than 1 million tonnes" 





undermine the Justicialista administration, in alliance with Brazil's conservative União 
Democrática Nacional (UDN) (Ibid).  
Although gains for labour had been much more prominent in the cities, the rural masses 
also constituted an important source of political support from the 1930s onwards, when agro-
exporting oligarchies were in a position of strategic retreat, given the less favourable external 
conditions at the time. Political discourse from even conservative politicians conceded on the 
often unproductive and idle nature of large estates (Balsa, 2012). Nevertheless, whereas the left- 
and centre-advocated solution was redistributive agrarian reform, the right warmed to a 
modernisation discourse on green revolution technologies (linked to foreign multinationals) and 
agro-industrial integration (linked to national industries). This strategy of so-called "conservative 
modernisation" prevailed after military coups across the region halted the more significant 
efforts at land redistribution undertaken in South America, particularly in Andean countries' 
Bolivia, Chile and Peru (1950s-1970s) (Delgado, 2005; Lipton, 2009; Chonchol, 2003). Yet 
peasants' struggles for agrarian reform proved formative for the rural labour unions and social 
movements that eventually coalesced at national level into Brazil's CONTAG, Paraguay's ONAC, 
and Chile's MUCECH - COPROFAM's member organisations with the largest contingents of 
peasants and agricultural wage labourers. 
 
3.1.2 Wage workers, peasants, and family farmers united in Brazil’s CONTAG 
 
In neighbouring Brazil, despite the timid appearance of agricultural worker unions in the 
1930s and early 1940s, it was not until the late 1940s and early 1950s that rural wage workers' 
strikes became more common. The latter were coupled with legal action in the country's labour 
courts demanding recognition of labour rights50 (minimum wage, holidays) based on the 1943 
Consolidation of Labour Laws51 (CLT). Although CLT in theory only applied to urban workers, it 
was frequently invoked as a benchmark for rural cases (Medeiros, 1989)52.  
 
50 Some of these were successful, such as recognition in 1951 by the Regional Labour Tribunal of São Paulo of the 
right to paid holidays to 'colonos and other agricultural wage earners' (Medeiros, 1989:24).  
51 Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho. 
52 Given the urban bias of Brazil's 1943 labour legislation, attempts were initially made to consider workers in rural 





Rural workers and small-scale peasants became increasingly influenced by the 
underground activities of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB). Founded in 1922, the PCB self-
reorganised after 1943 to become a mass party seeking to expand its bases among both urban 
and rural workers.53 Regarding the latter, the term 'peasant' (camponês) became increasingly 
used by the PCB to encapsulate a wide range of rural labouring classes, going beyond agricultural 
wage labourers to also include different types of tenant farmers (parceiros, meeiros, 
arrendatários), squatters (posseiros), and small landowners (pequenos proprietários) (Medeiros, 
1989).54 This broad terminology and political vision was later influential in forming a national 
agrarian confederation premised upon unity amongst different rural labouring class fractions.  
Two other factors of unity for what would become CONTAG deserve attention: the overarching 
goal of agrarian reform as a rallying plank, and the struggle to achieve state recognition of rural 
unions through a legally-sanctioned rural workers' statute. 
As per its third National Conference in 1946, the PCB's strategy of facilitating the creation 
of rural labour unions involved giving support to peasants' more immediate demands, since 
achieving real – albeit piecemeal – policy advances served as powerful evidence of how collective 
action could contribute to the improvement of their everyday living conditions. The PCB 
organised a first national-scale meeting to elect Brazilian representatives and voice its 
programmatic priorities ahead of the International Conference of Agricultural Workers, held in 
October 1953 in Vienna, Austria. Shortly thereafter, the Second National Conference of 
Agricultural Labourers and Workers in 1954 in São Paulo55 saw the creation of Brazil's first 
national scale organisation of rural workers: ULTAB (União dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores 
Agrícolas no Brasil).  
 
53 Although outlawed in 1947 by the semi-democratic regime of 1946-1964, the PCB went underground and 
remained active throughout this period, cultivating ties with more militant sectors of Getúlio Vargas’ and João 
Goulart’s Brazilian Labour Party (PTB).  
54 This was part of a conscious effort to build the widest possible class base to implement a 'democratic-bourgeois 
revolution'. The latter entailed an alliance not just with urban labourers, but also with the 'national industrial 
bourgeoisie', following the PCB's stagiest theory, which predicated full development of capitalist productive forces 
as a precondition for socialism (Medeiros, 1989).  
55 The conference had 303 representatives, including wage labourers (from sugar, coffee, rice, and cacao 
plantations), tenant farmers, and small or medium producers from 16 different states attending. 21 subsequent 
encounters of rural workers would occur between 1955 and 1961 (see Figure 7 below), most of them at federated 





The encompassing nature of the conference final document's definition of 'agrarian 
reform' reflected the PCB's efforts to integrate diverse sectors of the countryside.56 Though seen 
as a crucial first step, against which resistance of the rural oligarchies was strongest, wide-scale 
land redistribution was not the sole policy mechanism envisaged by the wider-ranging concept 
of agrarian reform. Indeed, part of ULTAB's rural social base included peasant family farmers 
(with and without land titles), whose policy priorities focused on support to agricultural 
production. Moreover, though agricultural labourers and other landless peasants' focus was 
primarily on securing access to land, the presumed following step involved obtaining support for 
production57. Convergence towards this type of comprehensive understanding of agrarian 
reform during the 1950s-1960s helped consolidate the social category of the peasant as 
encompassing not only landless agricultural wage labourers, but also small and medium scale 
farmers who had informal or formalised access to land (Medeiros, 1989; Teixeira, 2018).  
Besides the rural unions organised by the PCB, CONTAG's other main formative branch 
originated in rural organisations linked to the Catholic Church. A succession of episcopal meetings 
in the 1950s that raised concerns with social injustice in the Brazilian countryside led to a rise of 
unionisation sparked by local church-linked organisations. Starting in Rio Grande do Norte (RN) 
state, through the initiative of rural extension service organisation Serviço de Assistência Rural 
(SAR), in association with church-linked radio stations, agricultural labourers were informed 
about their rights and encouraged to organise into local unions.58 Strengthened by popular 
education institution Movimento de Educação de Base (MEB) (created by government decree in 
1961), and supported by Brazil's National Bishops Confederation (CNBB), the experience spread 
to other states, e.g. Circulos Operários (São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro) and Frentes Agrárias (Rio 
Grande do Sul).  
   
 
56 "Understood as a measure of social justice, agrarian reform was viewed as the distribution of latifundiários' land 
to the agricultural workers and landless labourers, or smallholders with insufficient land; of obtaining a consolidated 
property land title for posseiros, occupiers, and land colonos; of measures to support production (technical 
assistance, easy and cheap credit, supply of machinery and tools, price guarantees, support to cooperative 
movement); prohibition of […] semi-feudal forms of labour exploitation, such as unpaid work […]; guaranteeing 
indigenous [peoples] the [rights to] lands they occupied" (Medeiros, 1989:32).  
57 Interview IR-SA3. 






Figure 7: Brazil's President João Goulart at ULTAB's 1st Congress in Belo Horizonte, November 
1961. Source: CPDOC/FGV. 
 
CNBB-promoted rural unionism emphasized defending agricultural labourers' rights, and 
framed agrarian reform as a process that would secure the rural family household and property, 
straying away from any mention of class struggle. However, youth and student Catholic 
organisations59 defended a more radical approach, influenced by Christian Humanism, and thus 
competed not only with the PCB in enrolling agricultural workers into unions, but also with 
conservative Church segments. The Catholic youth's drive for rural unionisation propelled their 
own more autonomous political organisation in 1962, Ação Popular60 (Teixeira, 2018; Medeiros, 
1989). Stemming from both genuine concern with rural masses' living conditions and a strategy 
of disputing the rural social base being won over by the PCB, Ação Popular emerged as a powerful 
 
59 Juventude Universitária Católica (JUC), Juventude Operária Católica (JOC), and Juventude Estudantil Católica (JEC).  





social force. It effectively managed to compete with the Communist Party and with the Peasant 
Leagues,61 a third non-unionised social force channelling rural labourers' struggles. 
Executive orders passed in 1962 to regulate rural unionisation – allowing for only one 
union to officially represent municipality-level agricultural workers – led to a race between 
existing PCB and Catholic Church rural organisations to become officially recognised first in each 
locality. Federations uniting dozens of local unions across Brazil's federated states were 
subsequently created. The process was accelerated by legislative approval of the Rural Worker's 
Statute62 (ETR) (2 March 1963), which included provisions on rural unionisation. The National 
Confederation for Workers in Agriculture (CONTAG) was eventually created to nationally bring 
together both PCB- and church-linked unions and federations. Hence CONTAG's foundational 
congress (20 December 1963) had delegates from "263 recognized rural unions, 480 undergoing 
official recognition by the Ministry of Labour, and 29 federations from 19 states of Brazil" 
(Teixeira, 2018:86).  
The 1963 Rural Worker Statute both recognized rural workers' economic and social rights 
and established conditions for their organisation into local rural labour unions. Insomuch as it 
was strongly inspired by the 1943 labour act, it inherited the Vargas-era corporatist model based 
on representation monopoly and labour union unity.63 This meant that only one representative 
entity could speak for the entire sector.64 These top-down features of state-monitored labouring 
class representation were nevertheless a boon in the final months of the semi-democratic regime 
as they ensured CONTAG had solid national-level scale representation and country-wide 
capillarity before the 1964 onset of a two-decade military regime and its systematic repression, 
intimidation, and co-optation attempts65. CONTAG's foundation on the basis of single national 
rural labouring class representation would ensure its capacity to remain united throughout the 
following decades, despite its considerable internal ideological and socio-economic 
 
61 Ligas Camponesas. 
62 Estatuto do Trabalhador Rural. 
63 Principles known in Portuguese as monopólio da representação and unicidade sindical.  
64 CONTAG would retain this monopoly of rural labour union representation from its creation in 1963 until the 1988 
Federal Constitution of the new post-military democratic regime. The latter recognized the plurality of the labour 
movement in the face of new labour unions that emerged from the late 1970s and contributed to defeat the military 
regime in its final years (Favareto, 2006; Selwyn, 2012).  





heterogeneity. Both the 1963 Rural Worker Statute and CONTAG's name referred to 'workers in 
agriculture', an expression that, like the term 'peasant' used by PCB in preceding decades, 
encompassed the wide diversity of rural people who worked the land, whether it formally 
belonged to them or not. 
After the 1964 coup and top-down 'intervention' inside CONTAG by the military regime's 
appointment of José Rotta, a conservative union leader from São Paulo's Círculo Operário, an 
internal election in 1968 eventually challenged that leadership. The alternative plank formed by 
representatives of north-eastern states in alliance with Rio Grande do Sul, led by José Francisco 
(from Pernambuco)66 won by one vote, taking back the direction of the national confederation. 
After taking office in April 1968, the incoming leadership organised a large CONTAG gathering to 
discuss the organisation's strategy. This proved crucial in later expanding CONTAG's reach 
throughout Brazil's states, and multiplying the number of affiliated unions.67 Yet a key faultline 
between Brazil's Northeast and South (home to Brazil's largest peasant family farmer 
constituencies) remained: access to productive land. It divided the mostly landless or land-short 
agricultural workers/peasants of the Northeast drylands and the mostly poor but landowning 
family farmers of the Southern temperate zones. As described by CONTAG former Director and 
Secretary General, Francisco Urbano:   
We organised a large encounter […] to rethink CONTAG [where] we spent the whole week debating. The 
big internal conflict between farmers of the South who wanted to discuss agricultural policy returned. And 
we from the North/Northeast called them all latifundiários, because we wanted land. That's when they 
threatened: "either you discuss our interests, or we're going to create the small landowners' union, and the 
small landowners' confederation" […]. So we started to show them that founding the small landowners' 
union [would link them to] the confederation of the self-employed, [which] would have to be affiliated to 
the employers' confederation. So they would have to go to [large-scale farmers' organisation] CNA.68 A big 
debate emerged. We said: "Ok, you're a small landowner. What's the difference between you and a wage 
labourer? You have a little house, a little plot of land, and a place to work […]. You're poor, miserable, 
without any right. These guys here also have nothing, and the difference is that they don't have that little 
house. These tenant farmers, same thing". We called this: 'similitude of living conditions'. Because of […] 
the proximity between the everyday lives of each of these [types of workers in agriculture], they should be 
together. As long as programmes, actions are created to defend the small landowners […]. To convince the 
Gaúchos, Catarinenses, Paranaenses69 not to leave.70  
 
66 Francisco would preside the organisation during more than a decade (1968-1979). 
67 Following the 1943 CLT model, the 1963 ETR determined that the labour movement in the countryside would be 
constituted of unions at municipal level, organised in federations at state level, under one confederation at national 
level.  
68Confederação Nacional da Agricultura. 
69 Inhabitants of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná - the three Southern states of Brazil.  






 The 'similitude of living conditions' argument enabled to justify 'differentiated agricultural 
policy' as one of the pillars of a 'national integration programme' that came out of the 1968 
encounter, and was to be disseminated across each of the country's state-level federations, 
through a union training and capacity-building line of action. Another key pillar included a 
strategy to defend wage labourers, including by hiring lawyers, upholding clauses from the Rural 
Workers' Statute, and making collective (as opposed to individual) claims in the country's labour 
courts: 
To generate a political force, if you create a legal case with 50 instead of just 1 against a factory, then you're 
creating a political platform […]. Although you do run the risk of one decision putting at risk all 50 
[labourers]. But soon enough you have the strength to confront this question.71 
 
  A further line aimed to uphold the 1964 Land Statute72, to improve conditions of tenant 
farmers and "creating [land] conflicts, to be able to request expropriation, when the social 
function of property, of land, is not being fulfilled".73 CONTAG's national integration and training 
programme, with one pillar for each key segment, together with a strategy of creating municipal-
level unions and state-level federations, enabled CONTAG to consolidate its diverse membership. 
Indeed, after the 1968 internal election based on Northeast-South unity reasserted the 
organisation's strength, CONTAG leaders were able to negotiate with government technocratic 
wings and ensure some social service delivery to rural areas, while maintaining the regained 
autonomy of its top management. This occurred despite the military regime's severe repression 
of many local agricultural labour union members. 
Increasing tensions in the countryside in many Latin American countries, coupled with the 
Cuban revolution in 1959 had created a domestic and international environment that was initially 
favourable to redistributive land reform (1950s-early 1960s). The Cuban revolution and agrarian 
reform sparked fears within US and Latin American governments that its suddenly visible 
practical feasibility would lead to a spread of communim in the region. Indeed the US had recently 
imposed top-down redistributive agrarian reforms in South Korea (1950) and Taiwan (1953) to 
curtail the spread of communism in Asia after the 1949 Chinese revolution (Moraes, Árabe, and 
 
71 Ibid.  
72 Estatuto da Terra. 





Silva, 2008). Redistributive land reform was thus promoted in Latin America by the Kennedy 
administration's Alliance for Progress. The Organisation of American States (OAS) meeting, in 
partnership with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) and FAO in 
1961 led to the adoption of the Punta del Este Charter, in which member countries agreed to 
support  
integral agrarian reform programmes, to transform, where necessary, the unjust structure of land 
ownership and use, in order to substitute the regime of latifundios and minifundios by a fair property 
system, so that, complemented by adequate credit, technical assistance, commercialisation and 
distribution of their products, land would become, for those who work it, the basis of their economic 
stability, foundation of their welfare, and guarantee of their liberty and dignity (Guimarães, 1963: 228).  
 
This reformist discourse held sway among "urban-based liberal political forces (populists 
and Christian Democrats)" in the region (de Janvry, 1981:146). Alliance for Progress funding 
initially helped implement several agrarian reforms in the region (Lipton, 2009). It was supported 
by the structuralist theses of CEPAL economists, chiefly among them Celso Furtado, who served 
as Minister of Planning under Brazil's progressive government of João Goulart (1961-1964). 
Furtado saw "the inexistence of a modern agriculture, of a capitalist base, linked to the internal 
market" (Furtado, 2002:31 [1957]) as a key reason for frequent food supply and inflation crises 
(Delgado, 2005) and justification for the breaking up of outdated land tenure systems and labour 
relations. Another intellectual who served in Goulart's ministerial cabinet, Darcy Ribeiro, 
summed up that government's vision for agrarian reform, after citing the US Homestead Act of 
1862 as a reference:  
We wanted to […] create 10 million small [land]owners, for property to be better defended. It was a 
capitalist proposal. They said it was communism. Instead of 10 million of small landowners with 50, 100 
hectares each, they created a thousand super-landowners with 500.000 hectares, with 1 million hectares 
[each]. (Ribeiro, 1988: 38:33-38:48) 
 
 The modernisers of Brazil and Argentina during the 1930s-1960s indeed were not 
communists, but aimed for a national development path that would be sufficiently autonomous 
from both the US and the Soviet Union, something deemed unacceptable for US foreign policy at 
the height of the Cold War. The subsequent government of General Castelo Branco (1964-1967) 
had an explicitly US-aligned foreign policy (while successors resumed the more nationalist 





approved the Land Statute (Estatuto da Terra) in November 1964 (Mendonça, 2010) to contain 
social pressures by apparently yielding to some rural labouring classes' demands74.  
 Meanwhile in Paraguay, the authoritarian regime of Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989) 
initiated an approximation strategy with Brazil to reduce its dependency on Argentina (Moraes 
and Vieira, 2015:367). This occurred in parallel to its cooptation of part of the Paraguayan 
peasantry (Ezquerro-Cañete, 2018) by founding small farmer colonies near the Brazilian border, 
generating internal migration patterns from rural areas near Asunción towards the eastern 
border of the country (Setrini, 2011). This would in the future prove explosive (see chapter 5), as 
the Stroessner regime simultaneously created incentives for Brazilians to buy land (e.g. by 
removing legal constraints for land acquisition by foreigners), migrate, and settle in the very same 
eastern border region settled by Paraguayan beneficiaries of colonisation schemes (Moraes and 
Vieira, 2015; Galeano, 2004). It was reinforced by a geographical 'outsourcing' of Brazil's agrarian 
question by the Brazilian military regime, which, in addition to colonisation projects in Brazil's 
Amazon or other underpopulated internal 'agricultural frontier' regions, actively encouraged 
small-scale farmers to migrate and found colonies in Bolivia and Paraguay, with those countries' 
governments blessings (Zirker, 1994). 
 
3.1.3 Agrarian Leagues and agrarian reform: the origins of ONAC and MUCECH 
 
Brazil's Peasant Leagues – which had been a driving force of rural organisations from the 
mid-1950s (particularly in the Northeast, with strongholds in Paraíba and Pernambuco states) – 
started showing signs of decline by the early 1960s, partly as a result of increased competition 
for recruitment from the PCB's ULTAB and Catholic youths' Ação Popular into formal unions, 
which deviated from the Leagues' more diffuse and less hierarchical social movement strategy. 
This left the Peasant Leagues and other social movements (such as Master in Rio Grande do Sul) 
outside CONTAG's founding membership. Furthermore, the Leagues were internally divided 
between those who saw Cuban-inspired peasant revolutionary struggle as the only viable way to 
 
74 Among its surprisingly progressive features, the statute recognized the social function of land property and 
legalised a posteriori compensation of expropriation through debt titles rather than through a priori payments in 





overcome the latifundio (led by Clodomir Moraes), and those who favoured non-violent forms of 
direct action backed by the law to achieve agrarian reform (led by Francisco Julião) (Medeiros, 
1989). These internal contradictions coupled with increased repression of autonomous rural 
movements after 1964 meant that the Leagues had all but disappeared or gone underground by 
the second half of that decade.  
Agrarian leagues with similar features as those of Brazil in the 1950s nevertheless 
resurfaced elsewhere in the Southern Cone in the 1960s and 1970s, most significantly in the 
Paraguayan central Departments of its Oriental region (Misiones, Paraguarí, Cordillera, San 
Pedro, Concepción, Caaguazú, Guairá), as well as in Argentine northern and eastern Provinces 
(Chaco, Formosa, Misiones, Corrientes, north of Santa Fé)75. Most contemporary Paraguayan 
peasant family farmer organisations claim their origins in the rich experience of the Christian 
Agrarian Leagues (Ligas Agrarias Cristianas), particularly COPROFAM member ONAC, but also 
national counterparts (and LVC members) MCNOC (Mesa Coordinadora Nacional de 
Organizaciones Campesinas) and FNC (Federación Nacional Campesina) (Parra and Soares, 2003).  
Paraguay's Agrarian Leagues sprung from a combination of social forces, particularly in 
the southern Department of Misiones. There, the Stroessner regime  took advantage of increased 
resources awarded by the US Alliance for Progress after 1961 to initiate its Wheat Plan (Plan del 
Trigo). This was to be the ground for green revolution technologies' introduction in Paraguay to 
grow wheat and soya, and intensify pre-existing cotton production (Palau, 2015). Resulting 
increased demand for land put pressure on peasant family farmers' individual plots as well as on 
the campos comunales. These were collectively used grazing areas for cattle belonging to 
hundreds of adjacent peasant families, as a way of making the most out of increasingly scarce 
land (Telesca, 2014).  
When outsiders escorted by policemen enclosed a common grazing area in San Juan 
Ruguá, Misiones, over 400 peasant families self-organised and obtained an order from a higher 
military authority (a veteran from the 1930s Paraguayan-Bolivian Chaco War with whom many 
of the peasants had done their military service) to cancel the fencing of the field (Telesca, 2014). 
The peasants' successful defence of their land through collective mobilisation - fused with an 
 





increased presence of progressive missionaries and youth organisations connected to urban 
labour unions - laid the groundwork for the growth of Paraguay's Christian Agrarian Leagues.  
European-based Jesuits' 'return' to Paraguay in the 1920s-1930s (160 years after their 
expulsion by Spanish and Portuguese forces) to some of the towns that their forbearers had 
helped found in Misiones (Santa María, San Ignacio, Santa Rosa), would later spur an increase of 
Paraguayan Jesuits in the region from the 1950s.76 Their knowledge of the Guaraní language 
intensified their links with peasantries of southern Paraguay, leading to local articulation of 
groups reinforced by the youth organisations' activism. The Catholic Workers' Youth organisation 
(JOC) – created in 1940 – helped found the initial centre of the Christian Agrarian Leagues in Santa 
Rosa, and its first federation uniting several districts in the Department of Misiones in 1962. 
These rapidly spread to other Departments of Paraguay's Oriental region (Telesca, 2014).  
The growth of social Catholic organisations in urban and rural Latin America was 
influenced by the socially progressive encyclicals of Pope John XXIII (1958-1963)77 and Church 
reformism of the Vatican II Council (1962-1965), as well as the international Catholic labour 
movement – including the creation in 1954 of the International Movement of Agrarian and Rural 
Catholic Youth (MIJARC) in Belgium. It played a key role in fostering progressive thought and 
mobilising resistance at the height of South America’s authoritarian regimes (1960s-1970s), 
including Stroessner’s in Paraguay. 1960 saw the creation of the Christian Democrat Social 
Movement (future Christian Democrat Party - PDC in 1965) (Telesca, 2014), and inauguration of 
the Catholic University of Asunción (UCA) (Birch, 2011), followed in 1963 by the foundation of 
urban labour union Central Cristiana de Trabajadores (CCT) and its rural counterpart, Federación 
Cristiana Campesina (FCC) (Caravías, 2015).  
 
76 Persistent, if vague, collective memory of Jesuit 'missions' and their self-contained evangelized indigenous 
communities (along the present-day territory straddling Paraguay’s Misiones and Itapúa departments, Argentina’s 
Misiones province, and Northwestern RS state in Brazil) is until today part of agrarian organisations' symbolic 
discursive repertoire in the region, particularly Guaraní leader Sépé Tiaraju’s battle cry 'This land has owners!' (Essa 
terra tem dono!) when leading resistance against the Portuguese and Spanish expulsion of the missions from the 
1750s (Interviews AO-SA4 and CS-SA26).    
77 For instance, Mater et magistra (1961), aimed to update some of the principles set out in another previous key 
social Catholic text, Rerum Novarum (or "Rights and Duties of Capital and Labour") published by Pope Leo XIII in 
1891. Mater et magistra was addressed to "all workers of the world", emphasizing the rights of workers to organize 





The nascent Christian labour union movement was thus critical in expanding the initial 
grassroots experience of the agrarian leagues, although part of the leagues preferred to remain 
autonomous from the Christian Democrat party structure, urban labour movement, and Church, 
and founded FENALAC (Federación Nacional de Ligas Agrarias Cristianas) in 1965 (Telesca, 2014; 
Caravías, 2015) with a less hierarchical and formalised structure. Members of FENALAC 
purchased 3.000 ha of land in San Pedro Department and founded the community of San Isidro 
de Jejuí, which became a model for self-sustained collective farming and a centre of popular 
education for peasants (1969-1975). FENALAC's approach also influenced that of the organisation 
borne out of its merging with FCC in 1971, the Coordinación Nacional de Bases Campesinas 
Cristianas, known as KOGA (meaning 'planted' in Guaraní) (Caravías, 2015), which avoided 
permanent leadership structures, and rotated coordination functions amongst its members.  
The strong emphasis on popular education partly drew from the growth of Liberation 
Theology across the region. But the Leagues also made a concomitant reaffirmation of common 
agricultural work practices that harked back to ancient indigenous traditions, such as the minga, 
whereby several peasants would join forces to successively work on each of their neighbours' 
respective plots, thereby reducing drudgery and strengthening social ties (Caravías, 2015). 
Repression against the Christian Agrarian Leagues grew during the 1970s, becoming particularly 
violent and widespread between 1974 and 1976, when the leagues' members went underground 
(Ezquerro-Cañete, 2018). Survivors of the leagues would emerge again from the 1980s onwards, 
some of them becoming ONAC's co-founders78.  
The 1980s also saw the reactivation of Chilean agrarian organisations whose heyday had 
been in the 1960s, at the height of agrarian reform mobilisation in Latin America. MUCECH's 
formation was encouraged by Chile's cardinal Silva Henriquez. Henríquez had been one of the 
Catholic Church's key advocates for Chile's agrarian reform and had contributed by distributing 
and parcelling some of the Church's lands, before Christian Democrat president Eduardo Frei 
Montalva (1967-1970) initiated the national land redistribution process in earnest, kickstarted by 
the Agrarian Reform and Peasant Unionisation laws in 1967, and continued under Salvador 
Allende's (1970-1973) Popular Unity (UP) government (see Figure 8 below).  
 







Figure 8: Chile's Cardinal Silva Henríquez (left) and president Salvador Allende (centre).  
Source: www.memoriachilena.cl  
 
Despite the political strength of its conservative sectors supporting Chile's military 
dictatorship, the Catholic Church's progressive wing had a crucial role of mediation and alliance 
building in the 1980s-1990s between remnant segments of organisations created shortly prior to 
the 1967-1973 agrarian reform. Indeed, the agrarian reform process had a crucial role in the 
formation of agrarian organisations in Chile, given that its beneficiaries were also trained with 
rural extension and popular education tools to strengthen their unions and social movements, in 
order to consolidate land redistribution gains in the long term.79 Despite the agrarian 'counter-
reform' of the Pinochet regime (1973-1989), previous gains were not entirely obliterated, and 
agrarian organisations were ressuscitated from underground activity during Chile's democratic 
transition in the 1980s:  
MUCECH was born in 1987 […]. This was all sheltered by the Catholic Church, which supported [MUCECH] 
a lot. At that time, cardinal Silva Henríquez – this was the peasant's cardinal, he called us and told us: 'it is 
no good when the rats are scattered, [as] the cat takes advantage", in reference to the dictator [Pinochet]. 
Consequently, he said, 'unite'. And this kickstarted a political reflection process, because there were 
organisations from the Christian-Democratic world, the Socialist world, the Communist world. And 
 





previously they had been divided by ideological problems. But here was a common space. MUCECH takes 
shape in 1986 as a political alliance, which united small producers, agricultural workers, and the etnias. [The 
latter] were unrecognized, today [they are] referred to as pueblos originarios [i.e. indigenous peoples]. The 
Mapuche, the Aymara, at that time in Chile [were] not even [considered] part of society.80 
 
The Agrarian Leagues (Ligas Agrarias) of Argentina's northern and eastern Provinces in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, for their part, sprung essentially from workers of rural processing 
factories (cotton, tobacco, sugarcane) in semiarid or tropical regions, outside the temperate 
zones of the Pampa Húmeda. Their ideological references and political formation were also 
linked to Catholic youth movements, at times going against the orientation of the Church, but 
nonetheless perceived by the latter as potential alternatives or ramparts to the spread of 
communist-linked groups in the countryside. The Argentine leagues suffered from violent state 
repression, before and increasingly after the 1976 military coup (Waisberg, 2014) that 
precipitated Argentina into its last authoritarian regime (1976-1983). 
 
3.2 Political democracy and economic neoliberalism in the Southern Cone: the roots of 
COPROFAM’s formation 
 
From the late 1960s, the two-decade process initiated by Perón's land price freeze, 
through which a significant part of FAA's tenant farmer base had secured their access to land, 
had begun to be reversed (Tifni, 2018; Pérez, 2015). Argentina's Agricultural and Livestock Census 
of 1988 revealed a significant reduction in the country's total number of farms (compared to the 
previous 1969 census), the great majority of which (93%) were under 200 ha in size, a loss of 
more than 75.000 farms. In the Pampa region alone, the census revealed a disappearance of 
"almost half of the units under 100 ha, reduced to some 85.000 farms. Simultaneously, the 
average size of all [farms rose] from 278 to 379 ha" during the 1970s-1980s period (Pérez, 2015:4-
5). In sum, "FAA's social base became increasingly heterogeneous", posing considerable 
challenges to "unitarian political representation" (Pérez, 2015:21).  
The transformation of tens of thousands of FAA tenant farmers into small and medium 







establish alliances with organisations with which it had historically maintained a relation of 
confrontation" (Pérez, 2015:20), that is the large-scale latifundio and agribusiness organisations, 
SRA and CRA. At the other extreme, the permanence of a politicised smaller-scale farmer base, 
particularly in FAA's historical stronghold in southern Santa Fé, meant that a significant part of 
its membership allied itself with urban labour unions, such as CTA (Central de Trabajadores 
Argentinos) or MTA (Movimiento de Trabajadores Argentinos) (Ibid.). Moreover, the political 
force of more capitalized Pampa middle farmers within FAA blurred a more contrasting picture 
at the national territorial scale. Hence "a federado who produces soya [in or near the Pampa] is 
one thing, a [much less capitalised] federado agrario from Neuquén [in north-western Patagonia] 
is another".81 
The infamous 'lost decade' for Latin American growth set off by the debt crisis in the early 
1980s, which by some measures amounts more to a 'lost quarter century' in both poverty rates 
(Ocampo, 2014) and stagnation of the agricultural sector82 was particularly harsh on the 
impoverished masses of the South American countryside. But it also badly affected more 
consolidated medium producers, whose hopes of becoming well-to-do larger-scale farmers 
under the previous economic boom were now drastically dashed.83 Hence, in Argentina, 
 
The period initiated with the military dictatorship in 1976 concluding with the final crisis in 2001 [marks] a 
quarter century of Argentine decadence from several points of view, basically of deindustrialisation. But it 
is also in the last years of the 20th century a period of falling international prices, of gradual appreciation of 
the exchange rate, which generate profound agrarian crises. If one spoke to an Argentine in the 1990s, it 
seemed that 'the countryside' - let alone family farming - [but even] large agriculture, the [whole] 
countryside did not seem to exist, did not seem to have an important role in the Argentine economy.84  
 
Domestic contexts of declining industrial sectors in both Brazil and Argentina, whereby 
agricultural exports were increasingly used to guarantee fiscal results and reduce debt burdens 
(Delgado, 2005) under galloping hyperinflation crises that would only be stabilised in the 1990s 
(Ocampo, 2014) intertwined with increased trade liberalisation at global and regional levels. This 
combination of factors consolidated the Southern Cone's agricultural policy corollary of the 
neoliberal paradigm: public support to competitive larger-scale export-oriented agricultural 
 
81 Interview CS-SA13. 
82 Interview CS-SA8.  
83 Interview CS-SA26.  





sectors, and minimal social protection for those not deemed competitive enough under new 
liberalized trade rules.85 Under this logic, reflecting larger-scale farmer organisations' discourse 
that there was 'only one agriculture', and that those who could not compete under existing rules 
were to receive only social compensatory measures, there was little space for agricultural policies 
tailored to medium or smaller-scale agriculture.   
Neoliberal hegemony within both Northern development agencies and Southern country 
governments by the 1980s and 1990s accentuated in economic policy terms the conceptual 
division between small-scale peasant and middle family farmer in South America. Hence, "IICA, 
FAO, and governments of the region at the time envisioned a countryside where "those that go 
up [the social ladder] ascend, and those that do not must be catered to with social policies".86 
COPROFAM and those within government administrations and academia that backed their claims 
defended a much wider array of support policies for their represented base. As recalled by a 
Uruguayan former Minister of Agriculture (1990-1993) in tune with COPROFAM’s policy agenda, 
"we had very strong arguments with people from IICA, people from FAO, who did not see any 
convincing reason for políticas diferenciadas", i.e. specific policies.87 Differently from the 
compensatory social policy paradigm, políticas diferenciadas was part and parcel of COPROFAM 
country member organisations’ discourse across the region. These were to be sufficiently 
vigorous economic policies targeted at smaller-scale segments of South American agriculture to 
potentiate their economic production, processing and distribution capacities, while maintaining 
the peculiarity of the family farm as self-managed rural labouring economic unit (see chapter 6).  
 
3.2.1 Creation of a regional family farmer platform in the Southern Cone 
 
From the late 1980s, as negotiations for the creation of MERCOSUR were under way, 
large-scale farmer organisations of the four founding countries88 held regular meetings with 
 
85 Interview IR-SA1.  
86 Interview IR-SA1.  
87 Interview IR-SA1.  
88 These would go on to form the Federación de Asociaciones Rurales del Mercosur (FARM) in the mid-1990s. FARM 
members were the only rural organisations represented in MERCOSUR's Consultative Council in the 1990s, based on 





Ministers of Agriculture of the region through CONASUR (Consultative Council for Agricultural 
Cooperation of the Southern Area Countries). Though FAA and CNFR took part in CONASUR in 
the early 1990s, the lack of attention given to small- and medium-scale farmers' demands 
eventually led them to focus on creating  a separate regional organisation that would represent 
their specific interests (Riella, 2002).  
The Catholic Church-linked rural youth organisations that had helped found agrarian 
leagues in Paraguay and Argentina during the 1960s and 1970s also existed within Uruguay's 
family farmer organisations and cooperative movement.89 Silvio Marzaroli, who presided 
Uruguay's CNFR (1980s-1990s) and would become COPROFAM's first president, had built 
previous international networks (in Latin America, Europe, and Africa) as a member of global 
agrarian Catholic youth organisation MIJARC, including as its Vice-President (1967-1970).90 
CNFR's Marzaroli established contacts with CONTAG in Brazil, particularly through the latter's 
federation in neighbouring Rio Grande do Sul state (FETAG-RS), which at the time was presided 
by Alberto Broch.91  
Given the southernmost state's porous borders with both Uruguay and Argentina, FETAG-
RS members were deeply concerned about the impending perils of lifting trade barriers with the 
two Southern Cone neighbours92 after the signature of the Treaty of Asunción in 1991.93 They 
eventually discovered that their counterparts across the border were equally worried about the 
impending unrestricted entry of southern Brazilian agricultural products into their own borders. 
Broch accumulated knowledge on MERCOSUR related-issues through training given to FETAG-RS 
members at the time, which would later prove crucial in organizing with other COPROFAM 
members after he became Vice-President94 of CONTAG in 1995.  
 
89 The Centro Cooperativista Uruguayo, for instance, was founded in 1961, and influenced by the Economy and 
Humanism principles of French priest and activist Louis-Joseph Lebret (see chapter 4). Interview IR-SA1. 
90 Interview AO-SA4.  
91 Broch eventually became CONTAG's Vice-President, and subsequently President, as well as COPROFAM General 
Secretary and President (as COPROFAM’s top leadership role was subsequently named) on two separate occasions.  
92 As recalled by CONTAG's Luiz Vicente Facco: "There were many discussions between 1991 and 1994 on the Treaty 
of Asunción, preoccupation with milk, wheat, grapes, wine, peaches, pork, meat […]. There was a fear that Argentina 
and Uruguay were coming for us with free trade and would wipe out family farming". Interview AO-SA5.  
93 Signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, initiating the MERCOSUR regional integration process. 
94 Given Broch's first-hand experience and knowledge of international issues affecting family farming, CONTAG's 





MERCOSUR negotiations on trade tariffs and harmonisation of legislation were divided 
into sectorial working groups. Governments of the region allowed national-level family farmer 
organisations to take part in the meetings of Subgroup 8 on Agriculture,95 though their capacity 
to influence negotiations in that space was highly constrained. Faced with this impasse, Marzaroli 
organized several meetings of family farmer organisations from the founding countries of the 
regional bloc between 1993 and 1994, with support from the Red Interamericana de Agricultura 
y Democracia (RIAD).96 Thus in Porto Alegre,97 14 organisations of the region, including CONTAG 
and CUT, CNFR, FAA and Paraguay's FNC98 met to create COPROFAM in August 1994.  
Different terms had been used by COPROFAM's national organisations to designate their 
members in the years leading up to the regional agrarian organisation's formation. Yet two terms 
predominated: COPROFAM members either referred to themselves as peasants 
(campesino/camponês) or small and medium producers. At the time of its creation, CONTAG's 
base in Brazil's Northeast and Paraguay's Federación Nacional Campesina (FNC) referred to 
themselves as peasants. On the other hand, Uruguay's CNFR and Argentina's FAA members, as 
well as CONTAG's base in Brazil's South referred to themselves as small and medium producers.99  
After an internal restructuring phase between 1997 and 2000, COPROFAM elected a new 
Secretary General, CONTAG's Alberto Broch, who took over from the regional network's 
Uruguayan founder and first Secretary General, CNFR's Silvio Marzaroli. This transition coincided 
with COPROFAM's decision to expand beyond MERCOSUR's four founding member countries, 
incorporating Chile's MUCECH, Bolivia's CIOEC, and Peru's CCP.100 Organisations from Chile, Peru, 
 
95 Given its concomitant representation of agricultural wage labourers, CONTAG also took part in Subgroup 11 on 
Labour Relations, along with members of a previously existing regional network of labour unions, the Coordinadora 
de Centrales Sindicales del Cono Sur – CCSCS (Interview CS-SA1). CCSCS included Brazil's Central Única dos 
Trabalhadores - CUT, represented by its Director of Union Policy in the early 1990s, Miguel Rossetto, who would 
later become RS Vice-Governor (1998-2002) and MDA minister (2003-2006, 2014). CUT had created its own Rural 
Department in 1986, and would eventually merge with CONTAG in 1995 (until 2009) (see chapter 6).  
96 Interamerican Network of Agriculture and Democracy. A key funder of RIAD was the Swiss-based Charles Léopold 
Mayer Foundation for the Progress of Man, with whom Silvio Marzaroli had previously developed close contacts. 
Interview AO-SA4.    
97 The meeting was organized by CONTAG's Rio Grande do Sul state federation, FETAG-RS.   
98 FNC eventually left COPROFAM and joined CLOC/LVC several years later. Interviews AO-SA4 and AO-SA5.   
99 Interviews AO-SA4, and AO-SA1.  
100 Interview AO-SA4. At the peak of its membership, COPROFAM was composed of 12 member organisations from 
7 South American countries (the 4 MERCOSUR founding countries plus Chile, Bolivia, and Peru), congregating 125 





and Bolivia that joined COPROFAM in the early 2000s referred to themselves first and foremost 
as campesinos, as reflected in those organisations' names (Berdegué, 2014). Reflecting the social 
base of its expanded membership, COPROFAM's documents from its next assembly in 2003 
onwards no longer referred solely to agricultura familiar (family farming) but to agricultura 
familiar campesina e indígena (peasant and indigenous family farming),101 an amalgamate term 
that better contemplated the wide-ranging diversity of rural working people in the Southern 
Cone and Andean countryside. This terminology was a self-representative discursive frame effort 
to summarize the huge diversity of South America's rural labouring classes into three major 
categories and identities (indigenous peoples, peasants, small and medium producers), although 
it was often shortened to '(peasant) family farming' in national contexts.  
 During the late 1990s COPROFAM managed to have Subgroup 8 hold discussions on the 
impact of regional integration on peasant family farmers of the countries and several seminars 
with government and agrarian organisation representatives on would-be specific policies for 
family farmers in the region, within MERCOSUR agreements. However, attempts to further 
influence MERCOSUR policy negotiating spaces initially had little effect (Riella, 2002). The 
breakthrough came when a COPROFAM seminar organised with IFAD support at the margins of 
a MERCOSUR summit in the Uruguayan capital yielded a written list of demands that would 
become known as Carta de Montevideo,102 signed on 15 December 2003. The letter expressed 
that the region's "rural family farms need special treatment", and consequently "internal public 
policies and instruments […] in each country […] need to be harmonised". It also stated that 
"family, and peasant and indigenous farming103 represents the social and economic base of small 
and medium communities" of the countries' regions. COPROFAM requested a space in which it 
would directly meet with government representatives in order to "propose an agenda for family 
 
(unions, associations) adding up to a total of 35 million rural workers, family farmers, peasants, and indigenous 
peoples (Interview AO-SA5).      
101 Often referred to by its Spanish/Portuguese acronym AFCI.  
102 Letter of Montevideo. 
103 The expression "Peasant and Indigenous Family Farming" would resurface a decade later in the run up to the 
campaign for the International Year of Family Farming, as it would be adopted by the Latin American coordination 
of agrarian movements Alianza por la Soberania Alimentaria (regional arm of the global International Planning 
Committee for Food Sovereignty - IPC) as a way to clearly delimitate the family farming sector and distinguish it from 
North American and European counterparts using an ambiguous definition of the term that could potentially include 





farming policies to the [MERCOSUR high-level] CMC [Common Market Council]" (COPROFAM, 
2003: 2-3).  
 A COPROFAM delegation then headed to MERCOSUR headquarters in Montevideo and 
pressured Brazilian diplomats to have then-foreign minister Celso Amorim receive them. Amorim 
agreed to let COPROFAM president Alberto Broch address MERCOSUR's Common Market Group 
(GMC104) meeting of MERCOSUR Ministers of Foreign Relations, the first time a South American 
peasant family farmer leader was given the floor at that level of regional negotiations. 
COPROFAM's request for an institutionalised policy dialogue in the Carta de Montevideo aimed 
to take advantage of a rapidly changing political landscape.105 The elections of presidents Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva and Nestor Kirchner a few months apart from each other opened prospects 
for greater participatory space, including at the regional level.106 Yet COPROFAM's initial formal 
request seemed very timid in retrospect,107 given the dimension that the soon-to-be-created 
Specialised Meeting on Family Farming (REAF) would later take, as a permanent regional forum 
for agrarian organisation participation. 
 
3.2.2 The opening up of regional participation to agrarian organisations: 
REAF/MERCOSUR 
 
After COPROFAM's speech and handing of the Carta de Montevideo to the region's foreign 
ministers, Brazil's Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) was prompted by CONTAG to make 
good on the promise of opening MERCOSUR's policy dialogue mechanisms to regional agrarian 
organisation participation. MDA opted to find existing underexplored institutional spaces outside 
the spotlight of MERCOSUR's trade negotiation subgroups. Undoubtedly, if a new subgroup on 
 
104 The GMC is MERCOSUR's executive decisional body and is composed of member countries' representatives from 
ministries of foreign relations, economy, and central banks. 
105 Interviews CS-SA1, AO-SA4, and AO-SA5.  
106Presidents Kirchner and Lula signed the Consenso de Buenos Aires at their first bilateral summit on 16 October 
2003. The declaration included a reorientation of the terms upon which South American regional integration was to 
occur, namely not merely as the reduction of trade tariffs but as a wider reaffirmation of regional sovereignty and 
of a social dimension of regional integration.  
107 It demanded the creation of a temporary ad hoc group within Subgroup 8 that would discuss some of the more 





family farming was proposed, Brazil's Ministry of Agriculture108 would most likely block it on the 
grounds that there already existed a subgroup on agriculture, and that the three other countries 
did not have specific counterpart institutions for family farming policies. Only two MERCOSUR 
'specialised meetings' existed at the time (forestry and cooperatives) and were marginal to the 
regional bloc’s decisional structure. Yet they were sufficiently institutionalised to meet regularly 
and possess the legal attribution to propose resolutions, recommendations and decisions for 
endorsement by MERCOSUR's GMC.  
MDA's international department, in collaboration with key diplomats working on trade 
policy or food security in the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE) ensured that the resolution 
proposing REAF's creation did not solely focus on "facilitat[ing] the trade of family farming 
products" (MERCOSUR, 2004:1) in line with MERCOSUR's trade-centred regional integration 
mandate. Most importantly for MDA, it made sure REAF was a dialogue space with a mandate to 
"strengthen public policies" for family farming (art. 1), including with the inputs of "legally 
recognized regional associations" (art. 2) (MERCOSUR, 2004:Ibid).109   
REAF's first three meetings (2004-2005) nevertheless represented a further stage of 
negotiation to open the newly created regional space to COPROFAM and other organisations' 
participation. Most government participants had little to no experience of discussing on a par 
with labour unions or social movement representatives in formal government meetings, let alone 
at an international level amongst other country delegations. The first REAF in Foz do Iguaçu 
(September 2004) happened only with government representatives. The following regional 
meeting in Brasilia (November 2004) was particularly tumultuous, as it involved negotiation of 
the regiment and functioning of the newly created MERCOSUR specialised meeting. While Brazil 
insisted that the regional policy dialogue space should be equally represented by civil servants 
and agrarian organisation leaders - with added pressure from CONTAG members present in the 
Brazilian delegation - Argentina was still requesting internal consultations and refusing to 
concede on institutionalising agrarian organisations’ permanent and systematic participation110.  
 
108 Brazil's Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) focused solely on supporting the large-scale 
export-driven agribusiness sector.  
109 Interviews CS-SA21 and CS-SA1.  





The third meeting in Asunción, Paraguay (May 2005) was the first to have COPROFAM 
members of MERCOSUR's four founding countries present, but the form in which they would 
participate also required arduous negotiation. The Paraguayan hosts installed four tables for the 
government representatives, and seating at a reasonable distance for civil society 
representatives to merely observe the process without actively participating, at which point the 
Brazilian delegation protested and threatened to walk out of the meeting with the civil society 
delegation. Both the Paraguayan Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Brazilian International Advisor 
escalated their positions phoning their respective ministers to back up their positions. Deadlock 
was broken with a constructive attitude from (former Uruguayan minister and IFAD 
representative) Álvaro Ramos, who alongside members of the Brazilian and Uruguayan 
delegations clarified and reassured that participation would occur in an orderly fashion with each 
government representative coordinating their delegation's position, notwithstanding the 
possibility for civil society members to take the floor on behalf of their country's delegation. This 
also had to be elucidated with COPROFAM members, who initially entered the room and sat 
together in a corner, and only after clarification went to sit with their respective country 
delegations.111 
 Despite this victory for regional participation, many government delegates were still 
unsettled by the prospect of regional meetings in which at any minute things could potentially 
get out of hand, given that agrarian organisation representatives were now in principle allowed 
to take the floor on behalf of their national delegation. This naturally brought to the fore the 
need to create what became REAF's National Sections: national-level meetings between 
government and civil society representatives to prepare their delegations' position before 
meeting regionally. This came to be regarded by COPROFAM’s member AOs as a significant 
opportunity for national-level participation, particularly in countries where there was very little 
access to dialogue with government officials.112 For instance, Paraguay's REAF National Section 
 
111 Interview CS-SA21.  






became the country's main policy dialogue space between government and AOs, including to 
discuss national-level issues that did not necessarily make it to the regional agenda.113  
Additional mid-semester regional meetings with a smaller number of national 
coordinators and AO representatives were also created to give coherence to the process and 
reassure previously recalcitrant civil servants. The IFAD MERCOSUR programme, hosted in 
MERCOSUR headquarters in Montevideo, was crucial given that its director knew the region’s 
key agricultural ministry actors, but also because IFAD provided much of the funding for 
COPROFAM and other AOs’ participation at regional meetings. A REAF Technical Secretariat 
(ST/REAF) later grew out of governments' desire to obtain greater autonomy from international 
organisation funding, as was the approval of a regional Fund for Family Farming (FAF). Thematic 
working groups on Rural Women, Rural Youth, Land Reform, Trade Facilitation, and Rural 
Insurance (later Climate Change) channelled policy discussions. Cooperation activities involving 
MERCOSUR’s four founding countries (later also including associated members), also enabled 
mixed government/civil society delegations visiting experiences throughout the region, to learn 
from the Southern Cone’s different national agrarian policy experiences.  
The 2004-2014 period was the most fertile for REAF. Between 2006 and 2010 many 
agendas were taken to the national sections and regional meetings, Brazil’s neighbouring 
countries set up previously inexistent national institutions and policies specifically directed at 
supporting family farmers, whilst Brazil expanded on its own pre-existent programmes and policy 
instruments. Regional agrarian participation created space for national-level policy formulation 
through REAF National Sections and related participatory spaces (Mesas de Desarrollo Rural114 in 
Uruguay, Foro Nacional de la Agricultura Familiar115 in Argentina, Consejo Nacional de Agricultura 
Familiar116 in Paraguay), as well as new institutional structures in countries' Ministries of 
Agriculture. But policy creation and expansion were also restricted by conjunctural oscillations, 
internal bureaucratic inertias, political resistance, and budgetary limitations. Still, COPROFAM 
and other AOs' participation in REAF set off a virtuous regional participatory process that left its 
 
113 Interview CS-SA20.  
114 Rural Development Committees. 
115 National Family Farming Forum.  





marks at all decisional scales, and durably inserted peasant family farming into the Southern 




 The formation of COPROFAM's member AOs in Southern Cone countries began in the 
early 20th century in the trans-border temperate Pampa region. Small and medium-producer 
colonies on the fringes of latifundios were part of modernising government administrations' 
support base, in alliance with growing urban working and middle classes, through policy 
mechanisms such as progressive taxation of land (in Uruguay and RS-Brazil). After recognition of 
rural wage labour rights in Argentina (1943), Peron's administration aimed to create a wider 
labouring class alliance by capturing and redistributing agrarian rent through combined wage 
rises for agricultural workers and producer price support for FAA's small and medium farmer 
base. This was facilitated by participatory councils in which FAA actively partook.      
 A second formative phase included small-scale peasants and wage labourers from Brazil's 
semi-arid Northeast, whose struggles for agrarian reform were coupled with PCB and Catholic 
Church social organisation efforts. Their association with Brazil's southern small/medium 
producer base as 'workers in agriculture' (1963) was further cemented by CONTAG's (1968) 
'similitude of living conditions' discursive frame, which combined land, labouring rights, and 
agricultural policy planks. Struggles for agrarian reform in 1960s-70s Paraguay and Chile laid the 
foundations for what would become ONAC's and MUCHECH's own worker/peasant/indigenous 
bases under 1980s democratisation processes.  
Under MERCOSUR regional integration in the 1990s, the above AOs joined forces as 
COPROFAM. In partnership with progressive Southern Cone government officials, they eventually 
managed to permanently open up regional policy deliberations to AO participation, with the 
creation of REAF/MERCOSUR in the early 2000s. Three of REAF’s emblematic policy processes are 










Differently from South America's sharp dualist contrast between very large-scale and 
small to medium farms, West Africa's agrarian landscape is mostly "based on family farms of very 
small size – inferior to 10 ha" (Blein et al., 2008:9). It has the most family farms in Africa, with 
estimates ranging between 500.000 to 1.5 million in medium-sized countries such as Senegal, 
Burkina Faso or Côte d'Ivoire, and up to 10 million in Nigeria (Moyo, 2016).  
The West African agrarian organisations that comprise ROPPA are composed of diverse 
rural labouring class fractions. Located primarily in the northern dry Sahel, a first category usually 
self-identifies as peasants and includes semi-proletarianised, pluriactive peasantries, migrating 
workers, and transhumant pastoralists. A second category, often referred to as agricultural 
producers, are located primarily in the central semi-humid savannah and southern humid tropical 
zones, where agrarian organisations also include relatively more capitalised family farmers linked 
to commodity export chains. In recent decades, these groups joined forces behind the banners 
of peasant agriculture and family farms. In the 1990s, Sahel countries' agrarian organisations 
were mostly led by former youth peasant leaders of the 1970s (particularly in Senegal) who built 
autonomous associations in reaction to the previous top-down cooperatives model of the 
colonial and post-independence decades. Yet many of these pre-existing produce-based (e.g. 
cotton, groundnuts, fish, livestock) organisations also formed a fundamental part of ROPPA 
national platforms’ membership base and leadership. 
Though production is usually diversified at family farm level, national policies are strongly 
skewed towards specialisation in a handful of commodities prevalent in their respective agro-
ecological zones (see Figure 9 below).117 Hence Sahel farmers mostly produce dry grains (millet, 
sorghum) in combination with livestock rearing (sheep, goats, cattle). Semi-humid savannah 
producers' major cash crop is cotton, while humid tropical producers grow cocoa, coffee, oil 
palm, and rubber (Ibid). Population density is highest in the southern humid tropical zone, 
 





followed by the semi-humid savannah. This has been accentuated by Sahelian populations' 
southward migration patterns, reinforced by soil degradation, droughts and famines most 




Figure 9: West African Regional Agrarian Territories118. 
 
 Almost all West African plots have mixed farming systems, which most often combine 
cash and food crops (including crops serving both functions, e.g. maize119). Most West African 
agricultural commodity producers are also small-scale. Hence "cocoa production in West Africa 
is produced mainly by smallholders – an estimated one million in Côte d'Ivoire and 800,000 in 
Ghana. [The] few large-scale plantations in both countries […] represent a small percentage of 
total output" (Toulmin, Guèye, 2005:25). Likewise, cotton "is produced by an estimated six 
 
118 Author's own design, partly based on FAO, 2001. Graphics by Luísa Vieira. 





million smallholder households, on farms varying from 3-20 ha, mainly in Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Benin, Chad, and Burkina Faso" (Ibid).  
Despite significant overlap between food and cash crop farming, West African family 
farmers are also socially differentiated. This is due largely to the fact that peasants' main source 
of policy formulation, funding, and implementation is the national state, while agricultural 
producers' is primarily dependent on negotiations with commodity chain enterprises. 
Territorially-based peasant organisations primarily obtain their means to invest and sell 
production from state agencies. Agricultural producer organisations receive financial services, 
training and rural extension, and sell their produce to former public (but increasingly privatised) 
agro-industrial firms. Hence,  
There are two types of professional and peasant organisations. There are the peasant organisations, which 
have a territorial status, and deal with all of the farmers' problems. [And] there are the filières [i.e. 
commodity chain] professional organisations. The cotton producers' organisation deals with the cotton 
chain: its organisation, access to inputs, [and] defence of its cotton producers' interests. Conversely, the 
territorial organisation, in a way the role played by [Senegal's national platform] CNCR, is to say "we family 
farmers, these are our needs, our ambitions, we take part in the definition of policies", and so on. The fact 
that both types of organisation exist and combine their activities is a positive thing.120  
 
To what extent are these features of West Africa's agrarian landscape the product of 20th 
century history? What do relative policy advances or setbacks for peasant family farmers under 
past and present international food regimes reveal for West Africa's peasant family farmers' 
political agency in its different agrarian territories today? How do West African regional 
territories and networks, class bases and discourses, policy representation and negotiation, and 
dialogue spaces interact in shaping ROPPA’s agrarian policy agency?  
This chapter looks at the formation of the West African agrarian organisations throughout 
three successive international food regimes spanning the 20th century, their merging as ROPPA 
at the turn of the 21st, and the opening up of regional policy spaces to participation shortly 
thereafter. It aims to depict the multi-generational accumulation of social force and political 
organisation, as well as adaptations to challenges posed by shifting political-economic cycles, 
including: peasant resistance and survival strategies under French colonial rule (1870s-1930s), 
struggles for agrarian policy space towards and after achieving national sovereignty (1930s-
 





1970s), and autonomous agrarian organisation building during transitions to democratic regimes 
under globalisation and neoliberal hegemony (1970s-2000s).  
 
4.1  West African rural communities under colonial rule 
 
4.1.1 West African peasantries in tributary social formations  
 
Though the nearest tropical region to Europe, West Africa was historically protected by 
the Sahara Desert and a barren coastline functioning as natural ramparts to full conquest by 
foreign powers. Until the late 19th century, European penetration across Africa was limited to 
coastal forts, trading posts, and incursions into river valleys. The West African economic centre 
was the Sahel ('coast of the Sahara' in Arabic), as attested by the medieval empires of Ghana, 
Mali, and Songhay, which thrived through trans-Saharan trade networks and supplied the 
Mediterranean with gold. After the 1500s, the discovery of gold and silver and the rise of 
plantations in the Americas coupled with increased slave trade from ports mostly located in West 
Africa's southern tropical belt gradually reduced the geopolitical significance of the Sahel 
hinterland. This macro-historical evolution marked the West African political-economic 
configuration to this day, as summarised by Hart (2013:5):  
After half a millennium of increasingly intensive commerce with Europe and the rest of the world, West 
Africa today is polarized into two zones, one quite developed, the other neglected and depopulated; but 
[…] the historical relationship of the two has been reversed […]. The coastal zone now boasts of 
metropolitan ports […] which funnel the agricultural products, timber and minerals of the forest out into 
world markets. The interior, now deprived of the trans-Saharan trade that brought its former glory, serves 
mainly as a reservoir of cheap labour for the South.  
 
At the 1885 Berlin Congress, European powers roughly split the West African territory by 
assigning most land to France, and areas with most trade and population to Britain (Hart, 2013). 
However, in both French and British colonies land ownership was altered much less drastically 
than elsewhere on the continent:  
The économie de traite121 of West Africa was characterized by agricultural export production by peasant 
farmers, and in some cases by larger-scale indigenous producers, and typically organized by metropolitan 
 
121 First coined by French geographer Jean Dresch, the term économie de traite (i.e. merchant trading economy) 
designated the unequal "exchange between imported manufactured goods and exported primary agricultural goods 





trading houses through various intermediary layers of merchant capital. The économie de traite did not 
therefore entail widespread dispossession. Its patterns of commoditisation of rural economy proceeded 
without the institution of private property rights and markets in land (Bernstein, 2005:68).  
 
The agrarian political economy of French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française, AOF, 
1895-1960) was affected by the abolition of the slave trade (1848 in France) and slavery (1905 in 
AOF), and by the growing demand for commodities fuelled by industrialisation under the French 
Third Republic (1870-1940) (Hidalgo, 2014). Key West African commodities prized by European 
powers included cocoa and oil palm in southern tropical forest regions, cotton in the 
intermediate savannah, and groundnuts in the Sahel (Bernstein, 2005). France's agricultural 
choices still bear imprints on the region. For instance, production of groundnuts became 
prevalent across Senegal, while cotton became the main crop of French Sudan (Mali) and Upper 
Volta (Burkina Faso).   
 Many post-slave trade West African ruling elites and coastal slave merchants reconverted 
to growing commodities used as industrial raw materials in metropolitan cities. Groundnuts in 
Senegal were increasingly produced and traded to produce soap, candles, wax, fodder, or 
margarine in Bordeaux or Marseilles (Hidalgo, 2014; Hart, 2013). As for the French textile 
industry, drastic interruptions in cotton supply resulting from the US Civil War (1860-1865) and 
World War I (WWI) and II (WWII) incentivised cotton production in AOF (particularly present-day 
southern Mali) (Roy, 2012).  
Slavery in precolonial West Africa had encompassed a wider variety of labour regimes, 
rights and duties, and relationships to families, castes, villages and kingdoms than the plantation 
slavery model prevailing in the Americas. The majority of slaves were war captives from outside 
villages and kingdoms, while internally recruited minorities were most often enslaved from debt 
bondage or imprisonment (Hart, 2013). The most common typology divides the former into 
'crown', 'household' and 'land' slaves, the first two types of which were under certain conditions 
allowed to hold their own plots of land (Searing, 2002; Roy, 2012). 
When France decreed abolition in 1905, approximately 25% of AOF's estimated 
population of 8 million at the time were slaves, though proportions were generally higher in 
 
infinitely higher work effort than its equivalent in Europe […] thus guaranteeing profits for the [European firms]" 





Islamic and trading zones and lower elsewhere (Boutilier, 1968, cited by Roy, 2012). Although 
traditional labour regimes became less hierarchical and many freed slaves reorganized 
production through family farms, emancipation from slavery was uneven across the colonial 
territory and often replaced by other types of forced labour. Indeed, the Code de l'Indigénat (30 
September 1887), "formalized the status of the colonised as subject, as opposed to citizen, of the 
empire, with related obligations such as taxation and forced labour" (Roy, 2012:54-88), and 
lasted until 1946. 
The destruction of the slavist mode of production […] and the recasting of a productive model based on the 
family farm, would be long and sinuous. […] The French would be very ambivalent with regards to the 
abolition of slavery, remaining cautious of managing the local social order, and most of all their access to 
labour (Ibid: 54). 
 
The land was worked by people of all social categories and backgrounds – from warriors 
to traders, from slaves to free castes (e.g. artisans, griots). Although distinctions did exist 
between fishermen, pastoralists, and peasants, West African division of labour was not akin to 
European understandings of 'peasantry' versus other forms of labour. Kinship (age, gender) and 
social hierarchy (including caste/profession divisions and slave/master relations) were often 
stronger determinants of labour differentiation, including decisions on crop allocations, food and 
seed stock management, and who could or could not farm their own land (Roy, 2012).  
 According to Samir Amin's (1974) typology of pre-capitalist modes of production and 
social formations, West African agrarian structures combined 'community', 'tribute-paying', 
'slave' and 'simple commodity' modes of production with mercantilist long distance trade, and a 
gradual penetration of capitalism from at least the late 19th century.122 Some community modes 
of production were more egalitarian, others more hierarchical (e.g. the Fulani of the Senegal river 
valley, or Hausa in Northern Nigeria) (Amin, 1974).   
The possibility for former 'crown' and 'household' slaves to access land in regions were 
slavery was prevalent undoubtedly enabled many to transition towards community family 
farming after abolition. For non-slaves and in areas where tribute-paying modes of production 
 
122 Early forms of capitalist accumulation in the first decades of the AOF colonial state were generally restricted to 
enclaves near cities and fertile river valleys (such as horticulture for both internal and external markets established 
near Dakar, along the coastline, the Casamance region, and Senegal river valley - in the case of Senegal), or where 





predominated, rural communities' de facto ownership of the land was part and parcel of the 
social and political equilibrium. Indeed, ruling classes "monopolize[d] the political organisation 
of society and exact[ed] tributes from rural communities", but rulers' "eminent domain of the 
land" was counterbalanced by the "rural communit[ies'] actual ownership" (Amin, 1974:59). 
Indeed, 
By the mere fact that he is a member of a clan, the peasant is entitled to a plot in the holding belonging to 
the clan. Consequently, the process of proletarization, that is, the process of separating the producer from 
his [or her] means of production (here, the natural means: the land) is impossible. Therefore it will be 
noticed that the integration of societies based on this type of the mode of production into the world 
capitalist system – which is the case with almost all the African peasant societies today – leads to 
impoverishment without proletarization (Ibid).  
 
Hence, while under European or Japanese feudalism, a landlord could 'free' their peasants 
and thus proletarianize them, this could not occur under the community/tributary modes 
prevalent in most African precolonial societies, given the degree of societal interdependence 
generated by social formations based on kinship - stretching from extended family at the 
collective farm scale, to clan or tribe at larger governing territorial scales – as the main balancing 
factor between chief or elder patriarchal rule and communities' innate right to land. This still has 
significant implications for West African land policy issues today, both in peasants’ capacity to 
resist land grabbing, but also in the persistence of patriarchal forms of traditional land 
governance (see chapter 5).  
 
 
4.1.2 French colonialism and the économie de traite 
 
Though parts of Senegal had been occupied by the French for centuries, most of what 
became AOF was conquered through military campaigns intensified after the Berlin Congress 
(1885). Whereas resistance to colonial occupation was at first mostly military (1880-1900), it 
subsequently developed into revolts at village level (1900-1914). In some cases chiefs rallied 
across entire administrative regions as colonial authorities looked to consolidate their territorial 
grip. Many revolts targeted specific colonial impositions, such as taxation (leading to the 
repressive 'pacification' of Côte d'Ivoire during 1900-1915) or drafting for World War I (as in 





In Senegal, the post-slavery downfall of traditional ruling aristocracies coincided with 
emerging Muslim religious orders whose ranks included peasants, former household slaves and 
caste artisans (Faye et al., 2007; Hart, 1982). While local aristocracy members integrated into the 
colonial administrative apparatus, marabouts (leaders of West African Muslim Sufi orders), 
especially the Mourides, partially overtook the groundnut economy and expanded it into the 
hinterland. There, they founded communities (dara) in which agricultural, social and religious 
roles and activities intertwined (Diop et al., 2010; Hidalgo, 2014). Accumulation strategies based 
mainly on groundnut production and trade engendered a powerful class of marabouts, with 
strong influence over the peasantries (Diop, 1972; Diop et al., 2010).  
In Sahelian West Africa, "marabout revolts became acts of Islamic resistance against 
European conquest" (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976:26), with the Sufi Muslim movements of 
Mouridism in Senegal and Hamallism in French Sudan123 gaining many followers at the turn of 
the 20th century by offering patriarchal forms of protection to peasants. Religion, security and 
self-sustaining agricultural production offered an alternative to the social strife and 
disorientation provoked by drastic political and economic transformations (Diop et al., 2010):  
These mass movements originating in the peasantry were not so much expressing demands as a general 
refusal of the new powers in the name of a return to the previous pre-capitalist social order. But the gap 
between revolt ideology and economic realities condemned these attempts to failure. The result was the 
collapse of ancestral beliefs and traditional socio-political values. The desperation that followed explains 
the massive recruitment to new religions that appeared as the last refuge of a distraught society: hence the 
growth of sects and more or less syncretic Churches, especially from World War I onwards. This movement 
affected the Muslim world as well as the animist countries more exposed to Christian currents (Coquery-
Vidrovitch, 1976: 34). 
 
Partly reluctant recognition of Hamallism by colonial authorities from 1914 favoured its 
spread in the Sahel region though it intermittently suffered from severe repression (particularly 
at its birthplace in Nioro-du-Sahel, Kayes region of present-day Mali, in 1940). Hamallism's 
"struggles for African peoples' identity and dignity" (Diop et al., 2010:82) put many of its followers 
at odds with other West Africans perceived by the former as complicit or passive towards the 
colonial administration, resulting sometimes in violent clashes. Hamallism eventually also 
contributed to the formation of the future pro-independence Rassemblement Démocratique 
Africain (RDA) political party, founded in Bamako in 1946 (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976).   
 





Mouridism in Senegal initially also preoccupied colonial administrators, given the growing 
numbers of peasants enrolled in a form of "patriarchal collectivism" (Suret-Canale, 1964, cited 
by Diop et al., 2010:82) that praised industriousness under strict allegiance to the marabouts, 
though founder Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba advocated only non-violent forms of resistance to 
colonialism. The expansion of Mouride agricultural communities into the interior and consequent 
forced eviction of pastoralist villages from the 1930s would nevertheless be tacitly accepted by 
French authorities, given the latter's straightening alliance with the former through the 
increasingly lucrative groundnut trade (Diop et al., 2010).   
The Sufi brotherhoods of Senegal and other Sahelian countries were also carriers of 
centuries-old intellectual endogenous cultures and knowledge harking back from the days of the 
Sahelian kingdoms, from which sprung "an educated elite of lawyers, priests and teachers [who] 
shared literacy in Arabic with the merchant class" (Hart, 2013: 14). Their koranic schools educated 
many young male disciples (talibés) some of whom would later become key figures of the post-
independence political landscape, such as Senegal's first post-independence council president 
Mamadou Dia (Colin, 2006).  
The superimposition of French capitalism onto pre-existing West African agrarian 
structures was essentially based on large trading firms124 that purchased groundnuts, cotton and 
other commodities from African farmers, urban manufacturing in Dakar, and related transport 
infrastructure (Oya, 2007). Syrian-Lebanese traders also competed for a share of the surplus, 
often as intermediaries between West African producers and French firms. Pre-existing pan-West 
African trading networks such as those established by the Dioula (of present-day Mali) and Hausa 
(of present-day Niger and Nigeria) were also prevalent and interlinked with the above (Hart, 
2013; Samaké et al., 2007). 
Among rural West Africans, to whom the production of cash crops was delegated, 
significant dynamics of agrarian change occurred as a result of a reconversion of ruling elites from 
slave trade to cash crop farming and selling, and a competing ascension of merchants and farmers 
who stood to benefit from the new farming and trading opportunities. Colonial authorities and 
 





trading firms frequently struck agreements with local ruling elites, not least in order to be able 
to manage a huge territory in which French settlers represented a very small minority. 
The colonial administration (which was required to have a self-sustaining budget, without 
relying on transfer of funds from the metropole) was built to attend the interests of the French 
trading houses and merchants. Hence the expression économie de traite is not just economic, 
but also a political term describing the prevailing regime implanted upon AOF's agrarian 
territories. Policy efforts were geared towards the production and transport of commodities from 
AOF to metropolitan France, and import of low-value French manufactured goods to West 
Africans. This involved the building of ports, railways, and roads, the colonisation of the 
hinterland through alliances with religious leaders, and large-scale seasonal migrant labour from 
neighbouring colonies (Faye et al., 2007; Diop et al., 2010).  
 
4.2 Controlling or emancipating peasants? Cooperatives and animation rurale 
 
4.2.1 From colonial to independent-state agricultural cooperatives 
 
4.2.1.1 French West Africa's Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance (SIP) 
 
The effects of the 1930s Great Depression in Europe had indirect repercussions on Africa.  
Colonies functioned as buffers for European economic interests in AOF, where rudimentary credit 
systems avoided contamination from the financial crisis, and enabled businesses to repatriate 
profits from colonies to metropole (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2010). West African peasantries suffered 
the most from the collapse of export crop market prices combined with persistence of taxation 
and forced labour (Gamble, 2009). This accelerated rural-urban migration, where insufficient 
formal employment opportunities could not absorb the increased labour influx. The economic 
shock led to "deterioration of the condition of local workers, which collapsed in relation to that 
of the European workforce" (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2010:342).  
French officials perceived peasants as less threatening to the colonial apparatus than the 
intellectual elites springing in the cities. Nevertheless, most of the population lived in rural areas, 





production of cash crops to withstand the 1930s economic crisis in France was perceived by 
colonial administrators as needing to be combined with additional state capacity to exert 
authority over an increasingly restless West African peasantry. Growing international criticism of 
the indigénat status, including a 1930 International Labour Organisation (ILO) norm outlawing 
forced labour125 in the colonies (Gamble, 2009) additionally pressured French colonial 
imperialism. Meanwhile, rural exodus in mainland France was rapidly changing livelihoods, 
incentivising sectors of French society to safeguard values associated with rural life, and the 
interests of farmers, large and small. The importance for the urban class alliance sustaining the 
French Third Republic (1870-1940) to secure a small farmer support base (in competition with 
the landowning aristocracy and Catholic Church) drove expansion of agrarian policies not just in 
the mainland. It also influenced agricultural policymakers in colonial territories (Chauveau, 1994; 
Roy, 2012). 
Thus, France shifted its strategy towards West African peasants to a carefully constructed 
(though ultimately failed) cooptation attempt to strike a wide-ranging class alliance, promising 
West African peasants more dignified economic and social conditions to secure their fidelity. It 
was symbolized by a paternalistic, 'noble savage'-type discursive recasting of rural West Africans 
from non-descript 'labourers' to idealized 'Black peasants' in official colonial discourse.126 
Nevertheless, they legally remained 'colonial subjects' under permanent threat of physical 
coercion and forced labour as per the indigénat status until its abolition in 1946 (Gamble, 2009). 
The contradictory combination of a pro-peasant agrarianist discourse with a centralising and 
authoritarian colonial state resulted in what Chauveau (1994) termed 'bureaucratic populism'.  
Attempts to merge colonial authorities' perceptions of French agrarian modernisation 
with West African traditional rural organisations of mutual aid and collective work127 (Assogba, 
2008) first took shape as village-level collective warehouses (greniers collectifs) for the 
management of food stocks and seeds. Increased area and labour power used to farm export 
 
125 On coercive recruitment for agriculture and construction in AOF – from river valleys to the tropical south – see  
Gamble, 2009 and Samaké, 2007.  
126 On this projection of romanticized nostalgia for European agrarianism onto West Africa see Gamble, 2009; 
Chauveau, 1994; Roy, 2012.  
127 Examples of these include: the Tons of the Malinke in Mali; the Naam in Yatenga and the Sosoaga of the Mossi in 





commodities had reduced rural communities' capacity to produce sufficient staple crops128 and 
made them more vulnerable to food shortages (McKeon et al., 2004). Traditional grain reserve 
systems thus served as inspiration for colonial authorities' to coercively superimpose their own 
versions of these onto West African rural societies. The colonial grain stores "to which "each 
family head had to contribute 100 to 150 kg of grains per year on average [became] one of the 
most unpopular institutions of the colonial period" (Gado, 2010:25-26), not least because food 
surpluses were more often than not used to feed security forces and administrative corps.  
Following a model experimented in Senegal after WWI, grain stores evolved into Sociétés 
Indigènes de Prévoyance (SIP)129 and were instituted in French Sudan (Mali), Upper Volta (Burkina 
Faso) and Niger from the1930s (Gado, 2010). In addition to seed storage and supply functions, 
the SIPs – for which peasants paid both taxes and mutualised contributions –offered loans, and 
later became points of sale for groundnuts, cotton and other commodities (Faye et al., 2007), 
though only a small fraction of the surplus was left for trading middlemen and peasants.130  
The colonially-imposed SIPs were to become the institutional structure through which 
mildly reformist (Chauveau, 1994; Gamble, 2009) currents within the colonial regime projected 
their idealisations of a rapidly disappearing agrarian France onto West African peasantries. 
Although West African SIPs had in theory at least 100.000 members per unit, most peasants 
ignored the existence of SIP governing structures, and those who were constrained into reserving 
part of their production for the collective warehouses resisted these measures through various 
means, such as maintaining their own undeclared parallel stocks, and handing over only damaged 
or lower quality produce.. Meanwhile, notabilités indigènes131 became key intermediaries 
between colonial authorities and peasants. Some of their descendants would later fulfill 
important local administrative functions in post-independence governments (Roy, 2012).  
 
128 Millet, sorghum, beans, maize, sweet potatoes, among other crops (McKeon et al., 2004).  
129 Short for Sociétés indigènes de prévoyance, de secours et de prêts mutuels agricoles (Foresight, Relief, and Mutual 
Loans' Indigenous Societies), the SIP were a "transposition of a model experimented in Algeria, Tunisia and Indochina 
at the end of the 19th century, later tested in Senegal and finally diffused in the other countries of AOF" (Roy, 2012: 
82). This specifically French colonial institution bears some similarities with the marketing boards of former British 
colonies, with the difference that the word prévoyance has a connotation of stocking food (as opposed to selling 
produce). Its name is nonetheless misleading given that under colonial administration SIPs' primary role was to 
ensure metropole and colonial cities' supply in agricultural commodities.  
130 See Faye et al., 2007: 81.  





Membership was mandatory for agricultural heads and chiefs, although representation in 
governing boards was merely symbolic, with real decisional power controlled by the local French 
colonial administration. Notwithstanding reforms allegedly aiming to make these structures 
more democratic – rebranding them into SMPR (Sociétés Mutualistes de Promotion Rurale132) in 
1953 and later SMDR (Sociétés Mutualistes de Développement Rural133) in 1956, and having two 
thirds of the SMDR members chosen by elections (with one third still chosen by the governor) – 
these institutions were alien to the majority of West African peasants. In practice they served for 
the colonial state to gain a foothold across the vast territorial hinterlands of AOF and attend the 
interests of French colonial administrators, and an elite of African civil servants (Gado, 2010).  
Despite the dominance of économie de traite export-import dynamics, internal 
agricultural markets and monetized trade also partially developed. Smoked or dried fish was 
traded from the coasts to the interior, as was livestock from the Sahel to the tropical regions 
(Samaké et al., 2007). After SIPs were gradually equipped with processing units in the 1930s, rural 
markets developed across Senegal's central groundnut basin region (Faye et al., 2007). The steep 
decline in global trade following WWII even led to relative increases in internal manufactured 
goods' production chains. Landlocked cotton producing regions supplied coastal markets when 
textile supplies from the metropole dwindled. Decreased supply of manufacturing goods also led 
several French industries to set up processing plants (such as vegetable oils) in Dakar. 
Whereas during the first decades of French colonialism in West Africa, the administrative 
apparatus was mostly preoccupied with securing control over the territory, creating the 
infrastructure and labour conditions for the économie de traite and attending little more than 
the trading houses' interests, the later period of French colonialism heralded greater state 
involvement in large-scale investments, institutionalisation of colonial policies in areas such as 
education and agriculture, and (after 1946) increased political and labour rights and coverage of 
social services as concessions to rising African labouring class and independence movements 
(Fall, 2006).134 This phase was eventually perceived as too costly by conservative circles in 
 
132 Rural Promotion Mutual Societies.  
133 Rural Development Mutual Societies. 
134 Official European historiography divided French colonial rule into three periods: i) military and administrative 
conquest (until 1914); ii) 'mise en valeur' roughly translating as 'adding value through investment’ (1920-1940) ; iii) 





metropolitan France,135 and after export crop prices peaked in the early 1950s (1952 for cocoa, 
1955 for groundnuts), a critical mass of French business interests pragmatically realigned their 
strategies towards acceptance of political independence, and focused on securing their economic 
interests. This enabled French ruling classes to cut short the rise of public costs incurred by post-
WWII harmonisation of colonial labour and social security regimes with metropolitan ones 
(Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976, 2010), as part of a global process of "negotiate[d] neocolonial 
transitions" (Moyo, Yeros, 2005:21) between Britain or France and the local elites of their 
respective colonial territories.  
The breaking up of the French West African federation into eight different sovereign 
states was the outcome of a struggle between class alliances favouring development of a 
regional-scale internal market versus those that favoured an extroverted economic model. Given 
(Ivorian first president) Felix Houphouët-Boigny's close links to domestic and powerful French 
export-oriented interests, (Senegalese first President) Léopold Sédar Senghor and other partisans 
of a federal internal-market solution that would have privileged unity amongst former AOF 
territories were eventually defeated. The division of AOF into smaller independent states 
reflected a more wide-ranging struggle at the level of the African continent between partisans of 
a united confederation versus those favouring a looser association between newly independent 
nation-states (Asante, 2010). The former's governments had deeper links to 'inward-looking' 
articulated class alliances, while the latter’s had stronger political-economic ties with 'outward-
looking' disarticulated ones. 
 
4.2.1.2 Post-independence cooperatives and popular education through animation rurale 
 
After WWII, French colonial authorities ceded ground to effervescent African nationalist 
movements (mostly urban-based but rapidly spreading into rural areas), and gave more policy 
space to its internal reformist elements. This occurred through animation rurale, a "non-
 
transition in the mid-1930s - thus Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976) distinguishes two main phases, respectively 'predatory' 
(1890-1930) and 'imperialist' (1936-1952) colonialism. 






revolutionary action model within a Cold War and increased [African] nationalism context" 
(Chauveau, 1994:34), which rose from post-war colonial administrators' critique of previous 
authoritarian and centralised policies. Animation rurale, which incorporated strands of French 
Catholic progressive currents, was later to be revamped by post-independence administrations 
in Sahelian countries in a more radical vein, incorporating some of its principles into their own 
visions of African Socialism.  
As formulated by such independence leaders as Léopold Senghor in Senegal or Sekou 
Touré in Guinea, African Socialism was an anti-capitalist, anticolonial and pan-Africanist current, 
whose observation of traditional African societies nonetheless made them reject the centrality 
of class struggle in the African context, given that in their vision these societies already contained 
many elements associated with socialist ideals. In this sense they differed from the more 
orthodox and Marxist-inspired 'scientific socialist' African regimes of Mali under Modibo Keita 
(1960-1968) in its final years (Roy, 2012), Benin under Mathieu Kerekou (1972-1990), or Guinea-
Bissau under Luís Cabral (1973-1980) the latter of which aimed to transition from production on 
small-scale plots to collectivisation (Gentil and Mercoiret, 1991). African Socialism of the first sort 
proved influential in the Sahelian countries, especially in the early 1960s (Dévés-Valdés, 2008).  
The first independent government of Senegal witnessed a significant, albeit short-lived, 
attempt to break with the économie de traite and emancipate the peasantries from 
internationally dependent super-exploitation. Through an ambitious programme centred on 
village cooperatives aiming to reconcile 'traditional' African values with 'modern' development 
objectives, it followed principles of African Socialism as theorized by Senghor, Mamadou Dia and 
other key figures of Senegal's Socialist Party (PS).  
Mamadou Dia, who led Senegal's domestic policies as President of the Council of 
Ministers in the country's first administration (1958-1962) was "passionate about participatory, 
democracy-generating development through the social economy of the cooperatives" (Colin, 
2006:142). Dia was influenced by the Economy and Humanism international network, which 
included the likes of Brazil's Josué de Castro, who authored the influential Geography of Hunger 
(1946) and held key positions at the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Theorized and 





the Human Economy current emphasised the cooperative movement and animation rurale as 
virtuous forces for development, and left a lasting imprint on agrarian organisations of both West 
Africa and South America136 (Chauveau, 1994; Dévés-Valdés, 2008). Dia most eloquently laid out 
his programme in his Instruction Circulaire 32 of 21 May 1962, entitled 'Doctrine and problem of 
the evolution of the cooperative movement in Senegal'. In this government document, he 
underscored the strategic dimension of animation rurale in the Senegalese countryside:  
The cooperative movement, at the level of the real human communities, constitutes the mode of 
organisation enabling to preserve ancient community values and to promote a modern development that 
can solidly take hold in the world's contemporary current of evolution […]. In a first phase, cooperation has 
been initiated essentially in rural areas with the goal of reclaiming the circuits of production and 
commercialisation of the groundnut, dismantle the économie de traite, and put an end to the usurious 
indebting of peasants […]. Animation […] aims for the masses to take on their own responsibilities across 
the board, in view of development, that is, [their] civic, economic and cultural responsibilities […]. This 
option implies a straightened collaboration both at the top and on the ground between animation and 
cooperation […]. Animation […] tends to favour not only the socio-economic structuration, [but also] the 
socio-political structuration, and must lead to the creation […] of the base rural communities, cells of 
peasant democracy in which the cooperative movement will harmoniously integrate (République du 
Sénégal, 1962: 1-3). 
 
A coordinated effort of state support (including a national development bank, agricultural 
commercialisation office, and local Regional Centres for Development Assistance (CRAD) in 
charge of seed distribution, credit and stocks management), to these "development 
cooperatives" gained traction during 1960-1962 (from around 100 in 1959 to over 1100 in 1962) 
and aimed in the medium term to diversify production, and reduce economic dependency from 
the groundnut economy. The cooperatives were planned to eventually become financially 
autonomous 'self-managed rural communities' and take over production and distribution 
activities from the state (République du Sénégal, 1962; Colin, 2006; Cruise O'Brien et al., 2002). 
The national animation rurale programme elaborated by the Ministry of Planning and 
 
136 Lebret (1897-1966) and his IRFED (Institute of Research and Training for Harmonized Development) counselled 
and assisted the Senegalese government during the independence transition years (1958-1960) and Mamadou Dia's 
government (1960-1962) (Colin, 2006). Lebret, who had been in Brazil (1940s-1950s) also influenced Rio de Janeiro's 
then auxiliary bishop Dom Hélder Câmara, who would later become a key figure of Liberation Theology in the 1960s 
and contribute to the creation of the Base Ecclesial Communities (CEBs) (Dévés-Valdés, 2008). CEBs would be one of 
the key rural grassroots organisations to spread during the final years of the military dictatorship (1970s) and 
democratisation process (1980s), and influence the constitution of the Landless Workers Movement (MST). The 
Economy and Humanism network also proved influential elsewhere in South America, including Uruguay's 
cooperative movement (see chapter 3), with links to COPROFAM member CNFR (Interview IR-SA1). Decades later, 
the Latin American Centre for the Promotion of Human Economy (CLAEH), headquartered in Montevideo, became a 





Development, and implemented through the local Centres d'Expansion Rurale (CER) (Assogba, 
2008; Cruise O'Brien et al., 2002) invested considerably into establishing  permanent training and 
popular education initiatives with the base communities, and ultimately aimed for the 
"emergence of a true peasant power, organized through development cooperatives" (Colin, 
2006: 144).  
 
 
Figure 10: Mamadou Dia (left centre, wearing sunglasses) visits a Senegalese rural 
cooperative. Source: Mbaye, 2012 (25:16). 
 
Despite peasants' general support and enthusiasm for Mamadou Dia's rural development 
programme (Cruise O' Brien et al., 2002), concern increased among international business 
interests linked to the groundnut trade, but also among marabouts who controlled a significant 
part of its production and distribution in Senegal. Established Mouride groundnut trading 
networks rejected the cooperatives' explicit goal of obtaining economic autonomy. Explicit state 
support to peasant family farming through village cooperatives indeed undermined established 
production and commercialisation circuits that had underpinned dependent global insertion of 





Local notabilities, chiefs, political party cadres and government officials also considered 
peasants' growing political autonomy and empowerment a threat to their political power, as new 
community leaders from the village cooperatives' training programmes increasingly challenged 
their colonially-enshrined intermediary role (Colin, 2006). The closing of ranks between 
international business, the Mouride-controlled groundnut sector, and local political 
administrators, eventually led to the ouster of Dia in December 1962, ending a short-lived but 
significant attempt of delinking the Senegalese rural economy from its chronic dependency on 
the global groundnut trade.137   
 Local administrators ended up maintaining essential control over management and 
channelling of central government funds, ultimately leading to widespread clientelistic and 
corrupt practices, which severely undermined the state-promoted cooperatives' credibility in the 
eyes of the peasantry (McKeon et al., 2004; Cruise O'Brien et al., 2002). The end of preferential 
access to the French groundnut export market (1967) prompted president Senghor to abandon 
the cooperatives' training and educational components, leaving them even more vulnerable to 
rent capture and political diversions from their original goals (Colin, 2006).   
Another post-independence West African case of state-promoted cooperatives whose 
members partially but "truly participated in the definition of modes of organisation and had a 
real decision-making power" (Gentil and Mercoiret, 1991:870) was Niger under President Hamani 
Diori (1960-1974). Diori initiated an animation rurale programme in Niger from 1963, training 
and sensitising peasants on policy issues, to "directly associate the population to the most 
important decisions" (Gado, 2010:28). Young motivated animateurs (trainers/popular educators) 
thus generated a parallel 'drive belt' between central government policy formulation and local 
implementation, enabling trained peasants to be better informed, voice opinions,138 and partly 
bypass local civil servants and political cadres reluctant to share power with the peasantries.  
An important ally was the state-subsidized Association des Radios-Clubs du Niger (ARCN), 
a widespread rural radio network that contributed to democratize technical knowledge and 
 
137 "By the mid-1960s […] the country's commercial groundnut economy covered about half the cultivated surface; 
supplied at least three quarters of rural money incomes; contributed 23 percent of GNP and about 80 percent of 
exports; and, through oil-processing plants, constituted 42 percent of total industry" (Hart, 1982:66). 
138 On peasant mobilisation through these structures, and on the youth's function as relays for technological 





practical information. It reverberated a political discourse emanating from central government 
that emphasized 'popular participation', while access to information revealed local 
administrators' and traditional authorities' poor management of resources and abuses of power. 
The risk posed by this increased political consciousness to the dominating state alliance with local 
village aristocracies eventually took its toll:   
Technical cadres and political appointees, concerned with preserving their privileges, started to show their 
concern with the excessive freedom of expression given to peasants by the animation agents, particularly 
during public meetings. […] Gradually, cooperative structures […] became strongly influenced by the party-
state. In village meetings, speeches by the Party's secretary general substituted those of the animateur 
rural. Later with the elimination of the animation directorship for development, and the creation of regional 
and sub-regional services for planning, the animateur rural became a "floating" agent with no 
administrative link […] Animation rurale is a perfect illustration of a structure that favoured a participatory 
dynamic, which public authorities were quick to curb (Gado, 2010:29-30). 
 
 Thus, even initially promising cases of peasant political empowerment in post-
independence Sahel countries (e.g. Senegal and Niger) were severely limited by the enduring 
weight of colonial and traditional political structures. State authorities were ultimately more 
concerned in maintaining social stability and increasing productivity across export crop chains 
than fomenting peasant power. Although the experience of 1960s-1970s state-led cooperatives 
generally left peasantries with bitter failed expectations, the memory left by some experiences' 
short-lived virtuous qualities, and a critical examination of why they failed, provided inspiration 
for a new wave of autonomous movements starting in the mid-1970s (Cissokho, 2009). 
 
4.2.2 Autonomous territorial peasant movements in Sahel countries 
  
In most West African nations, after attempts at transferring political and economic power 
to the peasantry faltered and as post-independence euphoria waned, export-commodity 
dependency and clientelistic state relations with the peasantry were reasserted. States gradually 
assumed trading functions, "adding the roles of banker, industrialist and landlord to that of 
merchant monopolist and bureaucratic provider" (Hart, 2013:36). Economic and political power 
was shared to varying extents by incumbent politicians, military and police forces, and state 
bureaucrats, alternately "supported or checked by weak civil interests: unions, chiefs, and 





labour aristocracies translated into high dependency on commodity exports, a low taxation base, 
and difficulties in stimulating the home market, despite some significant investments aimed at 
increasing national food production.  
 The severe drought and devastating famine experienced in 1973-1974 throughout the 
Sahel bore a series of regional institutional initiatives led by West African independent nation-
states. At the regional level, it yielded the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control 
in the Sahel (CILSS).139 Global repercussions of the 1973-1974 drought140 enabled CILSS to benefit 
from the support of an OECD countries' funding coordination group, the Sahel and West Africa 
Club (CSAO). Yet in parallel, despite providing immediate relief to famine-stricken rural 
populations, external 'food aid' considerably harmed peasant family farmers' access to national 
and regional markets saturated with dumped food surpluses from US and European subsidized 
overproduction (Moyo and Yeros, 2005).  
The scale of the drought's devastation in terms of loss of human lives and herding animals 
for the Sahel's predominantly agropastoral family farmers led many of them, particularly rural 
youth, to deeply question the premises of the prevailing commodity-export dominant economic 
model. Indeed, "[m]uch of the desertification that contributed to the Sahel famine occurred as 
export-oriented cotton and peanut cultivation depleted aquifers, pushed peasants off land and 
squeezed transhumant pastoralists into ever-smaller grazing areas" (Edelman and Borras, 
2016:22). The combination of the above-described global, regional, national, and local factors 
created space for the embryo of the local and national agrarian organisations that would come 
to form ROPPA.  
 The most significant autonomous and politicised peasant movements organising outside 
state-controlled structures developed in Burkina Faso and Senegal from the 1970s onwards, and 
lay the groundwork for the national federations that would later comprise ROPPA across the 
West African subregion. The basis for these movements' initial growth lay in: i) a solid grassroots 
foundation of interlinked village associations, frequently led by educated youth who migrated to 
 
139 Comité permanent Inter-états de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel.  
140 These included the first World Food Conference convened by the FAO in 1974. The conference yielded the 
creation of two global-level institutions aiming to complement the FAO's work, whose insufficiencies were made 
patent by the devastating famines in West Africa and Bangladesh (1974): UN Committee on World Food Security 





cities during the 1973-74 Sahel drought and later returned with alternative ideas for organising 
outside the discredited state cooperatives system, in alliance with rural youth and women, and 
in consultation with elders and village chiefs141 (Cissokho, 2009); ii) negotiated development 
assistance from key Northern INGOs and Church-linked organisations142 whose involvement and 
financial support substantially increased post-1973-74 (Arcand, 2003; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 
2004; McKeon et al., 2004).  
Originating in Burkina Faso's northern Yatenga Province, the Groupements Naam were 
set up under the guidance of school teacher-turned-popular educator Bernard Lédéa Ouedraogo, 
as self-directed alternatives to state-induced associations of young cultivators (Groupements de 
Jeunes Agriculteurs - GJA) in the late 1960s (Pedersen, 2001). Reclaiming the traditional Mossi 
collective village institution of the Kombi-Naam ('Youth Power') (Gentil and Mercoiret, 1991), 
they built a grassroots movement that combined ancestral values of solidarity and traditional 
knowledge with the learning and dissemination of modern techniques. This had a decisive role in 
implementing water and soil conservation practices in a particularly challenging agro-ecological 
Sahel region, and contributed to strengthening women and youth organisations. Members of the 
more literate younger generation became crucial actors in obtaining funding from external 
donors, thereby reducing the near monopoly of control and channelling of resources by elders 
and village chiefs (Rahmato, 1991; Pedersen, 2001).  
Increased and sustained INGO-support allowed village-level Groupements Naam to 
federate at provincial, and later national level. This eventually yielded the Federation des Unions 
de Groupements Naam (FUGN), which by the early 1990s spanned 17 provinces, with 3000 
Groupements representing 350.000 members from 1200 villages (Arcand, 2003; Gentil and 
Mercoiret, 1991). The alliance between Swiss NGO Six-S143 and the Groupements Naam provided 
 
141 This was part of careful balancing strategies, given that exclusion from decision-making under traditional 
patriarchal kinship social structures, and their reproduction through local political party and administrative posts, 
had partly been the motivation for the setting up of these structures. 
142 These broke the frequent top-down and unsustainable micro-project patterns of most of their counterparts, that 
had often led to externally dependent and project-specific local associations. They included Six-S, Maisons Familiales, 
and ENDA-Tiers Monde. One bilateral cooperation agency - the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC) - also supported peasant organisations (McKeon et al., 2004).  
143 Six-S stands for Se Servir de la Saison Sèche en Savane et au Sahel (Taking advantage of the dry season in the 
Savannah and Sahel). Composed of mostly Christian-linked organisations (Misereor, CCFD, Action de Carême Suisse, 





a stable and reliable source of funding and technical support that was later extended to other 
emerging West African movements, and enabled these to retain a significant degree of autonomy 
while contributing to build national-level, and later regional-level connections:  
Six-S, was without a doubt the most original and significant support mechanism.  This international NGO, 
established in 1977 with funding from several European NGOs and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation, was designed specifically to support emerging village-based groups in West Africa and 
encourage them to federate. In consequence, Six-S operated unobtrusively by providing village groups with 
a flexible and renewable fund, co-financed and managed by them. From 1977 to 1992, Six-S supported 
thousands of village group activities, particularly in Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal, and helped to establish 
73 unions of groups and two federations, the Federation of Naam Groups in Burkina Faso and FONGS in 
Senegal. Six-S was also a source of discreet and respectful technical assistance, and its general assemblies 
offered an important occasion for farmer leaders in the subregion to meet and strategize (McKeon et al. 
2004:12). 
 
The first encounters between the burgeoning West African peasant associations of the 
mid-1970s occurred through the Six-S network, particularly at the headquarters of the Centre for 
Social and Economic Studies of West Africa (CESAO) at Bobo-Dioulasso in Burkina Faso. Burkinan, 
Senegalese, Malian, Nigerien, Gambian, Ivorian, and Togolese peasant leaders met on different 
occasions and founded the Association for the Training of African Peasants (AFPA) to organize 
further training encounters, mostly in Burkina Faso and Senegal (Cissokho, 2009). At their 2nd 
International meeting in CESAO on January 1976, rural association representatives vowed to 
"work together, amongst peasant leaders, to expose our difficulties, build trust and confidence 
in ourselves, to see our common problems and prepare the creation of the international 
organisation" (Cissokho, 2009:118), laying the groundwork for the sub-regional peasant network 
to be formalized some decades later. 
 As in Burkina Faso, informal village associations usually initiated by women or youth 
sprung from the late 1960s in Senegal. Some encouraged others to set up autonomous peasant 
organisations after the 1973-74 drought, initially outside the country's central groundnut basin, 
and eventually across all regions: from the Senegal river zone in the North - the Walo Friends' 
Socio-Educational, Sports and Cultural Association (ASESCAW) - to the Casamance Association of 
Young Farmers (AJAC) in the South. Nine of these joined forces to form the Senegal Federation 
 
NGO founded by Switzerland's Bernard Lecomte and Burkina Faso's Bernard Lédéa Ouedraogo that supported 
existing peasant organisations not affiliated to political parties or religious entities, and gave them more 





of Non-Governmental Organisations (FONGS) in 1976, obtaining state recognition in 1978.144 
Other local associations later joined, including the Entente de Bamba Thialène, created by 
Mamadou Cissokho, later to become leading founder of CNCR and ROPPA in the country's eastern 
region (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2004; Gentil and Mercoiret, 1991; Hrabanski, 2010; McKeon et 
al., 2004; McSween, 2015). 
Famara Diedhiou, a former rural extensionist who at the time presided the Senegalese 
network of the Maisons Familiales Rurales (UNMFR)145 led the federative effort and became 
FONGS' first president (1976-1990). According to Diedhiou, this early unison sought to avert the 
risk of having associations played off against each other by distrustful state or political party 
authorities (McKeon et al., 2004; Cissokho, 2009). Suspicion from marabouts was also partly 
assuaged by peasant organisations' frequent and genuine references to the Koran, especially at 
initial stages, notwithstanding youth organizers' efforts to update religious teachings by focusing 
on peasants' practical needs, and collectively organise in the face of food insecurity (Cissokho, 
2009; Hrabanski, 2010).  
 
4.2.3 Agricultural producer organisations in francophone West Africa  
 
Whilst in francophone West Africa the term 'peasant' denotes the family farms that are 
not necessarily or primarily connected to export commodity chains, 'agricultural producers' 
encompasses precisely those. West African agricultural producers may be small or medium-sized 
with some degree of capitalisation, yet almost always mix commodity production for external 
markets with food for self-consumption and internal markets. Indeed, savings from commodity 
earnings allow producers to invest in food crops, not least because cotton and other agricultural 
commodities necessitate crop rotation146.  
 
144 The name's reference to NGOs is misleading, as these were actually peasant associations, but were legally 
required to register as NGOs to be distinguished from state-promoted cooperatives and groupements (McKeon et 
al., 2004). 
145 The Maisons Familiales Rurales were borne out of cooperation with Christian NGOs linked to French Priest 
Lebret's Economy and Humanism movement, and had established a dense network of local village associations 
across Senegal (Cissokho, 2009). 





Although the political initiative of ROPPA has been originally led by the Sahel's 'territorial' 
peasant organisations, the relative force of its agricultural producer organisations, particularly in 
semi-humid savannah and humid tropical zones, is significantly linked to investments made by 
farmers historically linked to commodity chains, as explained by Mamadou Cissokho: 
In Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, [Burkina Faso], it is financing for cotton [production] that began structuring 
[producer organisations]. As with coffee, cocoa, banana, pineapple [in the humid tropical zone]. […] The 
producer is someone who has a bit of money, who invests in agriculture. […] He may have 20, 30, 35 
hectares […]. He produces, especially for exports, but he also goes [to the internal market]. Those same 
producers farm maize. Because when you have cotton cycles in your field this year, next year you cannot 
make cotton there. Only maize and sorgho can be done every year in the same plot. But for groundnuts, 
beans, cotton - you need [crop] rotation. […] They buy animals, which give them organic manure, put it in 
the field. And when the [crop season] has not turned out well, you take two oxen, and you sell them.147  
 
Cases of less politicized and more instrumental forms of 'sectorial' (as opposed to all-
encompassing 'national') animation rurale (Assogba, 2008), did provide literacy and other 
technical and organisational skills to agricultural producers, without generating the political 
backlashes spurred by 1960s attempts to foment peasant power in order to break from 
colonially-inherited commodity dependency. This occurred most significantly in export crop 
state-led enterprises where the workforce was sufficiently organised to make collective demands 
and pressure management to negotiate better conditions for production and commercialisation, 
such as in the cotton sector and hydro-agricultural development projects, most notably in Mali 
(Gentil and Mercoiret, 1991).  
 The 1973-74 drought's economic and social strife, and its strain on public resources was 
closely followed in 1974 by acquisition of majority stakes148 in the French Textile Development 
Company's (CFDT) West African country subsidiaries, by cotton-producing francophone West 
African states (Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Senegal). Despite previous decades of 
colonial surplus extraction from francophone West Africa to France, CFDT's public state-
enterprise status meant its activities could be better regulated than private companies, providing 
more space for progressively-minded civil servants to reinvest a greater part of the company's 
profits into strengthening peasant family farmers’ economic capacities.  
 
147 Interview AO-WA10.  





CFDT indeed "chose to have cotton produced by small-scale farmers, with quite 
interesting remunerations [and] enabled them to access inputs".149 These were also used for food 
production (e.g. sorghum, maize) given the need to rotate crops to produce cotton in the semi-
humid savannah zone.150 CFDT's surplus was also channelled into literacy and vocational training 
of peasant family farmers in the cotton producing semi-humid savannah regions, paving the way 
for agrarian organisation representation in the following decades. As recalled by a French 
agronomist who worked in West Africa in the 1970s:  
CFDT completely integrated [its activities on a regional scale]: it bought inputs for all the African companies, 
and then sold the cotton for these African companies […]. It was a state-owned company so they did not 
have the mandate to [maximise profits]. Hence all of the money [was reinvested into] the commodity chain. 
They also organized self-managed markets […]: produce was sold by paid farmers' associations […] and this 
remuneration enabled them to finance sustainable development, infrastructure, teachers. So we generated 
territorial development.151  
 
 West African states inherited the cotton monopsony from the French company, "with a 
pricing regime guarantee for producers" (Roy, 2012:146). CFDT technician roles were increasingly 
taken up by West Africans, "effectively gridding the cotton production zones and gaining [family 
farmers'] trust" (Ibid.). But they also inherited a concentration of resources stemming from the 
metropole's textile industry chain, which contributed to create a privileged stratum of relatively 
capitalised and highly-skilled family farmers. Hence, while Mali had "only 431 rural extensionists 
for 2 million hectares of cultures across the country, CFDT employ[ed] 320 for the [cotton area's] 
60.000 hectares" in 1967 (Roy, 2012:192).152  
 The Associations Villageoises153 (AV), first created in the cotton producing region of 
southern Mali during the 1973-74 harvest, ensued from a standoff between cotton producers 
and the recently nationalized Compagnie Malienne de Développement des Textiles154 (CMDT). 
Though informal associations existed in the late 1960s around cotton silos, a key turning point 
occurred when cotton producers contested CMDT agents' cotton weighing malpractices and 
 
149 Interview AR-W1. 
150 Interviews CS-WA6 and AO-WA10.  
151 Interview A-WA1.  
152 Indeed, as shown by Selwyn's (2012:75) study on rural labour agency in Brazil's grape export chain, "capital's 
strategies to recruit, train and discipline, and then retain an increasingly skilled workforce, exist in a dialectical 
relationship with organised labour's strategies of ameliorating its own working and living conditions". 
153 Village Associations.  





threatened to interrupt production or stage village revolts if weighing responsibilities were not 
transferred to them (Roy, 2012).  
A new generation of CMDT local managers helped break the deadlock by suggesting to 
train producers and support them in organising associations. This would enable producers to 
assume not just weighing but other tasks related to input supply, credit, and commercialisation. 
By the late 1980s, AVs had been established in more than 1000 villages across southern Mali, 
taking over most functions of the productive process, literacy campaigns, investments in social 
equipment (maternity wards, health centres, wells) and technical supervision (statistics 
collection, animal vaccines). However, they remained dependent upon CMDT support, and had 
not yet established a significant inter-village network, nor developed a wider political 
consciousness that would allow them to influence policies at national level, as would occur in the 
1990s (Gentil and Mercoiret, 1991).  
Although they shared characteristics with the majority of peasant family farmers, West 
African 'agricultural producers' are usually at the more capitalised end of these, given levels of 
investments in commodity chains in which they have been able to negotiate better producing 
conditions (e.g. prices, credit, rural extension, debt relief, infrastructure, local social services). 
This was mostly enabled after independent West African states in the 1960s and 1970s created 
or inherited state monopoly enterprises to regulate commodity chain production, processing and 
distribution and reinvest profits into the chain. The higher efficiency of growing cotton with 
yearly crop rotation or groundnut under mixed agropastoral systems (as opposed to large-scale 
plantations) has underpinned the rationale for contract farming schemes negotiated with small 
and medium family farmers. Literacy and training programmes fomented by African independent 
states between the 1960s and 1980s created a rural labouring class fraction of agricultural 
producers capable of collectively negotiating policy conditions with commodity chain agro-
industrial management.  
 
4.3 Gaining a foothold in national and regional agricultural policy: the birth of ROPPA 
 






4.3.1.1 The National Rurals' Cooperation and Concertation Council (CNCR) 
 
After a second major regional drought in 1984-85, the Senegalese government's 
negotiations with global financing institutions (IMF, WB) pressing for state disengagement to 
service debt yielded the New Agricultural Policy (NPA) (1984). The consequent dismantling of 
state-support structures – e.g. the National Office for Cooperation and Development Assistance 
(ONCAD) in 1979 – and transfer of responsibilities to private sector and peasant organisations 
had significant impacts on Senegal's socio-economic rural landscape. One was the creation of a 
new type of rural economic association: the Groupements d'Interêt Économique155 (GIE). These 
could be formed by two or more individuals as rural organisations eligible for loans, and allowed 
more flexibility and self-management than cooperatives. GIEs would eventually organise their 
collective representation structures according to agricultural sectors of activity (e.g. horticulture, 
fishing, pastoralism, forestry) (McSween, 2015).  
FONGS had initially focused on training and informative activities, stimulating exchanges 
between its members. Within the NPA context, FONGS increased its economic role, setting up 
cereal banks and mutual exchanges between crop surplus and deficit villages (McKeon et al., 
2004). It also managed to round up members' savings and external donations to buy a 4% stake 
in Senegalese agricultural bank CNCAS156, and obtained a seat on board meetings to push for 
better conditions in family farmers' access to credit. By the early 1990s, FONGS "had expanded 
[…] to include 24 regionally based associations throughout the country, totalling over 2.000 
village groups with an active membership of about 400.000" (McKeon et al., 2004:13). Yet when 
the Senegalese government engaged in discussions with WB and IMF over the next Agricultural 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ASAP) in theearly 1990s, FONGS was not allowed to take part, 
allegedly because this was not the only federation representing Senegal's rural people (Cissokho, 
2009; McKeon et al., 2004).  
 
155 Economic Interest Groupings. 





Faced with that impasse, FONGS took a series of steps that decisively increased the 
Senegalese peasant movement's i) capacity to present alternative policy proposals; ii) 
representative legitimacy; iii) visibility vis-à-vis government officials, and thus greater access to 
policy negotiations. FONGS first obtained FAO support to organise consultations with their bases 
in 1991, from which they formulated alternative proposals to ASAPs. The following year, it 
decided to share the results of this process in a national forum, entitled 'What future for 
Senegalese peasants?' (Cissokho, 2009; McKeon et al., 2004).  
To draw government and general public attention, it took advantage of the crucially 
significant rural vote in upcoming national elections (mid-1993), by announcing on posters across 
the country that the event (February 1993) would be opened by the President of the Republic, 
bypassing formal invitation channels. This 'direct action' communication tactic pushed peasants' 
demands into pre-election public debate, when stakes were still high (Cissokho, 2009; McKeon 
et al., 2004). The event was ultimately opened by the Prime Minister in Dakar, and became "the 
first time that the peasant movement had called representatives of government services and 
donors to a public debate" (McKeon et al., 2004:14) and been given due attention at 
governmental level.  
It was also the first event gathering all Senegalese national peasant federations. Despite 
previous tensions between some and FONGS, centripetal forces proved stronger and led to the 
creation of the Rurals' National Concertation Committee (CNCR)157. This fusion occurred on 17 
March 1993 in Thiès, uniting FONGS and 6 other federations.158 Weathering funding crises since 
the post-1984 state retreat, the federations saw FONGS' wider and more secure pool of external 
resources as strategic for their own survival. For FONGS, its incorporation into a more 
representative national 'confederation of federations' strengthened claims for participation in 
policy negotiations. Additionally, manifold complementarities between members soon became 
evident. This was true from the local village base, where peasants benefitted from overlapping 
memberships (FONGS delivering training and communication activities, GIEs enabling access to 
 
157 ‘Cooperation’ was later added to ‘Concertation’ in the national platform’s name, both represented by the second 
‘C’ in CNCR. The first ‘C’ also later changed from ‘Committee’ to ‘Council’.    
158 Three GIE federations (fishermen, pastoralists, horticulturalists), two cooperatives federations (agriculture and 
animal husbandry), and one rural women's federation. Two forestry workers' federations joined CNCR in 1995, and 





credit, UNCAS159 cooperatives facilitating commercialisation), to national and international levels 
(e.g. FONGS external contacts enabled FENAGIE-Pêche to partake in 1994 EU fisheries trade 
negotiations) (Cissokho, 2009; McKeon et al., 2004; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2004). 
 CNCR began participating in evermore negotiations with government and multilateral 
organisation representatives, particularly with the WB. It also teamed up with the Association of 
Rural Council Presidents (APCR) to form the Senegalese Association for the Promotion of 
Development at the Base (ASPRODEB). ASPRODEB became CNCR's 'economic arm', which 
received funding from government and international agencies such as FAO and IFAD, for the 
implementation of small-scale projects at village level with funds managed by local affiliated 
peasant organisations. ASPRODEB was part of a drive aiming to increase CNCR's financial 
autonomy, by channelling economic surpluses generated by its family farmer members' 
activities, thereby reducing dependency on external funding (Faye, 2007).  
 Although self-defined as a movement, CNCR sought and obtained juridical recognition in 
1996; by then, it represented around 3 million rural people, out of Senegal’s population of 8 
million (McKeon et al., 2004). Between 1994 and 1996, CNCR unsuccessfully attempted to meet 
the President of Senegal, who met yearly with labour unions and employers' organisations. 
CNCR's legitimacy in speaking for Senegal's rural people had enabled its involvement in the 
government's negotiations with the WB in 1996 on its Agricultural Structural Investment 
Programme (ASIP). CNCR members were frustrated at the government's slow and insufficient 
response to implement agricultural support policies, and in June 1996 left ASIP negotiations. 
Given that the WB would not proceed until CNCR returned to the negotiating table, the impasse 
effectively pressured President Diouf to finally meet with 150 CNCR representatives in February 
1997. The meeting was a breakthrough: a substantial reduction in agricultural credit interest 
rates (from 14 to 7,5%), debt moratoria, public financing for soil improvement and the holding of 
high-level regular meetings were all approved and implemented (Cissokho, 2009; Oya and Ba, 
2013; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2004).  
Thereafter, CNCR representatives met President Diouf once a year (1997-2000), the Prime 
Minister every three months, and the Minister of Agriculture once a week to review the 
 





agricultural and rural conjuncture (Oya and Ba, 2013), and influenced policies at several levels. 
As current CNCR President Nadjirou Sall explained:  
If we arrived at LOASP;160 […] if we arrived at the restoration of the Senegalese public programmes; […] if 
we managed to reduce bank interest rates; […] if we achieved [soil] phosphating; […] for our lands, it's [all] 
linked to these spaces of dialogue. If we arrived effectively at the creation of instruments, in terms of rural 
extension, in terms of channelling funds for agro-silvo-pastoral research, it's linked to these spaces. These 
are daily spaces, that we try to occupy, and it continues. […] The same goes for livestock. If we've 
accomplished subsidies for fishing, it's linked to these spaces. If we managed, for livestock, to subsidise a 
certain number of vaccines, clearly, it is linked to all of these spaces. These are processes that are built. […] 
From 1976 until the 1990s, these efforts were met with success, because there was an opening of spaces 
for dialogue.161  
 
 
4.3.1.2 Sahel's Peasant Platform (PFPS) 
 
A key driver behind ROPPA's formation was its founders' perceived need to unite in the 
face of the newly created West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) (grouping 
together the CFA162 Franc zone's former AOF countries) in 1994, and its push towards negotiating 
a common external tariff and regional agricultural policy thereafter163.  
UEMOA’s creation resulted from French restructuring of its neocolonial zone of influence 
as a result of internal macroeconomic pressures, dramatically manifested by a unilaterally 
imposed devaluation of the CFA franc164 to half its previous value in 1994. The devaluation 
harmed West African import-dependent urban middle and working classes most, and "combined 
with market liberalisation and restrictions on credit, led to the collapse of many commercial 
farms, unable to compete with smallholders" (Toulmin and Guèye, 2005:27), thus evidencing the 
resilience of West African peasant family farms. Devaluation also made some food export sectors 
more competitive, enabling "Malian rice to recover a good level of competitiveness vis-à-vis its 
Asian competitors" (Blein et al., 2008:31).  
 
160 Agro-Silvo-Pastoral Framework Law, approved in 2004. See chapter 6 on family farm recognition in agricultural 
policy framework laws in West Africa.  
161 Interview AO-WA11.  
162 Originally standing for Colonies Françaises d’Afrique (French Colonies of Africa) during the AOF latter period 
(1945-1958), the West African common currency’s CFA acronym was retained post-independence but now stands 
for Communauté Financière Africaine (African Financial Community).  
163 Interview AO-WA10. 
164 A remnant of France's former colonial empire, the CFA currency remains under significant control of the French 





Hence, the opportunity to increase visibility of family farmers' role for national food 
security within UEMOA, combined with the potential threat of transferring policy responsibilities 
to a then inaccessible regional scale, led members of CNCR – the region's only national-wide 
peasant platform at the time – to reach out to similar budding organisations in UEMOA 
countries165. Many agrarian organisation representatives already knew each other from common 
activities in the Six-S network. The CILSS conference on land tenure organised that same year in 
Praia, Cape Verde (see chapter 5), represented a further step towards the creation of national-
level platforms and a regional peasant network (Cissokho, 2009; McSween, 2015; McKeon et al., 
2004). 
CILSS had had previous consultations with West African peasant associations since the 
1980s, particularly after the 1984-85 drought (Edelman and Borras, 2016; Cissokho, 2009). Their 
headquarters in the Burkinan capital had allowed for informal contacts with Six-S to develop 
(McSween, 2015). CILSS mandated peasant representatives from Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, 
and Niger to organise their own delegation for the 1994 conference, which became an occasion 
for Sahelian agrarian organisations to unite. National platforms were to be built by federating 
territorially-based and producer-based organisations within a country into a single 
representative movement of each member country's peasantries. According to Gambian ROPPA 
co-founder and first NACOFAG166 president, Mahamadou Fayinkeh:  
We had the fourth land tenure meeting in Cape Verde, organised by CILSS. Most farmers' organisations 
were there. […] We didn't have the means [to all fly to the same country to meet], so we seized the 
opportunity to meet at night [where Mamadou] Cissokho [was staying], to discuss the issue of how we 
can come together. 'We have seen that these people they want to privatize our land, with this new 
land tenure system […]'. So, 'as farmers organisations, what should be our stand'? […] Then we assigned 
Cissokho, to go to [CILSS member] countries so that we can establish our [national] farmers platforms. 
That's one platform in each country, so that we can discuss land issues [at the regional level]. This is 
[from] where ROPPA emanated.167 
 
After the above-mentioned evening meeting with Mamadou Cissokho, the 27-peasant 
representatives announced their intention to create a cadre de concertation168 of the Sahelian 
producer organisations. CILSS (and its donors grouped in CSAO) agreed to support the creation 
 
165 Interview AO-WA10.  
166 National Coordinating Organisation of Farmer Associations Gambia. 
167 Interview AO-WA4.  
168 The term is used by ROPPA to designate policy dialogue spaces, whether only amongst agrarian organisations or 





of national peasant federations in its 9 member countries. The Sahel Peasant Platform (PPS) was 
thus officially created in 1996 (Cissokho, 2009).  
Meanwhile, West African countries established national federations, with usually one key 
association leading in federating the others, as occurred with current ROPPA president Ibrahima 
Coulibaly's Association of Professional Peasant Organisations (AOPP) founded in 1995, which 
represented a wide array of Mali's agrarian organisations (Roy, 2012). Coulibaly clarified:  
AOPP was the largest and strongest of the [Malian] federations at the time. […] The history of AOPP started 
a bit earlier than that of others. It is not necessarily [that of] the ancient [cooperative] organisations. It was 
other types of organisations: mutual services associations, grain banks, common commercialisation 
groups… In fact, a whole array of commercialisation [initiatives] that had established themselves, given that 
the state was no longer there after the structural adjustment programme, and thus started to establish 
AOPP, which continued to grow […]. It is the only organisation that is present in all regions of Mali, […] that 
has personnel in the regions, that has actions, that makes the information circulate back up [from the base]. 
So it is the one that has the [largest] membership and representation compared to other [Malian peasant 
organisations].169   
 
 AOPP later joined forces with Malian producer organisations to eventually form the 
National Coordination of Peasant Organisations (CNOP) in 2002. Forms of participation and 
political dialogue with national governments varied, but most UEMOA members adopted the 
French model of the Chambres d'Agriculture,170 often established with French funding (McKeon 
et al., 2004). This was successfully resisted in Senegal, given CNCR's previously recognized 
legitimacy to engage in direct policy negotiation with high-level government representatives. On 
the other hand, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, and Côte d'Ivoire established Chambres d'Agriculture 
as institutionalised spaces for agricultural policy dialogue. These are perceived by ROPPA national 
platforms as dominated by an entrepreneurial expansionist agricultural model, opposed to 
ROPPA's defended sustainable peasant family farming paradigm. Still, ROPPA's national-level 
member organisations, particularly CNOP in Mali, have in some cases successfully influenced 
policy through dialogue in the Chambres d'Agriculture.  
At regional level, CILSS' openness to consultation with Sahel peasant associations was 
reinforced by international organisations' promotion of civil society participation in the 1990s, 
including at UN global conferences. This engendered global connections: at the 1998 meeting of 
the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, CNCR and other budding ROPPA members met La 
 
169 Interview AO-WA22.  





Vía Campesina171 (LVC) representatives, enabling 6 of ROPPA's 13 national platforms to 
eventually join LVC (McSween, 2015).172 Participation within CILSS meetings was nevertheless 
viewed as merely consultative and non-committal, with control over policy processes exerted by 
government representatives and little room for political agency. Still the constitution of PPS 
following the 1994 Praia CILSS Conference significantly boosted subregional articulation between 
national-level agrarian organisations.  
The evaluation of WB-promoted ASAP and ASIP was a turning point for the West African 
peasant network. After an FAO and WB 1997 report that glossed over the negative impacts of 
ASAPs in the region was rejected by CNCR, they conceded that a new evaluation be conducted 
with participation of agrarian organisations. A CNCR representative was tasked with conducting 
meetings in West African countries, and, crucially, was allowed to hold peasants-only meetings. 
This represented a fundamental step to enable greater coherence amongst each nation's 
agrarian organisations, in a safe environment of mutual trust, generating better conditions to 
later negotiate with governments.173  
In 1999, CNCR organized a WB-funded subregional workshop to share the evaluation 
results.174 It included peasant representatives not only from the PPS (CILSS) countries, but also 
other UEMOA members such as Côte d'Ivoire and Benin175, invited by FAO and WB. There, 
peasant organisation leaders demanded the creation of a regional network that went beyond 
only CILSS or UEMOA countries. Indeed, although UEMOA was then the most consolidated West 
African regional organisation, it was not representative of regional realities, given the 
demographic and economic weight of non-UEMOA member Nigeria, and the growing 
implications of regional agricultural policy and trade agreements negotiated at ECOWAS level. 
 
171 CNCR had previously been a member of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) but saw in 
LVC an organisation that was much more akin to its own policy visions and discourse. Adoption of LVC's concept of 
food sovereignty would later prove influential in ROPPA's negotiation of regional trade policy at ECOWAS level (see 
chapter 7) (McSween, 2015).  
172 In the tropical zone, meanwhile, the export commodity producers that make up Côte d'Ivoire's ANOPACI were 
key members of IFAP, as "members of the Executive Committee and president of the Cocoa Group" (Amoakon, 
2007:154).   
173 Interview AO-WA10. 
174 Interview AO-WA10.  
175 These countries, whose northern zones are on the semi-humid savannah transition zone beween humid tropical 





On the other hand, the 15-country bloc headquartered in Abuja was considered a manageable 
scale within which to operate and present policy demands, as opposed to expanding beyond that 
subregional level (McSween, 2015; Cissokho, 2009; McKeon et al., 2004).   
Furthermore, regionally framing the peasant network at ECOWAS-level reflected deeper 
considerations on the need to surpass enduring territorial divisions brought about by rival 
European colonial powers a century earlier. Mamadou Cissokho's own origins in the 
predominantly Mandinka transborder region of eastern Senegambia and western Mali enhanced 
his crucial role in enabling the creation of family farmer national federations beyond UEMOA and 
into ECOWAS's non-francophone countries, thanks to the persistence of West African linguistic 
networks across former inter-European colonial borders:  
When the Senegalese go to Gambia, they do not speak English or French, [they speak] Mandinka or Wolof. 
In Guinea-Bissau, I went several times, I spoke Mandinka. I went to Sierra Leone, Liberia, I spoke Mandinka. 
Because Mandinka over there is the reference. […] In our region, we have lived here together, culturally. 
We have many shared cultural values. Food and also history […]. So [we chose] ECOWAS because UEMOA 
is basically the [common CFA] currency and the colonies. Whereas ECOWAS is culture, development, it's 
much wider. And these are populations that always migrated, because in the time of the [West African] 
empires, there were no [internal] borders176. 
 
Besides colonial-era territorial divisions, extending West Africa's budding family farmer 
network from its Sahel cradle to its semi-humid savannah and humid tropical agrarian territories 
required incorporating corresponding rural social differentiations in its discursive self-
representation. The humid tropical region in particular – where cacao and coffee is produced in 
mostly small but also some large plots – hosts family farmers with the region's highest levels of 
capitalisation. This led Côte d'Ivoire's ANOPACI to request adding the term 'agricultural producer' 
to 'peasant' organisations when deciding on a name to designate the newly created regional 
family farmer network. Thus, the birth of the West African Network of Peasant and Agricultural 
Producer Organisations sealed joint representation of the region's wider rural labouring classes, 
across its three main dry, semi-humid, and humid agrarian territories. As one CNCR technical 
advisor put it:  
This distinction [between] peasant organisations [and] agricultural producers [is somewhat artificial given 
that] peasant organisations are [also] agricultural producers. But [we adopted this terminology] because of 
the forest countries, especially Côte d'Ivoire. Sure, maybe we [Sahelian peasants] are agricultural producers 
at a lower scale, in comparison. Because they consider themselves real industrial agricultural enterprises. 
 





ANOPACI's president for instance has quite large [landholdings and capitalisation], differently from our 
presidents. But fortunately, they understood that if they did not forge alliances with other [smaller-scale 
peasants], it would not work.177 
 
4.3.2 Peasant and agricultural producer organisations in ECOWAS 
 
ROPPA was thus formally constituted178 in July 2000 during a meeting in Cotonou, Benin, 
with approximately a hundred peasant representatives from 10 West African countries.179  Their 
priorities were several inter-related agricultural and trade policy regional negotiations (see 
chapters 6 and 7), launched or under way at the time: i) UEMOA negotiations for an Agricultural 
Policy (PAU) and Common External Tariff (CET); ii) European Union - Africa Caribbean Pacific (EU-
ACP) negotiations for inter-regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), including with 
ECOWAS180; iii) formulation of ECOWAS's regional agricultural policy (ECOWAP/CAADP)181; iv) 
negotiations for ECOWAS's transition to a customs union and definition of its own CET tariff lines. 
ROPPA's efforts to influence these different negotiations were met with varying levels of success, 
but all of them represented significant processes of growing participation and opening up of 
regional invited spaces to agrarian organisations. Their inter-related nature made ROPPA 
representatives synergically build up regional agricultural and trade policy technical knowledge 
as well as strategic political negotiation skills, as assessed in more detail in chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
The UEMOA agricultural policy formulation process did not initially include ROPPA, relying 
instead on a consulting firm that organised workshops with farmers without considering their 
national and regional representative bodies. When informed, ROPPA leaders complained to the 
UEMOA Commission President, and eventually obtained UEMOA funding to undertake 
 
177 Interview AO-WA7/AO-WA12.  
178 ROPPA's origins in CILSS and UEMOA countries account for the location of its main office in the same city that 
houses both subregional organisations' headquarters: Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. It now has a presence in 13 of 
the 15 ECOWAS countries, and a total membership of approximately 22 million farmers.  
179 These were: Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Togo. 
Ghana and Sierra Leone would join in 2006, and Liberia in 2010. Cape Verde and Nigeria have at times sent observers 
to meetings but do not have ROPPA national platform members.  
180 After the signature of the Cotonou Agreements between EU and ACP countries in June 2000 (one month before 
ROPPA's official creation in the same city). 
181 The previously existing ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) formulation process was eventually merged with 
the African Union’s (AU) Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), of which it became 





autonomous consultations (McSween, 2015). These culminated in a regional workshop in 
October 2001 on 'Common Agricultural Policies and Family Farms within the UEMOA area'. A 
memorandum presented two months later at the UEMOA Heads of State Summit by a ROPPA 
delegation of around 500 farmers from 8 countries took Heads of State by surprise (McKeon et 
al., 2004). In Mamadou Cissokho's words:  
In 2000 we created ROPPA, but UEMOA also decided to formulate its agricultural policy. So we 'forced the 
door open' [figuratively speaking] to get in there. And there, we defended the Regional Fund for Agro-Sylvo-
Pastoral Development […]. The most important thing is that we managed to get in there, and for the first 
time in the history of the [West African] Heads of State, in 2001 they received us in their meeting room.182   
 
Language on the underlying principle defended by ROPPA regarding family farmers being 
at the centre of PAU was included in the policy document signed by UEMOA Heads of State on 
19 December 2001 (McKeon et al., 2004). However, this did not reflect an actual incorporation 
of ROPPA's policy proposals, particularly relating to trade tariff measures (McSween, 2015). 
UEMOA's technical staff was seen by ROPPA as "technocratic and very [economically] liberal, 
[focusing essentially on] the large export commodity chains" (Coulibaly, 2007:141). ROPPA 
actively campaigned in their countries' respective media outlets against UEMOA's agricultural 
policy (McSween, 2015). PAU was never implemented, "given its […] dephasing with agricultural 
realities of the subregion" (Coulibaly, 2007:141). 
Meanwhile ECOWAS kick-started its own regional agricultural policy (ECOWAP) 
formulation process in 2003. Unlike with UEMOA's PAU, ROPPA was promptly included in the 
ECOWAP formulation steering committee, and managed to convince government members to 
debate different policy scenarios and potential impacts on family farming. This qualified ROPPA's 
capacity to set the terms of the policy agenda by co-elaborating alternative policy proposals in 
partnership with engaged researchers, and thus increased the legitimacy and negotiating power 
of the regional peasant network vis-à-vis member countries' and ECOWAS civil servants.  
These in turn were lauded by ROPPA as a "very motivated, very engaged" corps of regional 
technicians whose contribution to a participatory ECOWAP formulation process was decisive 
(Coulibaly, 2012:1). ECOWAS support for ROPPA's active engagement linked it to its top civil 
servant, President of the Commission Mohamed Ibn Chambas. Chambas increasingly consulted 
 





with the agrarian organisation's representatives before official negotiations, organising parallel 
meetings with ROPPA, and even inviting them to partake in Heads of State meetings, where they 
were frequently asked to voice opinions on public policy (McSween, 2015). Hence a few decades 
after creating their first autonomous associations and networks in the 1970s, West African 
peasants were now allowed a seat at the negotiating table on significant regional policy matters. 
The conditions under which they would manage to influence these policies during the 2000s is 




In the first period examined in this chapter (1870s-1920s) rural West African societies 
were characterised by labour regimes in which tributes levied by elders or chiefs were 
counterbalanced by communities' ownership of land. Traditional governing structures were 
shaken by colonial invasions, prompting many younger peasants in the Sahel to take refuge under 
Sufi Muslim orders. Under AOF's first 'predatory' colonialist phase (1900s—1930s) (Coquery-
Vidrovitch, 1976), the économie de traite organised investments to extract commodities at 
minimum cost (i.e. without densely gridding the barren hinterland), taxed and coerced peasants 
into forced labour, and sold them cheap manufactured goods from the metropole. Meanwhile, 
internal migrant networks across contiguous AOF territories still maintained pre-existing trans-
regional solidarities, reinforced by populations' shared opposition to colonial domination. 
AOF's second 'imperialist' phase (1930s-1950s) (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976) corresponded 
to a state-led reassertion of France's economic interests in the colonies, given the reduced 
margin for global trade and accumulation elsewhere during the Great Depression and WWII. As 
African urban civil servants and labourers' demands for better social conditions grew, colonial 
administrators sought to gain support from peasantries through 'bureaucratic populist' 
(Chauveau, 1994) investments into rural social services and in state-controlled marketing boards. 
Yet genuine state efforts at emancipating peasantries only came with national independence, 
whereby investments in the reclaimed agricultural cooperative structures were combined with 
popular education and training (e.g. Senegal, Niger). These initiatives faltered however, given 





African colonies and the continuity of economic surplus extraction to the benefit of French and 
other Global North business interests through unequal exchange.  
Though externally-oriented class alliances defeated a sovereign West African federation 
project at the time of political independence from France (1958-1960), the 1973-74 drought and 
famine in the drylands brought home the vital necessity of articulated regional integration, and 
generated the creation of CILSS, grouping together Sahel countries. Regional integration on a 
contiguous territorial basis was further reinforced with the creation of ECOWAS in 1975, upon 
the initiative of the humid tropical zone's anglophone and francophone countries led by Nigeria, 
particularly with the aim of securing an economic and monetary zone, thus challenging the 
principle of regional integration premised upon the CFA franc zone. 
The latter was nevertheless restructured into a new regional integration organisation – 
UEMOA – in 1994, in conjunction with France's unilateral decision to devaluate its former 
colonies' shared currency by half its value. Simultaneously, ECOWAS's mandate was refocused 
into reducing internal trade barriers towards a common market and enforcing regional peace and 
security. State disengagement from agricultural policy imposed through IFI debt-bonded 
structural adjustment from the 1980s in combination with democratic transitions in most states 
by the 1990s contributed to open space for burgeoning peasant organisations to take on greater 
economic implementation and political representation roles.  
Senegal's specificities allowed its peasants to build a robust agrarian organisation, CNCR, 
which obtained unprecedented access to state policy-making negotiations in the late 1990s. 
CNCR thus became a legitimate standard-bearer for the creation of a regional network initially 
based on the Sahel zone (PPS), later expanding to the remaining members of the ECOWAS region 
to form ROPPA in 2000. Experience gained in UEMOA's faltered agricultural policy process 
allowed ROPPA to gain further clout at ECOWAS level, and step up attempts to influence policies 






Chapter 5 - Secure and Equal Access to Land 
 
 Introduction    
 
Since the 1990s, a WB-led market-based narrative, followed by aid agencies and 
developing country governments, has influenced international land policy debates. It replaced a 
discourse on redistributive reform, predominant until the 1970s, with tenurial reform, 
emphasising land titling and privatisation benefits over other forms of land tenure for optimal 
resource allocation, and, purportedly, food production and supply (Manji, 2006). The post-2008 
global land rush accelerated drives for land privatisation and land tenure governance 
deregulation, as agricultural lands became perceived as both safe financial assets and external 
food supply guarantees for net food importing countries. 80% of 2,8 billion hectares of allegedly 
untapped agricultural frontier land globally identified by FAO in 2000 was located in Latin 
America and Africa (GRAIN, 2020), where most large-scale land acquisitions have since occurred.  
But recent decades also witnessed a resurgence of wider, more plural, debates on land 
governance and tenure policy, led by agrarian organisations, academia, and progressive 
governments. This was evidenced by FAO's International Conference on Agrarian Reform and 
Rural Development (ICARRD) hosted by Brazil in 2006, followed by the 2012 adoption of  the 
VGGT at the FAO-housed CFS. Both ICARRD and VGGT processes involved active participation of 
AOs, including COPROFAM and ROPPA.  
Yet everyday decisions on land policy remain tied to interlocking territorial dynamics, 
between local, national, and regional levels of political authority. RAO members in South America 
(SA) and West Africa (WA) have engaged with state representatives at these three contiguous 
territorial scales to advance proposals for land tenure policy, offering a wider palette of options 
than the prevailing market-led orthodoxy. Despite differing patterns of land occupation and use 
between and within the two studied regions, both share common challenges related to 
contemporary forms of 'permanent primitive accumulation' on a world scale (Amin, 2011a).  
Immediate responses involved much resistance and offensives at territorial level, as 
evidenced by land occupations enabling redistributive agrarian reform (SA), and campaigns 





been paid to regional initiatives aimed at land policy issues to build united fronts against land 
concentration and commodification, propose and negotiate alternative land policy conceptions, 
and disseminate these into official norms and laws.   
This chapter assesses regional land policy initiatives led by COPROFAM and ROPPA in their 
respective regions, along three parallel policy tracks spanning the 1990s-2010s, grouped here 
according to thematic sub-policy field, but presented in chronological order in each examined 
regional case: i) alternative regional policy frameworks and norms aimed at counteracting foreign 
or domestic driven land concentration processes (subsections 5.1.2 and 5.2.1); ii) intra-regional 
debates and policy diffusion processes aimed at keeping titled lands within non-privatised 
collective land tenure regimes (subsections 5.1.3 and 5.2.2); iii) territorially-rooted participatory 
forms of enforcing state regulation on land distribution and transfer (subsections 5.1.1 and 5.2.3). 
 
5.1 COPROFAM's regional drive for equitable land distribution and tenure reform 
 
This section examines three crucial and inter-related issues on which REAF's Thematic 
Group on Access to Land and Agrarian Reform (Land TG) has focused since the creation of the 
regional invited space in 2004: i) struggles for redistributive land reform, and their relationship 
to REAF debates on the social function of land property (section 5.1.1); ii) legal caps on foreign 
acquisition of land in MERCOSUR countries, partly stemming from REAF studies and deliberations 
(section 5.1.2); iii) securing existing land tenure rights as per REAF debates on titling to preserve 
land reform settlements or recognise indigenous/traditional communities' territories (section 
5.1.3).  
 
5.1.1 Upholding the social function of property to redistribute rural land 
 
This first subsection examines how regional discussions in REAF's Land TG reclaimed the 
historically buried legal concept of the social function of land property (SFLP) (see chapter 3). It 
evaluates how this 20th century foundational notion for SA land redistribution contributed to 





the first years of REAF/MERCOSUR in the mid-to-late 2000s. It then shows how SFLP was 
predominantly interpreted in land settlement disputes through a productivist lens inherited from 
previous generations of land struggles, and that land occupations combined with an upholding 
of the legally enshrined social function principle enabled the largest redistributive gains to occur 
in parts of the Southern Cone (mostly in Brazil's North and Northeast) peaking in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Lastly, it shows how agribusiness lobbies and neoliberal government 
administrations countered this redistributive wave by promoting the WB-led market-based land 
reform model, which – coupled with the 2000s commodity boom-fuelled land price increases and 
post-2008 land acquisition rush – halted land redistribution by the early 2010s. REAF 
deliberations after the post-2008 global land rush eventually prioritised a more international and 
multiscalar lens to resist land concentration, as discussed in the following section (5.1.2).  
Access to land for family farmers has been a regional policy deliberation priority between 
COPROFAM, other AOs, and Southern Cone governments since the creation of REAF/MERCOSUR, 
as stated in the invited space's internal regiment (2004) (França, 2016). A first contribution of 
regional discussions was a joint draft declaration proposal steered by the Uruguayan rotating 
presidency at the 4th REAF meeting in November 2005. It was distributed to MERCOSUR national 
delegations at FAO's ICARRD in 2006. Though not formally endorsed, it enabled REAF to bring 
land issues to regional policy debate with numerous AOs. The 'REAF Declaration on Land Reform 
and Rural Development' evidenced common land policy areas to debate in the regional invited 
space thereafter. Its recommendations included: implementing land redistribution policies, legal 
instruments to avoid land concentration, territorial zoning policies, promoting tenure rights of 
indigenous and traditional peoples and communities, and comparing national land legislations 
(França, 2016; Niederle, 2016).  
 The regional influence of AOs increased with the creation of the Land TG, which first met 
at the 5th REAF in Buenos Aires, in June 2006. At the 6th REAF in Porto Alegre (November 2006), 
the first Meeting of the Network of Institutions Responsible for Land Tenure Policies, Agrarian 
Reform and Access to Land took place (França, 2016). Hence, prior to the 7th REAF in Asunción 
(May 2007), a seminar on Land Tenure Policies and Agrarian Reform in MERCOSUR discussed land 





agrarian reform' (IAR) (see 5.1.3). This involved discussing access to land, and complementary 
policies supporting family farmer production and commercialisation on newly acquired or legally 
recognised land.  
These deliberations were an essential starting point at initial REAF meetings for 
COPROFAM, other AOs and government officials. Participants learnt about neighbouring 
countries' policy frameworks and land governance experiences. Seminars and joint declarations 
strengthened mutual comprehension on difficulties in implementing redistributive land reform – 
of which there were only some concrete gains to speak of in Brazil (Niederle, 2016; França, 2016). 
REAF's Technical Secretary recalled:  
We started with the social function of land […] with revaluing land use in family farming for the production 
of food. We explored this relationship, including at the normative level: 'Where is there a mention of social 
function?' 'What does it mean?'183  
 
A historically rooted concept throughout Latin America (see chapter 3), SFLP has most 
recently been enshrined in the Constitutions of Brazil (1988) and Paraguay (1992). Hence, the 
latter's article 109 guarantees the "economic and social function of private property with the goal 
of making it accessible to all", while its article 116 "states the goal of eliminating unproductive 
latifundia through expropriation" (FIAN, 2008:13). But within the Southern Cone region, SFLP 
underpinned the largest relative advances in land distribution and access in Brazil. 
In previous decades, CONTAG's demands for agrarian reform had built on calls to uphold 
SFLP, as per the 1964 Land Statute. Instituted by the incoming military dictatorship, the Land 
Statute was nevertheless a milestone for CONTAG-led land struggles. It indicated concessions to 
the effervescent agrarian movement, if only to diffuse tensions and attempt co-opting parts of 
it, while violently repressing its most militant elements. Hence CONTAG's "struggles were based 
on the argument that the 1964 Land Statute should be implemented, reinforcing an 'institutional' 
means of social pressure" (Sauer and Perdigão, 2019:78). A veteran leader recalled: 
The [local government official] would say 'communists!' [but we would reply] 'no this was done by [military 
general] Castelo Branco, look here'. We created the [land] conflicts, [claiming] the rights that were in the 
Land Statute. Many conflicts across Brazil were made from this. 'Let us claim – when there is a lawyer – let 
us demand enforcement of the Land Statute.'184 
 
 
183 Interview CS-SA25.  





The military government hardly redistributed land, and focused on colonisation schemes 
in frontier zones, particularly in the Amazon region. But the 1985 First National Plan for Agrarian 
Reform drawn by Brazil's transitional civilian government did take "the Land Statute's reformist 
potential to its ultimate consequences" whereby expropriation based on non-conformity of a 
landholding with SFLP became the "main agrarian reform instrument" (Guimarães and Medeiros, 
1997:11). Contrasting CONTAG's legalistic stance, the MST and CUT's rural department in the 
1980s led occupations of lands not fulfilling SFLP forcing the state to expropriate them. The most 
successful cases were nonetheless legally enabled by a constitutionally enshrined SFLP 
(Guimarães and Medeiros, 1997). The combination of MST-pioneered direct action (later 
followed by CONTAG) backed by legal recourse to SFLP formed the essence of redistributive land 
reform in Brazil during the following two decades (1990s-2000s) (see Guimarães and Medeiros, 
1997).  
This became possible because the social function criteria included a productivity index, 
making idle land usually kept for speculative purposes eligible for expropriation and 
redistribution.185 CONTAG was a latecomer to the occupation tactic, but increasingly adopted it 
from the mid-1990s), pushed by its social bases, particularly in the North and Northeast, where 
the MST often had a smaller presence than than in its stronghold in the country’s South.186 At 
national level, CONTAG became the second most active organisation struggling for agrarian 
reform. Hence, "from 2000 to 2012, CONTAG led 510 land struggles involving more than 53,000 
families, in comparison to the 2701 settlements involving more than 450,000 families led by the 
MST" (Welch and Sauer, 2015:1125). It also joined the National Forum for Agrarian Reform and 
Justice in the Countryside (FNRA) founded in 1995, which congregated MST and CUT among 40-
plus organisations.  
A total of 23.9 million ha were redistributed to 575.000 families during the 1990s-2000s 
(Silveira et al., 2016). From the mid-2000s, land redistribution slowed down, ending by the early 
 
185 While SFLP in Brazil also encompasses criteria related to labouring conditions and environmental conservation, 
in practice the degree of idleness versus productivity of rural land has been the only line of argument to legally 
enable significant redistribution of land to occur through expropriation. Yet outdated low productivity indexes meant 
that even largely idle plots of land were in many cases not deemed eligible for redistribution.  





2010s. A similar pattern is perceptible in neighbouring Paraguay during the same timeframe and 
with similar factors accounting for the rise and fall of redistributive agrarian reform. 
Indeed, the 1990s were the only decade in Paraguay’s history that saw some degree of 
land redistribution. As revealed by the 2002 agricultural census, the number of "land plots from 
5 to 10 ha and from 10 to 20 ha increased considerably" (Riquelme and Kretschmer, 2016:17), 
with more than 20.000 families accessing land through new settlements. One of COPROFAM’s 
coordinators, from ONAC, elucidated how the limited land redistribution of Paraguay resulted, 
like in Brazil, from bottom-up pressure through land occupations legally backed by SFLP:  
I am from the Department of Amambay, in the District of Bella Vista […], a land expropriated through a 
struggle that occurred in 1994-1995 […] from an Argentine citizen, [who had] an extension of more than 
500.000 hectares. […]. Half of this was done for agrarian reform. Sadly, we have had many land struggles in 
Paraguay. […] Among these we have had many achievements, thousands of peasant families have been 
settled. But everything has been through struggle. It was not given away for free. It was a fight – there were 
human casualties, imprisonments. […] All of the peasant settlements in Paraguay were [obtained] through 
occupations […]. None were given by the government. They were obtained in occupations of unproductive 
lands which were in the hands of foreigners who were not eligible for agrarian reform.187  
 
However, redistribution in Paraguay soon dwindled following increasingly systematic 
criminalisation and repression of peasant organisations, and a rise in land prices due to monocrop 
agribusiness expansion, itself fuelled by rising commodity prices (Riquelme and Kretschmer, 
2016). Reasons for waning redistributive agrarian reform in Brazil are similarly manifold. Most 
salient is the government's criminalisation of occupations and concomitant prohibition of Brazil's 
National Institute for Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) to "evaluate the agrarian reform 
expropriation suitability of land that had been occupied" (Welch and Sauer, 2015:1127) from 
1997 onwards, thus breaking the main mechanism of SFLP-based land redistribution.  
Yet two other significant factors came into play. The first one relates to the rise in the real 
value of agrarian debt bonds188 paid as delayed compensation to expropriated landowners189, as 
well as to increases in market valuation of land from the 2000s. The latter was due not just to the 
 
187 Interview AO-SA8.  
188 Títulos da dívida agrária (TDA).  
189 These were usually redeemable only 10 years after expropriation, as a penalisation for not following SFLP 
principles, and to provide the state with enough fiscal capacity to purchase land at scale by deferring financial 
compensation (see below). Yet the bonds became increasingly tradeable on financial markets  by the late 1990s as 
a result of government-mediated deregulation. Hence, TDAs eventually "became converted into a very liquid 
currency [that was] tradeable [before the 10 year expiration, thereby] increasing the federal government’s agrarian 





commodity boom (i.e. rising foreign demand fuelling domestic investment): land price increases 
also resulted from the valuation of agrarian debt bonds (after currency stabilisation in the mid-
1990s), and their trade on the stock market. This made land redistribution policy require much 
higher fiscal resources per hectare190 (see section 5.1.2) by the mid-2000s than it did in the 1990s.  
The second factor relates to the parallel and sometimes competing promotion of 
alternative forms of access to land, such as land regularisation and titling (especially of informal 
settlements in the Legal Amazon region), recognition of lands traditionally occupied by 
indigenous and Afro-descendent rural communities, land purchased by the state for 
redistribution, subsidised credit for land acquisition, and allocation of public lands for 
settlements191 (Del Grossi and Marques, 2016; Lipton, 2009). Additionally, priority shifted 
towards a more general need to developing settlements from redistributed land to make good 
on the promise of 'integral agrarian reform' in the face of competing land concentration 
pressures (see section 5.1.3).  
 The crisis of South American agriculture concomitant to the debt crisis and neoliberal 
structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s coincided with the rise of a united front of agrarian 
movements pushing for the redistribution of land. Occupations of idle or unproductive land 
legally underpinned by SFLP enabled the greatest land redistribution gains ever achieved192 in 
countries with some of the world's most unequal land distribution patterns. However, by the 
time progressive administrations were in power in all four MERCOSUR founding countries after 
the election of Paraguay's president Lugo in 2008, the redistribution process paradoxically had 
all but run out of steam and most land settlements in Brazil's agrarian reform process emanated 
from land regularisation in the Amazon region, as opposed to expropriation and redistribution 
(Silveira et al., 2016).  
 
190 Interviews CS-SA24, CS-SA15, CS-SA23. 
191 According to this wider definition of agrarian reform, which includes not only land redistribution but all forms of 
securing access to land for peasant family farmers, the 2003-2014 period saw the highest gains. Hence "as of April 
2015, there were 969,129 settled families in 9,623 land reform projects comprising a total area of 88 million hectares 
– about 10 per cent of the Brazilian territory" (Del Grossi and Marques, 2016:13).  
192 Although they represent only a small fraction of the land potentially elegible for redistribution according to SFLP 






In a regional context of decades-long unrelenting pressure on small and medium family 
farmers (with many farms disappearing via accelerated property concentration and land 
consolidation), reclaiming the historical concept of SFLP helped RAOs join forces, and reinstate 
the hitherto delegitimised objective of redistributive agrarian reform to serious policy debate 
with government. The significant drive to redistribute land in Brazil (as well as the modest gains 
made by Paraguay) during the late 1990s and early 2000s,  served as concrete evidence of the 
SFLP concept's force for MERCOSUR countries that have yet to experience relevant amounts of 
land redistribution. Yet the receding pace and eventual stagnation of agrarian reform in the 
Southern Cone at the time REAF began its most productive phase (2006-2014) shows how SFLP 
was as much an 'offensive' concept to accelerate land redistribution for peasantries in semi-arid 
or tropical areas, than a 'defensive' one, where SFLP serves to emphasize the wider societal 
benefits of small and medium landed property in order halt land loss, particularly in temperate 
or subtropical regions193. 
Indeed, the greater prevalence of expropriated and redistributed land in Brazil's North 
and Northeast versus the higher proportion of land acquired through subsidised credit in its 
South is mirrored by neighbouring countries with agrarian formations comparable to Brazil's 
different macro-regions. Brazilian Northeast is characterised by prevalence of minifundios 
analogous to Paraguay's Oriental region. In both cases, land occupations have been undertaken 
with some successful redistribution.  
However, Brazil's South bears more similarities with Argentine and Uruguayan cases, 
where COPROFAM's bases include a large contingent of propertied middle family farmers. Their 
most pressing concerns are usually avoiding debt insolvency and consequent loss of land or of 
their occupation as a producer194, as well as ensuring there is enough land for the new 
generations (i.e. farm succession). Rarely do they feel compelled to struggle for new lands 
through occupations. Differently from MST, CUT, and FETRAF (later CONTRAF) in Brazil's three 
southern states,195 CONTAG's southern federations have a significant medium farmer base with 
 
193 E.g. as argued by prominent FAA members on different occasions (see Prunotto, 1984).  
194 E.g. through financially coerced leasing of one's land to larger monocrop producers, a common sight in Argentina’s 
Pampa region. Interview AO-SA-3. 





usually more conservative political leanings than their counterpart federations in the Northeast. 
Particularly, their defence of small and medium private property (e.g. versus the MST’s defence 
of forms of collective ownership) approximates CONTAG's southern federations with FAA and 
CNFR. Hence, all three share an approach to land access via purchasing mechanisms.  
Although these mechanisms involve land markets, they have only significantly benefitted 
these AOs' bases insofar as they were considerably subsidised by the state. Hence, many 
southern CONTAG members prioritised a recourse to state-subsidised and regulated mechanisms 
to purchase land for small and medium producers. Similarly CNFR members in Uruguay have 
obtained some land via its National Colonisation Institute’s (INC) land purchase schemes funded 
via progressive taxation. Yet, while the land acquired by INC during 2005-2014 benefited about 
1.400 families, close to 12.000 family farmers (with less than 100 ha) lost their lands in a similar 
period (2000-2011) 196 (Díaz, 2014).  
Hence, SFLP was much less effective at preserving family farms from disappearing through 
the rapid advance of large-scale agribusiness throughout the Southern Cone, than at justifying 
expropriation for at least some land redistribution in parts of it. As fiscal limits to further 
implement the latter manifested by the late 2000s, financialised acceleration of the global land 
rush revealed how drivers of land concentration and small farms' disappearance were to a 
significant extent international, and – as all too evident to Paraguayans and Uruguayans vis-à-vis 
their two larger neighbours – regional. We now turn to this international dimension of SA land 
concentration, and the land policy solutions debated in REAF to tackle it.  
 
5.1.2 Approving legal limits to the concentration and foreign acquisition of land 
 
South American AOs' influence on land policy from a regional perspective reached their 
apex during discussions on concentration and foreign alienation (extranjerización) of land in the 
late 2000s. Subsequent changes in national legislations approved in Brazil, Argentina and 
Uruguay confirmed REAF's influence as regional policy space (Niederle, 2016).  
 
196 Out of INC’s 576.000 hectares of total public land allotted to 5.000 families purchased by INC (1948-2014), 81.000 





At the 8th REAF (Montevideo, October 2007), delegations noted that family farmers were 
undermined by land concentration driven by acquisitions from actors of " their own countries, 
[but also] from the region or outside of it" (França, 2016:22). Accordingly, reports were 
commissioned by the four MERCOSUR founding countries and presented at the 10th REAF (Rio de 
Janeiro, November 2008), where delegations decided to send an evidence-based 
recommendation to MERCOSUR's Common Market Group (GMC).  
The decision to send a draft recommendation to the GMC on 'Tenure Policies and Access 
to Land' was acted upon at the 12th REAF (Montevideo, December 2009).  Though approved by 
the GMC, which forwarded the recommendation to the Common Market Council (CMC), 
MERCOSUR's highest instance, the CMC rejected the proposal. This is the only REAF 
recommendation or decision that was not approved by MERCOSUR’s governing body since the 
creation of the regional specialised meeting in 2004. Although reasons for the rejection were 
never made explicit, the most  probable hypothesis put forward by observers points to the fact 
that many of the 'foreign acquisitions' came from other MERCOSUR countries, particularly 
Brazilian and Argentine capital acquiring lands in Paraguay and Uruguay respectively (Niederle, 
2016).  
Increasing land prices in Brazil and Argentina drove an expansion towards land purchase 
and consolidation of agricultural commodity chain operations in Uruguay. The trans-border 
territory formed by Brazil's Mato Grosso do Sul and Paraná states with Paraguay's eastern 
Departments bears continuity with successive generations of Brazilian agricultural interests in 
Paraguay. This dates back at least to Paraguayan military ruler Alfredo Stroessner’s policies which 
encouraged Brazilian migration and investment since the 1960s along the country’s eastern 
departments (see chapter 3), and indeed to lands acquired as a result of the 1870s Triple Alliance 
War pitting Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay against Paraguay.  
As shown in Figure 11 below, in some of Paraguay’s eastern  departments, such as  
Canindeyú (60,1 %) and Alto Paraná (55,2 %), Brazilians hold more land titles than Paraguayans 
(Castilho, Bassi, 2017). The eastern departments also concentrate the sites where Stroessner's 
government promoted peasant family farmer colonisation in the early 1960s (see chapter 3). 





border in the late 1970s displaced numerous Brazilian peasant family farmers, who settled along 
both sides of Paraguay's borderline. The massacres of Ñacunday and Curuguaty in 2012 (the 
latter of which was used by the opposition as a pretext to impeach President Lugo) were only the 
latest in a series of land conflicts involving predominantly Brazilian (first- or second-generation 




Figure 11: Proportion of land titles held by Brazilian nationals in Paraguay’s eastern 
Departments197 (Source: Castilho, Bassi, 2017). 
 
However, despite intra-MERCOSUR reasons for rejecting REAF's recommendation, links 
between regionally articulated agribusiness and global transnational networks equally 
underscored the extranjerización discourse employed in the draft recommendation text. Global 
soya bean expansion was a clear driver of land concentration across MERCOSUR in recent 
decades, indirectly fuelled by growing export markets in Asia (particularly China) and Europe. 
MERCOSUR's increase in soya production was so great that its four founding member countries 
plus Bolivia now represent two thirds of global soya bean exports, a position hitherto held by the 
 





US in the 1990s, with a significant portion of the economic surplus retained by input-supplying 
global agri-food conglomerates (see Figure 12 below).  
 
 
Figure 12: Syngenta publicity emphasising the 'transborder agrarian territory' covered by 
soya expansion since the 1970s in the Southern Cone.198 (Source: Wesz, 2014). 
 
Despite the CMC's rejection, debates leading up to the country studies, seminars, regional 
synthesis and joint recommendation between delegations was fruitful in enabling participants to 
incorporate regional lessons into national legislations. Though Brazil and Uruguay only slightly 
altered their legal frameworks regarding foreign acquisition of rural land, the debate reached 
most public exposure in Argentina. As recalled by a civil servant of Argentina's Ministry of 
Agriculture:  
Argentina approved an anti-extranjerización law. […] Land was concentrated, often in the hands of 
foreigners, a significant part of the land. [The] agribusiness [sector] was completely against the law. They 
thought this would discourage investment. I mean the most powerful of the [Argentine agribusiness actors] 
- they are partners [of transnational capital]. There are not many of them.199  
 
 
198 Right side headline: 'Soya knows no borders. Neither does Centinela's information'. Left side map: 'United 
Republic of Soya', encompassing the four MERCOSUR founding member countries plus Bolivia. 





 Argentina’s Senate approved Law 29.737 - which places limits on foreign acquisition of 
land - almost unanimously in 2011. It determined that up to 15% of Argentine land could be held 
by foreign capital and instituted a 1.000 hectare limit on any landholding held by a foreign citizen 
or business. COPROFAM’s FAA had attempted to introduce similar legislation on previous 
occasions (see Figure 13 below). 
  
 
Figure 13: FAA poster promoting public debate on the 
foreign acquisition and concentration of Argentine land200 
 
 However, the 2011 Land Bill allowed for a potential revision of the 1.000-hectare limit 
which occured under President Macri in 2016 through Decree 820/16. This led FAA's President 
Omar Príncipe to publicly question "which interests are behind this decree, that encroaches upon 
small producers?" (Corrientes Hoy, 2016:2). FAA's Union Secretary Orlando Marino added that, 
one week before the bicentennial independence celebrations, "the worst homage we [could] pay 
to our heroes is to give away our natural resources and favour [land] concentration" (Ibid).  
 Macri's administration's lifting of restrictions aimed to encourage foreign investment in 
agriculture, including in the country's most productive 'nucleus zone' (zona núcleo) (north of 
Buenos Aires province, and south of Cordoba and Santa Fe provinces). Significant parts of this 
zone have strong FAA representation, hence the resistance displayed by its leaders in the face of 
 





the 2016 presidential decree. The lifting of the 1.000 hectare limit that had been instituted by 
the 2011 bill is the main point of contention denounced by FAA. This is revelatory of the dense 
network of small and even medium farmers (by South American land size standards) from a 
prosperous agro-exporting region that would be negatively affected by the measure (InfoSur, 
2016).  
 Yet Macri's administration did not overturn all of the bill’s provisions. Under Kirchner's 
administration, the need for a national cadastre of agricultural landholding to identify owners, 
including potential law-breaking foreign owners, contributed to trigger a land registration and 
titling process. This was later reconfigured into a land-titling programme,201  which relates to 
discussions in the following subsection below.  
 
5.1.3 Securing redistributed, indigenous, and traditional lands through non-privatised 
titling 
 
Cooperation programmes between MERCOSUR countries resulting from the network of 
national land institutes created as part of REAF's Land TG involved exchanging formulation and 
implementation experiences. For instance, a cooperation agreement between Paraguay's 
INDERT and Brazil's INCRA aimed to share Brazil's agrarian reform beneficiary registration 
methodology with their Paraguayan counterparts (França, 2016). Avoiding land (re)-
concentration became increasingly seen as the other side of the coin to redistributing land, since 
both concur towards the same goal of securing land tenure for family farmers.  
Regarding exchanges between the national land institutes to build policy implementation 
capacity, REAF’s longtime Technical Secretary Lautaro Viscay, an Argentine agronomist with in-
depth knowledge of Southern Cone agrarian policies, recalled: "there was always the titling 
question in the middle".202 This was partly because international donors, who had a non-
negligible influence on agricultural policy budgetary allocation (particularly in smaller countries), 
favoured land titling, for reasons further explored below, particularly in the West African section 
 
201 Interview CS-SA27.  





(5.2) of this chapter. But it also reflected indigenous and traditional peoples' demands for titling, 
including Brazil's Afro-descendent quilombolas.203  
Indigenous and traditional peoples demanded formalising collective possession 
throughout SA, given that recognition as state-protected land under non-privatised tenure 
regimes was perceived as a fundamental way to prevent further land alienation and 
concentration. For instance, Brazil's legislation confers permanent public status to officially 
registered indigenous and quilombola territories (respectively 13,3% and 0.11% of Brazil's 
territory), which, differently from agrarian reform settlement lands, cannot be resold. This 
explains Brazilian AOs' longstanding demand that settlements also be included as permanently 
public lands not to be resold on the private market.204  
In parallel, COPROFAM began to call for 'integral agrarian reform' (IAR), a discursive policy 
frame which encompassed both access to land and policies to maintin it. Thus it reflectedd 
COPROFAM members' diverse class and territorial objective interests: whether these were 
principally focused on the redistribution process to obtain land or on safeguarding it, as their 
possession of it became increasingly threatened by monocrop or cattle-ranch driven land 
concentration  (2000s-2010s): 
COPROFAM and its affiliated organisations will continue to exercise their right to defend family, peasant, 
and indigenous production […]. For this they shall continue proposing specific public policies to promote 
integral agrarian reform and secure access to land, production, commercialisation and access to markets, 
and public procurement, among other indispensable measures to guarantee rooting and sustainable 
development to improve the lives of family, peasant, and indigenous farmers. (COPROFAM, 2007: 6-7).    
 
 For the regional network of AOs, civil servants, and academics working together in REAF's 
Land TG, the shared discursive policy frame of IAR served to orient discussions on at least two 
dimensions of land tenure security (looked at in the remainder of this section): i) developing land 
reform settlements through a comprehensive set of public policies; and ii) legally recognising 
indigenous and traditional collectively held territories205.  
 
203 Brazilian autonomous Afro-descendent traditional rural communities formed by former plantation slave 
labourers that remained active after slavery was abolished in 1888. Analogous rural communities exist in former 
plantation colonies across Latin America and the Caribbean, with different local names (e.g. palenque in Colombia 
cumbe in Venezuela, maroons in the Guyanas and English-speaking Caribbean).  
204 Participant observation in 27th REAF Land TG, Florianópolis, 2017.  





Brazil's First National Plan for Agrarian Reform (PNRA, 1985) had placed most of its 
emphasis on land redistribution and the legal backing to ensure the expropriation process that 
preceded it. The Second PNRA (2004) instead focused on developing land reform settlements, 
given that only a fraction of redistributed land was receiving adequate access to support policies 
that would enable these to be economically and socially viable, and thus avoid reversal of land 
redistribution through reselling of reformed land206.  
Indeed, one of the key challenges of agrarian reform policy is maintaining settled land in 
the hands of family farmers. Part of the critics of Brazilian land reform since the 1990s  related to 
the state’s incapacity to provide policy support - including the most basic services - to settled 
families. With no access to electricity or running water, let alone support for farming activities, a 
substantial part of these families consequently had no other option but to leave the 
settlements.207 These challenges severely affected Paraguay's land reform areas. A REAF 
participant from Paraguay's ONAC and COPROFAM explains:  
The majority of those who abandoned their lands did not do so because they wanted to. [It is] because 
something happened, or [because] they were threatened. And here there is no oversight, no control, there 
are no public policies, these are not implemented. In other words, they basically give you a piece of land 
and they abandon you. And you have to make ends meet by yourself. And it's very difficult. […] They send 
your son to a faraway school, [to live] in another house, in other places. […] Today, I think only about 20% 
[of agrarian reform lands] are occupied by family farming. […] In the zone of Alto Paraná - one of the most 
productive regions of Paraguay's Oriental region - there are thousands of hectares that are INDERT lands 
which are occupied by soya bean growers, for kilometres on end… that [INDERT] is not capable of taking 
back, that are not titled.208   
 
REAF Land TG discussions on IAR were also about connecting access to land with access 
to agricultural policies – similarly to Brazil's Second PNRA. Former Minister of Agrarian 
Development Miguel Rossetto clarified:  
The pillars of the Second National Agrarian Reform Plan [relate to] the fundamental idea that [access to] 
land begins a process […] of agrarian reform - it doesn't finish it. So the reformed space must be a space of 
quality of production, quality of life. This oriented a whole debate on productive qualification, credit, 
financing […]. Involving these reformed areas with the territories meant qualifying these reformed areas, 
with electric energy, and so forth. […] There was a huge demand that we inherited, there was a brutal 
velocity of settlements, [a need to] satisfy a very big social demand.209  
 
 
206 Interview CS-SA26. 
207 Interviews CS-SA15 and CS-SA23.  
208 Interview AO-SA8.  





Under Brazil's legislation, lands obtained through INCRA's agrarian reform mechanisms 
(e.g. expropriation with delayed compensation, or legal recognition/titling of informal land 
possession as individual family farms) cannot be resold for a period determined by law. Yet 
differently from indigenous and quilombola lands, reformed lands are less protected from re-
concentration. Indeed, the period during which redistributed or titled land cannot be resold on 
the private land market was reduced by a 2017 presidential decree from 10 to 3 years.210 This 
mechanism, combined with drastically lower state support for family farms and a severe post-
2014 economic crisis, pressured family farmers to sell their plots and thus reverse agrarian 
reform gains. Hence, Brazil's 2017 agricultural census revealed that about 100.000 farms had 
disappeared since the previous census undertaken in 2006. Compounded by legislation that 
relaxed limits for foreign acquisition of land (see  section 5.1.2), Brazil's agrarian reform gains 
have come under unprecedented strain.  
A meeting of REAF's Land TG (which I attended as part of my fieldwork in 2017) enabled 
to evidence, by contrast with the above-described Brazilian conjuncture, how reformed land 
need not be subject to unfettered market forces and pit actors of radically different size and 
political-economic weight against each other. A high-level representative from Uruguay's INC 
raised the significant point to the attention of Land TG participants that any land previously 
obtained by INC (generally through purchase, financed by national taxes, including on land) 
remains in the hands of the Uruguayan state, managed by INC, turning beneficiaries into rural 
'state tenants' of sorts. Hence, should some family farmers be driven (whether by choice or 
necessity) to sell, INC's legal attributions maintain that land public and attribute it to other 
beneficiaries.  
This also explains why the maintenance of INC as a public agency was so vehemently 
defended when its privatisation was attempted, from the military dictatorship in the 1970s 
through to 1980s-early 2000s neoliberal democratically-elected governments. Indeed, INC's 
privatisation was resisted through mobilisation by organisations including CNFR and main urban 
labour union PIT-CNT (López, 2008) (see chapter 3).  
 





Yet INC's representative in REAF's 2017 Land TG highlighted the permanence of reformed 
lands as a collective Uruguayan public heritage managed by the state as part of a debate involving 
claims by indigenous peoples of neighbouring country delegations. Indeed, titling was back on 
the agenda under Argentine and Brazilian neoliberal restoration attempts post mid-2010s, but 
previously accumulated gains were still sufficiently entrenched to enable rational collective 
debate in the regional invited space of REAF. Moreover, the participatory nature of debates 
revealed fertile complementarities between the preoccupations and policy prescriptions voiced 
by South American indigenous and traditional community representatives, and those of 
progressive government civil servants still in office at the time (e.g. Uruguay, Chile).  
During president Bachelet's second mandate (2014-2018), Chile's INDAP211 was grappling 
with indigenous uprisings centred in its Araucanía region, many of them involving land 
conflicts212. This mirrored indigenous movements' rise to prominence in agrarian policy debates 
in neighbouring Argentina under president Cristina Kirchner's second mandate (2011-2015) (see 
chapter 7). Hence, in June 2017, at the 26th REAF regional meeting hosted by Chile213, fittingly 
held to commemorate 50 years of the beginning of Chile's Agrarian Reform (1967-1973), an 
indigenous representative reminded audience members that Chile's indigenous population had 
hardly benefited from that historical process, however progressive it may have been at its time214 
(see chapter 3). Argentine and Chilean indigenous groups have pressured for a recognition of 
indigenous territories, in similar ways as Brazilian traditional peoples and communities were able 
to obtain formal (though often threatened) recognition with its 1988 Constitution, or, more 
recently, inspired by recognition of indigenous lands in Bolivia during the Evo Morales 
administrations (2006-2019). 
The risks to land loss for these and other peasant family farmers across the region have 
remained acute as the unrelenting drive for 'permanent primitive accumulation' in the global 
 
211 Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario (Agricultual Development Institute). Created in 1962, INDAP had a central 
role in implementing Chile’s agrarian reform (1967-1973). Although threatened with disappearance by the Pinochet 
regime, INDAP survived into the country’s (post-1989) democratic transition (Faiguenbaum, 2017). It is Chile’s key 
government institution responsible for policies targeted at peasant and indigenous family farmers (PIFFs).  
212 Interview CS-SA10. 
213 An anomaly given that Chile is not a MERCOSUR permanent member, yet had a government willing to finance 
such an endeavour, differently from Brazil and Argentina at the height of late 2010s neoliberal restoration. 





peripheries persists. Despite some gains made in the 1990s and 2000s, rural lands held by South 
American indigenous/traditional communities and other peasant family farmers still represent a 
minority of the region’s rural territories. Meanwhile a majority of West Africa’s rural land is still 
held by peasant family farmers under different forms of tenure. Yet this other region of the Global 
South is no less strained by different forms of surplus extraction putting pressure on peasant 
family farms and collective land tenure systems. ROPPA has aimed to address these pressing 
issues in its multipronged efforts to influence land policy, which shall be looked at in the following 
section of this chapter.  
 
5.2 ROPPA's regional drive to secure and maintain distributed access to rural land 
 
This section looks at ROPPA’s tackling of land policy issues in West Africa through three 
inter-related strategies. The first subsection (5.2.1) looks at ROPPA’s alternative proposals to face 
the challenges of land grabbing and tenure fragmentation through regional efforts to widen land 
policy debates beyond the narrow titling-privatising orthodoxy. The second subsection (5.2.2) 
looks at how obstacles to mainstreaming local land policy principles via regional integration have 
been partly overcome through ROPPA’s network of national platforms and its diffusion of land 
laws that strengthen collective tenure regimes across West African countries. The challenges of 
reforming previous land laws or implementing new ones whilst resisting land concentration 
pressures are all related to the need for greater participatory land tenure governance, as 
encouraged or coordinated by ROPPA members at local and national scales. This is examined 
through the particular case of Senegal’s national land policy process and CNCR’s efforts to 
democratize local land tenure governance by strengthening village and inter-village commissions 
across the country’s territory (5.2.3).  
 
5.2.1 Regional land policy alternatives to privatised titling and land grabbing  
 






The pressures and financial incentives offered by the WB and other development agencies 
for governments in WA to privatise land in the 1990s gained traction as they ran in tandem with 
agrifood transnationals aiming to expand operations by acquiring land in the 2000s and 2010s. 
Hence "Between 2004 and 2009 the World Bank was committed to 34 land titling and registration 
projects worth US$1 billion compared to just 3 projects in [the] 1990–1994 period" (Chimhowu, 
2019:898). Yet registered lands in most African countries still represent an exception, as they are 
mostly "in urban areas and within irrigated projects, where returns to resources are sufficiently 
high for it to be worth establishing title" (IIED, 1999, ii). Hence, only "2 to 10% of rural lands are 
estimated to be officially registered" in Africa today (Chauveau, 2018:1). 
Although Senegal's land tenure is still governed by its 1964 law, the country's efforts to 
update its land legislation over the last three decades serves to illustrate wider trends across WA. 
Indeed, following its WB-contracted 1995 Agricultural Structural Adjustment Plan (PASA), the 
government initially agreed to transition towards privatisation of its land tenure system. It 
commissioned an expert-drafted report on "enabling private investors to gain access to 
[Senegal's untitled land] and obtain a land title" (Faye, 2007:3). Yet the report ignored Senegal's 
most pressing land tenure issues, particularly the increasing fragmentation of landholdings due 
to demographic pressures and soil degradation.  
Indeed, between Senegal's 1960 and 1998 agricultural censuses, "the average cultivated 
area per worker for all family farms [decreased] from 1.07 ha to 0.57 ha" (IPAR, 2007:7). Hence 
most of the country's rainfed "farms are not viable without significant animal husbandry and non-
agricultural activities" (Ibid). The average size of a Senegalese farm is 5.5 ha, meaning "less than 
1 ha per [family farmer] […]. These ratios decrease from generation to generation with the 
fragmentation of land assets resulting from customary inheritance practices in traditional rural 
societies. Today, more than 2/3 of farms have less than 4 ha, hence 0.5 ha per working member 
of each family" (Faye, 2018:57-58).  
This process of "miniaturisation of […] small farms as population pressure creates a need 
to subdivide to accommodate more people" in parallel with a "rise in the number of medium 
scale farms" mostly managed by "urban based professionals and external investors" has become 





902). Hence, the other side of the coin of landholding fragmentation has been the concentration 
of relatively larger plots into fewer hands. While 72,1% of Senegalese families had at least 6 ha 
of land in 2001-2002, by 2005-2006, this proportion had fallen to only 27,4% (Ndiaye, 2012:109). 
These minorities of relatively wealthier Senegalese farmers include religious marabouts, retired 
civil servants, tradesmen and carriers (IPAR, 2007).  
Despite growing recognition by the WB of some strengths of customary tenure systems, 
it remains committed in compelling countries to modify their land tenure laws to offer "secure 
and unambiguous property rights" to "allow markets to transfer land to more productive uses 
and users" (World Bank, 2007, cited by Chimhowu, 2019:898). A significant part of the "people 
taking advantage of national titling programme[s] are urban based professionals seeking to invest 
in rural land" (Chimhowu, 2019:901-902) referred to by CNCR/ROPPA's Sidy Ba (2018:9-10) as a 
"new aristocracy and new type of producers, [dubbed] 'Sunday peasants'". As a former high-level 
civil servant in the Ministry of Agriculture put it: "people have to stop simply wak[ing] up [one 
day and say] 'I'm a farmer', anyone wakes up [and suddenly decides] 'I'm a herder'. No, you are 
a novice herder, you do not even know what animal husbandry is. So we must be serious".215 
This has manifested through a "displacement of poor people from their land through 
distress sales [and/or] simple land grabbing by local elites working with state officials or investors 
especially in jurisdictions where customary tenure still does not offer statutory protection" 
(Chimhowu, 2019:901-902). ROPPA's former Executive Secretary, Mamadou Goita (2012:17), 
thus defined the RAO’s understanding of land grabbing to encompass not just foreign or larger-
scale land acquisitions but land transactions of all sizes, performed by actors foreign or national:  
For ROPPA, land grabbing is a much broader concept [than large-scale land purchase or long-term lease]. It 
refers to any kind of land transfer (concession, sale, rent, loan) to a national or foreign operator who has 
an influence on the land tenure security of family farms, whatever their size. […] Size is not a fundamental 
criterion: a 5 ha land grab in Guinea-Bissau, the Gambia or Benin, countries where agricultural land 
availability is very scarce, and where population is very dense, can create severe damage.  
  
Though difficult to ascertain given the secrecy involving most of these land transactions, 
as of 2009, approximately 400.000 ha had been earmarked for large-scale land acquisitions in 
Senegal, out of the country's 3.800.000 ha of agricultural land (Oya and Ba, 2013). Later studies 
 





(Kanoute et al., 2011) identified at least 17 investment projects representing almost 660.000 ha, 
or 16,5 % of Senegal's agricultural land, out of which about two thirds were attributed to foreign 
acquisitions, and the remaining third to national ones. At the regional scale, the "participatory 
inventory of massive land acquisitions in West Africa" cited by ROPPA's Sidy Ba (2018) in his 
allocution at the World Forum on Access to Land (WFAL) in Valencia, Spain in 2016, identified 2.3 
million ha acquired between 2000-2012 in 9 West African countries. 
 
5.2.1.2 Regional Land Policy Initiatives 
A variety of initiatives have aimed to create a policy framework for rural land governance 
at the West African regional level. Although these have mostly been incomplete policy processes, 
a resulting intensification of dialogue between West African member countries' AOs and their 
respective government authorities have enabled regional discussions on commonly faced 
challenges to influence national policies. Indeed, participatory national land commissions set up 
in WA to update national land legal frameworks in the 2000s and 2010s (see 5.2.1 and 5.2.3) were 
preceded by regional meetings initiated in the 1990s. Among these, a 1994 meeting in Praia, Cape 
Verde convened by CILSS was an important milestone on regional land policy discussions 
(Cissokho, 2009). 
The 1994 CILSS and CSAO-sponsored conference on land tenure in the Sahel countries 
and its subsequent developments (commonly referred to as the 'Praia process'), not only had an 
initial bolstering role in the formation of ROPPA's network of national-level affiliated 
organisations, as seen in chapter 4. The CILSS 'Praia Declaration' also created the bases for a 
regional land governance policy process that emphasised civil society participation and support 
to member states in the elaboration of land laws (CSAO, 2006; UNECA, 2011). A 'Praia + 9 Forum' 
meeting on 'Rural Land and Sustainable Development in the Sahel and West Africa' held in 
Bamako, Mali in 2003 incorporated results of national consultations and proposed in its final 
declaration the creation of a 'Regional Land Tenure Charter in the Sahel and West Africa' (CSAO, 
2006) to be approved by CILSS, UEMOA and ECOWAS member states. The charter would 





region, particularly in the framework of [UEMOA] and ECOWAS" (UNECA, 2011:45) and 
potentially serve as a "source of inspiration for national land reforms" (CSAO, 2006:16).  
The Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa were a joint initiative launched in 
2006 by the African Union Commission (AUC) in partnership with the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the African Development Bank (ADB).216 The Land Policy 
Initiative (LPI), as it is otherwise known, aimed to review African land policies and develop a 
common framework to "strengthen land rights, enhance productivity, and secure livelihoods" in 
the continent (UNECA, 2011:xi). The resulting framework document was endorsed by the 
continental body's Joint Conference of Ministers of Agriculture, Land and Livestock in April 2009. 
It was shortly followed by the AU Heads of State and Government Declaration on Land Issues and 
Challenges in Africa issued at their 13th meeting in July 2009 in Sirte, Lybia.  
LPI implementation was to occur in partnership with African RECs, including ECOWAS. Yet 
this process was halted a few years later due to withdrawal of earmarked funds. Nevertheless, 
West African regional encounters involved consultations and policy dialogue with ROPPA, 
providing its member organisations with spaces to reflect, exchange, and strategize on national 
land policies. The AU's initiative established key principles, later cited in documents produced by 
national-level land commissions (see 5.2.2 and 5.2.3), including recognition of the legitimacy of 
"indigenous tenure systems" (CNRF, 2016:7). Although a land tenure charter - conceived as a long 
term regional policy document - has yet to be approved in WA, workshops and meeting 
discussions at ECOWAS level have benefited from participatory dialogue related to these 
initiatives (ECOWAS, 2010a). These include attempts to formulate a "regional framework for the 
elaboration and implementation of convergent land policies within ECOWAS" (CNRF, 2016:8) in 
accordance with the AU’s LPI. Similarly, UEMOA's action plan approved in 2009 included 
provisions to create a Regional Land Observatory in West Africa (ORFAO).  
The profusion of regional land policy initiatives at ECOWAS and UEMOA levels is strongly 
correlated with the height of the post-2008 global land rush and civil society mobilisations against 
significant increases in large-scale land acquisitions and concessions.217 However, partly as a 
 
216 These three African continental-level institutions began collaborating closely and with a more strategic outlook 
in the 2000s and 2010s than in previous decades (see Dowbor, 2013).   





result of AOs' frustration with the absence of substantial political thrust to follow through any of 
the above-mentioned regional policy processes, alternative initiatives have also been launched. 
One of these, the 'Global Convergence for Water, Land and Seeds – West Africa' which includes 
ROPPA, other AOs, and international civil society networks, has mobilised across different West 
African countries as part of efforts to reconnect RAOs’ articulations with their local bases on land 
issues (see Figure 14 below). Yet in so doing it also aims to re-engage with official regional-level 
processes in order to reignite these and render them effective (Jacovetti and Koné, 2017).  
Members of the Global Convergence have called for "real and existing participation and 
respect for their decisions at both national and sub-regional level such as the sub-regional 
declination (ECOWAS, UEMOA) of the African Union's 'Framework and Guiding Lines on Land 
Policy in Africa' (GRAIN, 2016:6). Echoing ECOWAS's official motto – 'From an ECOWAS of States 
to an ECOWAS of Peoples' – the Convergence's 'Green Book' manifesto calls for an engagement 
of the "ECOWAS of Peoples to launch a regional policy process via a participatory memorandum 
for West Africa to live in stability and peace", including regulatory texts that would safeguard 
"communities' land rights, by respecting the fact that land, water, and natural resources are 
common goods and not commodities" (Convergence Globale, 2016:27).  
 
 
Figure 14: Demonstration against land grabbing greeting the Convergence’s West African 
Caravan at Ourour (Senegal, Fatick region) 218 (Source: GRAIN, 2016).  
Photo credit: Agence Mediaprod. 
 
218 Texts on demonstration signs: 'The jatropha project has disposessed Ourour lands', 'Stop land grabbing at Ourour', 






Whether led by the AU, CILSS, UEMOA, or ECOWAS, or by AOs and NGOs outside of these, 
different initiatives have aimed to tackle West African land issues through a single comprehensive 
framework. ROPPA and other AOs’ participation in these have contributed to a gradual 
convergence on principles, which have influenced national land policies, even if the initiatives’ 
original purpose of arriving at a regional land framework has not as of yet been attained. 
Meanwhile, the relentless pressure for privatisation through state-allocated agricultural 
investments in strategic territorial enclaves (fertile lands and urban proximity) and through 
informal land markets (mostly petty and state-linked bourgeoisies) in West African countries 
have in many cases been slowed down or temporarily stalled, not least as a result of successful 
local mobilisation campaigns and peasant resistance at specific sites earmarked for private land 
grabs (Inter-Réseaux, 2011). Yet informal markets and demographic/environmental pressures 
continue to increase land concentration for a small privileged minority, while land fragmentation 
and soil degradation affects a growing proportion of West African peasantries.  
Although functioning in practice as guarantors of stability and collective forms of land 
tenure, customary practices also produce their own forms of power imbalances and exclusions, 
particularly as a result of patriarchal governance systems that marginalize women and youth 
from decision-making, despite the crucial role of the latter two in ensuring the sustainability of 
peasant family farming. Thus, ROPPA members have supported reforming existing laws, not to 
advocate titling as a first step to privatisation, but rather to prevent full-blown privatisation and 
land concentration. They have also shown determination to push for land policies allowing all 
members of family farms - including women and youth to co-manage rural lands under different 
tenure arrangements, as shall be examined in the following subsection.   
 
5.2.2 Safeguarding access to land through collective tenure regimes 
 
A significant regional-wide trend with an impact on rural land issues across West Africa is  
the (long historical, but recently accentuated) southward migratory flow from semi-arid Sahel to 





livestock densities in the latter zones due primarily to lack of sufficient water or grazing areas in 
the former have put increased pressure on land use systems across the region. This is 
compounded by the fact that WA's southern tropical coastal region is also the site of export 
larger-scale plantations (rubber, timber, cocoa, coffee). Higher levels of capitalisation in these 
more densely populated plantation regions have yet to translate into significantly higher levels 
of formal tenure, but they did serve as a driver for past unsuccesful initiatives to step up land 
titling-privatising which led to significant land conflicts, sometimes collapsing into civil war (e.g. 
Côte d'Ivoire in the 2000s) 219. Whether due to relative economic strengths (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire's 
dynamic export-oriented economy) or weaknesses (e.g. Liberia or Sierra Leone's more dependent 
global insertion) coastal countries indeed succumbed most to the privatising-titling narrative in 
the 1990s and 2000s. Their savannah and Sahelian neighbours were generally more cautious, 
even more so after witnessing the risks of civil war associated to ruthless titling-privatisation of 
collectively owned and managed rural land in the above-cited coastal countries.  
ROPPA's interventions in public demonstrations, media outlets, and invited spaces have 
contributed to opening up debates on land titling to a wider spectrum of possible policy options 
than that traditionally promoted by the WB and others. As ROPPA's Mamadou Goita (2012:18, 
emphasis added) puts it,  
There are other forms of ensuring land tenure security which enable farmers to be serene on their land 
without having an individual property title. The [individual property] title is the royal path to concentrate 
land in the hands of a few operators, particularly banks which demand it as a guarantee. Indeed, if land is 
used as collateral to obtain a loan, given the interest rates charged on the market [which are] much higher 
than the profitability rate of family farms, producers will go bankrupt.  
 
Whether its is followed by privatisation or not, titling is often a highly contested process, 
given the collective and informal nature of land tenure regimes in most of West Africa. This is 
perhaps most salient for such tenure systems as pastoralist transhumance corridors, river and 
lake fisheries, or forestry reserves whose collective management often clashes with area 
expansion of crop farming. But it also occurs in many cases where land is informally owned or 
 
219 High rates of land conflicts (a key factor in most African wars and protracted foci of instability) are often linked to 
competition over attribution of individual property rights, particularly among youth (e.g. to purportedly ‘true’ 
Ivorians versus discriminated Burkinan migrants in Côte d'Ivoire), and to collective resistance against land loss 





leased by extended families, and can lead to tensions and conflicts when individuals within or 
outside these aim to capitalize on such plots of land without prior collective consultation.  
ROPPA's network has enabled it to influence national land policy formulation and reform 
processes across the West African region. Regional policy patterns and dynamics have thus 
emerged, even in the absence of the Regional Land Charter previously proposed by CILSS, 
UEMOA and ECOWAS (see 5.2.1). The most striking elements of these features include the 
creation of: i) participatory land commissions, especially at the local (village or inter-village) level 
(see 5.2.3); ii) incentives for the coexistence of various tenure regimes inside a same country, to 
account for contrasting types of agricultural use and according to planned and negotiated 
zoning220; iii) different types of safeguards against indiscriminate purchase and sale of land (e.g. 
via progressive taxation). All three types of land policies (i.e. participatory commissions, mixed 
tenure regimes, land transaction regulations) are often inter-related and formulated so as to 
reinforce each other in some of the proposed national legislations, as shall be seen in the several 
West African country cases below (i.e. Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Mali). 
In several countries, ROPPA national platforms have found innovative forms of enabling 
provisions for land titling while simultaneously instituting safeguards to limit land sale or lease. 
For instance, Burkina Faso's 034/2009 Law, which was strongly influenced by ROPPA's CPF, 
created the new Rural Land Tenure Possession Certificate (APFR), which can be individual or 
collective. Collective APFR titles have the particularity of including, besides the name of the 
entrusted individual on the front side of the document, the names of all other family members 
on the obverse side of the land title form. The latter are also legally entitled to the formalised 
land plot.221  
 
220 Despite the existence of regional institutions and initiatives aimed at territorial management of shared natural 
resources and transborder flows (e.g. rivers, pastoralist transhumance, seasonal labour migration), regional policy 
processes have yet to provide adequate responses (Diallo, 2013). Territorial approaches to land governance have 
nevertheless begun to emerge within countries. For instance, Senegal's consultative policy process has emphasized 
the potential complementarities that can be built between mixed systems of land tenure within a single country 
(CNRF, 2016). Hence, titling related to agro-industrialisation projects or achieving economies of scale is not rejected 
per se by agrarian organisations: access to technologies and productivity are indeed sought, provided they occur in 
a justly distributed and ecologically sound manner across contiguous territories. Interview AO-WA-11. 





Not only does this foster better adequacy between legislation and the extended family 
type of informal land tenure regimes and family farming systems of WA, it also places significant 
limits on sale and purchase of rural land wrought by speculative pressures, and reduces the 
chances of families losing their collectively owned land as a result of unilateral decision by one 
individual family member to sell it. Hence, Burkina Faso's collective APFR land titles only allow 
for newly titled land plots to be bought and sold if all registered members of the family agree to 
the decision. Significantly, although the title is transferable, it cannot be used as collateral for 
bank loans (Jacob, Hochet and Ouedraogo, 2011). The legalisation of this collective type of land 
ownership is perceived as a significant milestone for peasant family farmer tenure security, not 
just in Burkina Faso, but in the wider West African region.222  
Moreover, formalisation of tenure in Burkina Faso was negotiated as a system regulated 
by progressive taxation that "supports rural family farms founded on collective […] possession, 
thanks to very low titling costs" (CTFD, 2015:46). Indeed, the 2009 law applies differentiated 
taxation brackets on land registration procedures as well as on land markets. Hence, 
progressively taxed land registration procedures encourage the formalisation of collectively held 
titles over individual titles, making it six times cheaper to register a collectively owned land plot 
than an individually held one. Furthermore, individual plots' first registration are taxed thirteen 
times less than those acquired from the sale of previously titled ones, in order to discourage land 
reselling after titling (Ibid.).  
Hence, Burkina Faso's APFR, created by Law 034/2009, is a balancing exercise between 
collective and individual rights. It favours collective rights above all. Yet the tax breaks given to 
individuals at first registration (versus higher taxed buyers of previously titled land) enables 
women and youth to guarantee smaller plots that are often allowed in tandem with collectively 
held land under customary practices. This allows to strike a formalised balance between 
individual women and youth autonomy within collectively held land tenure regimes, and 
centralised patriarchal customary tenure community and family systems. Negotiated internal 
 
222 Interviews AO-WA15 and AR-WA3. Implementation is still at an incipient stage, however, with lack of funding a 
major challenge. As of mid-2017 only 69 of Burkina Faso's 365 local communes were delivering APFR land titles, and 





consultations at village levels conducted or mediated by members of Burkinan ROPPA platform 
Faso Peasant Confederation (CPF) largely contributed to generate these compromises.  
Similarly, Guinea-Bissau's 2017 proposed application decree for its 1998 Land Law takes 
great care not to equate land titling with facilitation of land transactions, linking it instead with 
ameliorated access to credit. Thus,  
When the title is obtained [and registered] at the civil registry, you have a rural concession for 90 years, 
[which is] automatically renewable, as long as all exigencies are met, [including] environmental norms. The 
land is yours. So you have your registered title, and can with this title obtain credit. Now, you will not be 
able to sell this title. You have to go through the State, and need to come back again to negotiate with the 
community. [..] Recognize traditional authority with modern law.223  
 
 The proposed Bissau-Guinean decree found not only legal-administrative, but also 
economic policy instruments to limit the extent of these land transfers in both value and land 
size, through what would amount to a new progressive land taxation system. The former head of 
the land commission Mario Lopes Martins described it as follows: 
Apart from the land commissions, the central element [of the new land law and implementation decree] is 
the tax. […]. The law created the [rural land] tenure tax mechanism, with the goal of avoiding grabbing, 
concentration of land. The tax will depend on the area that is occupied. If one occupies 100 ha, one already 
knows that they will have to pay a higher tax. And [he who holds] less than 5 ha does not pay anything. This 
is already created in the [1998] land law. And the application decree will create the mechanism of how to 
collect this income. […] For now, big businesses that have land are not paying [any] tax. […] In Guinea-
Bissau, people want to seize lands, to later be able to sell, for cashew plantations.  
 
The 1998 Land Law, and ensuing 2017 implementation decree proposal resulted from 
what was described by civil society and governmental Bissau-Guinean interviewees as an ample 
and participatory consultation process. This process was simultaneous with the participation of 
ROPPA-affiliated national platform QNCOCPA,224 (formed in the early 2000s with the support of 
other ROPPA national platforms, particularly CNCR). 
Another significant land law elaboration process that limits land transactions, while 
allowing efforts towards land titling, occurred in Benin. ROPPA-affiliated PNOPPA, and 
particularly Benin's National Peasants Union225 (SYNPA or Synergie Paysanne) had a crucial role 
in establishing the country's Code Foncier et Domanial, conceived as a defensive rampart against 
 
223 Interview CS-WA4.  
224 Quadro Nacional de Concertação das Organizações Camponesas e Produtores Agrícolas da Guiné-Bissau. 





foreign and domestic land grabbing of Beninese peasants’ lands (see Figure 14). As one of 
PNOPPA's technical advisers explained:  
This code has reduced the ease for people [to buy and sell lands], it did reduce it. There are certain 
thresholds that, when attained, require the city council to give its authorisation; there are [other, higher] 
thresholds that, when attained, require the council of ministers' [authorisation]. In terms of volume, of 
number of hectares, the decision must be taken […]. It was not like that before [the approval of the law]. 
And one [must] really demonstrate that it is an agricultural activity [undertaken on the land]. Because 




Figure 15: Poster by Beninese PNOPPA member SYNPA against foreign land grabbing227 
(Source: farmlandgrab.org) 
 
 While the Beninese bill placed limits on the purchase and sale of land, by requiring the 
approval of local or national authorities depending on the size of the plot, Mali's 2017 land bill 
creates local land commissions with a similar goal. This was cited by ROPPA and CNOP President 
Ibrahima Coulibaly as a form of limiting large-scale land transactions: 
I think that with the new [Malian land] bill, it is very difficult to have large-scale land grabbing. Small 
grabbing [is] very difficult [to avoid], as [it is] insidious. But, one of the important advances, which will 
enable to manage this is the land commission. In each village. We had already seen it in the texts, at the 
municipal level. But we brought them to the lowest level, the villages. And all of the sensibilities will be in 
them. In principle - I say in principle, because this is never absolute - in principle, we cannot, not even a 
 
226 Interview AO-WA19.  
227 Top line: 'Campaign against mass purchase of agricultural lands in Benin'. Centre-diagonal: 'Not for sale'. Bottom 





[whole] family can sell their land if [agreement] from the commission is not there.  Before the bill, the law 
said that any member of a family could go sell a part of the family's land heritage. Without consulting 
anyone. So that has [now] become impossible. […] The real comfort for land grabbers is when people do 
not speak to each other. But as soon as people speak to each other, the situation becomes complicated for 
them.228  
 
Regional land policy diffusion processes were identified in several conversations with 
members of ROPPA national platforms, as well as West African national governments.  For 
instance, family farmer representatives of Senegal's CNCR visited Burkina Faso, seen as a relevant 
experience of AO policy influence in land tenure legislation. ROPPA Executive Secretary and CNCR 
President Nadjirou Sall described: "with ROPPA facilitation, Senegalese farmers went to visit that 
experience […] to see what [it] could bring to our propositions in the land reform policy process 
in Senegal".229  
Similarly, Guinea-Bissau's land application decree elaborated and sent for appreciation to 
the council of ministers in mid-2017, almost 20 years after approval of the 1998 Land Law also 
drew from neighbouring countries' experience. As the former director of Guinea-Bissau's 
national land commission explained:  
[ROPPA President of Honour] Mamadou Cissokho is a colleague, with whom we worked. Because, you 
know, in the process of elaboration of the land law, we did not only consult at the national level, we also 
consulted and observed the experience at the level of the countries of the sub-region. We started in Chad, 
[then] Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Gambia, and [Guinea] Conacry. Therefore, our law was inspired 
[not only on the qualities but also] on the faults of the neighbours.230 
 
Three decades from the initial external and internal pressures towards titling and 
privatisation of land in WA, the persistent low proportions in land titling across the region raises 
several questions. On the one hand, the de facto non-formalisation of West African land means 
that it is largely managed by local communities. Yet the higher prevalence of titling and 
privatisation in fertile enclaves and urban perimeters is only the visible tip of a much larger pool 
of increasingly active and dynamic informal land markets (Lavigne Delville et al., 2017). 
 In the last two to three decades informal land markets have tended towards higher levels 
of concentration in ownership, although West African land concentration levels today are still far  
 
228 Interview AO-WA22 
229 Interview AO-WA11.  





lower than those of South America. ROPPA's participation in national land policy processes has 
aimed to regulate informal land markets and stabilize land tenure systems to ensure a focus on 
policies of support to family farms’ production and distribution. Yet given that state 
implementation capacity is still very low, ROPPA and its partners in academia, government and 
international organisations have defended that existing land tenure systems in West Africa 
necessitate participatory local governance systems capable of implementing the regulation of 
informal land transactions, by submitting these to collective approval by village and inter-village 
commissions. The legal provision for these types of local commissions, usually including equal 
participation of women and youth, is a form of organising what are in practice mixed customary 
and statutory land tenure regimes, by submitting them to local collective forms of regulation.  
 
5.2.3 Legally enshrining local village commissions to regulate land tenure 
 
Regardless of variations on the nature of new land policies across West Africa, ROPPA's 
national platforms have consistently advocated for the creation of participatory land 
commissions at all administrative instances, particularly at the most local village (or inter-village) 
levels. This emphasis also reflects the nature of consultative processes undertaken by ROPPA 
members to discuss the content of new legislations.  
The case of Senegal illustrates ROPPA's and its national platforms' combined strategies of 
mobilisation outside the state and participation inside its invited spaces in order to influence 
policy. Debates on modernisation of the country's land law, approved in the post-independence 
years (1964), were put back onto the negotiating table by the Senegalese government starting in 
1996. The LOASP process initially aimed to include land policy as one of its main pillars (see 
chapter 6). However, given the highly controversial nature of some policy proposals, particularly 
relating to successive governments' and investors' intention of titling and privatising land, and 
strong opposition from civil society, negotiation of the land chapter was postponed to enable 
approval of the remaining parts of LOASP in 2004.231  
 





A first land commission was formed in 2005 by then-President Wade but did not bring the 
policy formulation process to fruition. Wade's successor Macky Sall created a new National Land 
Policy Commission (CNRF) in 2013. However, this commission initially did not include Senegal's 
main peasant family farmer organisation. CNCR thus used its mobilising power throughout the 
country to pressure the government into opening up the land commission to its members’ 
participation, as one of the AO’s key land policy experts recalled: 
We launched a national campaign to tell the producers: 'the state is moving towards land reform, and you 
are not represented in this commission'. Everywhere in the country, there were people voicing their 
concerns. […] The president of the commission at the time certainly heard during several days 'CNCR, land 
reform, CNCR, land reform…', until one day we met in a workshop with the World Bank, which was about 
land tenure. And since they wanted to give voice to civil society, they called on CNCR, [and] we recalled in 
our intervention our whole trajectory, our legitimacy. So he was there, and in his speech said […]: 'well, the 
commission is open, it is democratic […], so all of those who wish to be part of it can do so'. So I asked CNCR 
to let 5 members take part, designate 5 delegates. Then he sent us a correspondence. We then sent a list 
of the 5 delegates. That is how, since then, we are members.232 
 
When CNCR joined CNRF, its members were better prepared than most to influence policy 
deliberations, given that they had previously elaborated land policy proposals in their own 
autonomous space since 2010, in the wake of the land grabbing crisis. This space, the Framework 
for Reflection and Action on Land Tenure in Senegal (CRAFS) was more plural, in that it included 
many other actors from civil society and academia, but was also shielded from private sector and 
state-linked lobbies favouring land privatisation. 
At CNRF, state, private sector actors, and local elected officials all defended the 
facilitation of private investment through land titling and privatisation. Yet by the time CNCR was 
accepted into the national land commission, it was equipped with well-debated and thought-out 
positions on a variety of issues related to land tenure policy. These went beyond defensive 
actions to resist land-grabbing, which had been the initial spark for the creation of CRAFS. Indeed, 
CNCR had mobilised resources to organise encounters and exchanges throughout the country, in 
order to debate and harmonise its positions through contacts with their bases. Thus,  
CNCR was a bit of a 'drive belt' between civil society and the national land commission. So every technical 
document produced at the level of the commission was brought to civil society. We analyse this together, 
we define our common position and at the next meeting of the commission, CNCR has a document that it 
has already sent to the commission, which advocates to defend our positions.233  
 
232 Interview AO-WA8. 






CNCR had allies in the national land commission: these were chiefly urban civil society 
actors such as CONGAD, a national NGO collective; the Association of Women Senegalese Jurists; 
and ENDA-PRONAT, the Senegalese chapter of international NGO network ENDA Tiers-Monde. 
All four organisations were members of the autonomous land policy debating space (CRAFS), 
which enabled them to align their positions prior to meeting with other actors at the national 
land commission (CNRF). There, CNCR and these CSOs supported each others' interventions. 
Often, the others gave voice to CNCR, seen as the most legitimate collective actor to speak for 
the immense contingent of Senegalese family farmers. This reinforced the legitimacy of CNCR's 
proposals inside the national invited space. As one of CNCR's representatives in the national land 
commission put it: "each time we have to defend certain positions, I ask for the floor, explain our 
positions, and the [three other CRAFS and CNFR members] complement these in their own 
interventions".234  
As a result of the strength and legitimacy of CNCR interventions, a significant part of their 
proposals were incorporated into the commission's final document and officially delivered to 
President Macky Sall on 20 April 2017, after two years of deliberations. The document's four 
'strategic objectives' related to rural land tenure have a balanced wording that manifestly aims 
to reconcile the conflicting interests of the commission's diverse participants. For instance, 
Strategic Objective 1 ('Attributing real tenure rights to family farms, agricultural entrepreneurs 
and other users of natural resources') goes beyond a no-titling versus titling-privatising 
dichotomy, when it states that "the main actors of the tenure system […] consider it is essential 
to recognize the types of existing rights […] in a chain of formalisation comprising a gradation of 
tenure rights that may be of different juridical nature, and bridges enabling to shift from one type 
of title to another" (CNRF, 2016:72).  
Further, the same strategic objective aims to regulate access of private investors to land, 
through what appears as a carefully worded balance between private sector and family farmer 
interests: on the one hand it recommends lifting some of the barriers to productive agricultural 
investment that exist under the current 1964 legislation; on the other, it advocates giving 
 





"development tools for residents of territories to develop their localities and protecting members 
of rural communities against potential land speculators" (CNRF, 2016:73). Yet despite the 
painstakingly negotiated compromises worded in the commission's final report, the latter still 
generated resistances within influential sectors of Senegalese society, preventing its final 
approval by the government.  
Indeed, President Sall did not follow through with the institutional procedures that would 
allow for an incorporation of the commission's recommendations into national legislation. In the 
meantime, CNRF was dissolved, provoking consternation among its CRAFS members. They 
drafted an open letter to the President reaffirming the democratic and representative credentials 
of the policy formulation process, and the national commission's legitimacy, requesting 
resumption of activities based on the "participatory process [that] enabled the CNRF to conduct 
14 Regional Development Committees, 45 departmental workshops, and 45 intercommunal 
workshops, adding up to a total of 108 meetings in which close to 38.000 people have taken part" 
(CRAFS, 2017:7).  
Although not explicit, resistance from powerful private sector lobbies with their political 
and civil servant representatives against what they perceived as a set of recommendations too 
far removed from their immediate interests is nevertheless made evident by the erratic approval 
of Presidential decrees attributing lands for specific use (such as Law n°2017-06, approved on 6 
January 2017, related to Special Economic Zones which did not result from consultations with 
civil society), without a coherent national policy framework, as criticised by ENDA-PRONAT head 
Mariam Sow in interviews given to the Senegalese press (Le Quotidien, 2017).  
After many months of silence on the commission's land proposal, President Sall's first 
public comments were expressed as strong opposition towards "transferring the management of 
lands to local authorities", which according to him would lead to Senegal not having any more 
lands available for agricultural investment (Le Quotidien, 2017:3). Several commission 
participants subsequently urged the President to read its document more carefully, as they 
argued that what it does is create a better balance in the attribution of responsibilities amongst 
different institutional actors involved in Senegalese land tenure governance, which may lead to 





prevent the "commodification of land", and calls for the establishment of "citizen accountability 
mechanisms" through officially recognised committees. It also calls for recognition of "[land] 
governance instruments [that have been] elaborated by local communities [such as] Soil Use 
Plans (Plans d'Occupation des Sols) […]" and thus advocates a "shared local governance" model 
(Ibid:4).  
When asked to what extent CNCR had been able to influence the land policy document in 
the national commission, one of the AO’s land policy technicians highlighted that, if approved, a 
key gain introduced by the new land law would be the creation of "other levels of tenure 
governance":  
The village, which has a very important role in the management of tenure, practically did not have any 
responsibility - because we would only say "the village chief must be included [in discussions]" when one 
would take lands in his territory. This is too vague. We called for the establishment of village or inter-village 
commissions. 
 
Securing land tenure in West Africa in the short term has involved a great deal of 
mobilisation to defend collectively held plots against state-authorised larger-scale land grabs. It 
has also involved reframing land policy debates at regional level (CILSS, ECOWAS, UEMOA) 
beyond the titling-privatising narrative, to influence national legislations under reformulation in 
most of the region's countries. Yet a much more pervasive but 'silent' process of land alienation 
and concentration continues to grow as a result of increased commodification of land through 
informal land markets. This has led to a perceived necessity among ROPPA's leadership to 
regulate informal capitalist land markets while ensuring customary land transfers such as 
generational succession processes, under strengthened collective/individual combined forms of 
possession. Additionally, formalisation of land tenure with effective community and state 
regulation would potentially enable to reconcile efficient resource allocation with socially and 
culturally rooted modes of production, but also ensure equal rights of women, youth, or 
transborder migrants.  
These main guidelines on how land policy titling should ideally occur as a positive 
alternative to titling-privatising in order to regulate informal land markets, by the same token 
aimed to stabilise land tenure and render it more transparent, secure and equitable. National 
laws adopted in Burkina Faso (2009) and Mali (2017), and the work of Senegal's land commission 





well-distributed economic agrarian landscape ensured by traditional customary tenure, while 
reforming the most exploitative dimensions of patriarchal family farming, particularly regarding 
socially necessary labour and local decision-making rules, regarding both economic management 
and political participation.235  
 Yet implementing such an ambitious alternative land policy agenda laid out in these laws 
without unrealistically relying on almost inexistent state means has been one of the central 
puzzles around which ROPPA and its national-level platforms have debated and proposed policy 
measures in different countries. In this respect, consultations,  undertaken in hundreds of 
localities across West African countries became the site of an affirmation of rural communities, 
often in negotiation and partnership with local authorities. This has included village-level 
informal dispute settlements on land transfers as well as makeshift contracts signed between 
two or more parties and stamped by local authorities as semi-formal mechanisms enabling a 
bottom-up local political and economic administration, in order to surpass engrained top-down 
and clientelistic relationship patterns with public authorities (Lavigne Delville et al., 2017).  
While countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali or Benin have approved laws with encouraging 
provisions (notwithstanding difficult implementation), Senegal’s mobilisation network (outside 
state institutions) and participation in a government-mediated 2010s policy process has not as 
of yet yielded a new policy to replace its 1964 land law. The almost decade-long participatory 
policy formulation with consultation at its bases has nevertheless revealed the important value 
of participation in itself for territorial policy articulation, across local, national, and regional levels 
– given that the clear and convincing presentation of viable land policy alternatives contributes 
to partially deconstruct the inevitability of the land titling-privatisation narrative. The stated goal 
of reaffirming local communities as prime legal responsibility bearers with regards to economic 
decisions made on their lands thus aims to rebalance local communities' economic and political 
role with regards to land policy, particularly to secure land tenure by democratically regulating 
land transfers through local village and inter-village commissions.  Hence, if regionally articulated 
 
235 The latter shall be seen in greater detail in chapter 6 (section 6.2.2) when analysing the national agricultural policy 
frameworks (lois d'orientation agricole), whose formulation processes in the last two decades were in some cases 






resistance to land grabbing appears as the immediate defensive priority to ROPPA, this can be 
potentiated in the longer term by legally recognising and updating de facto decentralised village 




This chapter has examined regional land policy processes in two regions with very 
different agrarian structures. Despite those differences, both COPROFAM and ROPPA have aimed 
to address three key inter-related challenges of rural land policy: i) attempts to regulate land 
transfers within articulated regional integration strategies (5.2.1), including by putting breaks on 
externally-driven land concentration pressures (5.1.2); ii) ensuring participatory land governance, 
whether via legally-backed direct action to enable land redistribution (5.1.1), or wide-ranging 
local-level consultations within participatory national policy processes (5.2.3); iii) efforts to secure 
distributed land by formally recognising and updating collective forms of land tenure (5.1.3 and 
5.2.2). 
 The regional policy drive to regulate land transfers in both regions was mainly a 
'defensive' strategy: in both cases, regional agrarian discourse contributed to shed public light on 
how global production and distribution agrifood firms are the largest links of ongoing national 
land concentration processes. Efforts to influence land policy through regional norms or 
guidelines (whether via REAF/MERCOSUR or ECOWAS, UEMOA, and AU) have nevertheless 
proved elusive until now. This is in no small part due to their blocking by politically influential 
dependent bourgeoisies in both regions, whether their role in land concentration occurs still 
mainly within national borders (WA) or spills over across transborder agrarian territories (SA). 
Yet regional policy venues have served in both cases as spaces for policy diffusion, influencing 
national policies within each region. This has enabled the approval of quantified limits to foreign 
land acquisition by law in Argentina and infralegal norms in Brazil and Uruguay (5.1.2), despite 
the veto to a REAF-drafted regional norm by MERCOSUR’s highest governing body. Resistance to 
land grabbing in West Africa was likewise not mainly driven by regional land policy initiatives. It 





awareness raising on the magnitude of foreign land alienation at national, regional, and global 
discussion forums (5.2.1).   
Regional land policy debates involving COPROFAM and ROPPA also evidenced patterns 
across countries of a same region in their efforts to construct alternative land policies, whether 
to ensure participatory land tenure governance (5.1.1 and 5.2.3) or to secure existing (collectively 
held or state redistributed) land (5.1.3 and 5.2.2). Regarding the former, a common thread 
between almost symetrically opposed (SA and WA) land questions is linked in both cases to 
efforts to democratise the regulation of land transfers: whether it is to prevent largely informal 
land markets from further concentrating and fragmenting land through participatory 
consultations and policy dialogue in WA, or enabling more substantial proportions of land to be 
redistributed based on the need for it to fulfill a 'social function' in SA. The recognition of village 
and inter-village commissions in most WA land laws of recent decades is a significant 
improvement in democratising land tenure governance (5.2.2 and 5.2.3). In SA, despite significant 
initial gains in the 1990s and 2000s, criminalisation of land occupations, financial deregulation 
(e.g. via financialisation of agrarian reform debt bonds in Brazil, ultimately diverting state 
resources to remunerate landholders in breach of SFLP, instead of penalising them) and post-
2008 fiscal constraints all but eliminated prospects for further land redistribution with delayed 
compensation in the 2010s (5.1.1). Indeed, during this latter period, a more pressing concern 
became the strengthening of collectively held (e.g. via titling of indigenous lands) and 
redistributed land tenure (e.g. through agricultural support policies in Brazil and/or keeping 
reformed land as a state lease in Uruguay) to avoid it being lost to land concentration pressures 
(5.1.3).  
The above has shown how the capacity to regulate land transfers – whether to enforce 
land redistribution or to halt land concentration - is closely linked to fiscal policy instruments such 
as progressive taxation, as it already was in early 20th century SA (see chapter 3) and has been 
brought to the fore in present-day WA policy processes (e.g. laws aiming to discourage collective 
land privatisation and concentration, seen in 5.2.2). These can potentially curb hoarding of land 
for financial speculation while augmenting state resources to redistribute land and invest in small 





policies that aim to slow down the concentration of land as in Burkina Faso or Guinea-Bissau’s 
land policy processes (5.2.2), and reinvest fiscal resources into land distribution as with Uruguay’s 
INC (5.1.3).  
While capacity to implement such measures at scale is still very low, their presence in 
land policy debates of both regions is nonetheless significant, insofar as it reveals an aim on the 
part of RAO members from both regions to regulate unfettered land markets through fiscally 
redistributive land policy instruments. As we shall see in the following chapter, fiscal capacity is 
also a key determinant of whether peasant family farmers remain part of a largely informal 
economic sector, or become recognised as a specific rural labouring category with access to 





























The second policy process examined in this research is the least easy to pin down, because 
differently from land tenure or trade policies, it is not as obviously recognisable in classic agrarian 
and development policy repertoires. It nevertheless has crucial and manifold implications related 
to: i) age-old debates on defining who is and who is not a (peasant) family farmer and on 
distinguishing subcategories within that universe; ii) how members of this rural sector collectively 
self-represent themselves through their discursive mobilisation (i.e. aiming to reflect agrarian 
organisations' unity in diversity) and participation (i.e. translating popular claims into 
implementable policy language) strategies, and; iii) formal recognition of PFF’s rights - whether 
political and civil (such as the right to participate in policy processes), or economic, social and 
cultural (such as obtaining access to national social security systems). Technical definition criteria, 
collective self-identification, and rights-based citizenship claims indeed all underpin RAOs' drives 
for the recognition of peasant family farming as a distinct category and creation of specific public 
policies. 
 COPROFAM and ROPPA both orient their claims by representing members’ collective 
interests as those of 'peasant family farmers'236 in each region. The diverse rural sector 
encompassed by this term has often been alternately (self-)identified as 'peasants' (e.g. by LVC), 
'smallholders' (e.g. by the WB), or 'small-scale food producers' (e.g. at the CFS), among other 
partly interchangeable or contested terms used in international policy debating arenas and 
official documents. In both the South American and West African cases, achieving PFF recognition 
as a distinct economic and social category through legislation and registries is perceived as a 
stepping stone towards promoting an alternative rural development paradigm. Though often 
overlooked – whether for its seemingly secondary technicalities, or precisely because of its far-
 
236 As mentioned in chapter 1, frequent (though not systematic) addition of the term 'peasant' (and ‘indigenous' in 
SA) before 'family farming/er' serves to underscore the predominance of family labour in this type of farming. This 
is in accordance with both COPROFAM and ROPPA’s understandings of the term 'family farming' (as shall be explored 
further in this chapter), but different from uses of it that designate distinct types of actors (e.g. large-scale family-





reaching policy implications – it is a key policy drive for both RAOs. Yet these efforts have also 
been fraught with the difficulties of formulating policies and the challenges of implementing 
them.   
How did regional invited space negotiations reach agreement on formal criteria to clearly 
distinguish small and medium family farmers from large-scale agribusiness? How did negotiated 
criteria and related typologies include and safeguard the interests of different rural labouring 
class fractions within the broader family farming sector? To what extent did legal recognition of 
the family farm address gendered and generational economic roles within rural families and 
communities? Has legal recognition enabled to channel sufficient resources in a coherent and 
equitable way towards supporting family farmers' economic autonomy? 
 The tracing of policy processes in both regions follows pioneering countries Brazil, Chile 
(SA) and Senegal (WA) in tandem with regional institutions MERCOSUR and ECOWAS, and later 
key neighbouring countries' policy processes (Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay in SA; Mali, Côte 
d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso in WA). Subsequent regional-national policy diffusion links across these 
and other countries of both RAOs have informed implementation efforts, particularly through 
mutual learning from strengths and weaknesses between earlier and later adopters. 
 In subsections 6.1.1 and 6.2.1 I look at the drives for family farmer recognition in pioneer 
countries Brazil/Chile and Senegal in the context of regional integration processes in which 
COPROFAM and ROPPA pressed for dialogue space, under concerns over the consequences of 
unfettered regional trade for both regions' family farming sectors. It explores how regional-level 
recognition of AOs as legitimate interlocutors and of PFF as a distinct policy category of their 
contiguous countries' agrarian landscape were concomitant in both regions.  
This was followed a few years later by technical and legal debates underpinning policy 
diffusion processes across countries of each region. These processes were propelled by efforts to 
build regional articulated rural labouring class alliances for family farmer recognition in both 
regions. Diffusion paths relied more strongly on MERCOSUR as driver of Brazil's regional foreign 
policy in SA (6.1.2), whereas they were principally characterized by the dense web of peasant 
leaders, civil servants, academic and technical experts, and international organisation actors 







6.1 Creation and diffusion of specific policies for family farming in South America 
  
This section shows how COPROFAM's members came to define themselves as family 
farmers237, and how this discursive frame has served both for collective self-representation and 
to orient specifically-tailored state support. It traces the origins of the term's use in early 1990s 
Brazil, the result of a wide rural labouring class alliance cristallized within CUT238/CONTAG (with 
the support of engaged Brazilian academics and civil servants) in response to the effects of an 
acute economic crisis on the country's agricultural sector since the early 1980s. It then looks at 
the spread and consolidation of the term's use in Brazil through local municipal-level invited 
spaces, and in MERCOSUR through the regional invited space of REAF.  
In the above local, national, and regional spaces, significant debates amongst COPROFAM 
members, academics, and civil servants revolved around the criteria that define the PFF sector. 
These debates had simultaneous implications for AO membership, collective self-representation 
in invited spaces, and policy targeting. These interrelated dimensions of the family farming 
discursive frame have contributed to strengthen a regional class alliance in the Southern Cone 
between self-identified peasants, indigenous/traditional peoples, and small/medium producers, 
under the FF umbrella term (or its latter (P)(I)FF239 variations).  
Following a chronological-thematic periodisation, I look at COPROFAM representatives' 
efforts at negotiating the creation of specific policies for PFF in two networks of invited spaces: 
Brazil's national discursive arenas and creation of a National Programme for the Strengthening 
of Family Farming (PRONAF), the region's most comprehensive policy for PFF (6.1.1); 
MERCOSUR's REAF and the role of its national-level subsidiary spaces in agreeing on a regional 
family farmer definition and creating national registries (6.1.2). 
 
237 And after 2003, as peasant and indigenous family farmers. 
238 Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Unified Workers' Central). CUT was the main autonomous urban labour union 
to spearhead Brazilian civil society’s push towards political democratisation in the early 1980s. CUT’s rural wing 
would have a key role in Brazil’s family farmer debate. As it began to offer an alternative to CONTAG for PFF 
membership in the late 1980s and early 1990s, negotiations between both eventually led to CONTAG and CUT’s 
fusion in 1995, which would last until 2009.  






6.1.1 Family farming identities and representations in the Southern Cone 
 
 This first sub-section assesses the public self-representation of COPROFAM and its 
national and local member organisations. It focuses on three main self-identifying discursive 
frames dating from the RAO’s formation period: small/medium producers, peasants, and 
indigenous peoples. It first shows how in 1990s Chile and Brazil, those previously existing 
collective identities fused under the umbrella term 'family farming'240 to become a nationally 
recognised socio-economic category entitled to specific public policies. It then looks at why this 
was not the case in Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, where cohesive narratives to unite 
competing rural labouring class fractions across diverse agrarian territories initially failed to 
materialise. This changed in the following decade with the creation of REAF in 2004 (see chapter 
3), and as a result of deliberations within it to formally recognize family farming in MERCOSUR’s 
institutions. FF eventually became a distinctive public policy category in all of the regional bloc's 
founding member countries, and to varying degrees in most of SA’s other countries (see 6.1.2).  
 PRONAF, created in Brazil in 1996, was the first specific policy for FF in the  region. Its 
creation stemmed from the resurgence of Southern Cone AOs during the 1980s and 1990s in the 
space left void by an economic crisis of the agricultural sector and potentiated by a simultaneous 
political democratisation process (see chapter 3). Two out of several key milestones towards 
PRONAF’s creation are highlighted here: i) CONTAG and CUT's negotiated participation in 
elaborating Brazil's Federal Constitution (1988) and its related Agricultural (1991) and Agrarian 
(1993) laws, and; ii) mobilisations against the negative consequences of MERCOSUR's (1991) 
initial import tariff reductions. Although CONTAG and CUT's earlier internal debates had already 
yielded the essence of the criteria to be used in subsequent legal definitions, the use of the term 
'family farming' was subsequently adopted by both, particularly in close dialogue with Brazilian 
and international agrarian scholars. With AO unity and strength at its height in the mid-1990s, 
the government was compelled to negotiate. For Brazil's government at the time, taking on board 
 
240 Increasingly substituted by the more inclusive 'peasant and indigenous family farming' (agricultura familiar 





AO demands for tailored policies was also a way of partly giving in on the agricultural policy front, 
and thereby avoid making more concessions on the agrarian reform front (see chapter 5). A 
confluence of AO mobilisation, academic debates, and negotiations with government thus 
resulted in the creation of PRONAF in 1996, and in its gradual expansion during the late 1990s 
and 2000s.  
Before COPROFAM’s creation in 1994, several terms were used by its national-level AOs 
to designate their members. Yet two terms predominated: peasant,241 and small (or medium) 
producer. In broad terms, the peasant (campesino) identity was predominant in most of Latin 
America's rural areas, except in the Southern Cone (particulary its temperate climate area), 
where use of the term small and medium producer (pequeño y mediano productor) became the 
norm from the 1970s onwards.242 Indeed, 'small and medium producer' is prevalent and 'peasant' 
is generally absent in COPROFAM's key formative organisations which posess a significant base 
in temperate agrarian territories – Uruguay's CNFR, Argentina's FAA, and Brazil's southern 
CONTAG federations. Yet in Brazil and Chile - who pioneered legal recognition of FF as a specific 
policy category in the early 1990s - both concepts somehow coexisted, albeit with tensions, since 
the 1970s.  
There, authoritarian states created and disseminated the technocratic category of small 
and medium producer through a limited number of policies, substituting the politically charged 
term peasant associated with pre-dictatorship struggles for agrarian reform. Hence, in Chile, 
"[d]uring the dictatorship years, the concept of 'small agriculture' was instated, perhaps because 
the 'peasant' concept referred to social and political struggles that the regime had no interest in 
remembering" (Berdegué, 2014:9). Similarly, in Brazil, use of the term "small production 
contributed to depoliticize the theme [given that] the concept of peasantry was mostly 
associated to political and ideological" debates and struggles (Porto e Siqueira, 1991, cited by 
Grisa, 2012:122).  
Family farmer registries were first instated in Chile and Brazil in the early to mid-1990s. 
These drew from both the peasant and small producer conceptions. While the former was 
 
241 Campesino/Camponês.  





connected to AO struggles and intellectual debates, and the latter to government policy 
implementation necessities, both concepts' operationalisation aimed publics that largely 
overlapped. This is reflected in Chile's Law 18.910 (1990), the region’s first piece of national 
legislation to define the public later referred to as family farmers. As explained by MUCECH's 
Orlando Contreras:   
In 1990, INDAP's organic law was reformed, small producers and peasants were included, under a law that 
defined the sector, with a certain quantity of economic resources, with a certain number of hectares, and 
having to live in a rural area. And this, which did not appear to be very relevant to the rest of society, 
became very relevant for us. Because not anyone can be in INDAP. It is a segment of society that represents 
small-scale agriculture. The previous law [dating from INDAP's creation in 1962] was quite ambiguous, but 
this was now clarified. [Hence] Chile advanced rapidly when [family farmer] registries were discussed in 
REAF [as it] already had a registry.243 
 
Chile’s law 18.910 defines both the small producer and the peasant as policy target 
categories, with some overlap, but with the significant difference that peasants can also be wage 
labourers. Indeed, a significant part of the ranks of Chile’s MUCECH and Brazil’s CONTAG were 
members of local agricultural worker unions dating from the 1960s-1970s (see chapter 3).  
Conversely, Uruguay's CNFR and Argentina's FAA members were officially considered by 
their countries' institutional frameworks as employers' organisations, even if their represented 
members mostly used their own family labour and only exceptionally hired outside wage 
workers. Yet because these two century-old national AOs have never included agricultural wage 
labour unions, and many of their farmers own their land as private property since the 1950s-
1960s, they have been considered by default as employer organisations in both countries' policy 
dialogue representation mechanisms. Hence, according to former CNFR president Fernando 
López, in Uruguay's National Rural Council, a state-mediated deliberative space, "Comisión 
Nacional [de Fomento Rural, i.e. CNFR] participates as rural 'employer'". Nevertheless, Uruguay’s 
largest AO maintains "good relations with the workers' delegates [and has] made some common 
proposals with the workers unions".244 FAA's relations with agricultural labour unions or smaller-
scale peasant organisations has historically been more turbulent, however, and has typically 
alternated between periods of collaboration and others of tension and confrontation (see 
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chapter 3). Still, its members primarily use their own family labour to work the land, and thus fall 
within the family farmer definitions adopted in the region during the 1990s-2000s. 
At MERCOSUR's inception, because of their 'employer' status, CNFR and FAA were 
represented in CONASUR (later FARM245), a dialogue space dominated by large-scale agribusiness 
associations holding meetings with ministers of agriculture. However, as the only small/medium 
farmer organisations, CNFR and FAA's demands for specific policy treatment were systematically 
ignored. This led them to seek an alliance with more similar organisations from neighbouring 
Southern Cone countries, eventually resulting in COPROFAM's creation in 1994 (Riella, 2002) (see 
chapter 3).  
COPROFAM's foundation occurred only a few months before CONTAG's official adoption 
of the term 'family farming' to describe the wider rural labouring classes and middle farming 
sectors in Brazil. The RAO's name uses the similar term 'family producers', which was often 
already used by counterpart organisations in Argentina and Uruguay, as well as in Brazil’s 
North.246  
Until the 1990s, "CONTAG and all the Brazilian rural workers […] were not conceptualized 
as family farming. Our conceptualisation was 'small farmer'"247. In official CONTAG documents 
produced in the South, rural workers with access to land248 self-identified as "small farmers".249 
In CONTAG documents produced in the Northeast, however, members usually referred to 
themselves as "peasants".250 According to Alberto Broch, both terms were plagued with negative 
connotations in general public opinion: "that thing seen as small, miserable, poor, subsistence 
[farming]".251  
 
245 Federación de Asociaciones Rurales del MERCOSUR (Federations of Rural Associations of MERCOSUR).  
246 Federations from Brazil’s North (mostly comprised by the Amazon rainforest biome) frequently referred to 
themselves as 'family producers'. This related to their own rural activities, predominantly linked to forestry and 
fishing, often within traditional livelihoods and at odds with mainstream notions of 'farming' (Interview AR-SA1).  
247 Interview AO-SA4.  
248 CONTAG's wide membership had a significant parcel of landless agricultural wage labourers since its creation in 
1963 (see chapter 3). In 2015, a separate but closely associated entity (CONTAR) was created to advocate for this 
rural labouring fraction's specific needs. 
249 Pequeno agricultor. 
250 Camponês. This is a clear inheritance from the 1950s and 1960s peasant leagues, which were particularly strong 
in Brazil's Northeast (see Shapter 3).   





The 1980s saw a resurgence of rural mobilisation from peasantries (particularly from 
Brazil’s southern states) who organised into unions (led by CUT) and social movements (led by 
the MST) and contested CONTAG's legalistic approach of 'state-centric' negotiation, seeking 
alternative forms of collective action (Picolotto, 2014). However, as CUT began structuring its 
Rural Workers National Department (DNTR), its leadership became increasingly dominated by 
small/medium producers, while the proportion of agricultural wage labourers declined (Favareto, 
2006). Indeed, whilst during the 1950s-60s, wage labourers' claims to labouring rights on a par 
with urban counterparts were central, and in the 1970s-80s sugarcane cutters' strikes still had a 
central role in rural unions' mobilisations, by the 1990s structural changes in the economy252 had 
weakened wage labourers' relative weight within rural unions (Favareto, 2006).  
Moreover, whereas direct labour-capital negotiations previously predominated, the new 
democratic regime allowed for greater negotiation space with the state. This justified calls within 
CUT's rural department to establish distinct representative structures for wage labourers (who 
negotiated working conditions with employers' unions)  and for small/medium producers (who 
negotiated public policies with the state).253 This collided with CONTAG's historical stance of 
maintaining unity in diversity through a single national representative confederation that 
included both wage labourer and peasant family farmer trade unions.  
Yet the two competing rural unions began a gradual approximation during the 1990s. 
CUT's initial autonomous posture eventually ceded ground to tactical considerations as it aimed 
to expand its reach within existing rural unions, and indeed many national CUT leaders were 
locally affiliated to CONTAG-linked organisations. CUT stood to benefit from the capillarity of 
CONTAG's far-reaching presence and negotiation capacity with state actors across Brazil.CONTAG 
on the other hand seized the opportunity for a much-needed internal renewal by feeding off the 
innovative policy debates at CUT's rural department. The latter included calls for an 'Alternative 
Rural Development Project based on Family Farming and Agrarian Reform' (Bianchini, 2015).  
 
252 E.g. increasingly mechanised, integrated and concentrated agro-industrial sector; deregulation of labour 
contracts, precarisation of labour, and chronic unemployment; densification of rural-urban linkages leading to semi-
proletarianisation and reduction of agricultural wages as primary source of income for rural populations. 





A process of social differentiation had occurred within the Southern Cone during the 
1970s given that a minority fringe of more consolidated middle farmers accessed support policies 
By the mid-1980s, however, these sources of support had all but dried up. Yet, in Brazil, CONTAG 
and CUT's participation in the 1987-88 Constituent Assembly launched a virtuous process that 
would enable them to consolidate their peasant and middle farmer base. Although the drive to 
create a strong legal framework for agrarian reform was largely defeated (Welch and Sauer, 
2015), AOs secured the universalisation of social security regardless of previous contribution, 
enfranchising millions of rural workers for the first time (Delgado, 2005). The 1988 Constitution 
provided a fundamental social safety net indexed on the minimum wage for rural peasantries 
who had for the most part been excluded from any government support. It also determined the 
necessity ofapproving two central pieces of legislation in the following years: an Agricultural Law 
(8.171/91) and an Agrarian Law (8.629/93).  
Hence, in the run up to the 1988 Constitution and after its approval, both CUT and 
CONTAG intensified internal debates, not only on agrarian reform and wage labour disputes, but 
also increasingly on agricultural policy. This allowed the main actors of Brazil’s rural union 
movement to put forward the concept of política agrícola diferenciada, that is, a set of policy 
instruments tailored to the specificities of small andmedium scale agriculture. Convincing 
authorities of the relevance of this endeavour required demonstrating its strategic importance. 
Hence CONTAG cited statistics regarding small-scale farmers' production of the bulk of Brazil's 
staple foods (cassava, beans, and maize in particular) and employment of most of its rural labour 
(70% at the time). Yet the new agricultural policies demanded by CONTAG and CUT required a 
precise enough definition of the targeted rural segment.  
 Both AOs laid down the premises for the criteria that would later become integral to 
Brazil's – and later South American neighbours– legal definitions of family farming. CONTAG and 
CUT's deliberations for the 1991 Agricultural Law yielded some key criteria. While both national 
rural unions agreed on family labour must be predominant on the farm, and that FF income 
should mostly be obtained from agricultural activities, they diverged on land size: CUT proposed 
a slightly larger cap (up to 5 fiscal modules) to include middle farmers, while CONTAG initially 





In a similar way to CONTAG in the 1960s (see chapter 3), internal debates within CUT 
questioned whether rural workers that held land property titles (no matter how small the plot) 
should be represented in the union, given that, according to some members, this would taint the 
coherence of rural labouring class representation. Others, nevertheless, won the argument by 
pointing out the unavoidable fact that "CUT's main rural bases and leaders were made up of small 
landowners in the South and North of the country" (Grisa, 2012:111). Hence, the wide 
understanding of rural labour enshrined at CONTAG's foundation in 1963 (i.e. including 
propertied small andmedium farmers) was renewed by its competing younger union, CUT, in the 
late 1980s.254 Indeed, insofar as the labour used on the land emanated from the family itself, 
these farmers could be considered part of a wider rural labouring class. They simply differed from 
other rural workers to the extent that they owned a slightly bigger part of the factors of 
production. In the case of land, this usually happened to also be where they lived. 
The Agricultural Law (1991) and Agrarian Law (1993) policy processes were dominated 
by entrepreneurial agriculture representatives, however, with little space for other actors. Yet 
the mere fact that the 1991 law acknowledged the need for políticas diferenciadas for small-scale 
producers was a breakthrough. Furthermore, CONTAG was also allocated two seats in a newly 
created National Agricultural Policy Council. But concessions from the dominant agribusiness 
lobby stopped there.255 
Who to include mattered not only for AO representation purposes, but for the 
composition of invited spaces. Selection of interlocutors to speak with government – e.g. on 
public policies for family farming – was based on how representative their organisations were. 
Hence CONTAG was the main AO discussing the actual contours of the new política diferenciada 
for family farming with government officials: 
A working group was created – resulting from CONTAG's pressure – in the ministry of agriculture […]. This 
group must have met 10 times in the Ministry of Agriculture, with members of each region of Brazil, and 
with the sector from the Ministry of Agriculture [who used to work] in the old EMBRATER [former state 
rural extension agency] to create an agricultural política diferenciada. This is where PROVAPE256 was born. 
PROVAPE was the first specific public policy.257  
 
254 This was partly also a consequence of CUT's competition with CONTAG for rural labouring class representation 
(see Favareto, 2006).  
255 Interview AO-SA4. 
256 Programa de Valorização da Pequena Produção Rural (Programme for Valuing Small Rural Production).  






The large-scale agribusiness-led CNA was not invited to negotiate the family farmer 
definition criteria. Yet CNA was still able to influence the Ministry of Agriculture on one criterion: 
allowing for the hiring of two permanent employees. CNA's legitimacy in pushing for this specific 
change was warranted by its own representative base, given that part ofthe middle farmers that 
fit into the newly agreed definition were affiliated to it.  
At its 5th congress (1991), CONTAG created several secretariats, including one for 
agricultural policy. Its second director, Alberto Broch (see chapter 3)258 recalled: 
In CONTAG I served two mandates as director of agricultural policy. In this period we strongly boosted the 
family farming issue on the scale of Brazil. Because this was a theme more related to the South of Brazil, 
more to Rio Grande do Sul. The North, the Northeast used to work more on the issue of the wage labourer, 
the issue of agrarian reform. 
 
This congress witnessed a CONTAG/CUT approximation (two of the seven directors of 
CONTAG's elected governing board were CUT members) and CONTAG's decision to officially 
incorporate the term 'family farming' (Teixeira, 2018). As a senior CONTAG advisor recalled: 
It's exactly during this period […] that the mini and small producer came to be known as family farmer, or 
farmer of family base. And how did CONTAG characterize this family farmer? Through great discussions, 
regional encounters, in this [CUT/CONTAG] project, where we discussed 'how do we characterize, how do 
we identify this family farmer? So it was first the land factor, second the labour force, third this question of 
the existence of occasional [hired] labour, [fourth] residing in the property or not, and [fifth] his objective 
[sources of] income. So these factors determined, and characterized family farming.259  
 
Though the idea of políticas diferenciadas emerged from CUT/CONTAG-government 
debates, the name of the new beneficiaries was derived from debates within academia. Through 
international comparative historical analysis, two influential publications – José Eli da Veiga's 
Agricultural Development: A Historical Vision (1991)260 and Ricardo Abramovay's Paradigms of 
Agricultural Capitalism in Question (1992)261 – showed how capitalist development in 
industrialised countries had relied on a specific yet overlooked social rural actor. As another 
Brazilian researcher who was partly influenced by the above authors put it:  
When you look at the development of the more advanced capitalist countries, you had the predominance 
of a type of agriculture, which was neither the old peasantry, nor the large holdings based on wage labour 
 
258 Interview AO-SA5. 
259 Interview AO-SA5. 
260 O Desenvolvimento Agrícola - Uma Visão Histórica. 





[…]. It is something that theory had never predicted, a modern agriculture which nevertheless remained 
organised under a family base (as was the old peasantry).262 
 
In the above-described Brazilian 1990s contextputting the hitherto obscure category of 
'family farming' under a favourable light with the legitimacy of academia's scientific rigour fit like 
a glove for the aspirations of the small and medium farmer of Brazil’s South. Until then, under 
the prevailing designation of 'small producer', this agricultural segment was often considered in 
government circles as ultimately incapable of producing in sufficient quantities and thus 
perceived as a burden for the rest of society (or at best, a reserve army of labour for cheap 
employment). It was now being revealed by respected scholars as a crucial pillar for successful 
development.  
There was hardly any dialogue space for smaller-scale farmer organisations in MERCOSUR 
negotiations. But discussions at national level yielded a 'Technical Commission of the Small 
Producer' which at least on paper reflected the rural union policy priorities of the time revolving 
around access to rural financial services, including subsidized interest rates, insurance, and 
"specific [credit] lines for reconversion/diversification for products impacted by MERCOSUR" 
(Bianchini, 2015:24). Meanwhile, CUT-linked Southern unions advised by researchers at the 
Socio-Economic Department of Rural Studies (DESER)263 held a seminar entitled "Investment 
Credit - a struggle worth millions of lives". Participants agreed that access to credit would be the 
key plank for rural unions, from which other policies enabling a restructuring of the family 
farming sector would be built, including to enable competition with farmers from MERCOSUR 
countries (Bianchini, 2015). Moreover, access to credit was an attractive policy plank because it 
could provide visible and immediate results to CONTAG-CUT support bases eager to see concrete 
demonstrations of their leaders' intense involvement in policy negotiations with legislative and 
executive branches in Brasilia (Grisa, 2012).  
1994 saw a particularly unique convergence between AO mobilisation and consolidation 
of academic debate, which created favourable conditions within government to create Brazil's 
first specific policy for family farming. Besides Brazil's South, during the 1980s the rural union 
movement had also been reinvigorated in the country's Northern macro-region (corresponding 
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to most of the Amazon rainforest biome), where the specific production forms of traditional 
peoples and communities, as well as peasants who had migrated to the region in past decades 
also went beyond the national confederation's prior focus on agrarian reform or workers' rights. 
Their mobilisation campaigns entitled Grito da Amazônia264 inspired the wider rural union 
movement to conduct what would become CONTAG's nationwide annual Grito da Terra265 
mobilisations. The first two of these (1994 and 1995) included CUT and the MST, as did the first 
COPROFAM meetings, also held from 1994 onwards.266 As recalled by a senior CONTAG leader:  
[For the] Second Grito da Terra Brasil, in 1996, CONTAG did a large national mobilisation, […] occupied the 
Ministry of Planning and Budget […], put turkeys on the table, brought pigs, chickens, inside the ministry. 
And in a few days CONTAG was sued, had to pay, indemnify. Years of judicial processes, and CONTAG was 
held responsible for this occupation. But it was very memorable, because it was exactly on this year that 
CONTAG pulled off decree nº 1.946 of 1996 which creates the National Programme for the Strengthening 
of Family Farming, PRONAF.267  
 
The strength of an agrarian united front and consolidated list of academia-backed policy 
demands prompted a credit programme specifically tailored for 'small rural production' 
(PROVAPE in 1994), and PRONAF (1996). PRONAF criteria were listed in a Brazilian Central Bank 
(BACEN) 1995 resolution (in Bianchini 2015:25-26, emphases added): 
BACEN Resolution 2191 of 24 August 1995 instituted the rural credit [chapter] of the National Programme for 
the Strengthening of Family Farming (PRONAF) and defined the following criteria for the Declaração de Aptidão 
(DAP) [PRONAF Eligibility Declaration]:  
a) uses land parcel as owner, posseiro [informal tenure], land-leaser or partner; 
b) does not maintain a permanent employee. Occasionally resorting to the help of third parties will be 
admitted, when the seasonal nature of the agricultural activity justifies it; 
c) does not possess in any type of [land] title, an area superior to four 'Módulos Fiscais'268;  
d) a minimum of 80% of his/her gross annual income results from agricultural or collector activities; 
e) lives in the property or in a close urban or rural settlement.  
 
As formulated in criterion 'b)' above, hiring temporary employees, for instance to 
undertake seasonal work, does not necessarily preclude the basic principle of predominance of 
family labour. Yet, the exact conditions under which a farm may employ additional (non-family) 
labour and still be considered a family farm was the subject of heated debates in Brazil (Bianchini, 
 
264 Cry of the Amazon. 
265 Cry of the Land. 
266 Interview AO-SA4. 
267 Interview AO-SA5. 
268 'Fiscal module', a Brazilian land measuring unit whose size varies according to different parts of the country’s 





2015), as in the previously mentioned concession made to CNA on hired labour. Hence, "On the 
first, second year of PRONAF, CONTAG itself, mainly its bases in the Northeast defended the 
criterion of family farming without employees".269 The Northeastern CONTAG federations 
position reflects the social formation of its bases; that is, either small-scale peasants who seldom 
employ non-family labour, or agricultural wage labourers who do not farm their own land. 
Consequently, as highlighted by Selwyn's (2012:95) study of CONTAG-affiliated rural unions in 
the Northeastern São Francisco river valley, local unions in Brazil's Northeast have often 
mobilized to defend wage labourers' interests "employed by large and medium producers, while 
effectively sidelining wage workers employed by small producers", even when these are also 
members of CONTAG-affiliated rural labour unions.  
Conversely, in Brazil's South, most of CONTAG's base is made up of small/medium family 
farmers with access to land, and agricultural wage labourers are not nearly as strong a 
constituency as in the Northeast.270 A first compromise allowed for the hiring of up to two 
permanent employees, ensuring that most labour still originated from the family (Bianchini, 
2015). Eventually, "from 97, 98, the South ended up winning, [leading to adoption of] the concept 
of predominance of family labour [emphasis added]".271 This more flexible criterion ended up 
allowing the hiring of as many employees as there are family members, "so if a family has eight 
people, you can have eight employees."272  
The consolidation of the family farming concept from the late 1990s throughout Brazil 
occurred chiefly through the PRONAF Infrastructure programme. This was a variant of PRONAF 
destined primarily to investments in community infrastructure and training, which ended up 
channelled primarily to poorer municipalities.273 As observed by Veiga and Abramovay in 1998 
(cited by Leite et al., 2007:50), "credit operations are concentrated in municipalities with highest 
HDIs and infrastructure loans in the poorest".   
 
269 Interview CS-SA24.  
270 Interview AO-SA4.  
271 Interview CS-SA24 . 
272 Interview CS-SA24 .  





The spread of local rural development councils nonetheless became a CONTAG strategy. 
Over 2300 Municipal Councils for Sustainable Rural Development (CMDR)274 were created, 
enabling some channelling of state resources, promoting discussion of local sustainable 
development projects, and training of CUT-CONTAG cadres to participate:  
We would say: we need to make [people in the] North, South, East and West [of Brazil] speak of family 
farming, this new name, this new actor of the countryside who practices an agriculture which is not 
recognized by government, or by society. So we adopted the following [strategy], the so-called PRONAF 
Infrastructure [programme]. […] Here was a programme that destined infrastructure resources to the local, 
municipal level. Who would get this? The municipal mayors. But what was the condition? You had to create 
a Municipal Council of Agriculture and Sustainable Rural Development. [...] This council had to be half 
represented by family farmers (president of the union, community leaders, of the municipality) and the 
other half could be of the public power (local judiciary, city councillors, the mayor and others that he 
managed to include). [...] This started in 96, 97, 98. In 99 to 2000, thousands of municipal councils were 
created. These municipal councils discussed which demands existed in the municipality, what were the 
needs, and they elected the priority for that year. And the municipality received an amount which the 
council – with the mayor, the city council, the president of the cooperative, the priest – would take […] and 
invest.275  
 
CMDRs were often captured by local powers' agendas, but they did spread the term 
family farming consolidating the idea that this was a specific type of agriculture, contrary to the 
agribusiness lobby's discourse that there was "only one agriculture".276 Moreover CMDRs 
became a training ground for thousands of CONTAG-affiliated local union leaders in policy 
dialogue and influence. 
By the late 1990s, PRONAF delivered an average of 900.000 loan contracts per year, and 
would reach up to 2.5 million contracts for the 2005-2006 crop year (Bianchini, 2015). PRONAF 
eventually yielded a comprehensive set of public policies encompassing, among others, 
insurance, technical assistance and rural extension, and public procurement of food from family 
farmers. Nevertheless, despite expansion efforts, credit lines remained concentrated in the 
dynamic middle farmer strongholds of Brazil's three Southern states and the South-eastern state 
of Minas Gerais. These still accounted for 93% of family farming contracts and resources (seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides, animal feed, etc.) two decades on (Bianchini, 2015:95-96).277  
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The North-eastern states, which house half of Brazil's family farmers, predominantly of a 
smaller-scale peasant base, were mostly left out of the above credit lines. This largely reflected 
the public policy's dependency on the national banking system. Despite treasury-backed 
subsidies and guarantees, and the predominant deployment of credit through state banks, the 
latter's profit maximisation logic and aversion to risk continuously translated into a reluctance to 
engage in painstaking lending to a larger number of smaller-scale peasants of the semi-arid 
Northeast (with limited return on investment), as opposed to the expedited lending to a smaller 
number of dynamic middle farmers in the subtropical Southeast or temperate South, yielding 
higher returns for the banks.278 Other policies were nonetheless created for the Northeast 
peasantries and the North's indigenous, forestry, and riverine traditional communities, also 
technically within the umbrella of 'family farming', besides other less consolidated PFFs in the 
remaining regions of Brazil.  
This subsection has looked at the regional process through which COPROFAM and its 
national member organisations came to represent their diverse membership base through the 
self-identification term 'family farming' in the 1990s, to which 'peasant and indigenous' was 
added in the 2000s. The two countries in which national agrarian representation combined the 
small/middle family farmer and peasant identities into a single socio-economic policy category 
encompassing diverse types of self-managed rural labourers - Chile and Brazil - were the ones 
where a new collective rural subject, the family farmer, gained political recognition as an actor 
in its own right (substituting urban-centred employer-worker negotiations by territorially-
centred state-family farmer policy dialogue).  
In Argentina/Uruguay (where the small/medium producer identity predominated) and 
Paraguay (where peasant identities were strongest) AOs lacked a sufficiently wide and united 
base to compel states into negotiating a set of specific institutions and policies for family farming. 
This would change in the 2000s-2010s, after REAF/MERCOSUR's official recognition of family 
farming with commonly applicable criteria, would Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay begin 
creating their own national policy instruments to support PFF, as discussed below. 
 
 





6.1.2 Regional policy criteria: legally defining family farming in the Southern Cone 
 
 Often cited as one of REAF's milestones, its jointly formulated 'Guidelines for the 
Recognition and Identification of Family Farming in MERCOSUR', were approved in 2007 by the 
regional bloc's highest governing instance (and are usually referred to by its participants) as 
Resolution 25/07 (RES 25/07). This regional policy process built upon Brazil's (and to a lesser 
extent Chile's) state-sanctioned 1990s experiences, and national participatory processes initiated 
following the creation of the regional invited space from 2004, in Argentina, Uruguay, and 
Paraguay. The constant iteration between regional and national policy formulation dialogues, 
enabled by the co-existence of REAF regional and national sections, and involving a core of AO 
leaders and government representatives at both scales, led to common agreement on RES 
25/07's three criteria to recognise family farming in MERCOSUR countries: i) predominance of 
family labour, ii) on-farm management by the family, and iii) compatibility of productive 
resources with family labour capacity, developed activities, and utilised technology. The third 
criterion is of particular interest, as it reflected a painstakingly negotiated compromise that 
enabled to incorporate very diverse realities across neighbouring countries, including by avoiding 
putting a quantified land size cap on family farms.  
Although in neighbouring countries, organisations and academia sometimes referred to 
'family producers' or 'family farmers', there was no official written definition agreed upon, let 
alone validated by official legislation. There had been studies proposing different, partly 
overlapping definitions and typologies of family farming since the early 1990s, often linked to 
IFAD- and WB-funded rural development projects focused on small-scale farming (Obschatko, 
2002; Oyhantçabal, 2013). There was no consensus as to which definition or typology would 
prevail, given that there had not been a perceived need to differentiate agricultural policies 
according to size and levels of capitalisation, and therefore there were as of yet no negotiated or 
institutionalised public policies aimed at family farmers on a national scale. It was the REAF 
regional policy process that first drove actors to define family farming in each national section, 
and later adopt common regional criteria, from which each country could subsequently derive 





In REAF early meetings, once the mechanisms under which participation would take place 
had been established and accepted by all member countries (see chapter 3), delegations began 
debating the need to tailor both national support and regional trade policies to the family farming 
sector. Potential special treatment of family farming at MERCOSUR level meant each country had 
to have its own nationally agreed definition of family farming. Moreover, neighbouring countries' 
definitions should be compatible with each other and mutually recognized (REAF/MERCOSUR, 
2016). At the III REAF held in Asunción in May 2005, delegations agreed on commissioning studies 
on the economic weight of family farming in MERCOSUR, as well as on country-level applicable 
legal frameworks (Niederle, 2016). However, what was initially presented as an instrument for 
the harmonisation of intra-MERCOSUR trade (see chapter 7) - the family farmer registries - 
eventually became an essential tool for national policies.  
The first two criteria, respectively predominance of family labour and collective self-
management resolved the labourer-versus-employer representation discrepancies between 
COPROFAM’s national AOs (see 6.1.1) by creating a new collective subject that shares 
characteristics with both but is also distinct from either one. This newly defined collective subject 
thus became entitled to negotiate public policies directly with the state. Debates on the third 
criterion, regarding family farmers' maximum capitalisation levels, proved too conflicting to 
resolve through quantitatively defined ceilings. Thus, resolution 25/07's wording resorted to the 






Figure 16: Illustration of the three criteria adopted in MERCOSUR’s  
GMC Resolution 25/07 (Source: REAF, 2016).279 
 
This enabled to surpass intractable discussions on land size ceilings (given the wide 
variation of social reproduction conditions across and within single countries) by delegating their 
delimitation to each country. Hence, agreeing on social and economic criteria with Southern Cone 
state authorities to define family farming at regional level enabled COPROFAM to: i) create a wide 
enough alliance between diverse rural labouring class fractions by maintaining unity in diversity 
of AO representation; and ii) build this unity through the common denominator of self-managed 
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production and agro-pastoral activities. It lives in the farm or in a close location' 
-lower right corner: 'Productive resources compatible with labour. The productive resources will be compatible with 
the family's working capacity, with the developed activity, and the utilized technology, in accordance with the reality 






family labour to differentiate it from large-scale agribusiness, and thus recognise family farming 
as a specific public at the regional level. 
Brazil and Chile’s previously existing family farmer registries both used a land criterion 
that incorporated several variables, beyond only area size. Brazil's módulo fiscal (fiscal module) 
is a variable area unit dating from the 1970s, determined locally in each municipality (ranging 
from 5 to 110 ha) according to several criteria including economic viability, biomes, and 
conservation zones. Chile's hectárea de riego básico (basic irrigation hectare) is also a variable 
measure based on climate and soil conditions and productive potential of each region, and was 
created as part of the 1960s' redistributive agrarian reform. Updated in 1990 legislation, Chile's 
definition of pequeño productor (small producer) caps it at 12 HRBs (which can represent up to 
750 ha), while Brazil's 1993 Agrarian Law defines the pequena propriedade (small property) at a 
maximum of 4 fiscal modules (which can go up to 440 ha), also used in PRONAF's eligibility criteria 
at its creation in 1996.   
Brazil's land size criteria was hotly debated by AOs. Many development projects used a 
standard 50 ha limit, others associated family farming only with the minifundio (under 1 MF, 
while an influential FAO/INCRA 1994 report included medium farmers (up to 15 MF). CONTAG 
had a crucial role here, as recalled by CONTAG former president Francisco Urbano:  
We started discussing […]: we need to regulate the agrarian law: what is a small property, what is a medium 
property? For agrarian reform. I spent two days, three days, calling every state [CONTAG federation], asking: 
what is a [fiscal] module in your property, what are four modules in your region? We started to understand that 
4 modules was the ideal to [define] the small property, and the medium [from] 4 to 15 modules.  
 
Indeed, the 4 MF limit was large enough to include most of Brazil's family farmers from a 
wide diversity of agro-ecological conditions, simultaneously differentiating them from large-scale 
agribusiness. However, apart from Chile, neighbouring countries had not instituted variable plot 
size unit measures accounting for differences in climate, soil, and other productivity-related 
criteria.  
This generated debates in the run up to agreement on the wording of RES 25/07 in REAF. 
Indeed, given the wide diversity of FF in the region, land size and capitalisation are not necessarily 
correlated. For instance, in Argentina, as explained by a former civil servant at its Ministry of 
Agriculture, "if you look, between a minifundista from Jujuy, who may have 4 ha of maize, and a 





4 ha, there are huge differences".280 Similarly, in Uruguay, "I can be a smallholder, and have 20 
hothouses. And have 50 day-labourers in the hothouses. So I'm small according to land size. But 
I'm not small [in scale of operation]. And you can have a guy who has 200 ha on hard dry land 
rearing sheep",281 who can barely make ends meet. Such examples underscore the geographical 
diversity of the FF segment, and the difficulty of agreeing on a single land size measure, even 
within one country, let alone at the regional scale.  
An alternative generic formulation was eventually agreed upon. The carefully and 
painstakingly negotiated language of RES 25/07 offered to resolve the regional land size disparity 
issue without explicitly putting a size limit on landholding.282 Instead it resorted to other 
attributes of agricultural scale (productive resources, activity, technology) and their compatibility 
with family labour capacity. Ultimately, debates representing the region's wide diversity of family 
farming systems revealed how land size is a necessary but insufficient criterion to ascertain the 
amount of productive resources that can be self-managed by families working the land with their 
own labour.  
The case of Paraguay is equally revealing of the power of regional intersubjective debate 
between AOs, civil servants, technicians, and academics in providing member countries with 
public policy instruments that reflect the internal diversity of FF - not just at the scale of the 
Southern Cone, but within each national territory. Paraguay was, along with Chile, the only other 
country besides Brazil equipped with legislation defining its FF sector when REAF was created in 
2004. Yet, while Paraguay's Law 2419/04 (which gave birth to its land institute INDERT) defined 
peasant family farming (in its article 6) through the predominance of family labour, it did not 
adopt specific quantified criteria. This changed with REAF's policy process in the run up to RES 
25/07. A Paraguayan civil servant explained:  
For the characterisation of family farming, several workshops were organised, where the organisations 
were convened to establish what the parameters would be. […] There wasn't yet the [REAF 25/07] 
resolution, it was still being worked on. […] So what had to be done was the characterisation of family 
farming and decide what were going to be the [criteria]. […] We had to work on the issue of land size. The 
issue of the family unit: who they could be? How many people could work during the year [as seasonal 
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employees]? How much income? And this took […] three or four workshops […] with space for civil society. 
It was very interesting – a milestone of work in common to determine this characterisation.283 
 
Policy targeting in Paraguay prior to REAF discussions occurred through INDERT's 
classifications of small producer in a restrictive form, through a 5 ha national land size cap that 
excluded its middle family farmers, thus stripping the wider rural labouring classes of policy 
segment unity. Paraguay's REAF national section discussed the issue at length and aimed to 
rectify it by proposing a new definition that contemplated middle family farmers, adapting the 
land size criterion to the country's territorial diversity. Though not approved into law, Paraguay's 
REAF national section adopted an official definition that enlarged the land size cap to "50 
hectares of land in the Oriental Region and 500 ha in the Chaco" (COPROFAM, 2018:7). The 
territorially-based differences in land size caps reflected the fact that the north-western Chaco is 
much less densely populated and has climatic and soil conditions that are considerably different 
from those of Paraguay's south-eastern half. Hence:  
One of the big discussions was on the size of the land, of the farm. […] The only legal framework that 
we have is the INDERT law […] INDERT works with settlements; the producers questioned it because 
usually one would work on the basis of at least 10 ha. [Regarding the size], we would get into a great 
dilemma, because within the group, there were also small soya producers. And so, since it was an 
extensive culture, there had to be an agreement on up to how many hectares a family can manage. […] 
They may produce soya or they may focus on small cattle herding. Which is also extensive. Or milk 
production. […].284 
 
REAF national sections thus drew lessons from regional debates on the territorial variability 
of FF and endeavoured to apply these nationally, even if they did not always prevail at 
formulating new pieces of legislation. Discussions inside REAF during its first years thus 
contributed to help define who was and who wasn't a family farmer in each of the region's 
countries.  
This section has shown how COPROFAM representatives' participation in invited spaces 
between the 1990s and 2010s resulted in the legal recognition of its social base as family farmers. 
This identity allowed to group together various rural labouring segments into single AOs, which 
in turn successfully petitioned governments for the creation of tailored invited spaces and 
policies in MERCOSUR and its member countries. The mere creation at scale of these specific 
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policies for FF rowed against the current of agricultural policy orthodoxy, and faced opposition 
from large-scale agribusiness lobbies. The latter considered most of COPROFAM's members as 
structurally incapable of productive dynamism and therefore only eligible for compensatory 
social policies.  
COPROFAM members' self-identification as peasant and indigenous family farmers 
became a discursive frame uniting a wide diversity of rural peoples under one representative 
banner, and thereby defined their requested policies' public. Legal definitions distinguished this 
public from large-scale agribusiness, given that the former work the land as self-managed units 
of family labour, whereas the latter manage their own farms but hire outside labourers.  
The reaching of agreement on common regional criteria to define family farming was no 
simple task. It involved multiple AO meetings with national governments, as well as dozens of 
regional discussions over several years. The originality of each national process reflected not only 
its singular agrarian and political trajectories, but also the conditions of political and policy 
dialogue in national invited spaces, the so-called REAF National Sections. Further discussions at 
the regional level sometimes revealed strong differences between different conceptions of family 
farming across the Southern Cone. Reaching regional-level agreement despite these divergent 
visions was achieved in different ways, identifiable in: i) which criteria were chosen, and which 
were left out; ii) how the criteria were formulated to both encapsulate a diverse sector and 
clearly distinguish it from large-scale agribusiness; and iii) how their formulation was specific 
enough to achieve this, but also wide enough to enable different national definitions to fit within 
broader regional parameters.  
 
6.2 Legal recognition of the family farm and agricultural professions in West Africa 
 
6.2.1 Recognising family farming in Senegal and ECOWAS agricultural policies 
 
This subsection shows how the creation and growth of ROPPA over three decades (1990s-
2010s) has run in tandem with the recognition of family farming by state authorities as a political 
actor to be reckoned with on all significant agrarian policy matters, at regional and national levels. 





diverse rural labouring class fractions (e.g. semi-proletarianised, pluriactive peasantries, seasonal 
migrating workers, pastoralists, or more capitalised family farmers linked to commodity chains). 
These different groups, that most frequently self-identify under either the peasants or 
agricultural producers285 umbrella discursive frames, have joined forces behind the banners of 
peasant family farming (agriculture familiale paysanne) and family farms (exploitations 
familiales). From public invisibility to regular presidential and ministerial meetings in the late 
1990s in Senegal (and other UEMOA member countries by the 2000s), the Sahel and savannah’s 
peasant majorities scored significant policy victories in Senegal in the late 1990s, including debt 
pardons, lower interest rate loans, and the maintenance of the national rural extension agency 
in state hands (Faye, 2007).   
One must look at both the regional West African and national Senegalese contexts in the 
early 2000s to understand how ROPPA and CNCR's strategies combined to enable institutional 
advances towards the recognition of family farming in agricultural policy. As regional integration 
processes intensified and UEMOA and ECOWAS addressed agricultural policy at the highest 
regional political level (see chapter 4), national government administrations felt the pressure to 
correspond, at least in official rhetoric, if not in concrete budget allocations. According to CNCR 
President Nadjirou Sall, besides the resilience and continuing prevalence of Senegalese FF, it was 
also the unequivocal inclusion of FF as a central actor of ECOWAS's regional agricultural policy 
that facilitated greater acceptance of debates on stimulating smaller-scale agriculture in 
Senegal.286  
Given its previously close contacts with president Diouf's government in the 1990s, 
CNCR's relationship with president Abdoulaye Wade's administration (2000-2012) was fraught 
with tensions from his first year in office. Nonetheless, negotiations were under way by 2002. 
Deadlock was broken after an imposing demonstration of force by CNCR, when on 26 January 
2003 over 20,000 members rallied at Dakar’s Senghor Stadium, and invited government 
members to attend. A then-published manifesto demanded the drafting of an Agricultural Policy 
Framework Law (Loi d'Orientation Agricole).287  
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Thereafter, the government publicised a draft bill, opening it up for civil society 
contributions. The first version was skewed in favour of commercial agricultural enterprises, but 
after CNCR gathered its governing board, it requested and obtained additional time from 
government authorities, and undertook consultations with its bases. For 3 months, workshops 
involving around 3,000 peasants in villages across the country’s different regions and the main 
filières,288 and concluding with a national encounter, led to the drafting of an alternate bill 
presented by CNCR to the Ministry of Agriculture.  
The ministry created a committee with key government institutions linked to agricultural 
policy and CNCR, where all parties negotiated a final version incorporating most of CNCR's 
proposals (McSween, 2015). The alternate draft proposal represented "almost 80% of the LOASP 
that you see now", according to one of the AOs technical advisors.289 A comprehensive 
framework for Senegal's agricultural policies for 20 years, LOASP was adopted by the National 
Assembly on 27 May, and promulgated on 4 June 2004.290 Like ECOWAP/CAADP's subsequent 
reflection of ROPPA's main demands (see chapter 4), LOASP's final CNCR-influenced version put 
FF at the heart of Senegal's agricultural strategy (see following subsection 6.2.2) and set food 
sovereignty as its primary objective.  
Unlike former president Abdou Diouf (1981-2000), presidents Abdoulaye Wade (2000-
2012) and Macky Sall (2013-present day) and respective liberal parties did not open space to 
dialogue in Senegal's 2000-2020 period. Yet CNCR had garnered enough political strength by then 
to become the country’s main AO. It refused to be misrepresented as an urban-type labour union 
(despite Wade's efforts) or as a member of a proposed Chambre d'Agriculture (see chapter 4).  
Yet West African agricultural policy framework laws are the result of ROPPA national 
platform negotiations with states that are built to disproportionately serve national urban ruling 
class interests. Hence, despite its incorporation of most CNCR demands, Senegal's LOASP has 
been described by critics on the left (Ndiaye, 2012) as essentially a first milestone in president 
Wade government's (2000-2012) to focus almost exclusively on large-scale agribusiness 
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investments supported by the Senegalese state. Wade's vision would be explicitly laid out a few 
years later in his GOANA programme launched after the 2008 food crisis.  
After it was adopted in 2005 at the 28th ECOWAS Conference of Heads of State, ECOWAP's 
merging with the CAADP process connected it to further formulation and implementation 
processes. In 2003, AU Heads of State had agreed to the Maputo Declaration and launched 
CAADP, the operationalisation of which involved AU countries' formulation of CAADP 'compacts' 
and 'investment plans'. These only materialised after the 2007-2008 food price crisis put 
agriculture and food security back at the top of African policymakers' agenda. In West Africa, 
Heads of State adopted the 'Regional Initiative for Food Production and Fight Against Hunger' in 
June 2008, and ECOWAS decided to formulate a CAADP 'regional compact' – the only AU Regional 
Economic Community (REC) to do so. The resulting ECOWAP/CAADP compact signed in Abuja in 
November 2009 included ROPPA as one of its seven signatories and incorporated its prioritisation 
of family farms and food sovereignty. Its correspondent Regional Agricultural Investment Plan 
(RAIP) for the 2011-2015 period, first presented in Dakar on June 2010, cited 'producer 
organisations' as one of its key implementing partners, and ROPPA as the implementing 
organisation for three of its planned actions. ROPPA was also given a seat in the newly created 
Consultative Committee for Agriculture and Food (CCAF) (Afun-Ogidan et al., 2012).  
Despite the gradual gains in mutual trust and working collaboration between ROPPA and 
ECOWAS representatives throughout ECOWAP/CAADP formulation, the same could not be said 
of the equivalent processes in most of the region's countries. The formulation of CAADP's 
corresponding National Investment Plans (NAIP) was generally much less inclusive than its 
regional counterpart process. AOs' participation, which had been financed by the ECOWAS 
commission for ECOWAP/CAADP, was not made available for national level investment plan 
consultations. Mali's CNOP leader Ibrahima Coulibaly summarised: "states have tried to 
marginalise [AOs] in many countries. They have chosen malleable producer organisations, side-
lining those that have ideas and capacities to influence the process" (Coulibaly, 2012:1). Even in 
Senegal, where CNCR had a relatively strong position, it did not get as much consultative and 
policy formulating space as ROPPA had in ECOWAS. Rather, president Wade's Liberal Party 





the creation of parallel AOs to undermine CNCR’s near-monopoly of Senegalese peasant 
representation.291 
ROPPA's policy dialogue spaces at ECOWAS-level remained open to participation after the 
ECOWAP/CAADP policy process, during elaboration of RAIP, signed in June 2010. After the 
ECOWAS policy process was merged with that of the African Union NEPAD's CAADP, the more 
participatory ECOWAP elaboration methodology was maintained for the regional investment 
plan. Conversely, the more technocratic, government-centred, CAADP process (based on 
macroeconomic modelling to identify sectors that contribute most to poverty reduction and 
economic growth) was usually the norm for NAIPs (Benkhala, Dièye, 2010).  
Yet even the more participatory ECOWAP implementation process was fraught with 
limitations, among which: i) an overlap of many international donor initiatives that all claimed to 
be in sync with ECOWAP but hardly ever committed funds to ensure proper coordination 
between each other or with ECOWAP; ii) downgrading agricultural policy in the face of other 
ECOWAS budgetary priorities, notably peace and security issues; iii) general institutional and 
resource constraints (despite arguably being the most densely integrated REC) (Inter-Réseaux, 
2016).   
 Following adoption of the 'Regional Initiative for the Production of Food and Fight Against 
Hunger' by ECOWAS Heads of State after the 2008 food price crisis, the regional agricultural policy 
was reoriented towards three main axes: i) increasing food production, ii) facilitating trade, and 
iii) providing access to food for vulnerable populations. In the RAIP document signed in June 
2010, proposed budgetary allocations reflected a prioritisation of the first of these three 
mobilizing programmes, and within it, of that programme's first component, that is, the 
"promotion of food products leading to food sovereignty: rice, maize and cassava" (ECOWAS, 
2010b:15). The first listed activity of this component (1.1.1), for its part, was phrased as a 
"support to the modernisation of family farms and intensification of production systems 
[emphasis added]" (Ibid:28). Thus not only did initial implementation efforts clearly underscore 
the oft-stated link between support to family farming and achievement of food sovereignty; they 
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also equated the formal recognition of family farming stated in the strategy documents with 
support for its modernisation. This would later prove to be a double-edged sword for ROPPA's 
leadership, since it meant a desirable strengthening of family farmers' economic capabilities, but 
often at the expense of undermining their social, environmental, and cultural functions, and 
indeed putting at risk the survival of smaller-scale family farms292.  
 Besides RAIP's confirmed commitment to ROPPA's policy vision originally outlined in 
ECOWAP five years earlier, several key institutions were to be created to implement the regional 
agricultural policy: a Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food (RAAF), headquartered in Lomé, 
Togo and inaugurated in 2013; a Consultative Committee for Agriculture and Food (CCAF), 
whichhas met on many occasions (sometimes in Abuja, but usually in the country that holds the 
ECOWAS rotating presidency) 293; and a regional fund hosted by the ECOWAS Bank for Investment 
and Development (EBID), which has yet to be operationalised. ECOWAP implementation has thus 
yielded a recurring regional invited space, CCAF, in which ROPPA is represented, alongside 
regional institutions, member states, private sector, donors, and members of the ECOWAS 
Parliament.  
While this has enabled ROPPA to maintain an influential regional policy profile, it has 
occurred within an environment of constrained budgetary resources, in which policy 
coordination is severely hampered by dependency on external funding, resulting in a myriad of 
often disconnected or overlapping short-term and geographically circumscribed programmes. 
Moreover, a study conducted by ROPPA and the two main regional West African pastoralist 
networks (RBM and APESS) concluded that only about a tenth of the credit available for 
agriculture throughout the West African region targeted PFFs, while other reports highlight how 
most budgetary resources target fewer larger-scale agricultural projects (Inter-Réseaux, 2016).  
 Though ECOWAP succeeded in attracting the attention of agricultural policymakers on 
FF's importance, and the 2008 food price crisis on their role as food suppliers in the region, the 
ways in which policymakers attempted to address challenges exposed unresolved dilemmas. 
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Indeed, after recognising past decades of neglect and disdain, the question posed was no longer 
why support FF, but how to do so, explained ROPPA's Executive Secretary.294 
  The discourse on family farm 'modernisation' which characterised ECOWAP was initially 
seen as a victory for at least part of the peasant movement leadership, insofar as it represented 
potential access to forms of support (subsidies, credit, insurance, extension services, access to 
markets) that had only been precariously available to most smaller-scale farmers, especially since 
the post-1980s dismantling of state agricultural policy levers. Nevertheless, 'modernisation' in 
practice often became equated with simply making agricultural enterprises out of family farms, 
disregarding their economic, social, environmental and cultural specificities. At the other end of 
the political spectrum, the predominant neoliberal recipe for rural development disseminated in 
the 1980s-1990s (consisting in seeing family farmers as mere beneficiaries of social 
compensatory measures) also persisted to a large extent, with only larger agricultural enterprises 
considered desirable recipients of productive investment (Inter-Réseaux, 2016).295  
 The permanence of these predominant policy paradigms, whether developmentalist or 
neoliberal, posed a challenge to ROPPA members in terms of how to reconcile their own strategic 
policy vision beyond those paradigms, with immediate pressing needs and existing resource 
constraints within them. Some of the policy proposals of ROPPA national members in Agricultural 
Orientation Laws of West African countries (examined in subsection 6.2.2 below) are illustrative 
of the innovative ways in which their policy deliberations across the region have attempted to 
tread this balance. 
  
6.2.2 Diffusing legal recognition of the family farm across UEMOA countries 
 
This subsection examines how ROPPA platforms' agricultural policy visions laid out in the 
lois d'orientation agricole (agricultural policy framework laws) that they considerably contributed 
to shape (in Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire, the four countries where laws were 
approved in the 2000s-2010s) reflect at least three policy planks revolving around the recognition 
of self-managed rural labouring classes: i) agrarian organisations as legitimate representatives of 
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peasants, pastoralists, fisherfolk, women, youth, commodity producers among others; ii) family 
farms as self-managed collective rural labouring units entitled to specifically-designed public 
policies; iii) the professions of peasants, producers, and agricultural wage labourers, entitling 
them to economic and social labouring rights hitherto reserved to urban labour.  
Difficulties in influencing CAADP national investment plans, inconsistencies between their 
different lines of action, and their variable importance within national governments' policy 
agendas exposed the fragilities of over-relying on the ECOWAP/CAADP regional-national 
relationship as an effective strategy (Coulibaly, 2012). Nonetheless, the ECOWAP 
implementation process, as well as other regional meetings convened by UEMOA or CILSS, 
provided opportunities for members to exchange perceptions on alternative avenues to explore. 
When ECOWAP was approved in 2005, ROPPA members believed that Senegal's LOASP (2004) 
best addressed how to effectively translate this newly gained recognition of FF into specifically 
adapted policy frameworks. As the leader of Mali's CNOP Ibrahima Coulibaly put it:  
Senegal had elaborated its agricultural orientation law before Mali […]. Then you had the ECOWAP process 
in 2005 […]. So this means that throughout all ROPPA countries, there is a will to obtain the recognition of 
family farming – that is, it was one of the engines. One must recognize the substratum of all this – because 
ROPPA was born in 2000. And we were a founding member of ROPPA. So most of the strong political 
messages went through this channel. Because ROPPA defended a robust, protected family farming centred 
on agricultural family farms, which must be defended. […] We had very strong political messages. For which 
we fought, not only at the regional-, but also country-level […]. I don't know if it's the regional [institutional] 
level, but it's the regional level through which ROPPA influenced countries. […]. ROPPA's political message 
influenced countries to defend these positions in their national policies.296  
 
 A regional policy diffusion process thus gradually took shape. Initially based on Senegal's 
LOASP, the diffusion dynamic was strengthened by a similar process in Mali and the adoption of 
its own Loi d'Orientation Agricole297 (LOA) in 2006. 298 This involved peasant leaders, civil servants, 
academics and technical experts traveling between countries of the region, and exchanging 
experiences between their respective countries' agricultural policy elaboration processes, as 
recalled by a CNCR technical advisor:   
Once we had results in Senegal […] ROPPA immediately saw the need to share this 'Senegalese expertise' 
with other countries. This explains all of CNCR leaders' visits to Mali. Then to Côte d'Ivoire, etc. In Burkina, 
 
296 Interview AO-WA22.  
297 Agricultural Orientation Law.  
298 Côte d'Ivoire (LOACI) and Burkina Faso (LOASPHF) would follow suit adopting their respective laws in 2015. 





it was CNCR peasant leaders who went there to train them, to tell them that this is the strategy through 
which you have to go, until we get there.299  
 
A senior civil servant who worked for decades in Senegal's Ministry of Agriculture 
describes his role in the regional policy diffusion process:     
I was lucky to go in the name of the Senegalese government, to help decant the process somewhat, and 
ignite the process. Because they [had] spent 6 months arguing […]. And this was a demand from [Malian] 
President ATT [Amadou Toumani Touré] himself, who had asked President Wade. And they asked me. It 
was financed by French cooperation. And we discussed. Doctor Diara, who was nominated for the 
implementation of LOA in Mali, he comes here often. The LOA in Mali, it is the LOASP from Senegal. They 
are [practically] the same. [For] Côte d'Ivoire's LOACI [Loi d'Orientation Agricole de Côte d'Ivoire300]: they 
came here. We discussed, exchanged. And they went back with a lot of material from Senegal's LOASP. 
Building from our prior meetings at ECOWAS […]. Benin: they came here. Between December 2015 and 
January 2016. Government agents, peasant organisations - about thirty people. We visited CNCR.301  
 
 Regarding academic and technical expertise, IPAR also played a fundamental role, as 
acknowledged by CNCR:  
When we talk about peasant leaders - we did not develop the strategy here [at CNCR headquarters]. But 
the strategy was: peasant leaders who called upon expertise, and amongst this expertise, most of it came 
from IPAR, with the likes of Jacques Faye, etc. It was they who had helped define the strategy to develop 
here. So when we had to also go in the other countries, IPAR was clearly associated to this.302    
 
 The regional policy diffusion of LOAs relates not only to the content of proposed 
legislation, but also to the mobilisation and participation methods utilised by ROPPA's national 
AOs to gain the upper hand in negotiations with governments. This varied from one country to 
another, depending on the representative legitimacy and political clout of each ROPPA national 
platform, and the degrees of openness of governments to allow for participatory policy 
formulation processes. Nevertheless, elements of a strategy first utilised by CNCR in Senegal, and 
expanded upon by CNOP in Mali, particularly involving the drafting of a 'peasant memorandum' 
(i.e. an autonomous policy programmatic document) based on cross-country village-level 
consultations (as subsequently occurred in Benin, Niger, and Burkina Faso303), have at the very 
least strengthened national platforms' negotiating clout, even where government authorities 
were initially not as receptive to their policy proposals as in the first two Sahel countries.  
 
299 Interview AO-WA9.  
300 Côte d'Ivoire's Agricultural Orientation Law.  
301 Interviews CS-WA5 and CS-WA7.  
302 Interview AO-WA9.  





The Malian LOA (2006) policy process is particularly representative of a strong national 
peasant platform empowered by a government that understood the significance of creating a 
national policy framework centred on the historically marginalised PFF majorities. It underwent 
several stages of elaboration: i) an existing national invited space (commission paritaire) where 
AOPP had a seat; ii) AOPP then gained the mandate to conduct national consultations (certain 
villages, regional syntheses, and national level encounters); iii) joint elaboration with key 
ministries in agricultural policy; iv) exclusively inter-ministerial alterations of the original 
document which reversed many of the inclusions from the on-site consultations v) permanent 
lobbying at the national assembly to reconstruct the originally formulated document. This version 
was then finally approved at the national assembly in 2006304.  
The drafting of LOAs, inspired by Senegal's experience, was perceived as relevant to other 
ROPPA members for at least two reasons. Firstly, it would provide countries with a 
comprehensive, long-term strategic framework, better shielded against the volatilities and 
whims of successive government administrations, consequent policy discontinuities, and 
dispersions of resources.305 Secondly, such formulation processes founded on AOs' robust 
participation became a unique opportunity to legally enshrine formal recognition of family farms 
and agricultural professions, and mould some of the policy implications of this recognition.306  
 The LOAs approved in the last two decades in Senegal, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina 
Faso deal with a wide range of agricultural policies, including: the status of agricultural 
professional organisations (including ROPPA national platforms and their members), provisions 
for access to services such as credit, extension, insurance, infrastructure, and the creation of 
funds to implement these. However, they are most notable for establishing definitions of the 
family farm and their members' specific rights and duties.307 This relates particularly to how 
family farms: i) are distinct from agricultural enterprises; ii) are characterised by social, 
environmental, and cultural specificities and functions; iii) are defined by forms of collective 
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305 Interviews AO-WA22, AO-WA19, AO-WA15, and AO-WA16.  
306 Interviews AO-WA22 and AO-WA19.  





organisation that may partly overlap with - but are different from - individual, nuclear family, or 
cooperative-like units.  
A clear distinction is established between family farms and agricultural enterprises in all 
LOAs. This differentiation is frequently justified by ROPPA's representatives as necessary to avoid 
the recurrent problem of agricultural policies disproportionately benefitting larger-scale farmers. 
As one of CNCR's members put it:  
Regarding the status of the family farms, it was a concern raised by CNCR, in the LOASP [drafting process]. 
To urge the state to define and ameliorate public policies that target family farming. Because, first of all, it 
is essential and important to know who is a family farmer, a producer, and who needs to benefit from state 
subsidies. Because, as we have seen, every year subsidies are given out, but we realise that it is the category 
that we call 'large producer' that captures the greater part of these subsidies.308  
 
Labouring and management conditions are key criteria used to operate this distinction in 
the region’s agricultural framework laws. Whereas agricultural enterprises must exclusively 
employ formal wage labour in accordance with pre-existing legislation, labour relations amongst 
members of family farms are "freely defined" and "not governed by the labour code" – as 
explicitly stated in both Senegal's LOASP (art. 18) (République du Sénégal, 2004:10)  and Burkina 
Faso's LOASPHF (art. 58) (République du Burkina Faso, 2015:36). While Mali's LOA and Côte 
d'Ivoire's LOACI do not specify this latter element, they both refer to the "common use of factors 
of production"  (explicitly including labour amongst these factors in LOACI) as one of family farms' 
defining features (République de Côte d’Ivoire, 2015:118).  
The laws do mention the possibility for family farms to hire wage labour, according to the 
official labour code (Mali's LOA art. 18, Burkina Faso's LOASPHF art. 62), or to a specific 
convention to be elaborated by the state and professional agricultural organisations (Senegal's 
LOASP art. 18). They therefore indirectly imply that externally hired labour is more frequently the 
exception than the norm, but stop short of setting rigid rules determining the proportion of 
labour use that should be family-based. Similarly, Burkina Faso's LOASPHF mentions that 
agricultural activities are entirely or partly conducted by family members, without specifying the 
proportion of externally hired or family labour.  
 





Thus, whereas definitions in other parts of the world – including South America – establish 
predominant use of family labour as a defining criterion, West African LOAs imply that this is most 
frequent, without excluding other situations (hired wage labour may predominate for specific 
types of activities or times of the year, such as planting or harvesting). But they do clearly 
delimitate them from agricultural enterprises by defining the latter through its exclusive use of 
wage labour.  
Management of both family farms and agricultural enterprises can be assigned to one 
individual according to all of the above-cited laws. However, whereas agricultural enterprises can 
alternately only be managed as private limited companies, legal provisions entrust family farms 
with varying degrees of collective management responsibilities to their remaining members. 
While Senegal's LOASP states that family farms can be either individually or collectively managed, 
the three other countries' laws establish the figure of a designated male or female 'head' (chef 
d'exploitation) in charge of managing and legally representing the family farm. This is nonetheless 
counterbalanced with provisions upholding the rights of family farms' other members. Thus, 
according to Burkina Faso's LOASPHF, the chef d'exploitation is designated by all adult members, 
and his/her management activities are exercised "under the control of the family farm council, 
which is made up of all members" (République du Burkina Faso, 2015:35). Furthermore, it 
formally establishes equality in rights (and duties, in the case of Mali's LOA) between all family 
farm members. Similarly, Côte d'Ivoire's LOACI prohibits any exploitative or demeaning practice 
towards members of any type of farm. Mali's LOA and Burkina Faso's LOASPHF also make it 
compulsory for heads of family farms to "promote participatory management practices" 
(République du Mali, 2006:5; République du Burkina Faso 2015:36), as part of several provisions 
that aim to balance individual and collective management responsibilities.   
Recognising the coexistence of individual and collective management practices and 
establishing legal clauses to ensure that these are well balanced was part of some of ROPPA 
national AO members' planks, when debating the proposed content of LOAs. According to the 
president of Mali's CNOP, participatory management practices as formulated in that country's 





has something to say. Organize farm councils to plan production. And have farm councils to 
manage harvest […] We fought in the discussions on the status [of family farms], for this." 309  
In a similar way as recognizing the equality of rights between all family farm members – 
criticised by some as perhaps unrealistically bold, given its "denial of traditional social values" 
(Bélières, 2014:16) – the struggle to establish more democratic practices at the micro-local unit 
of the family farm can be seen as a continuation of struggles initiated by some of ROPPA's 
founding members since the 1970s (see chapter 4). The autonomous movements and local 
associations that grew exponentially after the 1973-1974 Sahel drought were indeed already 
seeking to give greater voice to women and youth. Nevertheless, movement leaders at the time 
realistically understood this would only take root if balanced with continuing respect for the 
traditional role held by male elders, whose own experience and knowledge they also valued.   
The balance struck between respect for certain elements of traditional patriarchal 
decision-making with the local political empowerment of youth and women finds its economic 
equivalent in the everyday practices that reconcile collective and individual forms of ownership, 
and the use of factors of production within the family farm unit. Hence: 
All [members] are mutually interconnected, through links, but each has individual rights, and together 
collective rights […]. For example, the youth can - say he's working with horticulture and does well, he can 
buy his motorcycle. He doesn't need the support of his family. It's his money. He's been given a plot. 
Women, they have a small plot, they have resources, they can do what they want with them. So [the law] 
doesn't prevent you from having the collective and [emphasis added] the small private [plot and resources] 
on the side.310   
 
Definitions of FF in LOAs have thus included innovative forms of farm management that 
strike a fine balance between collective and individual rights. This very much reflects the 
inclusiveness of country-wide consultations led by ROPPA national platforms that fed into LOAs. 
Consultations indeed revealed a strong push towards obtaining recognition of the extended 
family farm model that has endured over countless generations throughout West Africa (despite 
recurrent climatic, political, and/or economic shocks). But they also revealed a will, particularly 
from women and youth, to obtain greater decision-making voice and economic autonomy as 
individual members within each collective farm unit.  
 
309 Interview AO-WA22.  





Yet recognition of West African FF posited in LOAs is also about crafting policies that 
identify these as distinct units composed of "one or several members united by kinship links or 
practices and customs" (as expressed in Mali's LOA, art. 14) (République du Mali, 2006:4). In other 
words, they entail an incorporation of the family farm as the prevailing culturally-rooted socio-
economic entity in West African rural areas, to foster more adequately designed forms of policy 
support. 
Nevertheless, identification by the state for agricultural policy purposes to date still 
occurs generally only at the scale of individuals or cooperative-like entities such as Senegal's GIE, 
which allow for any group of people to freely associate, regardless of them living on the same 
farm and having family/customary links or not (see chapter 4). Hence, in Senegal, tenure rights 
can be accessed by individuals, whilst collective access to services such as agricultural credit can 
be made available through cooperatives or GIEs, but none of these are necessarily accessible to 
family farms in their own right.  
Furthermore, the nuclear family – as opposed to prevalent wider groups formed by the 
extended family and other members collectively farming and living on the same plot – is the 
default unit of reference for official statistics guiding policy decisions and implementation. As 
stated by a CNCR advisor:  
All the statistics […] rely on what they call ménages agricoles [i.e. agricultural (nuclear family) households]. 
Whereas we […] speak of the family farm, under which you can find several agricultural households. For us, 
this was the object of many discussions, to be able to find an agreement. Now, we accept to continue using 
the concept of agricultural household, but let us agree […] that in a given [family] farm, one can find several 
households. When we undertake our studies for the monitoring of our farms, we can correlate [our results] 
with [official] statistics. For instance when DAPSA311 talks […] about 2.000 households, we know that this 
may be 6.000 [households]. 6.000 households [may actually correspond to] 2.000 family farms.312  
 
Notwithstanding variations between each country's legislation, the above-described 
regional policy diffusion process of agricultural orientation laws has contributed to create legal 
benchmarks that highlight the singularities of the family farm across francophone West African 
countries. Official recognition of a pervasive use of family labour, combined individual and 
collective management practices, and the wider extended family as a distinct social, cultural, and 
 
311 Direction de l'Analyse, de la Prévision et des Statistiques Agricoles - Directorship for Agricultural Analysis, Forecast 
and Statistics, a government agency linked to Senegal's Ministry of Agriculture.  





economic entity is gradually enabling policy formulators and implementers to tailor policies to a 
longstanding FF sector that has been newly identified through negotiated and intelligible criteria.  
But to what extent have these legislations actually influenced policy implementation on 
the ground? Although some countries are still in formulating stages (Niger, Guinea, Benin) or 
have approved laws fairly recently (Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso), looking at ROPPA's national 
peasant platforms' strategies over the last decade and a half in early adopters (Senegal and Mali) 
allows to gauge how they have continuously combined mobilisation and participation to steer 
agricultural and rural development policies in adequacy with orientation laws approved over a 
decade ago. This has proved a challenge in both cases. But it has also generated innovative and 
differentiated strategies in each country. 
Nevertheless, most state authorities still consider peasants a reserve army of cheap 
labour, which costs much less to maintain than the minorities of formal urban workers whose 
labouring rights require public funds, while peasants are left to their own devices to ensure their 
social reproduction. Yet increased social differentiation, bringing consolidation opportunities for 
some and impoverishment (with or without proletarianisation) for others, has pushed ROPPA 
national platforms to negotiate legal recognition of all of the above segments as a single self-
managed rural labouring class. This is witnessed in LOAs, the national agricultural policy 
framework laws negotiated with strong participation of ROPPA's national platforms in the Sahel 
(Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) as well as other tropical francophone countries (Côte d'Ivoire, 




This chapter has aimed to show how rural labouring class fractions in South America and 
West Africa united efforts through collective representation in AOs to become legally recognised 
as a specific policy category. COPROFAM and ROPPA both founded their collective rural labouring 
class representation and policy demands around the interrelated discursive frames of family 
farmer, family farming, and family farm.  
These discursive frames correspond to the three key criteria that have been most 





activities, considering the rural household (and in some cases the enlarged family or rural 
community) as a single economic unit. Hence in both regions, this economic unit is defined by 
combinations of self-management (family farming) of one's own labour (family farmer) on one's 
own land (family farm). In the countries where such criteria have been clearly defined and legally 
enshrined, COPROFAM and ROPPA leaders subsequently turned their attention towards 
obtaining sufficiently voluminous support for FF, demanding coherent sets of public policies in 
their regions and countries.   
The recognition of the family farmer as a clearly defined subject of state policy through 
government-sanctioned legislation in countries of SA and WA was a historical milestone for 
COPROFAM and ROPPA national member organisations. Although in both regions, this process 
was initially led by a single country – Brazil or Senegal – several neighbouring countries (Uruguay, 
Paraguay, Argentina in SA; Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire in WA) followed suit, while others 
are currently in the process of negotiating legal frameworks influenced by these processes. 
All three FF-related discursive frames have been used in two key dimensions: i) AO self-
representation and ii) policy plank formulation. As a discursive frame for self-representation, 
COPROFAM members' self-reference as peasant and indigenous family farmers,313 and ROPPA's 
as peasant and agricultural producers working and living on family farms have crystallised as a 
newly recognised economic, social, and political actor within their national jurisdictions. This has 
legitimated the existence of COPROFAM and ROPPA's national-level member organisations as 
speaking for a legally defined public that encompasses diverse fractions of the wider rural 
labouring classes within the two regions.  
In policy terms, the legal recognition of family farming translates as the recognition of 
family farmers' rights over their own labouring process through individual and collective self-
management. This can enable to better channel state-directed demands for access to credit, 
insurance, rural extension, among other essential policies to support the production, processing, 
and distribution of food and other agricultural products, as it did to a significant extent in some 
South American countries (particularly Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay), but has yet to occur at scale 
in West African countries.  
 





Chapter 7 - Regional Trade Protection and Promotion 
 
Introduction 
 The third policy process guiding this comparative study is the one most associated with 
regional organisations, given that one of the premises of integration between neighbouring 
nation-states has historically been the lowering of mutual trade barriers, and the agreement of 
common external tariffs vis-à-vis third countries outside these regions.  
In principle such measures are held to enable a mutual strengthening of neighbouring 
countries' economies, by making the most out of geographical proximity, economies of scale, or 
productive complementarities. This in turn potentially allows regions to negotiate as stronger 
blocs on the global arena. Nevertheless, even relatively consolidated regional entities by Global 
South standards such as MERCOSUR and ECOWAS still have very low levels of intra-regional 
trade, respectively peaking at around 15% and 10% of the two blocs' members' total international 
trade as of the early 2010s. These figures are a reminder of the enduring predominance of 
colonially inherited core-periphery trade linkages. They also reflect the difficulties of fostering 
deeper regional integration within the contemporary international order.  
The production and distribution of food is no exception to this rule. Whereas most West 
African countries were still net food exporters at the time of their independence, by the 1970s-
1980s they had become critically dependent on food imports. This was made abundantly clear at 
the onset of the 2008 food price crisis. Likewise, South American agricultural export giants still 
witnessed high levels of hunger and under-nutrition in the 1990s-2000s, demonstrating that 
efficiency in producing food for export markets does not necessarily correlate with providing food 
security for a country's own people.  
The family farming production of COPROFAM and ROPPA members is essentially linked 
to food for local, national, and intra-regional markets. However, it also includes members who 
produce for distant export markets, such as groundnuts and cotton respectively from the Sahel 
and savannah drylands, or maize and soya beans from the humid Pampa grasslands, making AOs' 
relationship to trade policy multifaceted and complex.  
What have been COPROFAM's and ROPPA's strategies to influence trade policy in the 





diversity of peasant family farmers and resolve potential conflicting interests within COPROFAM 
and ROPPA member organisations? Which alliances have they struck in order to influence trade 
policies in their respective regions? Have the approved policies enabled to create alternative 
trade visions that favour PFFs or have these been merely defensive damage control strategies?  
 The period between the early 1980s and late 2010s has been characterised by decades-
long negotiations of global, regional, and bi-regional trade agreements, with considerable 
implications for the peasantries of SA and WA. The mid-1990s in particular witnessed the 
conclusion of several international trade agreements and the launch of negotiations towards a 
number of additional deals. The former included the entry into force of the WTO and its 
Agreement on Agriculture in 1995, the Treaty of Asunción that created MERCOSUR in 1991, the 
revision of the ECOWAS treaty in 1993, and the creation of UEMOA in 1994. The launch of extra-
regional negotiations between these and other blocs soon followed: Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) (1998) and EU-MERCOSUR (1999) in SA, and the EU Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPA) with African regional organisations after the signature of the Cotonou 
Agreements in 2000314 in WA. At the global level, the WTO Doha Round was launched one year 
later, in 2001. 
 Whether between asymmetric neighbouring countries or with other regions of the globe, 
liberalisation of trade in the 1990s occurred with little to no consultation of PFF sectors in both 
studied regions. This created a sense of urgency within AOs, given the impending risks of opening 
up SA and WA markets to cheap food from more powerful competitors. Indeed, the very creation 
of COPROFAM (1994) was ignited by mutual fears amongst Southern Cone family farmers of 
being wiped out by their neighbours' larger-scale producers, just as ROPPA's (2000) was strongly 
influenced by the perceived risk of West African family farmers losing their national markets to 
European producers (see chapters 3 and 4). Influencing the actual nature of trade policies 
became a subsequent imperative for both COPROFAM and ROPPA, rendered possible by the 
opening of some trade negotiation spaces to agrarian organisations in the early 2000s.  
 
314 FTAA negotiations would be abandoned in 2005, while EU negotiations yielded treaties signed with all ECOWAS 






This chapter explores COPROFAM's and ROPPA's strategies to influence trade policy at 
the regional level. It focuses on three key dynamics from the extra-regional, intra-regional and 
national perspectives315: i) a mostly defensive stance aiming to protect sensitive sectors from 
extra-regional trade agreements, including by militating against their ratification (subsections 
7.1.1 and 7.2.3); ii) efforts to strengthen intra-regional trade under mutually beneficial conditions 
(subsections 7.1.2 and 7.2.1); iii) regional policy diffusion processes of initiatives aiming to 
expand PFFs' access to their national markets (subsections 7.1.3 and 7.2.2).   
 
7.1 COPROFAM in MERCOSUR 
 
 Just as the founding of COPROFAM was prompted by concerns over impending trade 
liberalisation across the Southern Cone, the opening of a permanent regional invited space for 
FF policy dialogue was also motivated by COPROFAM members' urge to influence MERCOSUR 
trade agreements and norms. Nevertheless, international trade has yet to become one of 
COPROFAM's major areas of policy influence. This relates to a series of factors examined in the 
subsections below, including the role played by export-led agribusiness in providing Southern 
Cone countries' left-of-centre governments with fiscal resources during the 2000-2014 
commodity boom cycle (7.1.1), but also the heterogeneity of COPROFAM's social base (7.1.2). 
Negotiating trade policy to the benefit of family farmers in SA has thus proved particularly 
challenging. Yet, continuing pressure from below on governments to materialise their 
commitments to food security and sovereignty has also been at the source of trade-related policy 
innovations (7.1.3). These revealed the potential of expanding and safeguarding family farmers' 
access to internal markets in ways that challenged conventional notions of trade policy, as well 





315 The chronological order followed for both case studies means that these three (extra-regional, intra-regional, and 
national) dimensions of regional trade policy processes are not treated in the same order in the SA and WA cases, 





7.1.1 Extra-regional trade negotiations and the creation of REAF/MERCOSUR 
 
At its 4th Assembly in Ypacaraí, Paraguay, in June 2003, COPROFAM members publicly 
manifested their preoccupation with FTAA, WTO, and MERCOSUR-EU negotiations, and its 
"agreement proposals which seriously limit the possibilities for development and poverty 
reduction in the region" (COPROFAM, 2003b:6). COPROFAM's demands for greater policy 
influence on extra-regional trade negotiations had indeed gained momentum, particularly via 
CONTAG's participation in the Brazilian Network for the Integration of Peoples (REBRIP), a 
grouping of social movements, labour unions, and NGOs created in the late 1990s. When the Lula 
administration took office in 2003, REBRIP's deliberations had consolidated a considerable body 
of technical knowledge and elaborate positions on key trade negotiations potentially affecting 
Brazil's FF sector, chiefly the FTAA and WTO Doha Round.316  
These issues were debated between civil society representatives (including REBRIP and 
COPROFAM members) and government ministers at the Family Farming and International 
Negotiations seminar held in August 2003 at Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE).317 
Shortly thereafter, the WTO 5th Ministerial Conference (MC5) (Cancún, September 2003), was 
the first to include members of civil society in an international Brazilian delegation. MDA minister 
Miguel Rossetto was in close contact with REBRIP representatives throughout the summit. 
Rossetto came back from Cancún convinced of the centrality of the issues posed by international 
trade negotiations for family farmers. It had become clear that WTO rules could potentially 
prevent the ministry from creating or expanding allegedly trade-distorting 'domestic support 
measures', i.e. national public policies that were the core reason for the ministry's existence. This 
prompted the creation of an international policy department within the ministry.318  
 
316 Interview CS-SA2.  
317 The resulting 'Latin American Charter on Family Farming' highlighted the "profound impacts on family farming" 
of international trade agreements, and likely repercussions, such as "decrease in farmers' incomes – which can lead 
to increase of rural exodus and of problems in urban agglomerations -  [showing how] the evaluation of these 
repercussions cannot be reduced to estimations of financial results in the balance of trade" (COPROFAM, 2003a:6) 
and called for a "treatment which takes into account the specificities, fragilities, and potentials of family farming […] 
in international trade agreements" (COPROFAM, 2003b:9).  





The Ministry of Agrarian Development's International Advisory and Trade Promotion 
Office (AIPC/MDA) thus became Brazil's first public institution to negotiate trade policies in 
representation of the interests of peasant family farmers. AIPC held frequent meetings with 
REBRIP's Agriculture Working Group, in what became an informal yet dynamic national invited 
space for family farmer-centred trade policy formulation.  
The G-20 group of developing nations (formed at MC5) was indirectly a child of this 
articulation, given that agricultural trade issues were pivotal in precipitating the group’s creation. 
Indeed, China and India alone represent more than half of the world's peasantries (Lowder et al., 
2014), so their stake in defending PFFs was historically high. Yet Brazil's post-2003 shift from a 
merely agricultural export-driven stance to one that balanced it with an equal concern for food 
security (and relatedly, with family farming) was new. This enabled the surge of a common front 
of developing nations led by Brazil, India, and China, which put food security and support to 
peasant agriculture as a fundamental red line, thus changing trade negotiation dynamics in the 
Doha Round. It eventually led developed countries to adopt alternate strategies to expand their 
access to markets in the Global South. These included signing bilateral or so-called 'plurilateral' 
trade agreements as ways of bypassing the WTO. Thus, the European Union gave heightened 
priority to bi-regional negotiations that had been initiated with MERCOSUR in 1999.319 
At national inter-ministerial level, representatives of MRE and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) had a long-standing fluid relationship and deeply ingrained 
understanding of international trade negotiations, in which their essential aim was to conquer 
export markets. At regional level, MERCOSUR countries' largely export-oriented agribusiness 
sectors were prepared to sacrifice internal market access (facilitating imports of products such 
as milk, cheese, wine, or olive oil) in order to increase access to European markets (boosting 
exports of products such as beef, poultry, pork, or soya)320 (see Figure 18 below).  
 
 
319 Interview CS-SA2. 






Figure 18: Expected rise in agricultural trade between MERCOSUR and the EU after 
agreement signature in 2019 (Source: GRAIN, 2019). 
 
Brazilian dairy products, more than half of which emanate from family farmers,321 became 
a decisive point of contention. Besides constituting an essential part of Brazilians' food and 
nutrition security, milk provides a rare source of non-seasonal year-round steady income, and is 
thus sometimes referred to as 'the family farmer's wage'. MDA negotiators at meetings with 
MAPA and MRE insisted that import duties on milk and dairy be kept sufficiently high to protect 
an essential sector for Brazilian FFs' income and national food security. Conversely, MAPA 
representatives argued that 'if we want them to open their markets, we need to lead by example 
[by opening ours]'.322  
Whenever inter-ministerial trade negotiations mediated by MRE reached a stalemate, 
these would be settled by Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber (CAMEX). CAMEX's governing body was 
composed of several ministries, including MAPA and MRE, but not MDA. Not surprisingly, it ruled 
in favour of reducing Brazil's dairy import duties in the offer that was soon to be made by 
MERCOSUR to the EU.  
 
321 58% of Brazil's milk production, according to the 2006 Agricultural Census (França et al., 2009).  





This episode led MDA to petition the National Council for Food and Nutrition Security 
(CONSEA), an invited space composed of civil society (2/3) and government (1/3) members. 
CONSEA's statutes enabled it to make non-binding recommendations to Brazil's President, hence 
it pleaded for Lula to overturn CAMEX's decision. While Lula did not go so far, he did determine 
that MDA would henceforth be included as a permanent member of CAMEX, giving the small 
ministry a key stake in the country's international trade policy as of 2005.323  
MDA civil servants knew from initiatives such as COPROFAM's (2003) Letter of 
Montevideo (see chapter 3) and seminars, that neighbouring countries' AOs also demanded to 
be represented in MERCOSUR trade negotiations.324 Despite the unfavourable CAMEX ruling, 
MDA insisted and rounded up technical arguments to show the potentially devastating 
consequences of opening up Brazil's dairy market to European imports, in the hope that other 
MERCOSUR members might weigh in, defending their own FF dairy sectors. Delegations from the 
three neighbouring countries were oblivious to MDA's arguments. 
The national and regional trade negotiation setbacks suffered by MDA negotiators served 
as a decisive thrust towards creating the regional policy dialogue space which COPROFAM 
members had been demanding for years. According to one of AIPC/MDA's former trade 
negotiators: 
REAF came about as a way of trying to bring to the governments of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay the 
perception that in those countries family farming also exists, food security is also relevant. So REAF initially 
rose as a tactic, as it were. To foment [a recognition of FF] in those countries so that they'd go through a 
similar process to what Brazil was undergoing. So that their states would incorporate the two visions 
[agribusiness and FF], incorporate this diversity that existed in their respective rural areas […].In the 
medium-long term, in [negotiations with] the WTO, the European Union, it would be easier to bring in these 
themes.325  
 
In sum, the perceived urgency of defending not just agribusiness, but also family farmers' 
interests in international trade deals by at least some Brazilian government officials yielded three 
significant institutional changes between 2003 and 2005: i) the creation of MDA's international 
office (AIPC); ii) the inclusion of MDA in CAMEX; iii) the creation of REAF, a regional invited space 
without a mandate for trade negotiations, but aimed at strengthening and coordinating Southern 
 
323 Interview CS-SA2.  
324 Interviews CS-SA2 and IR-SA1.  





Cone AOs' interests in extra-regional negotiations, as well as facilitating and reducing trade 
asymmetries within the bloc.  
 
7.1.2 Intra-Regional Trade Facilitation of Family Farming Produce 
 
Besides expressing their preoccupation with ongoing extra-regional trade negotiations 
(FTAA, WTO Doha Round, MERCOSUR-EU), COPROFAM leaders also increasingly voiced the 
importance of addressing intra-MERCOSUR trade imbalances. Repeatedly, COPROFAM 
declarations mentioned the need to 'reduce asymmetries' and 'harmonize regional policies' to 
that effect. Nevertheless, it would soon become clear after REAF's first years that discussing the 
specifics of trade policy was not an easy matter. This had to do not just with the highly technical 
nature of trade rules that created difficulties for both agrarian leaders and civil servants to discuss 
issues at depth,326 but also with the fact that trade is potentially divisive within COPROFAM itself.  
For instance, more than half of Uruguayan family farmers produce bovine or ovine meat 
as their main source of income, a significant part of which is – directly or indirectly – destined to 
export markets. A similar claim applies to Argentina's middle-sized farmers who produce grains 
that are mostly destined for export, such as soya beans or maize. Conversely, for the peasant and 
indigenous bases of Paraguay, Chile, or Brazil's Northeast and North, agricultural production is 
mostly destined to national – frequently local – markets, and self-consumption. Thus, different 
members of COPROFAM can often have diametrically opposed views on trade negotiations.  
As expressed by former COPROFAM General Secretary and President of Uruguay's CNFR 
Fernando López: 
Regarding negotiations with the EU, we did bring forward [a joint COPROFAM position] at some point, a 
while ago. But this is not so common on trade issues. Because if you look, for instance, an organisation like 
CONTAG, or MUCECH in Chile: they have wage labourers, they have peasants, they have indigenous 
peoples. So trade issues are not a priority. […] The same goes for ONAC in Paraguay. You realise that 
priorities are elsewhere. Access to land. Youth. Women […]. Where there is less conflict between the 
organisations. Trade issues have that: we all agree on seeking the hereafter, until it is time [to negotiate]. 
For example, for [Uruguayan] small cattle ranchers, MERCOSUR-EU is not such a problem. Although they 
are not as integrated into chains, [for] one who rears lamb which later becomes meat, meat has an offensive 
position in MERCOSUR [trade] with the European Union. So for the cattle ranching family producer, there 









Similar claims apply even when looking inside a single country's AO. Hence, participatory 
processes unleashed by REAF in each of MERCOSUR's member countries revealed not only a clear 
demand from national AOs for policies that differed from those essentially targeting large-scale 
farmers. Newly created national-level dialogue spaces evidenced the need for differentiated 
policies within the FF sector, particularly regarding trade. Hence, as Argentina's National Family 
Farming Forum327 (FONAF) laid out in the key orientations of its Documento de Mendoza in 2006, 
where FONAF members acknowledged a twofold need for trade policies that i) are unlike those 
directed at larger-scale entrepreneurial agriculture; ii) utilise different policy instruments for 
different strata within a very diverse FF sector (FONAF, 2006).  
These policy implications doubtless reflected a consciousness from FONAF's government 
and civil society participants on the need to accommodate different interests, so as to secure an 
alliance between smaller-scale peasants of predominantly dryland semi-arid or subtropical 
regions (NEA328, NOA329, Patagonia, Cuyo) and middle farmers of the Humid Pampa temperate 
belt that formed the core of FAA's base. Despite the accurate diagnosis of FONAF, the Argentine 
government did not have sufficient time nor resources to accommodate that variety of needs in 
its policies before the 2008 'crisis of the countryside'330 would burst and collapse the tenuous 
alliance between smaller and middle-scale sectors (see subsection 7.1.3). 
Once REAF/MERCOSUR's policy dialogue participation mechanisms were incorporated by 
attending country delegations (see chapter 3), space was gradually opened for discussions on 
how trade policy impacted upon FFs' access to markets within each MERCOSUR member country, 
and across their common borders. Indeed, MERCOSUR's Resolution Nº 11/04 creating REAF not 
only called for the "strengthening of public policies for the sector" but also set among its goals 
"to promote the trade of products from family farming" (art. 1) (MERCOSUR, 2004:2) and 
facilitate FF's access to markets. Country delegations nevertheless soon realised that the initially 
limited amount of systematised knowledge about each country's FF sector impeded in-depth 
 
327 Foro Nacional de Agricultura Familiar. 
328 Noreste Argentino (Argentine Northeast).  
329 Noroeste Argentino (Argentine Northwest). 





discussions on different types of national policy support, let alone concerted regional trade 
policies.  
Discussions on intra-regional trade were initially fraught with mistrust between 
delegates. Despite Argentina's agricultural trade surplus with its MERCOSUR neighbours 
(Villalobos, 2015) Argentine delegates initially feared the unknown concept of 'family farming' 
would be used by Brazilians as a pretext to flood the Argentine market with products in which 
the former was more competitive (e.g. pork and poultry). They were also wary of adopting FF as 
a guiding policy concept, lest WTO third countries denounce it as a non-tariff barrier in 
disguise.331 
 Fears were not only voiced by government representatives. Members of COPROFAM and 
other AOs at REAF meetings requested that studies be conducted on transborder intra-
MERCOSUR production and distribution chains of sensitive products – particularly those from 
Brazil.  These were frequently suspected of trumping competition rules. A researcher to whom 
studies were commissioned to address such sensitive intra-regional agricultural trade issues 
explained: 
The request of studying the most problematic chains for each country came from the social movements. 
Paraguay suggested the tomato chain, because Paraguay was permanently invaded by Brazilian 
producers.[…] bringing prices down and bankrupting [family] farmers.332 
 
Studies on transborder tomato and pork chains333 demonstrated how the novelty of the 
participatory space and regional scale of its policy attributions did not prevent members of AOs 
from voicing issues that were chiefly local and immediate. This was partly due to lack of 
consolidated reliable data at national-level, preventing systemic reflection within government 
bureaucracies on FF policies, but also reflecting the need of insecure delegates to save face and 
build mutual trust. These studies, among other initiatives, set the ball rolling. Moreover, their 
rootedness in AOs' demands proved that the latter's participation in the regional invited space 
was not merely decorative.  
 
331 Interview IR-SA3. 
332 Interview IR-SA3. 





Following several seminars on trade facilitation of FF products, delegations at REAF's 5th 
meeting agreed to create a specific Trade Technical Group (TG) for strategic focus on intra-
regional trade complementation, reflecting a shift in priorities from extra- to intra-regional trade. 
Agreeing on definitions of family farming and their country-level criteria became a necessary first 
step towards differential treatment in the trade of FF products within MERCOSUR (see chapter 
6). Meanwhile, trade-related discussions identified ways of reducing regional asymmetries in 
agricultural production and commercialisation within and between MERCOSUR member 
countries, as had been called for in COPROFAM's (2003) Letter of Montevideo. This entailed 
ascertaining regional complementarities between different types of FF production and consumer 
markets334. REAF National Sections thus composed lists of goods based on their income-
generating significance for family farmers, their prevalence as staple foods in national diets, but 
also their sensitivity to competition from other family farmers in neighbouring countries. These 
were to be merged into a regional list of key products impacting both family farmer incomes and 
food security335.  
According to several key REAF civil society and government actors, the gathering of this 
information was to eventually lead to a MERCOSUR-level policy for family farming and regional 
food security.336 That vision was especially defended by Brazil,337 given that, by the time of REAF's 
creation in 2004, specific FF policies had already been running for almost a decade. For the 
government, regionalising these policies in tandem with neighbouring countries was the next 
step in keeping with MDA's regional strategy. Yet, the fact that neighbouring countries had not 
yet created specific policies for FF meant that their government bureaucracies were still grappling 
with the FF policy agenda.  
The reality of everyday trade between MERCOSUR countries or with third parties after 
the lifting of trade barriers in the 1990s meant that sensitive sectors were exposed to much more 
ruthless competition than previously. Governments only had partial short-term measures at 
 
334 Interview CS-SA28. 
335 Interview IR-SA1. 
336 Interviews CS-SA21, IR-SA1, CS-SA25.  





hand, such as the inclusion of a few select products in lists (LETEC338) that temporarily exempted 
these from application of MERCOSUR's common external tariff339.  
The generation of reliable systematised and comparable data on family farmer 
production across MERCOSUR countries was greatly facilitated by the creation of national FF 
registries by the end of the 2000-2010 decade. It enabled governments to bring producers from 
neighbouring countries to the negotiating table and informally agree on voluntary production 
quotas that would level market access between them. This occurred repeatedly with dairy, peach 
and wine family farmers of Brazil's South, who were gradually losing national market access to 
their more competitive Uruguayan and Argentine counterparts.340  
Milk and dairy were key (see 7.1.1). Though MDA policies to support dairy producing FFs 
significantly increased their output, they were still ill-equipped to compete with more 
consolidated MERCOSUR neighbours (see Figure 19 below). Rio Grande do Sul farmers suffered 
the most, since geographical proximity reduced transport costs for cheaper Uruguayan and 
Argentine dairy products. Ad hoc settlements were fraught with tension and frustration on all 
sides.341   
 
338 Portuguese/Spanish acronym for Common External Tariff Exemption List.  
339 Interview CS-SA14. 
340 Interview CS-SA14.  






Figure 19: Table highlighting increase in Brazil's dairy imports from Argentina and Uruguay after 
MERCOSUR's creation342 (Source: Villalobos, 2015). 
 
In its first ten years (2004-2014), REAF's policy dialogue mechanism created a gradual 
process of characterising and regionally defining FF, as well as creating national registries. 
According to its idealisers, this process would have eventually led to the adoption of a common 
regional FF trade policy. However, this was not the case, due to several factors discussed in the 
next section, including: i) still nascent national family farmer registry systems in MERCOSUR 
member countries; ii) expectations for more immediate results from the Trade TG; iii) expansion 
of REAF beyond its Southern Cone origins, incorporating neighbouring Andean countries 
(Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela); and iv) their own experiences of facilitating family farmers' access 






342 Text translation: 'Brazil's dairy products' import substitution. In US$ millions and %'. In the 1992-2011 period, 






7.1.3 Access to National Markets 
 
Five main factors contributed to the REAF Trade TG's transition from focusing on intra-
regional trade to becoming a regional platform for policy diffusion of national-level experiences 
that increased FF internal market access. Two of these factors related to a hollowing out of the 
Trade TG's agenda by 2010. Two other factors related to the aftermath of the 2008 food price 
crisis in the larger South American countries, namely: i) Argentina's policy shift towards smaller-
scale peasant and indigenous FF, and ii) international recognition of Brazil's Zero Hunger policy. 
A fifth factor related to the greater participation of Andean countries – Ecuador, Bolivia, and later 
Venezuela – in REAF, and their own movements' and governments' conceptions of internal 
market access for peasant and indigenous FF.  
 
7.1.3.1 REAF's Trade TG reinvented after Registry agenda gains its own TG 
 
Before 2008, the REAF Trade TG's main achievement had been the reaching of a common 
regional definition of FF, and a corresponding regional norm (RES. 25/07) that translated it into 
practical criteria. These in turn laid the foundations for the creation of national family farmer 
registries. The FF definition, common criteria and registry agenda, though originally conceived as 
necessary for a regional trade policy with differential treatment for family farmers, took on a life 
of its own.343 REAF's Trade TG had thus spawned the creation of an ad hoc Registry TG, which 
would have been dissolved once national registries were set up. It nevertheless became 
permanent from 2012 onwards344 (Niederle, 2016) since members’ sharing of information about 
each country’s national registry proved mutually beneficial to the gradual improvement of these 
policy instrument databases (see chapter 6).  
From 2011, collective realisation that building an intra-regional FF-specific trade policy 
agenda was a long-term endeavour became a second factor for the Trade TG's transition towards 
national internal market policies. While Brazil's family farmer registry had been created in 1996, 
it would take two more decades for neighbouring countries' Uruguay and Paraguay to establish 
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equivalent policy instruments and reach significant coverage in family farmer registration.345 
Argentina's registry was plagued with implementation problems from the beginning, preventing 
it from reaching comparable degrees of coverage. The Argentine FF registration difficulties were 
of course not merely technical, but closely interconnected with a major economic and political 
disjuncture. The next section shows that this was provoked by a standoff between Argentine 
articulated and disarticulated class alliances, and the shifting pivotal role of the middle peasantry.  
 
7.1.3.2 The Argentine Crisis del Campo of 2008 
 
Argentina’s 2008 Crisis del Campo346 would have a decisive influence on the regional 
agenda, and the shift in focus of REAF's Trade Facilitation TG towards internal market access. The 
four-month lockout led by Argentine agribusiness organisations in mid-2008 shook the 
foundations of President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner's (2007-2011, 2011-2015) governing 
coalition and social base. Middle farmer constituencies within FAA played a significant role.  
The spark that lit the fire was a presidential decree – Resolution 125 – issued in March 
2008, which amounted to an export tax increase on grains (wheat, maize) and oilseeds (soya, 
sesame). The tax hike aimed to harness the 'agrarian rent'347 of historically high international 
prices at the time (see Figure 20 below) to fund redistributive policies. The export tax was also 
devised to put brakes on rapid soya bean expansion throughout the Argentine countryside, which 
was becoming a threat to the country's national food security, as food crops were being 
substituted on a massive scale by the lucrative oilseed.348  
 
345 Figures – coverage of national FF registries. 
346 Crisis of the Countryside.  
347 See chapter 3 on Juan Perón's introduction of a similar export tax to fund IAPI in the late 1940s. 






Figure 20: Cristina Kirchner's two presidential mandates coincided with 
unprecedently high global soya bean prices349. (Source: Sticco, 2015) 
 
FAA internally found itself at a crossroads. Members of its growingly export-oriented 
middle farmer Pampa base felt that their interests were being threatened by CFK's export 
taxation bill. However, this was not the case for other regions' sectors of FAA (Patagonia, Cuyo, 
NEA, NOA), whose members relied mostly on internal markets. This agrarian territorial feature 
of non-Pampa FAA members is shared with other smaller-scale peasant organisations, as 
discussed further below (see 7.1.3.3).  
The crisis affected FAA internally. This was precipitated by a sudden change in the 
organisation's national leadership, when Eduardo Buzzi became its president.350 In the words of 
an Argentine civil servant: "Federación Agraria started sounding weird. Buzzi would say one thing, 
and many people from Federación Agraria would say something else".351  Many sectors of FAA, 
 
349 Text translation: 'Soya: Prices in Chicago. Dollars per ton (annual average)'. 
350 Interviews AO-SA9 and AO-SA10. 





including its top directors, publicly voiced outrage at its president's decision to join the 
agribusiness-dominated Mesa de Enlace (Liaison Committee),352 and continued to question this 
unholy alliance throughout Buzzi's mandate (Ámbito, 2013). A branch from FAA's political left 
broke away from the federation to form its own organisation. FAA Women and Youth 
representatives at the directorship also left.353  
Age-old tensions between interests of the fertile humid Pampa and the so-called 'regional 
economies' of the remaining provinces came to the fore. Local organisations in the Argentine 
NOA and NEA were created aiming to garner support for Buzzi's tenure, but were not 
representative of a significant base in those provinces. These local organisations would end up 
turning against Buzzi by supporting his successor Omar Príncipe, who took over the FAA 
presidency in 2014.354 Príncipe adopted a more conciliatory tone towards CFK's government, and 
refocused FAA's discourse on the need for FF-specific policies.355  
In the meantime, FONAF's organisational structure changed as a result of FAA's – and later 
government civil servants' – departure from it. By the time the 2008 crisis burst, peasant 
organisations with strongholds in Argentina's North, West, and South such as LVC's MOCASE356 
and MNCI357 had already publicly voiced strong criticism of FAA on at least three grounds, namely 
for: i) its disproportionate weight inside FONAF to the detriment of other AOs, ii) joining and 
actively taking part in the agribusiness-led Mesa de Enlace, and iii) its privileged access to 
government posts and agricultural policy budgets via its (until then) close relationship with the 
Kirchner administrations.358 
No longer mediated by the state, the national-level Argentine invited space began its 
metamorphosis into a civil society-only (re)claimed space. It evolved from a more vertical 
 
352 The four-month lockout was led by Argentina's two main agribusiness unions (Sociedad Rural Argentina – SRA 
and Confederaciones Rurales Argentinas – CRA), joined by two medium to smaller-scale farmer national 
organisations - Confederación Intercooperativa Agropecuaria – CONINAGRO, and FAA. Together, these four 
organisations formed the Mesa de Enlace, which became a publicly brandished symbol of opposition to Kirchner's 
government. 
353 Interviews AO-SA9 and AO-SA10.   
354 Interview AO-SA10.  
355 Interview CS-SA8. 
356 Movimiento Campesino de Santiago del Estero (Santiago del Estero Peasant Movement).  
357 Movimiento Nacional Campesino Indígena (National Peasant Indigenous Movement).  





'corporatist' to a more horizontal 'autonomous' structure, where smaller-scale peasant and 
indigenous organisations from the country's interior provinces now became predominant. 
Though retaining its acronym, FONAF's denomination changed from the National Forum of 
Family Farming to the Federation of Grouped Family Farming Organisations.359  As a result, both 
government and civil society's principal FF policy interlocutors shifted from a) the middle family 
farmer external market-oriented Humid Pampa base to the b) campesino (or semi-proletariat) 
internal-market oriented base mainly located in the NEA, NOA, Cuyo and Patagonia regions. 
 
7.1.3.3 Strengthening access to local and national markets  
 
The void created by FAA's departure from FONAF was filled with a series of new FF policy 
priorities in Argentina, among which access to local and national markets. This occurred 
particularly through the sharing of experiences of peasant family farmers organising into 
associations and cooperatives, and selling their produce directly to local consumers in street fairs 
or local village markets, thus avoiding surplus extraction by middlemen. This marked a watershed 
for Argentina's state-civil society interaction regarding the creation and expansion of trade 
policies for the wider FF sector. At the regional level, it became a decisive push for the Trade TG 
to reorient its agenda towards national, internal-market trade, as recalled by an Argentine civil 
servant present at REAF meetings at the time:  
In 2011, in Asunción, Brazil proposed the Public Purchase [of food from family farmers regional] exchange 
programme. This mobilised us, because […] we had absolutely nothing on public procurement. So we 
suggested talking about […] healthy and affordable food provision systems […]. We talked about food safety 
as well […]. About SENASA360, which has a commission, SENAF361 […] for family farming […]. All of the 
region's food safety agencies [create barriers for FF access to markets]. Public procurement branches out 
into many other themes. For instance: associations, cooperatives […]. This triggers food safety issues: how 
is a peasant to sell to a school if they don't have a bromatological certificate? And we [expanded] towards 
other strategies. Such as the ferias francas [i.e. 'fair local markets'] here in Argentina. To reclaim this form 
of commercialisation […]. Then there were the [FF] labels.362   
 
Another factor was the gradual expansion of REAF to MERCOSUR's associate members 
Bolivia and Ecuador, and the incorporation of Venezuela after its full accession to MERCOSUR in 
 
359 Respectively, from Foro Nacional de la Agricultura Familiar to Federación de Organizaciones Nucleadas de la 
Agricultura Familiar. 
360 Servicio Nacional de Sanidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria (National Agrifood Safety and Quality Service). 
361 Comisión de Agricultura Familiar del SENASA (SENASA's Family Farming Comission). 





2013. New delegations contributed to the Trade TG's incorporation of discussions on food 
sovereignty, buen vivir, and solidarity economy. In practice, this translated in the sharing of policy 
experiences strengthening FF conditions of access to local and national markets – a welcome 
move for the smaller-scale peasant fraction of COPROFAM's organisations, such as CONTAG's 
northeastern federations, Paraguay's ONAC, or Chile's MUCECH.363  
The growing prominence of Argentina's peasant organisations in REAF delegations after 
the FAA leadership's provisional severing of ties with Kirchnerismo led to an increased role of 
LVC-linked organisations, such as MNCI and MOCASE. According to an MNCI representative, 
MERCOSUR's incorporation of Venezuela showed LVC organisations that other conceptions of 
trade could be discussed in the dialogue spaces:   
The discussion was that basically, the conjuncture in Latin America had changed. It coincides with the entry 
of Venezuela [in MERCOSUR], of Bolivia [in REAF meetings]. Ecuador was also there. In this Latin-American 
conjuncture, is where we understood that both Venezuela, as Bolivia – Evo [Morales] was a founder of CLOC 
for example – the whole process in Venezuela, there is a recognition on the part of CLOC and Via Campesina, 
and vice-versa. We understand that through this, there was a rapprochement attempt, between REAF and 
CLOC/Via Campesina, with us in this discussion. Why do I tell you this? Because it was not only in Argentina 
that we were lobbied to enter REAF. It was in all countries – in Chile, in Brazil...364 
 
7.1.3.4 Food and nutrition security invited spaces: from national to global 
 
The change of focus of REAF's Trade TG was also influenced by the growing recognition 
of Brazil's public procurement policies that formed a pillar of its Zero Hunger (2003-2010)365 and 
Brazil without Extreme Poverty (2011-2014) strategies, and their diffusion through dialogues at 
REAF. Both its Food Acquisition Programme (PAA) and National School Feeding Programme 
(PNAE) at once provided food to vulnerable groups and ensured stable and predictable markets 
for family farmers from whom state institutions procured their food. PAA and PNAE became 
symbols of Brazil's successful hunger reduction at the peak of Lula's popularity during his second 
mandate (2006-2010) and Dilma Rousseff’s first mandate (2011-2014). Following the 2008 world 
food price crisis, other nations became eager to understand Brazil's policies.  
 
363 Interview AO-SA1.  
364 Interview AO-SA3.  
365 Zero Hunger's four strategic axes were: i) Access to food; ii) Strengthening of Family Farming; iii) Income 





Lula's Zero Hunger strategy proved influential beyond national borders. Its firm roots in 
participatory deliberation through local and national committees on Food and Nutrition Security 
(CONSEA) and on Sustainable Rural Development (CONDRAF) influenced the 2008-2009 CFS 
reform.366  The expression 'Zero Hunger' skyrocketed from a (national) PT 2002 election campaign 
rallying cry to a (global) UN slogan for hunger eradication. This was audible in the discourse of 
Rome-based agencies (FAO, IFAD, WFP), of former UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon's own 
'Zero Hunger Challenge', and in the wording of SDG 2367.  
A flagship policy of the Zero Hunger programme, PAA was a public procurement policy 
specifically targeted at less capitalised peasant family farmers, often living in the poorest rural 
areas. It was praised for contributing to peasant family farmers' capacities in better organising 
their production, and provided evidence of how state guarantee of steady and reliable markets 
became an important factor for rural social ascension in Brazil during the 2003-2014 period. 
Nevertheless, the scale of PAA was relatively small in terms of number of farms affected when 
taking into account the total number of family farmers. The 2009 bill which made it mandatory 
for public schools to purchase at least 30% of their food from family farmers provided an 
opportunity to considerably expand on the successful experience of PAA.  
Government and civil society visits were organised to Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay 
between 2011 and 2013. A second programme was organised with visits to Chile, Ecuador, 
Venezuela and Paraguay between 2014 and 2016 (Niederle, 2016). Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile 
were particularly interested in Brazil's public purchase policies. They successfully introduced 
legislation and policy mechanisms that connected some registered family farmers to markets via 
the institutionalisation of public purchase policies. COPROFAM's Chilean member organisation 
MUCECH was especially keen and adapted PAA to the Chilean context, as part of multi-pronged 
efforts to diversify Chilean peasant and indigenous family farmers' sources of access to their 
national markets368. 
 
366 GSF citation of CONSEA.  
367 Sustainable Development Goal 2, which aims to 'End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and 
promote sustainable agriculture' is also referred to in short as 'Zero Hunger'.  





In a sign of things to come, at the 12th REAF meeting held in Montevideo in December 
2009, the Trade TG had already agreed a workplan for 2010 based on three policy instruments: 
asociativismo, family farming labels, and institutional markets (MERCOSUR, 2009).  Institutional 
markets were prioritised, giving way to public purchase exchange modules. These were initially 
conceived as a 'quadrilateral cooperation' programme. The four MERCOSUR founding members 
sent delegations composed of government and civil society representatives to get to know 
neighbouring country's food public procurement policies, and share experiences and knowledge 
on how to direct these towards family farmers. Later they went on to include MERCOSUR 
associate members, such as Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador, as well as Venezuela after 2013. 
Notwithstanding the impressive spread of public purchase programmes, implementation 
in neighbouring countries has generally been slow and until now affected only a small proportion 
of family farmers. In some cases – most notably Chile – they show promising signs of expanding 
coverage. One challenge has been to strengthen family farmers' capacity to organise their 
production in accordance with this new state guaranteed demand, which relates to the sets of 
other policies demanded by AOs in the region, that relate to bolstering family farmer production.  
Despite the challenges in implementing the policy innovations discussed in REAF's Trade TG, by 
the beginning of the 2010-2020 decade, the terms of the debate on trade policy for FF had 
radically shifted, compared with ten years earlier.  
Overall, COPROFAM scored several victories in opening up invited spaces for policy 
deliberation. After securing AO participation as a staple of REAF's modus operandi, discussions 
shifted focus from resisting extra-regional trade agreements to finding forms of regulating intra-
regional trade in support of the South American FF sector as a whole. Nevertheless, the need to 
better know and understand each country's FF sector in its full diversity and complexity precluded 
any serious intra-regional trade policy formulation. Despite important debates on the possible 
nature of an intra-regional FF trade policy framework, these had to be set aside in favour of 
consolidating national-level experiences first. Protection from global and regional trade gave way 
to promotion of local and national trade on the scale of AO members' more immediate concerns. 
Yet the regional scale of debate and policy deliberation was crucial in ensuring the continuity of 





eventually yielded new public purchase policies, and their dual (pro-FF and food security) 
strategic outlook.  
 
  
7.2 ROPPA in ECOWAS 
 
ROPPA's creation in 2000 coincided with rising food import dependency, high population 
growth and increased strain on natural resources in WA. As stated in a document submitted by 
ROPPA to the WTO ahead of the Nairobi Ministerial conference in 2015, "excluding coffee, cocoa, 
tea and spices – which are not staple foods – [West Africa's] food import deficit increased from 
US$ 549 million in 2000 to 12,6 billion in 2011" (ROPPA, 2015:4). Coupled with the world's fastest 
rising population (from 180 million in 1990 to 305 million in 2010, projected to reach 510 million 
by 2030), West African states' staple food import dependency, particularly among urban 
populations, became economically and politically unsustainable by the time 'food riots' erupted 
in many of the region's cities in 2008 (IFAD, 2017; Berthelot, 2013). 
ROPPA's participation as a regional peasant platform in trade negotiations at global, 
extra-regional and intra-regional levels reflects its leaders' understanding of the interlocked 
multi-scalar nature of international trade rules. It was indeed a global-level WTO ruling that had 
called for an end to 78 Africa, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) countries' tariff-free access to the 
European market,369 on the grounds that this was discriminatory against non-ACP (mostly Latin 
American and Asian) developing countries. Thus, the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreements were signed 
in 2000 with a view to renegotiating Europe's trade relationship with most of its former colonies. 
The ensuing EPAs were initially to be negotiated by 31 December 2007 with a view to establishing 
supposedly 'reciprocal' EU-ACP trade relations as per the WTO ruling (Berthelot, 2013).  
Differently from previous agreements signed with all ACP countries at once, these were 
negotiated between the EU and various regional blocs into which ACP countries were 
geographically clustered. The promotion of regional integration in the different ACP regions was 
indeed one of the stated goals of the Cotonou Agreements. Nevertheless, as ROPPA's Malian 
 





leader Ibrahima Coulibaly put it, "the process demanded a superficial acceleration of regional 
integration with the sole goal of signing the EPA" (Coulibaly, 2007, cited by Blein et al., 2012:41).  
Yet, despite the extremely uneven odds stacked against them, the West African RAO 
played a key role in slowing down and avoiding a full ratification of EPA agreements with the EU 
(see subsection 7.2.3). It contributed to turning the threat of an EU-ECOWAS trade agreement 
into an opportunity to approve a higher Common External Tariff line (CETs) for most agricultural 
products at ECOWAS level, in order to protect the internal regional market (7.2.1). And it enabled 
innovative national-level policies to strengthen West African staple food producers' access to 
local and national markets (7.2.2). These processes paralleled each other, but are treated in the 
order that reflects their greatest visibility in public debate by focusing on ROPPA's mobilisation 
and participation strategies within them. 
 
 
7.2.1 Regional common external tariff for food sovereignty 
 
 7.2.1.1 ROPPA's struggle for food sovereignty translated into trade policy claims 
 
Since ROPPA's creation, its members' calls for 'food sovereignty'370 refer to policies that 
may enable the West African region to feed itself. Food import substitution is to be achieved 
through investment by peasant family farmers in staples that are already produced in West 
Africa. Their leaders' mention of food sovereignty is usually followed by concrete examples, as 
ROPPA's president Ibrahima Coulibaly clarified:  
So there is no mystery, one needs to invest. And this production must be protected. We would give 
examples, such as that of Kenya, which had gone down this path of protecting its milk production, had 
stopped imports, became self-sufficient, and even a milk exporter in the [East African] sub-region. So we 
would show the success stories demonstrating that indeed we were capable, if only we gave chances to 
local production.371  
 
 
370 In ROPPA's own words, food sovereignty is "the right for any country or group of countries to define their 
agricultural policy in the interest of its populations, to develop and protect their production and markets, so that 
these may satisfy the needs of a healthy, sufficient, culturally and religiously acceptable diet, and may also be the 
basis for a just remuneration of agricultural family farms' labour" (ROPPA, 2006, Food Sovereignty Forum, cited by 
Blein et al., 2012:22).  





Hence, according to ROPPA, the defence of a 'right to food sovereignty' justifies tariff 
barriers to protect the regional market and enable articulated regional integration. In ROPPA's 
written declaration distributed at the 2005 Hong Kong WTO Ministerial meeting, this was defined 
as a right of "our people to feed themselves and implement policies that favour them" (ROPPA, 
2005:3). Yet, most significantly, the concrete policy implications of upholding this "right and duty 
of protecting the region's farmers" were "a boundless tariffs system for as long as the great 
agricultural powers continue to give direct and indirect support [to their agriculture] which are 
destroying our markets [emphasis added]" (ROPPA, 2005:4). 
ROPPA's translation of food sovereignty in trade policy terms would later argue how 
protectionism need not be implemented to harm farmers and food consumers in other countries, 
but first and foremost to protect one's own: "food sovereignty does not imply autarky, but the 
right of each country to define its protection from imports without dumping [emphasis added]" 
(ROPPA, 2015:5). Moreover, this updated definition specified that protectionist measures need 
not be applied indiscriminately to all products: "countries may choose free trade in products for 
which they do not have sufficient potential to raise production at reasonable costs" (ibid). 
ROPPA's translation of 'food sovereignty' into policy terms is thus not a dogmatic stance in favour 
of all-around import tariff hikes. Rather, it is a firm assertion of the countries and regions' 
legitimate right to prioritise domestic food production in all the products for which this is 
objectively viable.  
Trade policy for ROPPA is therefore about guaranteeing West African PFFs' access to 
national markets through equitable international rules. In the case of regional integration, it 
implies working "for an agriculture that supplies a sub-regional demand, an internal market, with 
safe quality food in sufficient quantity for all consumers in the region" (ROPPA, 2005:8). These 
objectives are nonetheless rendered impossible by grossly unequal competition with Northern 
producers, who under GATT rules benefited from more than 50 years of financial and technical 
support, and as of 2005 (a decade after the WTO's creation) still had import duties 3 to 6 times 
higher on food products than those of West Africa (ROPPA, 2005).  
 






ROPPA's participation in trade policy dialogues stretches back to the days of its creation 
in 2000, when a CET was being negotiated at UEMOA level. Although ECOWAS member states 
had decided to create a customs union as far back as 1993, the larger of the two West African 
blocs initiated negotiations to adopt its CET only a decade later, in 2003. UEMOA countries who 
previously took part in negotiations for that bloc's own regional agricultural policy (PAU) would 
later take advantage of ECOWAS's transition towards a customs union to renegotiate and 
increase (originally low) import tariffs applied to agricultural goods under UEMOA rules. Indeed, 
ECOWAS rules would eventually apply to all members, overwriting those previously applied in 
UEMOA.  
ROPPA's demand for a "priority to the regional market and protection at the borders" 
(Blein et al., 2012:23) in the wake of the early 2000s trade liberalisation agenda (EU-ACP Cotonou 
agreements, WTO Doha Round), found its roots in the actually existing "realities of rural West 
Africa", as one ROPPA leader put it.372 Despite inheriting a colonial-era transport infrastructure 
geared towards extra-regional trade, the continuing widespread circulation of people, goods, and 
livestock along its countries' porous borders means that informal internal trade has remained 
significant across the region, reflecting the persistence of centuries-old trading networks (see 
chapter 4). Although official numbers place intra-regional ECOWAS trade at between 8-13% of its 
countries' average total trade, "it is estimated that approximately 75% of intra-regional trade is 
not accounted for in official statistics, as it takes place on an informal basis" (Torres and van 
Seters, 2016:ix). 
Livestock is the most internally traded food staple, mainly from the Sahel to coastal 
countries (Inter-Réseaux, 2016). For instance, "in 2006-2007, Burkina Faso and Mali sold close to 
4 million sheep and 1,8 million cattle towards Benin, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal, through 
informal transborder trade networks" (ENDA CACID, 2012:107). Likewise, West African rice has 
been traditionally traded along transborder exchange sites, particularly between Mali and 
neighbours Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire (ROPPA, 2005). Millet and sorghum is also 
intensely traded across WA borders, such as between southern Mali, northern Côte d'Ivoire, and 
western Burkina Faso (ENDA CACID, 2012). Many other examples reveal dense networks of 
 





agricultural intra-regional trade, estimated in 2012 to represent up to 70% of the origin of several 
staples consumed in countries of the region. Thus, ROPPA's call for a strengthening of the intra-
regional trade of staple foods, essentially produced by family farmers across West Africa, was to 
a large extent a call to legalise and support pre-existing intra-regional trade. One instrument to 
foster this internal trade was the adoption of a common external tariff for the ECOWAS region. 
 
Figure 21: ECOWAS top 5 intra-regional food exports. (Source: Torres and van Seters, 2016). 
 
The drive to adopt an ECOWAS CET was hastened by pressure from the EU to conclude 
negotiations for the EPAs with ACP regional blocs originally by the end of 2007, as stipulated by 
the Cotonou agreements (see subsection 7.2.3). This unexpectedly catalysed a regional class 
alliance for ECOWAS member countries to accelerate West African regional integration. As 
pointed out by a Senegalese journalist who closely followed trade negotiations:  
Actually the CET was born out of mobilisation against the EPAs. Because people really fought very strongly 
against the EPAs […]. And when pressure [for going ahead and negotiating the agreements] was too strong, 
[people felt] they could not create a common market in West Africa without a CET. But at the time, Europe 
asked them to copy UEMOA's CET model, whose highest tariff band was 20%, which was totally ridiculous. 
So people told them 'no'.373   
 
The EU initially intended to negotiate a West African EPA only with UEMOA given that the 
latter was already a customs union by the early 2000s, and separately negotiate on a country-by-
country basis with the remaining West African nations. However, by the time negotiations got 
 





under way, these were undertaken not just with UEMOA but all ECOWAS members plus 
Mauritania (Ukaoha, 2008; Bilal and Braun-Munzinger, 2008). Indeed, after the Ivorian civil war 
broke in 2002 and plunged the largest UEMOA economy into chaos and instability for much of 
that decade, the recognised role of ECOWAS in the military and political stabilisation of Côte 
d'Ivoire generated an opportunity for its two non-UEMOA heavyweights Ghana and Nigeria to fill 
the regional leadership vacuum (Faivre-Dupaigre, 2007).  
Nigeria, which had historically protected its internal production and market in attempts 
to industrialise its economy, was chronically flooded by goods indirectly imported from outside 
the region, through its smaller neighbours Benin and Togo. The latter countries had much lower 
import tariffs, and fed on a re-exporting and smuggling economy towards their larger neighbour 
(Orjinmo, 2019). Similar tensions often came to the fore between the Gambia and Senegal, given 
that the former's economy thrived on cheap imports re-exported towards the latter's larger 
internal market.374  
 Wide variations in the sizes of internal markets and domestic production capacity, and 
correspondingly divergent trade policies across ECOWAS countries thus meant that negotiating 
a CET for the region's 15 members would be no easy task. This is well illustrated by contrasting 
country positions in negotiations for the tariff line to be applied on rice: whereas the Gambian 
government pleaded in favour of bringing the UEMOA's 10% import tariff down to 0%, Ghana 
advocated to raise it to 20%, and Nigeria to 50% (Faivre-Dupaigre, 2007).  
 
 






Figure 22: Share of ECOWAS GDP by country375. 
(Source: Ntara, 2016). 
 
In the meantime, EU negotiators lobbied ECOWAS to simply extend the very low CET tariff 
bands adopted by the 8 UEMOA members in 1998 to the remaining 7 ECOWAS members 
(Ukaoha, 2008). ROPPA in turn pressured UEMOA and ECOWAS to refuse signing any extra-
regional agreement that risked drastically opening West African markets before the prior building 
of "a regional agricultural market that is competitive with the rest of the world" (ROPPA, 2005:7). 
ROPPA thus called for an extension of the deadline to conclude the EU-ECOWAS EPA beyond 
2007, and allow the ECOWAS CET negotiations to run their due course.  
At the 30th ECOWAS session held in Niamey in 2006, Heads of State and Government had 
decided to fast track the UEMOA-ECOWAS CET harmonisation process by transposing most of 
UEMOA's tariff lines to ECOWAS, following the EU recommendation. However, the government 
of Nigeria, backed up by ROPPA and other CSOs, coalesced to press for the CET to be raised above 
the UEMOA maximum 20% tariff, and pushed for the creation of a fifth tariff band at 50%. This 
was to be applied to products deemed strategic for the region's development, particularly 
agricultural products 'essential for the region's food sovereignty' (as officially stated in the 
 





region's previously negotiated agricultural strategy - ECOWAP/CAADP) - such as grains, oils, 
meats and milk, among others (Blein et al., 2012).   
Although negotiations forced a compromise to reduce the initial 50% CET plead to 35%, 
the approval of a fifth tariff band was considered a milestone in ROPPA's efforts towards making 
FF economically viable within ECOWAS borders. At the end of negotiations, just over half of 
agricultural products made it to the 4th (20%) or 5th (35%) tariff band, with none in the 1st (0%). 
Moreover, 90% of the goods that made it to the 5th tariff line were agricultural products (de 
Roquefeuil, 2014 et al.). Nevertheless, two key food staples maintained their low UEMOA tariff 
levels: rice (10%) and maize (5%) (Blein et al., 2012).  
 Widespread criticism of low UEMOA tariffs applied on agricultural products in its member 
countries since 1998, and ROPPA's previously acquired experience in UEMOA negotiations after 
2000 served as a thrust to negotiate the higher tariffs at ECOWAS. Producers of rice, chicken, 
tomato paste, dairy or cooking oil in UEMOA countries were particularly vocal (de Roquefeuil et 
al., 2014). These products are precisely those in which family farmers and other actors along 
production, processing, and distribution chains were better organised into what is known in 
francophone countries as interprofessions. These specific national-level representative bodies 
enabled not only negotiation between its members, but also the defence of common goals linked 
to safeguarding internal market access (see 7.2.2), including at regional level. 
ROPPA's strength in influencing the CET also involved consolidating its national-level 
platforms throughout the trade negotiations. Although many other civil society sectors were 
present, ROPPA had the most solid network in terms of representation across WA. As seen by a 
close observer from the Senegalese press:  
ROPPA had the advantage of saying 'we represent the bulk of the West African peasant movement', which 
had great critical mass. […] The trade negotiations indeed enabled ROPPA to strengthen its cohesion within 
the different national entities. It became necessary to have representations in the different countries of 
West Africa, to show that effectively when we talk about peasant movement representativity, we're not 
talking about the Senegalese, Burkinabe, or Togolese peasant movement, but the whole [WA] peasant 
movement, and each entity of each country felt [represented].376 
 
Yet it was ROPPA's articulation between national federations and regional scale that 
made the difference, not least given the fact that regional authorities respected the West African 
 





RAO more than did individual national governments, such as Senegal under president Wade's 
administration, as noted by the above-cited Senegalese journalist: 
I followed [this process] with [former ROPPA president] Ndiogou Fall, I travelled with him to Abuja […] That's 
when we saw that when we were in Senegal at the time [during Abdoulaye Wade's (2000-2012) tenure], 
and they would tell you 'I am the president of ROPPA, which represents West African peasant organisations', 
people would look at you a bit…They'd say, 'here's another smart Senegalese [opportunist]…'. When you 
go outside the Senegalese context, you see the respect, the honour [with which he is treated] and you 
[realise]: 'no, this is serious'.377  
 
A web of civil society and institutional actors joined forces with ROPPA in calling for the 
ECOWAS 5th tariff band. This included Dakar-headquartered ENDA Tiers-Monde (Environmental 
Development Action in the Third World) and its trade policy branch CACID (African Centre for 
Trade, Integration, and Development), as well as different branches of Oxfam (Intermon, Novib, 
Quebec, International). These "provided material, technical and financial support to the peasant 
organisations to prepare and implement their advocacy platforms" (Blein et al., 2012: 35). ROPPA 
also worked closely with ECOWAS's Joint CET Committee, composed of UEMOA, ECOWAS, and 
member countries' trade departments (Ibid).  
The fundamental actor to successfully push for adoption of the 35% CET, with support 
from ROPPA and its civil society allies, was ultimately the government of Nigeria (de Roquefeuil 
et al., 2014). In this, the Nigerian state acted not only to protect its agriculture but also nascent 
industries. As argued by the President of the National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS), 
Ken Ukaoha, who would also represent Nigerian civil society in EPA negotiations (see 7.2.3):  
In truth, Nigeria's request for a fifth band is a significant matter. It is not only of potential interest to Nigeria, 
but to all industrially aspiring countries in West Africa. Indeed, it is in the interests of the people of West 
Africa. For anybody to reject or even argue against the protection of West African producers is tantamount 
to an economic crime against the citizens of the region. Why must Nigeria continue to import everything it 
needs without the possibility of self-reliance? […] Shall Nigeria remain forever under the illusion of donating 
raw materials to others while importing finished and sometimes, 'decorated' goods? (Ukaoha, 2008:8). 
 
7.2.1.3 The limits of the CET 5th band: how to operationalize food sovereignty beyond fixed tariffs  
 
After 10 years of negotiation, the CET was officially approved by ECOWAS' Heads of State 
at Praia, Cape Verde, in March 2013, and enforced from January 1st 2015. ROPPA's success in 
influencing the creation of the new tariff line and its application to most of the region's 
 





agricultural products is a significant achievement, given how trade policy has historically been 
impermeable to the influence of rural labouring classes and their organisations in most parts of 
the world.  
However, the 35% CET's effectiveness in sustainably improving rural incomes and food 
security depends on other agricultural policies to stimulate production and guarantee access to 
markets. As a fixed tariff, it is also ill-equipped to adjust for global food price volatility, and risks 
making food more expensive during peaks whenever national production falls below domestic 
demand and imports become inevitable. This latter argument was used by ECOWAS negotiators 
as justification to keep the rice (10%) import tariff low.  
In that respect, ROPPA had voiced demands for more sophisticated policy mechanisms to 
protect both family farmers and consumers since the early days of its negotiations with ECOWAS 
"including through variable levies that guarantee entry prices above the average cost of 
production in the region, [and] safeguard mechanisms [applied to] special products" [emphases 
added] (ROPPA, 2005:7). Safeguard mechanisms have been commonly used during the Doha 
development round, and "allow developing countries to raise tariffs temporarily during import 
surges or price falls" (WTO, 2021), especially when price variations are shown to harm agricultural 
producers. Variable import levies, on the other hand, were one of the EU's Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) emblematic measures, taken to ensure that European consumers prioritised the 
purchase of food produced within their territories, and were in place between 1962 and 1994.378 
They are considered one of the essential policy mechanisms that enabled post-war Europe to 
transition from net food importer to self-sufficiency (and frequent overproduction) over a few 
decades (Oudet, 2013; Berthelot, 2013; Butault, 2004; Pouch and Courleux, 2019).    
Whereas the GATT era (1947-1994) allowed exemptions from trade liberalisation for 
agricultural goods, these were abolished with the creation of the WTO. Hence ROPPA leaders' 
call at WTO's 10th MC in Nairobi in 2015 to "reauthorise GATT exceptions to allow import 
protection for agricultural products", one of the "5 WTO rules to change to attain food 
sovereignty" (ROPPA, 2015:5) presented in a document at parallel press conferences. 
 






ROPPA also called for ECOWAS full membership at the WTO to speak for its 15 members, 
to give it greater voice in global trade negotiations, and allow it to negotiate higher bound tariff 
rates (i.e. maximum levels allowed) calculated as an average of member states' tariffs. Indeed, 
WTO rules exceptionally allow for trade tariffs to be raised above previous levels when member 
states are part of a regional bloc with a common external tariff, provided all of the regional bloc's 
member states take part in WTO negotiations (technically feasible for ECOWAS after Liberia's 
accession to the WTO in 2015) (ROPPA, 2015; Dupraz and Postolle, 2010). This would in theory 
allow many maximum tariffs to be above the CET 35% line with the flexibility of applying lower 
tariffs whenever international prices soar to avoid internal price surges (ROPPA, 2015).  
 Indeed, variable import levies allow for prices that are remunerative but also stable for 
farmers and consumers. Thus national/regional prices for each product would be set for a 
sufficient duration (e.g. one year) based on studies evaluating both the income needs of farmers 
and national consumers' purchasing power. For instance, imported rice sold below a set ECOWAS 
reference price would be taxed at the difference between reference price and sale price. 
However, if rice were to be imported and sold above the ECOWAS reference price, then no levy 
would be paid, since local rice would be automatically cheaper. Import levies would therefore 
vary according to the fluctuations of international commodity prices, in order to make any 
imported food sold internally available at an either equal or more expensive - but never cheaper 
- price than national produce. This would enable to introduce price stability in national/regional 
agricultural markets, and internally curb global price volatility. Variable import levies would, in 
sum, enable to set prices that are sufficiently high for West African food producers, yet still low 
enough for their consumers (Oudet, 2013; Berthelot, 2013).  
In that respect, variable import levies are a superior policy instrument to fixed tariffs, in 
that they can potentially cement an articulated class alliance joining small and medium family 
farmers (food producers) with the urban-rural semi-proletariat and lower middle classes of West 
African cities (food consumers), instead of pitting the former against the latter. The formulation 
of these policy proposals was enabled by a ROPPA leadership conscious of the need to bridge 
differences between these different West African classes and class fractions. It also reveals 





through the often-intractable complexities of international trade rules. This enabled ROPPA to 
show ECOWAS negotiators that there is an unexplored margin for manoeuvre even within 
restrictive international trade rules, with technically feasible policy paths that can pave the way 
for territorially articulated regional integration.  
The above-described initiatives are part of what ROPPA's president Ibrahima Coulibaly 
means by 'operationalizing food sovereignty':  
On food sovereignty, we explained [to Via Campesina comrades] that we are the first to have [included the 
term] in policies. But that this did not solve our problems. And that creating it as a slogan was not of great 
use. Even if you obtain this in a law or in a Constitution, you must develop operational instruments, of 
implementation, on a day-to-day basis. Here lies the difficulty. […] We are convinced that food sovereignty 
is not obtained globally at once. It is obtained piece by piece. And for that, one must really fight for 
instruments – for trade tariffs, tax rises, for public investments in certain areas – these kinds of things.379  
 
The approved 35% ECOWAS CET became one such instrument. However, given the CET's 
limitations, and the unwillingness or incapacity of ECOWAS negotiators to take on board ROPPA's 
variable import levy proposals, it soon became clear that trade policy had to be looked at beyond 
trade tariffs.  
 
7.2.2 The ECOWAS Rice Offensive and other food import substitution initiatives 
 
The political and economic consequences of the 2008 food price crisis in West Africa 
compelled its countries to prioritise production increases in key staples, and thereby reduce 
dependency on extra-regional imports. Some had encouraging results from the outset. A member 
of Benin's PNOPPA pointed this out:  
Experience has shown that when small producers are supported, they are able to express their potential 
[…]. In 2008, when there was the rice crisis, producers became conscious that we cannot continue 
depending on rice coming from overseas. And [when] governments at that time accompanied small 
producers to have access to inputs, fertilisers, factors of production […] after 2008 […], in 2009 already, 
Benin had a surplus in certain grains. Benin gave maize to Togo and Niger. That means that if we truly 
support, actors are capable of many things.380 
 
Most West African countries launched food self-sufficiency policies in the aftermath of 
the 2008 crisis. However, unsuccessful attempts to reconcile the diverging interests of family 
farmers and urban consumers exposed contradictions between national agricultural (support to 
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rice production) and regional trade (low rice tariff) policies. WA countries import about half of 
the region's consumed rice from Asian producers (Hathie, 2017; Blancher et al., 2020) (see Figure 
23). But, as mentioned by ROPPA's current president, Mali's Ibrahima Coulibaly, rice importers 
are a powerful lobby throughout WA:  
In [countries] whose markets were liberalised by the World Bank, […] traders developed links with 
politicians. So politicians in power were very much linked with these traders who imported food, 
particularly rice […]. This is not only the case in Mali, but also in many West African countries, [where] rice 
imports fund the political parties in power […]. And because of that, if you look, whenever a regime changes, 
the big rice importers change as well. Since rice is very consumed in the cities, it is really a financial windfall 
for the parties that take power in Africa. So that means it is the biggest problem that we have. It is not that 
we cannot be self-sufficient. It is not that we cannot feed ourselves. It is precisely because there are barriers 




Figure 23: African Rice imports in 2004, representing 23% of global rice imports, of which more 
than half are from West Africa382. 
(Source: Atlas of Economic Complexity, 2017).  
 
One of ECOWAP’s priorities is self-sufficiency in rice. Hence, the ECOWAS-approved 
"Regional Offensive for sustained recovery of rice production in West Africa" aims to produce 25 
million tons of milled rice by 2025 to feed the West African region. Negotiated with ROPPA as a 
type of compensation for the low rice CET,383 the strategy has the four following axes: (i) 
 
381 Interview AO-WA22.  
382 West African countries are in darker purple, on the left side of the diagram. 





sustained increase in rice production; (ii) processing and value addition to local rice; (iii) 
promotion of the rice regional market; (iv) improvement of the rice production environment 
(Hathie, 2017).  
The origins of the ECOWAS rice initiative lie in ROPPA's creation in 2011 of a permanent 
'claimed space' joining together national member rice producers in a specific regional policy 
dialogue space (CRCOPR)384 (ROPPA, 2011). Supported by ROPPA, Africa Rice, Hub Rural, with EU 
funding, CRCOPR aimed to influence ECOWAS through its promotion of alternative trade 
protection measures after the 10% CET defeat in 2013. 385  
 
 
Figure 24: Main Rice Producing Basins in West Africa. 
(Source: Inter-Réseaux, 2016). 
 
 
Their focus was on complementary trade policy measures. As explained by a senior IPAR 
researcher who collaborated with ROPPA on these initiatives:  
ROPPA tasked CRCOPR to think of other modalities to attenuate the problems due to the weak CET. That's 
when we started to think about certain modalities, including the promotion of institutional purchases […]. 
 
384 Conseil Régional de Concertation des Organisations de Producteurs de Riz d'Afrique de l'Ouest (Regional 
Concertation Council of West African Rice Producer Organisations).  





ROPPA's idea was to locate several experiences and go to ECOWAS to negotiate so that ECOWAS would 
publish guidelines for governments to scale up what was being done in some countries. For instance on 
institutional purchases […] Mali [and] Benin have done a lot […]. The other example was to see what Nigeria 
did. Nigeria made use of safeguard measures […]. But UEMOA countries could not use these, because they 
already had low tariffs, while Nigeria had high tariffs, so they could implement these.386  
 
 Beyond safeguard measures or government procurement, experience from within ROPPA 
national platform members pointed at how producers of specific crops were able to put pressure, 
negotiate, and convince government authorities of adopting fine-tuned policies that regulated 
imports of those crops, in ways that favoured both family farmers and consumers.  
 Hence, in Guinea, members of the Fouta-Djalon Producers’ Federation387 (FPFD), 
affiliated to Guinea’s national ROPPA platform CNOP-G, obtained a seasonal import ban on 
potatoes, between February-June of each year, when local potatoes are sold in the country’s 
markets. In parallel, it introduced different varieties to spread production throughout the whole 
year, and expanded cultivation in lowland areas. FPFD were also able to negotiate with local 
merchants for national potatoes to be sold at lower prices than imported ones. The virtuous circle 
of increased investment in production while safeguarding national market access resulted in 
considerable output rise, enabling Guinea’s potato family farmers to even sell their surplus to 
neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Senegal  (Blein et al., 2012). Thus, diversification 
investments in production combined with fine-tuned regulations on imports and direct 
negotiations with merchants in national markets was demonstrated to pay off by FPFD’s 
experience in Guinea.   
 Similar temporary import restrictions were used to put a brake on onion imports in 
Senegal by invoking the WTO’s special safeguards clause, given that the influxes of imports were 
driving prices down, hurting national producers. In 2003, imports were interrupted during the 
peak of national production (March-May), but after national traders stocked up on imported 
onions before the ban’s entry into force, import quotas were introduced in the preceding months 
from 2007 onwards. This enabled a rise in onion producer prices and national production (from 
70.000 to 120.000 tonnes between 2003-2007) (Blein et al., 2012).  
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Momentum generated by national governments’ efforts towards self-sufficiency, given 
an additional push by the ECOWAS Rice Offensive, has generated considerable rises in 
production. Though for most crops, post-2008 increases in West African output reflects mostly 
surface expansion, in the case of rice it also reflects higher yields (particularly in Nigeria and 
Senegal), a sign of the considerable public investments channelled towards self-sufficiency 
initiatives (Inter-Réseaux, 2016). For instance, Mali – the region’s second largest rice producer 
after Nigeria – for the first time was able to fully supply its internal market with rice produced 
within its borders in 2016 (Commodafrica, 2016). However, throughout West Africa high 
demographic rates add to the challenge of national food production increases translating into 
self-sufficiency. Thus despite a significant regional production increase over recent years, the 
region still imports nearly half of its consumed rice (Blancher et al., 2020). 
The incoherence of food self-sufficiency initiatives is pointed out by an interviewed 
Senegalese trade policy expert, as support to national production continues to run in tandem 
with under-taxed cheap imports:  
In Senegal, [for rice] they are now talking about a 100 billion CFA [US 170 million] import bill. These are 
financial resources running down the drain. So they've put everything in place to try to put an end to this 
[import dependency]. But the question is, when you have policies aimed at ensuring self-sufficiency – 
hence, national production – but instead you put all kinds of fiscal incentives in place to facilitate imports, 
what are you actually looking for?388  
 
The persistence of cheap imports have exposed the difficulties of selling to national 
markets despite a greater capacity to supply these. This has led Senegalese rice producers to seek 
negotiation with government officials in view of finding mechanisms to regulate rice imports and 
prevent these from harming national production, while still allowing importers to fill the demand 
gap not covered by local rice.  
By demonstrating to the Senegalese government how its significant investments in rice 
production were being laid to waste by excessive rice imports, producer organisations (most of 
them affiliated to CNCR) in northern Senegal (Daouda, Diagne, 2008) successfully pressured the 
government to 'couple' rice imports with local purchases. Along with other actors of the rice 
 





processing and distribution chain, grouped together in the National Interprofessional Committee 
for Local Rice (CIRIZ), producers negotiated a mechanism with importers/distributors and the 
government, whereby the amount of rice that each importer is allowed to purchase from abroad 
(through import quotas389 delivered by government authorities) is based on the equivalent 
proportion of nationally produced rice that they have previously purchased from Senegalese 
farmers390 (Hathie, 2017).  
ROPPA's President of Honour Mamadou Cissokho thus summed up national AOs' above-
described initiatives:  
Cities are the [locus of the] lower middle class. And since cities were created by colonisers, they made them 
eat rice. So the rice eating habit is urban. And so governments […] cannot risk putting a high import tariff 
on rice. But what we have asked, is that the government put a large sum of money to develop rice 
production. [...] If we can be assured that the region can produce 80% [of the rice it consumes] we agreed 
to that […]. Because here many peasants' children have settled in the city peripheries. So the price of rice 
and the price of bread can bring revolt in the cities. […] We'll arrive at a point where the government will 
say 'as long as Senegalese rice is not finished, we don't import'. We're doing that with onions. We're going 
to do it with potatoes.  
 
National production incentives coordinated with finely-tuned limits on importers' 
authorisations to purchase foreign produce (as shown for the examples of potatoes, onions, and 
rice) have amounted to successful processes of gradual food import substitution. This has been 
driven by mobilisation and participation from members of ROPPA national platforms in dialogue 
with key economic and political actors. Through careful and negotiated steering of private actors' 
activities, Senegal's coupling of rice imports with local purchases, or Guinea's seasonal import 
bans and price regulation on potatoes demonstrate the significance of agrarian organisations' 
dialogue across product chains for trade policy influence.  
The above-cited examples reveal how local organisations affiliated to ROPPA national 
platforms have been able to negotiate specific types of protection mechanisms, through dialogue 
with actors across chains, including processors, importers, distributers, and local merchants, as 
well as governments. This has enabled to bridge apparently irreconcilable interests between 
national producers and consumers, by fine-tuning different policy instruments, beyond fixed 
 
389 Import quotas are based on calculations of the country’s yearly import needs (incorporating total national rice 
production and expected demand). 





import tariffs. These have proven that when correctly protected against foreign competition and 
internally supported, gradual food import substitution processes that surmount the 
contradictions of internal food production support and low trade tariffs are possible.  
However, these examples are exceptions, corresponding to the production and 
distribution chains that are better organised and capitalised within each West African country. 
Moreover, while in some cases, such as safeguard mechanisms against import surges, these 
specific trade policies are in conformity with the WTO, in others, such as coupling rice imports 
with national purchases, this might not necessarily be the case391.392 This reconnects with 
ROPPA's resistance to the controversial EU-EPAs, and with the EU's request for WA to open its 
markets to European goods as per a WTO ruling (see 7.2 introduction).  
As with the first two trade policy battlegrounds examined here (CET 35% tariff line, and 
food import substitution initiatives), ROPPA's struggle against the EPAs would also reveal, albeit 
in different ways, how international trade rules were upon closer examination open to a much 
wider variety of interpretations and policy options than was initially apparent, and that using 
these in the interest of West African family farmers crucially depended on the building of a 
sufficiently wide and united regional class alliance.  
 
7.2.3 Resisting the extra-regional EPA agreements  
 
 7.2.3.1 EPAs institutionalisation of colonially-inherited unequal terms of trade 
 
 The fundamental inequity of the terms under which the EU's EPAs were negotiated with 
their ACP trading partners was vehemently denounced by prominent West African CSOs. These 
would give trade tariff exemptions on about 75% of EU exports to West Africa, to be phased in 
within a 20-year timeframe, in exchange for immediate ACP tariff free market access to the EU. 
Yet ACP countries already had tariff-free access to the EU market under the Lomé Convention. In 
other words, they had nothing new to gain from the EPAs. Moreover,two decades were deemed 
 
391 Interview AR-WA4. 





insufficient for West African producers to be able to compete on equal terms with their European 
counterparts (Berthelot, 2013; Dembélé, 2016).  
For agricultural goods, EPA conditions included tariff free access for 34% of the food bill 
imported by WA from the EU, including almost all grains and milk powder, submitting already 
strained West African producers of those commodities under even fiercer competition (ROPPA, 
2015). WA states would also lose precious fiscal resources. According to some estimates, tariff 
free access for EU goods would strip least developed country (LDC) African states of customs 
revenues on up to 11 billion euros of imports (Berthelot, 2014; Dembélé, 2016).  
 
7.2.3.2 The EU's strategy of dividing West Africa between its two major agricultural 
exporters and their neighbours 
 
A negotiated EPA was nevertheless signed in 2014 by most ECOWAS member states (and 
initialled by Gambia, Mauritania and Nigeria393) at the 45th ECOWAS meeting  held in Accra, 
Ghana. Given that West African countries had a lot to lose and little to gain from these 
agreements, what led their governments to sign them? Although the EU's commitment to 
negotiate EPAs with ACP countries through their regional blocs was presented as a way to 
strengthen these, part of its negotiators' strategy was to sow divisions within African regional 
organisations, by pressuring the minority of countries that stood the most to lose by not signing 
the EPAs. In the case of West Africa these countries were Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.  
The EU's Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative grants LDCs tariff free access to the 
European market for any non-military goods as of 2001. This was at the root of Senegal's 
successful government strategy to be downgraded from lower middle income to least developed 
country at the time, and gain tariff free access to the EU.394 LDCs would therefore not lose 
preferential market access after expiry of the Lomé Convention, and did not have anything to 
gain from negotiating a new trade agreement with the EU (Berthelot, 2013).  
 
393 Although Nigeria initialled the agreement on that occasion, the country did not subsequently sign and ratify it. 





 This was not the case for WA's non-LDC countries Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Cape 
Verde. Côte d'Ivoire, the region's second largest economy and first agricultural exporter 
(accounting for 53% of West Africa's agricultural exports in 2007) (Blein et al., 2008) was the 
country that had the most to lose from the end of preferential access to the European market. 
Ghana, West Africa's second largest agricultural exporter (averaging 20% of the region's 
agricultural exports) (Chatham House, 2020) was the other country most inclined to sign the 
EPAs. The predominant weight of these two countries in global cocoa and coffee exports (see 
Figure 25 below) made the issue particularly sensitive. Indeed, cocoa, and to a lesser extent 
coffee and tea, were the key exports that historically benefitted from non-reciprocal trade with 
Europe – representing more than 40% of total ACP-Europe agricultural exports in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, and still close to 30% in the early 2000s (Ribier, 2007).  
 
Figure 25: Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana account for nearly two thirds of global cocoa exports395. 
(Source: Atlas of Economic Complexity, 2017). 
 
 Nigeria, on the other hand, is a relatively smaller agricultural exporter (averaging a tenth 
or less of the region’s agricultural exports), compared with the country’s economic and 
 
395 However, despite controlling about 60% of the global raw cocoa market, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire “both continue 
to be price takers, competing for what the [Ghanaian] finance ministry estimates is just $6bn of a $140bn chocolate 
market dominated by multinationals” (Pilling, 2018:2), a sour reminder of often short term considerations on market 
share in raw materials compares with long term ones on investment in processing and value addition, something 






demographic weight in West Africa (72% of GDP and 52% of the population in 2016). Differently 
from its two neighbours, Nigeria's balance of payments hardly depends on agricultural exports, 
given the predominant role of oil in maintaining its trade surplus, combined with its huge internal 
market for agricultural products (Chatham House, 2020; Berthelot, 2018).  
 With preferential treatment expiring by 1st January 2008, West Africa's non-LDCs would 
fall back under the EU's Generalised System of Preferences (GSP),396 applied to all developing 
countries: Côte d'Ivoire's exports would be taxed on average at 27% of their value (equivalent to 
€ 700 million) and Ghana's at 25% (€ 240 million) instead of 0% under ACP tariff free access 
(Hazard, 2007). Ivorian and Ghanaian government negotiators were thus left with little choice 
but to initial the so-called interim EPA (iEPA) bilateral agreements with the EU in December 
2007.397  
Representatives of those countries' export-sensitive sectors certainly felt the pressure, 
and urged their governments to sign the iEPAs. Ivorian and Ghanaian horticulture, fishing and 
timber alone were estimated to bear two-thirds of potential tariff rises (Hazard, 2007). With a 
sizeable representation of peasant family farmers working in agro-export chains (coffee, cocoa, 
banana, pineapple, mango), Côte d'Ivoire's National Association of Professional Agricultural 
Organisations398 (ANOPACI) became ROPPA's only national platform to plead in favour of the 
EPAs (D'Achon, Gérard, 2010; Guèye, 2007).  
ANOPACI's former president, Ngoan Aka Mathias, who led its member organisation 
OCAB399 (Central Organisation of Producers, Exporters of Pineapples and Bananas) and was 
himself a pineapple producer, declared to the press: 
Why should Côte d'Ivoire sacrifice the existence of more than 50.000 workers in [the] banana [sector] and 
their families, in the name of regional solidarity? What has this solidarity done concretely for us? What will 
it do for us tomorrow, when we won't be able to pay Europe's trade tariffs? […]. I am a peasant. I only 
believe in what I see. And what I see for now, is that the EU doesn't want to retreat, and it has even informed 
us of the tariff levels that will be applied to our products after the expiry of the Cotonou agreement […]. 
European customs services have informed banana producers of Côte d'Ivoire […] that they will have to pay 
176 euros per ton of exported banana. (Guèye, 2007: 3-4). 
 
396 Not to be confused with the more favourable GSP+ conditions (see below).  
397 Côte d'Ivoire followed through and signed its iEPA on November 2008, but ratified it in August 2016. Ghana would 
only sign its iEPA on July 2016, before ratifying it also in August 2016. Nigeria chose not to negotiate a bilateral iEPA, 
and as of 1 January 2008 its exports to the EU are taxed under the less favourable GSP terms (Bilal and Braun-
Munzinger, 2008).  
398 Association Nationale des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles de Côte d'Ivoire.  






 Similar arguments were made by non-ROPPA Ghanaian pineapple and banana exporters. 
The Ghanaian president of the African Pineapples and Bananas Association (APIBANA) which 
represents Ivorian, Ghanaian and Cameroonian producers, pressed for his country's urgent 
signature of the EU trade agreements (Quartey, 2012). Yet these positions were a small minority 
among WA civil society represented organisations. Most other farmer organisations, small or 
large, were against the EPAs, as were most WA industrial associations. This was even true within 
Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, given most of their other agricultural and industrial produce were 
primarily destined to internal markets.  
Hence ROPPA's Ghanaian national platform FONG, composed mainly of smaller-scale 
family farmers and devoid of major agricultural exporters like its Ivorian counterpart, were not 
surprisingly against the EPAs (McSween, 2015). Even ANOPACI member organisations such as the 
Union of Poultry Farmers of Côte d'Ivoire (UACI)400 (Amoakon, 2007) or Ghana's non-FONG 
larger-scale National Association of Poultry Farmers (GNAPF) (McSween, 2015) denounced the 
impossibility of competing with highly subsidised European poultry, which would arrive on WA 
markets tariff free if EPAs were ratified.  
As other actors opposed to the EPAs, Ghana's poultry farmers' organisation instead 
suggested the inclusion of their country into the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus 
(GSP+) which grants lower middle income countries' exports to the EU tariff free access, provided 
those countries implement 27 international conventions (on human rights, labour rights, 
environmental protection, and governance). Extending GSP+ to West Africa's three lower middle-
income countries (besides Cape Verde, which is already part of the scheme) would enable these 
to maintain tariff free access to the European market for the bulk of their sensitive goods, without 
having to indiscriminately open their own markets to highly subsidised European products 
(Berthelot, 2018).  
In the first phase of EPA negotiations (2005-2007), ROPPA and other civil society actors 
managed to: i) convince West African negotiators to refuse signing an agreement by the end of 
2007, and ii) have ECOWAS propose a market access offer with varying timeframes for trade 
 





liberalisation according to differentiated degrees of sensitivity. This enabled to buy time for 
further ECOWAS-EU negotiations without changes in WA countries' EU market access, which was 
hailed as a significant victory at the time (Blein et al., 2012).  
Yet after Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana's initialling of separate interim EPAs in 2007, ROPPA and 
its allies made new counter-proposals to the ECOWAS Commission and member states, aimed at 
accommodating the tropical exporting countries' concerns. In a memorandum published after an 
ECOWAS ministerial meeting (held on 3-7 May 2010 in Bamako), ROPPA and other West African 
civil society networks pressed "political authorities of the region to bring all the necessary 
support to Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana to prevent them from having to implement their individual 
EPAs, or find economic instruments that may temporarily compensate for the losses which they 
would face on the European market" (POSCAO-AC, 2010:24).  
Despite all of the above efforts, largely short term economic and political concerns led 
most ECOWAS countries to sign the EPAs in 2014. ROPPA's post-EPA signature statement 
highlighted its members' perplexity as to why ECOWAS had not given more careful consideration 
to the proposed mechanisms to compensate for the two tropical agricultural exporters' projected 
revenue losses (ROPPA, 2014). As reported by a CNCR technical advisor:  
You know, with the EPA, the Europeans immediately attacked – I'm not sure if I should say the 'weakest 
links' – but they started bullying Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. They said: "if you don't sign, the agreements we 
have on coffee, cocoa, you will lose them". So the unity that you had at ECOWAS level begins to crumble, 
because these countries have no other choice. And we'd made the calculations amongst West African civil 
society. We had said "but, listen, these states should be solidary and be ready to pay for what Côte d'Ivoire 
and Ghana will lose when they refuse to sign". But do the other states have that consciousness? That's the 
difficulty in creating alliances.401  
 
The EU's strategy of exacerbating divergences between EU-dependent agricultural export 
interests of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana with the rest of the region ended up prevailing: those two 
countries ratified their iEPAs by August 2016, after again being threatened with losing 
preferential access to the EU market by October 1st 2016 if they did not sign. However, with 
Nigeria making it clear that it would not sign the EPA agreements, the ECOWAS EPA was defeated. 
But Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana interim EPAs consequently became permanent, and now threaten 
the ECOWAS regional integration project, given that most EU goods will eventually arrive in those 
 





two countries tariff free, and other ECOWAS countries will have to raise tariffs towards Côte 
d'Ivoire and Ghana to avoid potential re-exporting on a massive scale between those two 
countries and the rest of the region (Berthelot, 2018).  
 
 7.2.3.3 ROPPA's key role in West Africa's wide anti-EPA regional class alliance 
 
 The anti-EPA coalition was a broad network of organisations representing a wide range of 
economic interests – a significant effort in creating an articulated regional class alliance, which 
combined mobilisation in claimed spaces and participation in invited spaces. Besides ROPPA and 
its urban civil society intellectual middle-class allies from WA and Europe (NGOs, researchers, 
technical advisors), industrial sectors across the region played a crucial role. Their combined 
efforts first influenced the region's countries to initially refuse signing the EPAs in 2007, secondly 
delayed the negotiation process until most countries signed in 2014, and thirdly formed a 
sufficiently strong rampart to convince Nigeria to effectively bury the ECOWAS regional EPA.   
 ROPPA's alliance was strongest with Nigerian industrial sectors, which benefitted from 
the African continent's largest economy and population, a sizeable internal market, and growing 
resources directed towards industrialisation from the Nigerian state's oil exporting rent. Nigeria 
would stand most to lose, not only from unequal competition against its nascent industrial sector, 
but also in import duty revenues – which in turn constitute precious fiscal resources for its public 
investment and industrialisation strategy. The National Association of Nigerian Traders' (NANTs) 
were particularly vocal in their opposition to the EPAs  (D'Achon, Gérard, 2010).   
ROPPA's President of Honour Mamadou Cissokho summarised ROPPA's strategy to 
influence the EPA process (and in particular CNCR in Senegal) as follows:  
In 2000, we had the Cotonou Agreements, which replaced the Lomé Agreements. […] I was a member of 
the EU-ACP Economic and Social Committee, from 2000 to 2005. So they said, we will negotiate, but the 
deadline is 2007. They started in 2005, in the end. [In Senegal] the battle of CNCR took us to 2016 [when 
the country signed]. We mobilised. But chiefly, we did national workshops where we reached 50 to 100 of 
our members, who understood [the issues at stake and strategies to adopt], and the press, and also many 
people – retired, civil servants, etc.402 
 
 





 Senegal's 'No to EPAs' coalition, which besides CNCR, included entrepreneurs, union 
leaders, and urban civil society, grew from 2005 onwards, when the EU-EPA negotiations really 
got under way. One of their key arguments was the fact that most of the country's exports go to 
other WA countries rather than to outside regions, and that favouring EU imports is detrimental 
to intra-regional trade, contrary to EU negotiators' discourse who claim the EPAs are a boon to 
WA regional integration. Thirteen Senegalese labour unions released a declaration entitled 'No 
to the sinking of African integration', as civil society organisations in different WA countries 




Figure 26: Anti-EPA Demonstration by ROPPA’s Burkinan national platform CPF. 403 
(Source: ROPPA, 2014).  
  
The continent-wide African Industrial Association (AIA) formally manifested its firm 
rejection of any trade deal with Europe based on reciprocal trade conditions, perceived as the 
death knell for any serious attempt at African industrialisation. The AIA launched an anti-EPA 
petition on 24 April 2007, signed by nearly 80 francophone African CEOs from the continent's 
largest industrial and agro-industrial firms:   
 





The major challenge for AIA today […] is the industrialisation of the continent which is an essential factor in 
creating wealth and jobs [...]. No viable and strong economy has developed without protection. This is the 
case for the US, Europe, Japan and China, among others. It cannot be different for Africa today. We urge 
negotiators to leave their meeting rooms and go to the field to fully appreciate the difficulties faced by 
African industrialists (AIA, 2007, cited by Blein et al., 2012:41). 
 
West African AIA members signing the petition include significant agro-industrial sectors, 
such as Senegal's tomato concentrate producer SOCAS (Senegal Canned Food Company404), 
Mali's state-owned cotton enterprise CMDT (Malian Company for Textile Development405), or 
processing and packing Ivorian group IPS (Industrial Promotion Services), which together employ 
a significant parcel of the region's formal urban workers (Maury, 2007). The AIA's petition added 
to ROPPA and urban civil society calls to defeat signature of the EPA at its originally planned 2007 
deadline at the Africa/EU Lisbon summit held on 6 December of that year (D'Achon, Gérard, 2010, 
Dembélé, 2016).  
However, the industrial sector in Africa at the time represented only about 5% of Africa's 
500 largest African enterprises – dominated by oil, mining and distribution sectors (Maury, 2007). 
Despite its small weight in the country's economy, the Nigerian industrial sector, with its access 
to a large internal market and increased support via a state-led industrialisation strategy, proved 
crucial in preventing EPAs from being ratified by the West African regional power, and thus by 
ECOWAS as a whole. 
As stated by ROPPA's Malian leader Ibrahima Coulibaly, "all of the independent studies 
and analyses showed that EPA agreements […] would have negative impacts on customs revenue, 
agriculture and industry in the region [emphases added]" (Coulibaly, 2007, cited by Blein et al., 
2012:41). Coulibaly's declaration summarised the three main constituencies that mobilised 
against EPAs, i.e. those who stood most to lose from the loss of national fiscal resources and 
internal regional market access: i) the Nigerian state and largest ECOWAS importer, ii) industrial 





404 Société de Conserves Alimentaires au Sénégal. 








COPROFAM and ROPPA's strategies to influence trade policy in the regional invited spaces 
to which they had access led to different outcomes. COPROFAM's push to defend family farming 
from extra-regional trade agreements contributed to creating REAF, a combination of permanent 
regional and national invited spaces for FF policy deliberation in South America. While 
COPROFAM's attempts to influence extra and intra-regional trade policies failed to materialise, 
ROPPA's campaigns, alliances with urban sectors of society across its region, and commissioning 
of studies to qualify participation in regional trade policy debates enabled it to significantly 
influence regional trade negotiations through active participation in different ECOWAS spaces. 
COPROFAM and ROPPA both faced difficulties in reflecting the diversity of peasant family 
farmers' trade policy priorities and at times conflicting interests between (and even within) their 
national member organisations. South American Pampa grain and meat (e.g. Argentina) and 
West African tropical coastal coffee, cocoa, and fruit (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire) middle-farmer export-
driven interests, could not be easily reconciled with the national/intra-regional market 
prioritisation of smaller-scale peasant constituencies that make up the bulk of COPROFAM and 
ROPPA's membership. The recent renegotiation of export tax measures between Argentina's 
incoming government administration and FAA as of early 2020, and the gradual entry into force 
of interim EPA agreements in Côte d'Ivoire through tariff exemptions for imports from the EU as 
of 2019 – both show the continuing relevance of these pressing challenges. But the permanence 
of FAA and ANOPACI as active members of their respective regional networks serve to 
demonstrate how the latter can function as a force for unity even in the face of such critically 
divisive issues. 
 Different types of alliances were struck in order to influence trade policies in their 
respective regions. ROPPA's alliance with fledgling industrial sectors of West Africa, particularly 
Nigeria's, and a growing urban consumer population has enabled to push the West African policy 
agenda towards food import substitution and intra-regional market integration, despite the huge 
challenges ahead. South American progressive governments' dependency on landed elites and 





the 2000-2014 commodity boom restricted COPROFAM's push for special and differential 
treatment of family farmers in international trade. Nevertheless, policies aiming to increase local 
and national market access, such as public purchase programmes for food security, were diffused 
across the region through REAF's regional/national interfaces. 
ROPPA's successful pressing for approval of the ECOWAS 35% tariff band, the ECOWAS 
Regional Rice Offensive, as well as West African civil society's campaign against EPA agreements 
all contributed towards creating a new trade vision in West Africa, whose implementation is slow 
and uneven, but shows signs of permanence in the medium to long term. COPROFAM's 
recognition of family farmers as an active constituency of MERCOSUR’s agricultural trade policy 
benefited from a strong initial push, but its long-term vision was interrupted by the end of 
progressive governments and commodity boom cycle in the mid 2010s. Still, the creation of 
public purchase policies represented significant gains for family farming and food and nutrition 










Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
 
This thesis has looked at how regional agrarian organisations' policy demands on land, 
labour, and trade have been articulated by COPROFAM and ROPPA members at three scales of 
policy dialogue in South America and West Africa: regional, national, and local. The relative 
strengths and weaknesses of different class and territorial alliances weaved around each policy 
process have been examined in light of varying degrees of success in shifting policy narratives, 
achieving approval of key legal norms, and influencing public budgetary allocations for the 
strengthening of peasant family farming. 
 
8.1 Three policy processes across two regions: summarizing the comparison 
 
Regarding land, these have sprung as policy counter-proposals to externally-led policy 
narratives aiming to further privatize and buy up land for financial speculation or delocalised food 
production. Though neither COPROFAM nor ROPPA managed to have regional norms approved 
on land policy, discussions towards these enabled policy diffusion processes to take place 
amongst each region's countries. Laws that aim to prevent or reverse land concentration by 
regulating land transfers were approved in some countries, with mixed and uncertain results. Yet 
it is chiefly when pushed by agrarian organisations' actions at local level (land occupations in 
South America, village consultations in West Africa) that furthest land policy gains have been 
made.  
Regarding labour, agrarian organisations have represented their constituencies at 
regional policy dialogues as peasant (and indigenous) family farmers, a specific social category 
defying urban-centric employer/employee representation in both South America and West 
Africa. COPROFAM and ROPPA's involvement in policy dialogues in key pioneer countries in the 
1990s have been followed in the 2000s by regionally diffused policy initiatives that established 
precise criteria to legally define family farms as family or community units of self-managed rural 
labourers working the land, through a MERCOSUR official norm in South America, and through 
ROPPA's network of national platforms in West Africa. Significant implementation advances in 





spectrum of family farmers. In West Africa, family farming policies continue to channel only minor 
portions of national budgets, despite persisting rural demographic majorities. 
Regarding trade, an area in which regional integration blocs usually have their strongest 
policy attributions, MERCOSUR and ECOWAS both underwent negotiation processes with 
external trade partners under generally unfavourable conditions for peasant family farmers. 
Although COPROFAM was not able to prevent approval of a MERCOSUR-EU trade agreement, 
ROPPA's broad regional alliance has until now prevented a full signature of ECOWAS's EPA with 
the EU. Efforts at promoting family farmers' intra-regional trade in South America have faltered, 
in no small part due to wide differences in national family farmer registries' implementation rates 
between neighbouring countries. They were relatively more successful in West Africa, where  an 
important milestone was reached in approving a higher fixed tariff line in ECOWAS for most 
family farming produce. In both regions, more immediate gains were enabled by national policy 
levers to reserve internal markets for peasant family farmers, primarily through regionally 
diffused public purchase programmes in South America, and various nationally-negotiated food 
import substitution mechanisms in West Africa.  
Hence, in the three policy processes, RAO participation enabled to create or strengthen 
public policies to support FF insofar as it translated regional claims into cross-national policy 
diffusion processes, and locally-embedded initiatives. The use of common policy discursive 
frames across three regional scales served to give cohesion throughout diverse policy dialogue 
spaces. Wherever regional class territorial alliances were either too narrow or fractious, policy 
processes faltered. Where they were sufficiently wide and cohesive, they generated virtuous 
intra-regional policy diffusion dynamics. 
The tracing of COPROFAM and ROPPA's alternative policy strategies on land, labour, and 
trade, has revealed a propositional dimension of AOs capable of negotiating concrete gains for 
their constituencies, pointing towards combined strategies of mobilisation and resistance on the 
one hand, and policy proposition and negotiation on the other. Despite their limitations, the 
approval of regional norms recognizing family farming in South America and enabling agricultural 
trade protection in West Africa, in addition to unfinished regional land policy initiatives, point 







8.2 Relevance of regional agrarian organisation policy dialogues  
 
The relevance for agrarian organisations to organize at the regional level has been 
confirmed by the policy process comparative study on several grounds. Firstly, because 
increasingly, decisions relating to agriculture and trade issues are decided at the regional (or bi-
regional negotiations) level. Extra-regional and intra-regional negotiations held at MERCOSUR or 
ECOWAS level demonstrate this in the few concrete gains, however limited, that local and 
national organisations affilated to COPROFAM and ROPPA achieved on the international trade 
policy front.  
Second, the regional scale still has much less decisional power and policy impact than the 
national scale.  Precisely for that reason, however, the regional scale allows for more space for 
agrarian organisations to deliberate than in many of their corresponding national contexts. 
Regional policy norms, decisions and programmes have thus flowed back to the national level, 
albeit with more intensity in South America than West Africa, and with variable degrees of 
enforcement capacity.  
Third, even when regional initiatives falter, or approved norms fail to compel national 
governments to apply them, regional dialogue spaces have contributed to strenghten policy 
networks between neighbouring countries. This has created conditions for policy diffusion to 
occur across countries, as the regional land policy process particularly illustrates in both regions. 
Multiple examples of the formation of these regional policy diffusion networks are also shown 
by the labour and trade policy processes, whether these networks are formed in mostly state-
sponsored regional dialogues (as in South America) or predominantly externally-funded ones (as 
in West Africa).   
Fourth, not only is the regional scale better shielded from national class conflict and 
alliance dynamics, but also from political alternations of power between progressive or 
conservative governments, particularly because alternations usually occur in some but not all of 





given the continuity of REAF despite neoliberal restoration attempts in all of MERCOSUR's 
countries at different moments. Similarly, in West Africa, despite not being represented with 
agrarian organisations within ROPPA, the Nigerian government's key role in ECOWAS has enabled 
to put brakes on further trade liberalisation in the region. 
Fifth, where discussions have not made significant headway on policy issues themselves 
(such as trade in South America or labour in West Africa) they have contributed to opening 
permanent dialogue spaces on issues that require longer term regional policy processes. Hence, 
the value that agrarian organisations' place on maintaining regional policy dialogue spaces active 
is revealing of how these can create the conditions to accumulate force – if not yet influence 
policy - in the present, in order for policy gains to be made in the future.  
 
8.3. International economic class relations and political outcomes 
 
Barrington Moore's (1966) method of studying types of class alliances and corresponding 
political regimes serves as a significant milestone of comparative political-economic history from 
which many others have drawn (Luebbert, 1990, for instance), and which has also partly inspired 
this study. However, the above authors observed class relations within countries as self-
contained entities, without significantly taking into account core-periphery relations, as argued 
by Selwyn (2012). 
Indeed, when examining the political-economic alliance strategies and policy claims of 
COPROFAM and ROPPA, one must also observe the tensions introduced by these in relation to 
wider labour internationalist alliances - despite the fact that these are protracted uphill struggles 
waged on the scale of decades and threatened by strong pushbacks - in order to understand the 
underlying strengths and weaknesses, and spaces or impediments to substantive change. The 
composition of COPROFAM and ROPPA membership ranges from the local subsistence peasantry 
to the significantly consolidated middle family farmer. But it is united by a common thread of the 
'predominance of family labour' (see chapter 6) which places them into a wider category of rural 
labouring class alliances. 
As visually represented in Figure 27 below, these occur between countries of the same 





alliances), but also with progressive allies in the Global North (North-South labour internationalist 
class alliances), particularly niches of engaged academic researchers and international 
organisation staff (bilateral cooperation agencies, NGOs). However, differentiating between 
South-South and North-South is also fundamental. Indeed, many gains for the labouring classes 
in the Global North have happened at the expense of workers in the Global South, through 
'superexploitation' (Marini, 1973) of their labour (see chapter 2).  This has happened throughout 
the different international food regimes examined in this study. For instance, during the first food 
regime (1870s-1930s), industrialisation in Europe was facilitated by the cheaper outsourcing of 
grain and meat production to Argentina and Uruguay (see chapter 3), and of peanut and cotton 
production in Senegal, Mali and Burkina Faso (see chapter 4): thus, accepting moderate gains for 
Northern labour entailed increasing the rate of exploitation of labour in the Global South, so as 
to enable Northern workers to purchase the resulting bread, meat, soap, and clothing at cheaper 
prices.  
This does not of course impede North-South labour internationalist solidarity as 
manifested in joint struggles, illustrated by the common drafting of global documents like the 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests at the CFS, or the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants at the HRC (see chapter 1). However, given the 
overwhelming weight of global monopoly-finance capitalism, it means in practice that these 
efforts remain mostly normative, given that the structures of global governance essentially 
reflect the balance of political-economic power across different nations and regions of the world. 
At best, non-binding global governance instruments resulting from North-South labour 
internationalist alliances serve as fundamental blueprints (as some of the less successful policy 
demands of COPROFAM and ROPPA in their regions also do) for future constructions. But at 
worse they are cynically brandished as cosmopolitan fairy tales intended to co-opt and distract 
the naïve from the mechanisms through which political-economic power is actually exercised.  
Hence Amin's (1990) call for delinking, defined as "the submission of external relations 
[to internal requirements], the opposite of the internal adjustment of the peripheries to the 
demands of the polarising worldwide expansion of capital" (Saul, 2018:5). This is counterposed 





insertion. Delinking does not imply autarky, which is neither possible nor desirable, but does 
imply that external economic relations are oriented by the opportunities they offer to an internal 
market and labour-led strategy. It is therefore a counterpoint to external relations determined 
by much narrower and shorter term profit opportunities of Northern multinationals, through 
unconditional opening to foreign direct investment and unequal trade relations.  
In this sense, the regional scale is pivotal: on the one hand, it offers the main realistic 
opportunity for neighbouring peripheral countries to build a sufficient critical mass of interlinked 
production and consumption by pooling resources from contiguous territories, and through agro-
industrialisation strategies that may work with – instead of against - the peasantry and the 
industry and service workers. On the other hand, however, regional blocs can be turned away 
from that goal and disoriented by disarticulated class alliances to further pry open a whole region 
through further deregulation of global capitalism (e.g. via so-called 'WTO plus' North-South 
regional agreements – including the EU-MERCOSUR and EU-ACP cases examined in chapter 7).   
Different types of class alliances are in constant interaction and potential reconfiguration, 
through competing attempts to enrol ever-wider contingents to their opposing causes. The most 
pivotal actors are those located at the intersection of two 'grey zones' (see Figure 27 below). The 
first one is the 'grey zone of regionalism' (following the aforementioned duality between 
autonomous versus dependent forms of regional integration). The second is the grey zone of so-
called 'productive' classes, whose members may at best share enough common interests with 
the labouring classes to become their allies. This is either because: i) they can be considered part 
of  them, since they predominantly use their own labour force (such as the middle family farmer), 
or ii) because their employment of formal labour under potentially decent working conditions is 
combined with a routing of their surplus towards development strategies that correspond to the 











Figure 27: Typology of shifting class alliances and development paradigms in the global 
periphery.406 
 
However, just as North-South labour internationalist alliances can only go so far into 
enabling autonomous labour-led development in the periphery, similar limitations apply to 
labouring class alliances with their own national/regional industrial and productive sectors of the 
economy. Indeed, the 'regional grey zone' means that externally-determined economic agendas 
 





may become more enticing than internally-guided ones, depending on the evolutions of the 
global conjuncture, but also crucially on the national/regional policy choices that are made by 
political actors in countries/regions of the South. Hence the importance of policy agency, 
including that exercised by AOs through invited spaces.  
The comparative policy process case studies of chapters 5, 6, and 7 indeed have shown 
different instances in which: i) middle family farmer members of COPROFAM and ROPPA diverge 
from the internal-market led development policies favoured by their peasant majority base, in 
light of the formers' degrees of dependency towards external markets (and failure of 
national/regional policy to remedy this); ii) 'national bourgeoisies' turning their backs to the 
'productive sphere' of capital-labour negotiated strategies, and reaffirming their links with global 
financialized (i.e. non-productive) capital at the expense of national/regional labour (also as a 
result of failing national/regional policies and political strategies).  
Therefore, the potential progressive or reactionary shifts of pivotal agents such as middle 
family farmers and national bourgeoisies (represented by the double arrows in Figure 27) are the 
product not only of shifting external conjunctures, but also of collective national/regional policy 
agency, as this comparative case study has aimed to demonstrate. 
 
8.4 Replying to the research question: rural class alliances, regional territories, and political-
economic policy dialogue 
 
The research question posed in chapter 1 and unpacked in chapter 2 interrogated the 
conditions under which regional dialogue spaces could catalyse RAOs' agency to influence 
policies that strengthen PFFs. A fourfold analytical framework was then proposed, whereby AOs' 
policy agency was premised upon their capacity to unite broad alliances across a region’s 
territories and class fractions, particularly through the use of policy discursive frames in 
mobilisation and participation strategies. The capacity of AO leaders (and their allies in 
government, academia, and international organisations) to subjectively formulate and 
intersubjectively negotiate policy discursive frames that synthesized the diverse (and sometimes 
conflicting) territorial and class interests of RAO constituencies was submitted as a key condition 





 Insights from chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 allow us to now return to the original research 
question by revisiting its four key pillars identified in chapter 2 (regional, class, policy, spaces), 
which I summarize into three inter-related elements of RAO policy agency: i) diverse rural 
labouring class fractions, ii) from a region's different agrarian territories and countries, iii) 
potentially united by policy discursive frames voiced inside government-mediated dialogue and 
negotiation spaces. These three elements are examined individually below, each guided by a 
'sub-research question' derived from the original research question posed in chapter 2.  
 
8.4.1 Rural Labouring Classes 
 
Sub-Research Question 1:  How do regional agrarian organisations' different uses of policy 
discursive frames enable them to unite diverse rural labouring class fractions with competing 
interests?  
 
 South America provides the most convincing answer to this first sub-research question. 
This is most visible in FAA and CONTAG's agrarian formative paths examined in chapter 3, as well 
as what Argentina's contemporary regional policy processes tell us. Firstly, Perón's two 
presidential mandates in the 1940s-1950s (transition from Argentine first to second food regime) 
represented significant - albeit short-lived - efforts to capture the Pampa's agrarian rent and 
redistribute it more equitably across the wider rural labouring classes. Justicialista party 
administrations’ discursive and policy strategy aimed to unite wage workers and small and 
medium producers under a common support base. This was done by combining such initiatives 
as IAPI and the Rural Worker Statute (both in 1947), and a land rental price freeze (1948) after 
more radical efforts at redistributive agrarian reform were abandoned. Relative gains were 
crucially enabled by the myriad intersubjective dialogue spaces created by Perón (such as the 
Centros de Cooperación Agraria), in which FAA could negotiate its producer prices with the 
country's largest public bank without encroaching on rural labourers' wage rises. 
 Secondly (during Brazil's second food regime in the 1950s-1960s), peasants, wage 
workers, and small/medium producers united under the banner of 'workers in agriculture' in the 
creation of an unprecedented national-scale rural labouring class representative confederation - 





to push for comprehensive redistributive agrarian reform, and subsequent agricultural policies. 
This occurred with support from João Goulart's PTB government administration, whose Vargas-
era commitment to national rural labour class organisation led to Brazil's Rural Worker's Statute 
(1963). Yet under Brazil's military dictatorship (1964-1985), conservative modernisation of the 
latifundio on the back of agro-industrial complexes, and the outsourcing of the agrarian question 
through colonisation schemes in the Amazon and Paraguayan/Bolivian border areas pushed back 
CONTAG's formative agenda. Southern small and medium producers (who had either benefited 
from the 1970s rural credit expansion or been left out of it) were bankrupt by the 1980s debt 
crisis (as in neighbouring Pampean Argentina and Uruguay). This fuelled the rise of small and 
medium producer unionisation outside CONTAG (e.g. CUT) and inside it, eventually becoming the 
hegemonic rural labouring class policy plank, through the 1990s 'family farming' discursive frame. 
Hence, whether through the term 'peasant' in PCB's ULTAB (1950s), 'workers in agriculture' with 
CONTAG's creation (1963), or 'family farmers' with the rise of agricultural 'public policies for 
framily farming’ (credit, rural extension, insurance, access to markets) as key policy plank - all 
functioned as self-representative uniting policy discursive frames.  
 Initially led by FAA, CNFR, and CONTAG's southern federations, COPROFAM's formation 
as Southern Cone 'family farmers' drew from accumulation narratives largely inspired on Global 
North previous accumulation trajectories. Backed by productivity evidence (e.g. on family 
farming's higher productivity per hectare) it emerged as a narrative cristalizing a 'middle family 
farmer' ideal type which partly allowed for gains to be distributed amongst the wider labouring 
classes, yet generally still left most undercapitalized peasant majorities outside comprehensive 
economic support policy coverage.  
Productivity-centred legitimising narratives partly gave way to others, more centred on 
indigenous and traditional peoples’ territories (as in REAF's land policy processes from the mid-
2010s, seen in chapter 5), rejoining a broader nature, labour, and food sustainability discourse 
aiming to broaden the South American family farming narrative within its urban middle and 
working classes. The fragility of all these processes was nonetheless laid bare on many instances, 
most notably in Argentina's 2008 Crisis del Campo, in which Argentina's wider rural labouring 





substantial temperate zone middle farming minority. Indeed, the latter joined the large-scale 
agribusiness organisations in the Mesa de Enlace to ultimately force the Kirchner administration 
to back down from a contemporary attempt of sorts to reinstate Perón's 'agrarian rent capture' 
via export taxation. Still, gains were achieved in terms of indigenous land recognition, and 
transformation of former state-led policy dialogue space (el FONAF) into an autonomous peasant 
and indigenous representative space (la FONAF).  
 
8.4.2 The Regional Question: a new National Question? 
 
Sub-Research Questions 2: How do both studied regional agrarian organisations' discourse in 
policy spaces link pan-national narratives with agrarian ones?  And how are overlapping regional 
territories represented in these narratives according to their variable (agrarian-climatic, 
linguistic, state) geometries?  
 
 Another, simpler way, to pose the above second batch of sub-research questions is:  how 
are agrarian, national, and democratic questions intertwined? Indeed, it has been posed by 
borrowing from Moyo, Jha and Yeros (2013), Moyo and Yeros (2011) and Amin (2011b), and their 
global historical materialist political economy which places the Global South at its centre.  
 This thesis has first adopted a long view to examine the formation of regional agrarian 
organisations (chapters 3 and 4), to later explore (in chapters 5, 6, and 7) the policy discourses 
on land, labour and trade voiced inside newly built regional participatory dialogue spaces. So long 
as these regional spaces were mediated by communicatively rational policy analysis and 
horizontal solidarity networks expected of genuine public spheres, progress was made (at least 
on paper, if not in practice) in generating convincing alternative policy narratives at the regional 
level in South America and West Africa.  
 Yet overall, the West African case provides the most convincing answer to this second 
sub-question. Several elements demonstrate ROPPA's capacity to reformulate land, labour, and 
trade policies to address the contemporary national question in the Global South. Firstly, this is 
visible in ROPPA's formation in West Africa, as seen in chapter 4. Indeed, linguistic unity in 
diversity was used as cultural cohesion factor in ROPPA's formation as 'peasants and agricultural 





ROPPA's 13-member country RAO successfully united formerly rival and disconnected colonial 
zones, even if it was and still remains discursively spearheaded by its francophone members.  
 Secondly, relatively less land alienation (than elsewhere on the continent, let alone South 
America) inherited from West Africa's long-rooted and partly enduring pre-colonial distributed 
agrarian structure relates in contemporary terms to lesser degrees of cultural alienation in its 
rural areas, and therefore greater 'national (or regional)  consciousness' (Fanon, 2002).407 
Admittedly, this does not erase the persistence of subjection patterns, whether inherited from 
colonial 'bureaucratic-populist' (Chauveau, 1994) forms of dependent political-economic 
international insertion, or in the social reproduction of exploitation patterns derived from 
customary patriarchal ‘semi-feudal’ social relations.   
 Indeed, relatively untouched économie de traite surplus absorption patterns have been 
reproduced to this day through France’s neocolonial and economically-paternalist relationships 
with its former West African colonies, most glaringly via UEMOA countries' monetary tutelage of 
the CFA franc by the Banque de France (Nubukpo et al., 2006). Yet the shift in West Africa's 
regional agrarian policy processes from francophone regional zone (UEMOA) to pan-West African 
regional integration process suggest an ongoing slow, perhaps decades-long, transition from 
France to Nigeria as main regional political-economic hegemon. This has been partly facilitated 
by a wider margin for political-economic manoeuvre brought into the international system 
mainly with the rise of China – and, more generally, via diversification of African trade with a 
larger pool of partners (mostly located in Asia) in the last few decades.  
 The demographics of the largest food consumer market, with most of the world's 
population (East, South, and Southeast Asia) will inevitably affect future food regimes. The fact 
that one of the world's largest international commodity trade flows in volume and value is soya 
export from MERCOSUR countries to China (Chatham House, 2020), means that current 
evolutions in international food systems will necessarily influence and also be influenced by 









8.4.3 Global Food Regimes and Regional Agrarian Policy Influence 
 
Sub-Research Question 3: How does the 'global policy public sphere' reflect the balance of 
regional class and core-periphery forces under the present (post-1970s) international food 
regime?  
 
 Findings from the comparison of both regions are illustrative of the continuing and 
overwhelming power of global monopoly-finance capital (Sweezy, 1994) to impose neoliberal 
policy hegemony on a world-scale through the contemporary 'corporate' (McMichael, 2012) food 
regime. Yet in both South America and West Africa, post-1990s democratic regimes in the Global 
South have opened spaces for meaningful regional participatory policy deliberation, which at the 
very least discursively challenges that hegemony.   
 Under the present Global North-led food regime the labouring majorities in countries 
housing 85% of the world's population undoubtedly are still by and large submitted to core-
periphery super-explotation by a tiny minority within countries housing the remaining 15% (and 
their dependent allies of circumstance in the Global South). Nevertheless, trends regarding the 
rise of RAOs' representative discourse and intersubjective policy negotiation capacities in two 
different regions of the Global South appear to point towards a long-term relative decline of 
Global North-centred policy narratives on land, labour and trade - even if this is seldom matched 
by equivalent budgetary allocations from Global South treasuries.  
 These have had to contend with alternative South American and West African rural 
labouring class discourses, based on COPROFAM and ROPPA’s representation of policy interests 
at the three levels of transborder agrarian territories, neighbouring nations, and regional blocs. 
Hence, RAOs' capacities to negotiate policy outcomes have contributed to at least partially 
rebalance SA and WA agrarian policy discourse. Yet, large-scale agribusiness-led narratives 
largely continue to determine the bulk of agricultural policy budgets. Nevertheless, if PFF 
resilience and AOs' cumulative buildup of political agency witnessed in their century-long 
formation processes (seen in chapters 3 and 4) are reliable indicators, and if trends towards 
greater regional policy influence (seen in chapters 5, 6, and 7) persist in the next few decades, 





and ROPPA in recent decades – may indeed enable to more democratically channel agrarian rents 
towards sustained investment in PFF within their respective regions, and perhaps elsewhere. 
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